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PREFACE.
The cases here collected and annotated, have been selected by
the undersigned, primarily for the use of students in his classes.
To make a wise selection of cases from the large number that are
to be found upon a particular subject is a most difficult task.
The
question, which is the most important case upon a given subject,
is one upon which opinions will necessarily differ.
It has been
attempted here to select, as far as possible, the very earliest cases
upon the particular subject, so that the student would thereby be
able to get at the reason of the rule without reference to any statuAttention is called to the latest cases, however,
tory provisions.
in the foot notes.
Several years of experienoe), as an instructor has taught the
undersigned that the best method oi^iSipressing a principle upon
the mind of the student is to show him a practical application of
it.
To remember abstract propositions, without knowing their
application, is indeed difficult for the average student.
But when
the primary principle is once associated, in his mind, with particular facts, illustrating its application, it is more easily retained
and more rapidly applied to analogous cases.
It is deemed advisable that the student in the law should be
required, during his course, to master, in connection with each
general branch of the law, a few well-selected cases which are
illustrative of the philosophy of that subject.
To require each
student to do this in the larger law schools has been found to be
impracticable, owing to the lack of a sufficient number of copies
of individual cases.
The only solution of this difficulty seems to
be to place in the hands of each student a volume containing the
In the table of cases will be found many leading
desired cases.
E. F. J.
cases printed in black type.
University of Michigan,
Department of Law,
Ann Arbor, Oct. ist, i8g8.
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I.

History, Nature and Purposes of Negotiable Contracts.

SECTION

1.

BIOGRAPHY AND ORIGINAL OF BILLS AND NOTESGOODWIN

V.

ROBARTS.i

In the Exchequer Chamber,
[Reported in

7,

1875.

Law Reports 10 Court of Ex. yd, Jan. 28, 18 j§;
of Ex. Chamber, 337, July 7, i8y$,

also Law Reports 10 Court
also in the House of Lords

June I, i8'j6.'\

July

i

App.

Cas.

476,

May 12, 13, 18, rg;

Chief Justice, said: "Bills of exchange are
known to be of comparative modern origin, having been first
brought into use, so far as it is at present known, by the Florentines in the twelfth, and by the Venetians about the thirteenth
The use of them gradually found its way into
century^
CoCKBURN,

'This case is cited in Wood's Byles on Bills and Notes, 133,
173, 182, 272; Benjamin's Chalmers, Bills, Notes, and Checks, 14,
66, 67, 122; Ames on Bills and Notes, 783; Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, 473; Norton on Bills and Notes, 2, 14, 16; John-

son's Cases on Bills and Notes, 3.
'^
Chancellor Kent, in his learned commentaries, in speaking of
the history of bills of exchange says: "In 1394, the City of Barcelona, by ordinance, regulated the acceptance of bills of exchange;
and the use of them is said to have been introduced into Western
Europe by the Lombard merchants, in the thirteenth century. Bills
of exchange are mentioned in a passage of the Jurist Baldus of the
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We
France, and, still later, and but slowly, into England.
'
find it stated in a law tract by Mr. Macleod, entitled Specimen
of a Digest of the Law of Bills of Exchange,' printed, we believe, as a report to the government, but which, from its
research and ability, deserves to be produced in a form calculated to insure a wider circulation, that Richard Malynes, a
" Les
London merchant, who published a work called the
Mercatoria," in 1622, and who gives a full account of these
bills as used by the merchants of Amsterdam, Hamburg, and
other places, expressly states that such bills were not used in
There is reason to think, however, that this is a
England.
Mr. Macleod shows that promissory notes, payable
mistake.
to bearer, or to a man and his assigns, were known in the time
Indeed, as early as the statute of 3 Rich. II.,
of Edward IV.
(Hallam's introduction to the Literature of Europe,
M. Boucher received from M, Legon Deflaix, a
India,
a memoir, showing that bills of exchange were
native of
But the ordinance
known in India from the most high antiquity.
date of 1328.
Vol. I, p. 68.)

of Barcelona is, perhaps, the earliest authentic document in the
middle ages, of the establishment and general currency of bills of
exchange.
(Consultat de la Mer, par Boucher, tom. i, pp. 614,
620.) The first bank of exchange and deposit in Europe was
established at Barcelona in 1401, and it was made to accommodate
foreigners as well as citizens. I. Prescott's Ferdinand and Isabella,
Int. p. 112, M. Merlin says, that the edict of Louis XI. of 1462,
is the earliest French edict on the subject; and he attributes the
invention of bills of exchange to the Jews, when they retired from
The Italians, and merchants of Amsterdam,
France to Lombardy.
first established the use of them in France.
(Repertoire de jurisLettre
et
billet
de
tit.
In England,
sec.
Change,
prudence,
2.)
in
II.,
the
statute
made,
was
of
Rich.
ch.
2, to the
reference
5
bills.
This
in
was
the year 1381."
drawing of foreign
(See Hallam's Middle Ages, Vol. 4, Ft. 2, ch. 9, p. 255, and note, Am.
See also Cobbet on Pawns, pp. 3, 12.)
edit., 1S21.
See also
Hallam, Introduct. to Literature of Europe, Xo\. i, ch. i, § 55,
note (a), p. 40 of Paris edition, where he states on the authority
of Beekman, that the earliest recorded bills of exchange are in a
Baldus
passage of the Jurist Baldus, and bear the date of 1328.
a Dissertation of Mr. Bergson, in the Revue Etrangere
in
cited
(as
et Franc, by Foelix, 1843, pp. 203, 204, 206,) gives the forms of
bills of exchange drawn in A. D. 1381 and 1385. (Baldus, Consil.
edit. Brixcensis, Pars, i, Consil. 53; Id. Pars. 3, Consil. 298.
See also the forms in Scaccia de Cambio, § i, Quest. 5, pp. no to
127; Id., pp. 508 to 514; post, § 26, n. 3.)
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bills of exchange are referred to as a means of conveying money out of the realm, though not as a process in use
But the fact that a London meramong English merchants.
chant, writing expressly on the law merchant, was unaware of
the use of the bills of exchange in this country, shows that
that use at the time he wrote must have been limited. According to Professor Story, who herein is, no doubt, perfectly right,
"the introduction and use of bills of exchange," as indeed it
was everywhere else, "seems to have been founded on the
mere practice of merchants, and gradually to have acquired
the force of a custom."
With the development of English
commerce the use of these most convenient instruments of
commercial traffic would, of course, increase; yet, according
to Mr. Chitty, the earliest case on the subject to be found in
the English books is that of Martin v. Boure, (1603)' in the
first James I.
Up to this time the practice of making these
bills negotiable by indorsement had been unknown, and the
ch.

3,

earlier bills are found to be made payable to a man and his assigns, though in some instances to bearer.
Negotiability — When First Allowed. — But about this
period — that is to say, at the close of the sixteenth or the commencement of the seventeenth century — the practice of
making bills payable to order, and transferring them by indorseHartmann, in a very learned work on bills
ment, took its rise.
of e.Kchange, recently published in Germany, states that the
first known mention of the indorsement of these instruments
Slavery, cited
-occurs in the Neapolitan Pragmatica of 1607.
by Mons. Nouguier, in his work,
had assigned to it a later date,

" De Lettres

des Change,"
From its
1620.

namely,
obvious convenience this practice speedily came into general
use, and, as part of the general custom of merchants, received
the sanction of our courts. At first the use of bills of exchange
seemed to have been confined to foreign bills between English
It was afterwards extended to domesand foreign merchants.
tic bills between traders, and finally to bills of all persons,
whether traders or not.^
^Cro.
-'

Jac,

6

(1603).

Chitty Bills (8th ed.)

13.
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I,

Notes— When First Used.-In the mean-

use, differing herem
time promissory notes had also come into
drawn upon a third
from bills of exchange: That they were not
to pay by the maker,
party, but contained a simple promise
They
of the maker alone.
resting, therefore upon the security
when the practice of
were at first made payable to bearer, but
making bills of exchange payable to order, and making them
established, the
transferable by indorsement, had once become
order, and of
practice of making promissory notes payable to
transferring them by indorsement, as had been done with bills
of exchange, speedily prevailed. And for some time the courts

upon the usage with reference to promissory
notes, as well as with reference to bills of exchange.
In 1680, in the case of Shelden v. Hentley,' an action
was brought on a note under seal by which the defendant
promised to pay to bearer £100, and it was objected that the
But
note was void because not payable to a specific person.
it was said by the court: "Traditio facit chartam loqui, and
by the delivery he (the maker) expounds the person before
meant; as when a merchant promises to pay to the bearer of
Jones,
the note, any one that brings the note shall be paid."
that
made
that
merchants
of
J., said that "it was the custom

of law

acted

good."
the plaintiff declared upon the
custom of merchants in London on a note for money payable
C. J., said that
on demand, and recovered; and Treby,

In Bromwich

v.

Loyd,^

of cxcliangc were originally

dzHs

foreigners and merAfterwards, when such

betzveen

chants trading with the English.
bills came to be more frequent, then they were allowed between
merchants trading in England, and afterwards between any
traders whatsoever, and tiow between any persons, whether
trading or not ; and therefore the plaintiff need not allege
any custom, for now those bills were of that general use that
upon an indebitatus assumpsit they m.ay be given in evidence
To which Powell, J., added: " On indebitaupon the trial."
tus assumpsit for money received to the use of the plaintiff
'
2

2

Show., 160.

2

Lutw., 1582.

I.J
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bill may be left to the jury to determine whether it was
given for value received."
In Williams v. Williams,' where
the

the plaintiff

brought his action as indorsee against the payee
and indorser of a promissory note, declaring on the custom of
merchants, it was objected on error that, the note having been
made in London, the custom, if any, should have been laid
as the custom of London.
It was answered ''that this custom of merchants was part of the common law, and the court
would take notice of it ex -officio; and therefore it was needless to set

forth

the custom specially

was sufficient to say that such

a

in the declaration, but it

person

•

secundum

usum

et

consuetudinem mercatorum,' drew the bill." And the plaintiff
had judgment.
Holt's Objection to the Negotiability of Promissory
Notes — Thus far the practice of merchants, traders and others of treating promissory notes, whether payable to bearer or
order, on the same footing as bills of exchange, had received
the sanction of the courts, but. Holt having become chief justice, a somewhat unseemly conflict arose between him and the
merchants as to the negotiability of promissory notes, whether
payable to order or to bearer; thechief justice taking what must
now be admitted to have been a narrow-minded view of the
matter, setting his face strongly against the negotiability of
these instruments,^ contrary, as we are told by authority, to
the opinion of Westminster Hall, and in a series of successive cases persisting in holding them not negotiable by indorsement or delivery.
'

Carth.,

269.

a

it

'

it,

''Lord Holt, C. J., refused to allow the privilege of negotiability to promissory notes. He said in the case of Buller v. Crips
" I rememberwhen actions upon inland bills of
(6 Mod. Rep. 29),
exchange did first begin; and they were laid a particular custom
between
London and Bristol and it was an action against the
The defendant's counsel would put them to prove the
acceptor.
laughed and said they
custom, at which Hale, C. J., who tried
was said
North's time
in
Lord
And
had
of
it'
my
case
hopeful
law
of Engcommon
of
the
was
that the custom in that case
part

is

land, and these actions since became frequent, as the trade of the
nation did increase, and all the difference between foreign bills
and inland bills
that foreign hills must be protested before a notary
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and 4 Anne, c. g— Its Purpose.—
The inconvenience to trade arising therefrom led to the passing of the statute of 3 and 4 Anne, c. 9,' whereby promissory notes were made capable of being assigned by indorsement,
or made payable to bearer, and such assignment was thus renIt is obvious from
dered valid beyond dispute or difficulty.
the preamble of the statute, which merely recites that "it had

The Statute of

3

public before the drawer can be charged, but inland bills need
Lord Holt said of pro?nissory notes that they
not be protested."
' '
new sort of specialty, unknown to the common law and inwere a
He continued, " to allow such contract
vented in Lombard street.''
to carry any lien with it were to turn a piece of paper, which is, in
law, but evidence of a parole contract, into a specialty."
5 Mod.
2
Buller
v.
I
Salk.
6
442;
Salk.
Mod.
24;
Crips,
Rep. 13;

Rep. 30.

'Its most important provisions were as follows: "Whereas, it
hath been held that notes in writing, signed by the party who makes
the same, whereby such party promises to pay unto any other person, or his order, any sum therein mentioned, are not assignable
or indorsable over, within the custom of merchants, to any other
person; and that the person to whom the sum of money mentioned
in such note is payable cannot maintain an action by the custom of
merchants, against the person who first made and signed the same;
and that any person to whom such note shall be assigned, indorsed,
or made payable, could not, within the said custom of merchants,
maintain any action upon such note against the person who first
Therefore, to the extent to encourage
drew and signed the same:
trade and commerce, which will be much advanced if such notes
shall have the same effect as inland bills of exchange, and shall be
negotiated in like manner, be it enacted, that all notes in writing
whereby any person shall promise to pay to any other person, his
order, or unto bearer, any sum of money mentioned in the note
shall be taken and construed to be payable to anv such person to
whom the same shall be payable; and also every such note shall be
assignable or indorsable over in the same manner as inland bills of
exchange are according to the custom of merchants; and that the
person to whom such sum of money is payable may maintain an
action for the same as he might do upon an inland bill of exchange
made, or drawn, according to the custom of merchants; and that
any person to whom such note is indorsed, or assigned, or the
money therein mentioned ordered to be paid by indorsement thereon, may maintain his action for such sum of money either against
the person who signed the note, or against any of the persons that
indorsed the same, in like manner as in cases of inland bills of exchange."
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within the custom of mer-

chants," that these decisions were not acceptable to the profession or the country.
Nor can there be much doubt that by
the usage prevalent amongst merchants these notes had been
treated as securities negotiable by the customary method of
assignment, as much as bills of exchange, properly so-called.
The statute of Anne may, indeed, practically speaking, be
looked upon as a declaratory statute, confirming the decisions
prior to the time of Lord Holt.
We now arrive at an epoch when a new form of security
for money, namely, goldsmiths' or bankers' notes, came into
Holding them to be part of the currency of the
general use.
country as cash. Lord Mansfield and the court of king's bench
had no difficulty in holding in Miller v. Race,^ that the property in such a note passes, like that in cash, by delivery, and
that a party taking it bona fide, and for value, is consequently
entitled to hold it against a former owner from whom it has
been stolen.
In like manner it was held, in Collins v. Martin,'^ that
where bills indorsed in blank had been deposited with a
banker, to be received when due, and the latter had pledged
them with another banker as security for a loan, the owner
could not bring trover to recover them from the holder. Both
these decisions, of course, proceeded on the ground that the
property in the bank note payable to bearer passed by delivery, that in the bill of exchange by indorsement in blank, provided the acquisition had been made bona fide.
A similar question arose in Wookey v. 'Pole,^ in respect of
an exchequer bill, notoriously a security of modern growth.
These securities being made in favor of blank or order, contained this clause, " if the blank is not filled up, the bill will

"
Such an exchequer bill having been placed,
paid to bearer.
without the blank being filled up, in the hands of the plaintiff's
agent, had been deposited by him with the defendants, on a
It was held by three judges of
bona fide advance of money.

be

'i

Burrows,

452 (1758).

''i Bos. & P., 648 (1797)^Barn. &

Aid., i

(1818).
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the queen's bench — (Bayley, J., dissentiente) — that an exchequer bill was a negotiable security, and judgment was there-

The judgment of Holroyd, J.,
fore given for the defendants.
goes fully into the subject, pointing out the distinction between
money and instruments which are the representatives of

" The courts," he says,
money and other forms of property.
have considered these instruments either promises or orders
for the payment of money, or instruments entitling the holder
to a sum of money, as being appendages to money, and folAfter referring to the
lowing the nature of their principal."

authorities,

he

proceeds:

"These authorities show that not

only money itself may pass, and the right to it may arise, by
currency alone, but, further, that these mercantile instruments,
which entitle the bearer of them to money, may also pass, and
the right to them may arise, in like manner, by currency or
These decisions proceed upon the nature of the
delivery.
property {i. e., money) to which such instruments gives the
right, and which is in itself current, and the effect of the instruments, which either give to their holders, merely as such,
a right to receive the money, or specify them as the persons
entitled to receive it.
Checks — History of — Another very remarkable instance
of the efficacy of usage is to be found in much more recent
times.
It is notorious that, with the exception of the Bank of
England, the system of banking has recently undergone an
entire change.
Instead of the banker issuing his own notes
in return for the money of the customer deposited with him,
he gives credit in account to the depositor, and leaves it to the
latter to draw upon him, to bearer or order, by what is now
called a "check."
Upon this state of things the general
course of dealing between bankers and their customers has
attached incidents previously unknown, and these, by the decisions of the courts, have become fixed law.
Thus, while an
ordinary drawee, although in possession of funds of the drawer,
is not bound to accept, unless by his own agreement or consent, the banker, if he has funds, is bound to pay on presentation of a check on demand.
Even admission of funds is
not sufficient to bind an ordinary drawee, while it is sufficient
with a banker; and the money deposited with a banker is not
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only money lent, but the banker is bound to repay it when
■called for by the draft of the customer.
See Pott v. Clegg}
Besides this, a custom has grown up among bankers themselves of marking checks as good for the purposes of clearance
by which they become bound to one another.
Though not
to
the present purpose, bills of lading may also be
immediately
to
referred
as an instance of how general mercantile usage may
effect
to a writing which without it would not have had
give
that effect at common law.
It is from, mercantile usage, as
proved in evidence, and ratified by judicial decision in the
great case of Lickbarrow v. Mason\ that the efficacy of bills
of lading to pass the property in goods is derived.
It thus appears that all these instruments, which are said
to have derived their negotiability from the law merchant, had
their origin, and that at no very remote period, in mercantile
usage," and were adopted into the law by our courts as being
'
^

16
2

Maes. & W., 321.

Term. R., 63.

It is true that the law merchant is sometimes spoken of as a
fixed body of law, forming part of the common law, and, as it
But as a matter of legal history, this view is
were, coeval with it.
The law merchant thus spoken of with refaltogether incorrect.
erence to bills of exchange and other negotiable securities, though
forming part of the general body of the lex mercatoria, is of comIt is neither more nor less than the
paratively recent origin.
and traders in the different departments of
■usages of merchants
trade, ratified by the decisions of courts of law, which, upon such
usages being proved before them, have adopted them as settled
law, with a view to the interests of trade and the public convenience, the court proceeding herein on the well-known principle
•of law that, with reference to transactions in the different departments of trade, courts of law, in giving effects to the contracts and
dealings of the parties, will assume that the latter have dealt with
one another on the footing of any custom or usage prevailing genBy this process, what before
erally in the particular department.
was usage only, unsanctioned by legal decision, has become en_grafted upon, or incorporated into, the common law, and may thus
" When a general usage has been judicbe said to form part of it.
ially ascertained and established," says Lord Campbell, in Brandao
V. Barnett, 12 Clark & F., at p. 805, "it becomes a part of the
law merchant, which courts of justice are bound to know and
"

recognize."
The true origin and history of bills of exchange and negoti-
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if it were

able instruments like the origin and history of all our law, based
The
upon custom, is enveloped in no small degree of obscurity.
exchange of commodity for commodity or what is known as barter
and trade must have existed among all nations from the earliest
dawn of the formation of men into communities from their \ery
During these early days there could be no exchange
necessities.
of goods or trade in commodities except where two persons should
meet, each having a certain product which was desired by the other.
There was no necessity for purchases, made for the purpose of supAnd it was not until the merchants
plying the future demand.
conceived the idea of having a medium of exchange, some product
having an intrinsic value, and of great durability, that we had
properly what is known as a sale of commodities as distinguished
from barter and trade.
It is asserted that commercial contracts were known to antiChancellor Kent seems to
quity and practiced by the Romans.
known
think that they were also
among the Greeks, and cites a
passage found in one of the pleadings of Isocrates, showing that
bills of exchange were sometimes resorted to at Athens as a safe
expedient to shift funds from one country to another.
In an interesting forensic argument which Isocrates puts into
the mouth of a son of Sopseus, the Governor of Province of Pontus, in that suit against Passion, an Athenian banker, for the grossest breach of trust, it is said that the son, wishing to receive a large
sum of money from his father, applied to Stratocles, who was about
to sail from Athens to Pontus, to leave his money and take a draft
upon his father for the amount. This, said the orator, was deemed
a great advantage, to the young man, for it saved him the risk of
remittances from Pontus, over a sea covered with Lacedaemonian
pirates; it is added that Stratocles was so cautious as to take security from Passion, for the money advanced upon the bills, and to
whom he might have recourse if the Governor of Pontus should
not honor the draft, and the young Pontian should fail.
After full investigation, we have great reason to doubt whether
the use of bills of exchange or promissory notes for the purposes
to which they are now applied was known to antiquity.
The nearto
a
be
custom which prevailed at Rome, where
est approach seems
one paid money to another, to be paid by the other at another
This contract is frequently referred to in the pandeets, but
place.
it may be doubted whether these contracts were those of our
modern bills of exchange.
They were simply contracts or mandates for the exchange of money in different places.
Certainly the peculiar distinguishing quality of our modern
bills of exchange, their negotiable character, does not appear to
have been known to the ancients or to have found its way into the
general transactions of their commercial intercourse.
This at
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might be found in the fact that

least is the opinion of many of the modern authors who have discussed these features of these contracts.
Pothier, a French author, says: "There is not a single vestige of our contracts to be
found in the Roman law."
Mr. Bell, an early writer upon this
subject, says: "That as a branch of practical jurisprudence, or as
a circulating medium in trade, bills of exchange were unknown to
the

Romans."
Sir William Blackstone in remarking upon the subject of bills

of exchange, says that, "This method is said to have been
brought into general use by the Jews and Lombards, when banished
for their usury and other vices, in order the more easily to draw
their effects out of France and England into those countries in
which they had chosen to reside.
But the invention of it was a
little earlier, for the Jews were banished out of Guinne in 1287, and
out of England in 1290; and in 1236 the use of paper credit was
introduced into the Mugul Empire in China." 2 Black. Com. 467.
" Other nations," says Mr. Chitty, " had attributed the invention of these commercial contracts to the Florentines.
When being
driven out of their country, by the faction of the Gebelings, they
established themselves at Lyons and other towns in order to withdraw their effects secretly and to escape the confiscation of them
Mr. Chitty further says, "That it seems
by their enemies."
extremely doubtful at what period, or by whom bills of exchange
were first invented."
Each of these various accounts of the origin and history of
bills of exchange has been supported by some and rejected by
other authors as wholly unsatisfactory and uncertain.
Certain it is, that bills of exchange were used in many of the
commercial states bordering on the Mediterranean as early as the
14th century, although it is probable that the forms thereof were
different, and had not then settled down into one model or uniform
But while similar instruinstrument, like that in use in our days.
ments to our bills of exchange were in quite common use in the
Weber in his work on
14th century, they were used much earlier.
lo, states positively
in
18
customs,
of
these
published
the history
in
1171; and a law of
in
use
at
Venice
that such instruments were
While we find
Venice in 1272 clearly recognizes these documents.
a statute of Marseilles, that once great commercial metropolis of
dated 1253, which presents evident traces of
the Mediterranean,
of this description is attested by a docutransaction
them, and a
There has been found several copies of these
ment of 1256.
documents, dated early in the isth century, which correspond in
One is
form almost exactly with the forms in common use to-day.
in
Bruges
merchant
drawn
bya
28th,
1405,
dated
April
extant,
still
upon a mercantile company in Barcelona.
The introduction and the use of bills of exchange in England
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according to the old form of declaring on bills of exchange,
the declaration always was founded on the customs of merchants.
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In the King's Bench, January
S^Reported by

I. Burrows,

31,

452.

1758.
]

Form of Action. — It was an action of trover against the
defendant, upon a bank-note, for the payment of twenty-one
pounds ten shillings to one William Finney or bearer on demand.
The cause came on to be tried before Lord Mansfield, at
seems to have been founded upon a mere practice of merchants
and gradually to have acquired the force, at first of a custom, and

Mr. Chitty says,
subsequently of a binding code of rules or laws.
" That the earliest case on the subject to be found in the English
reports is that of Martin v. Boure (Cro. Jac. 6)."
We have good authority for saying that these instruments were
m use in England as early as 1307; for in that year King Edward
I. ordered certain money collected there for the Pope, not to be
sent to him in coin but by way of e.xchange.
But whatever may be said about the time of the origin of bills
of exchange, it is certainly true that their origin may be assigned
to the general necessities and customs of the widely extended business intercourse of the commercial nations which inhabited the
shores of the Mediterranean at a very early period in history.
In
France there is an ordinance of Louis XI. as early as 1462 which
permits all persons to give out and remit their money by bills of
exchange in the business of merchants in whatever country it may
It has been said that the law of bills and
be, except England.
notes or of commercial contracts has mainly grown up since Lord
Mansfield came upon the bench; and we owe more to his labor on
this subject than to any other one judicial mind, although vast and
valuable productions have been made on the subject by numerous
learned justices who have succeeded him.
'

This case is cited in Chitty on Bills, 196, 216, 241, 258, 260,
523; Story on Bills of Exchange, 62, 188, 207, 416; Tiedeman on
Commercial Paper, i, 289, 464; Wood's Byles on Bills and Notes,
50, 84, 577; Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 771, 1503, 1672,
1687; Randolph on Commercial Paper, 9, 481, 543; Ames on Bills
and Notes, 400; Norton on Bills and Notes,
199.

iii,
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Guildhall, London, and upon
the trial, it appeared that William Finney, being possessed of
at

this bank-note on the nth of December, 1756, sent it by the
general post, under cover, directed to one Bernard Odenharty,
at Chipping Norton, in Oxfordshire; that on the same night,
the mail was robbed and the bank-note in question (among
other notes) taken and carried away by the robber; that this
bank-note on the I2th of the same December, came into the
hands and possession of the plaintiff, for a full and valuable
consideration, and in the usual course and way of his business,
and without any notice or knowledge of this bank-note being
taken out of the mail.
It was admitted and agreed, that in the common and
known course of trade, bank-notes are paid by and received
of the holder or possessor of them, as cash; and that in the
usual way of negotiating bank-notes, they pass from one person to another as cash, by delivery only, [when payable to
bearer] and without any further inquiry or evidence of title,
It appeared that Mr.
than what arises from the possession.
Finney, having notice of this robbery, on the 13th of December, applied to the Bank of England "to stop the payment of
this note," which was ordered accordingly, upon Mr. Finney's,
entering into proper security "to indemnify the bank."
Some little time after this, the plaintiff applied to the
bank for the payment of this note; and for that purpose delivered the note to the defendant, zvho is a clerk in the bank,
but he refused either to pay the note or to re-deliver it to the
Upon which this action was brought.
plaintiff.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, and the sum of
twenty-one pounds ten shillings damages, subject, nevertheless, to the opinion of this court upon this question: ''Whether
under the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff had a sufficient property in this bank-note to entitle him to recover in
the present action ?"
Argument of Counsel for Defendant. — Sir Richard

Lloyd, for the defendant.
The present action is brought not for the money due upon
the note, but for the note itself, the paper, the evidence of the
So that the right to the money is not the present quesdebt.
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tion, the note is only an evidence of the moneys being due to
him as bearer.
The note must either come to the plaintiff by assignment,
or must be considered as if the bank gave a fresh, separate,
Now, the plaintiff can have
and distinct note to each bearer.
And the bank canno right by the assignment of a robber.
not be considered as giving a new note to each bearer; though
each bearer may be considered as having obtained from the
bank

a

new promise.

I do not say whether the bank can or cannot stop payBut the note is only an
ment; that is another question.
instrument of recovery.
Now this note, or these goods (as I may call it), was the
property of Mr. Finney, who paid in the money; he is the real
It is like a medal which might entitle a man to the
owner.
And it is by
payment of money, or to any other advantage.
Mr. Finney's authority and request, that Mr. Race detained it.
It may be objected, "that this note is to be considered as
cash in the usual course of trade."
But still, the course of
trade is not at all affected by the present question, about the
A different species of action must be
right of the note.
brought for the note, from wliat must be brought against the
And this man has elected to bring trover
bank for the money.
for the note itself, as owner of the note; and not to bring his
In which action of
action against the bank for the money.
trover, property cannot be proved in the plaintifl, for a special
proprietor can have no right against the true owner.
The cases that may affect the present, are Anonymous,'
coram Holt, C. J. at nisi prius at Guildhall.
There Ld. C.
"
That the right owner of a bank-note, who lost
J. Holt held,
it, might have trover against a stranger who found it; but not
against the person to whom the finder transferred it for a
valuable consideration, by reason of the course of trade, which
creates a property in the assignee or bearer,"^ in which case
'

I Salk., 126.
2
1 Ld. Raym.,
738, s. c, in which case the note was paid
away in the course of trade; but this remains in the man's hands,
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the note was paid away in the course of trade; but this remains
in the man's hands, and is not come into the course of trade.

Ford

V.

" If

Hopkins/ per Holt, C. J.,

at nisi prius

at

Guildhall.

bank-notes, exchequer-notes, or million lottery tickets,
or the like, are stolen or lost, the owner has such an interest
or property in them, as to bring an action, into whatsoever
hands they are come, money or cash is not to be distinguished;
but these notes or bills are distinguishable, and cannot be
reckoned as cash; and they have distinct marks and numbers
Therefore the true owner may seize these notes
on them."
wherever he finds them, if not passed away in the course of
trade.

In Middlesex, coram Pratt,

J.,

Armory v. DelaIt was ruled
mirie
chimney-sweeper's boy found a jewel.
"that the finder has such a property as will enable him to
keep it against all but the rightful owner, and consequently
may maintain trover.
This note is just like any other piece of property, until
And here the defendant
passed away in the course of trade.
acted as agent to the true owner.
Argument of Counsel for Plaintiff. — Mr. Williams

H.

—A

C.

^

contra for the plaintiff.
The holder of the bank note, upon a valuable consideration, (and without notice of existing defenses and before maturity) has a right to it, even against the true owner.
The circulation of these notes vests a property in the
1.
holder, who comes to the possession of them, upon a valuable
consideration (and without notice of defenses).
2.
This is of vast consequence to trade and commerce,
and they would be greatly incommoded if it were otherwise.
This falls within the reason of the sale in market3.
overt,

and ought to be determined upon the same principle.

In this case the transferee
and is not come in the course of trade.
However,
in
his
own name.
new
bill
a
went to the bank and got
considera
valuable
for
the case turned upon his having the note
ation.
W., I Salk, 283, 284

'

H.

^

I Strange

12

505

(8 Geo.

I.

)
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He put several cases where the usage, course,
and convenience of trade made the law, and sometimes even
against an act of parliament.'
This paper credit has been always, and with
Secondly.
great reason, favored and encouraged.^
The usage of these notes is, "that they pass by delivery
only (when payable to bearer); and are considered as current
cash; and the possession always carries with it the property."
A particular mischief is rather to be permitted than a genAnd Mr. Finney who was roberal inconvenience incurred.
bed of this note, was guilty of some laches in not preventing it.
Upon Sir Richard Lloyd's argument, a holder of a note
for want of title against
true
might suffer the loss of
owner; even
there was
chasm in the transfer of
through
a

it

a

if

it,

First.

a

is

one only out of 500 hands.
to be considered upon the same footing
Thirdly. This
as
sale in market-overt.

*"A

is

a

a

it

is

a

a

I

is

I

a

it

a

a

is

it

binds those that had right."
a substantial
But
objected by Sir Richard, " that there
difference between
right to the
right to the note, and
But say the right to the money will attach to
money."
Our right
not by assignment, but by
right to the paper.
law, by the usage and custom of trade.
do not contend
note, has
that the robber, or even the finder of
right to
the note; but after circulation, the holder upon a valuable
consideration has
right.
We have a property in this note; and have recovered the
value against the with-holder of it.
It
not material what
action we could have brought against the bank.
Then he answered Sir Richard Lloyd's Cases, and agreed
that the true owner might pursue his property, where
came
into the hands of another, without
valuable consideration, or
sale in market-overt

2

■*

I

is

'

2

''

Inst. 713.

3

a

i

2

J.

'

Stanley v. Ayles, per Hale, C.
at Guildhall.
Keb. 444J
1000.
v.
Strange
Palmer,
Lumley
Salk. 23, where
parolacceptance of a bill of exchange was holden sufficient against the
acceptor.
Feny v. Fowler, at al.,
Strange 946.
Salk. 126
in point.
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not in the course of trade: which is all that Ld. C.
J. Holt
said in i Salk. 284.
As in I Strange 505, he agreed that the finder has the
property against all but the rightful owner, not against him.

Replication
Lloyd in reply:

of Counsel for Defendant.— Sir Richard

I

agree that the holder of the note has a special property;
but it does not follow that he can maintain trover for it
against the true owner.

This is not only without, but against the consent of the
owner.
Supposing this note to be a sort of mercantile cash; yet
it has an ear-mark by which it may be distinguished; therefore
trover will lie for it.
And so is the case of Ford v. Hopkins. '
And you may recover a thing stolen from a merchant, as
well as a thing stolen from another man.
And this note is a
mere piece of paper; it may be as well stopped, as any other
sort of mercantile cash (as, for instance, a policy which has
been stolen).
And this has not been passed away in trade but
remains in the hands of the true owner.
And therefore, it
does not signify in what manner they are passed away, when
they are passed away; for this was not passed away.
Here,
the true owner, or his servant (which is the same thing), deAnd, surely robbery does not divest the property.
tains it.
This is not like goods sold in market-overt; nor does it
pass in the way of a market-overt; nor is it within the reason
of a market-overt.
Suppose it was a watch stolen; the owner
may seize it (though he finds it in a market-overt), before it is
sold there.
But there is no market-overt for bank-notes.
I deny the holder's (merely as holder) having a right to
the note, against the true owner; and 1 deny that the possession gives a right to the note.
Upon this argument on Friday last, Ld. Mansfield said,
that Sir Richard Lloyd had argued it so ingeniously, that
(though he had no doubt about the matter), it might be proper to look into the cases he had cited in order to give a proper answer to them, and therefore the court deferred giving

'i
2

Salk., 283.
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But at the same time Ld. Manstheir opinion to this day.
field said he would not wish to have it understood in the city
that the court had any doubts about the point.
Decision of Court. — Lord Mansfield now delivered the
resolution of the Court.
After stating the case at large, he declared, that at the
trial he had no sort of doubt, but that this action was well
brought, and would lie against the defendant in the present
case; upon the general course of business, and from the consequences to trade and commerce, which would be much incommoded by a contrary determination.
Negotiable Contracts — Common Law Contracts —

Goods — Distinguished. — It has been very ingeniously argued
But the whole falby Sir Richard Lloyd for the defendant.

lacy of the argument turns upon comparing bank-notes to
what they do not resemble, and what they ought not to be
compared to; viz., to goods, or to securities, or documents for
debts.

Now, they are not goods, not securities, nor documents
for debts, nor are so esteemed, but are treated as money, as
cash, in the ordinary course and transaction of business, by
the general consent of mankind; which gives them the credit
They
and currency of money, to all intents and purposes.
are as much money as guineas themselves are; or any other
current coin, that is used in common payments as money or
cash.

They pass by

a

will, which bequeaths all the testator's

money or cash, and are never considered as securities for
'
Upon Ld. Ailesbury's will, 900
money but as money itself.
On payment
pounds in bank-notes was considered as cash.
of them, whenever a receipt is required, the receipts are always given as for money, not as for securities or notes.
So, on bankruptcies, they cannot be followed as identical
and distinguishable from money; but are always considered as
money or cash.
'Tis pity that reporters sometimes catch at quaint expressions that may happen to be dropped at the bar or bench;
'

Papham, at al., v. Bathurst, at al., Ambl.

68,

Nov., 1748.

2.

J
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It

has been quaintly said,

be

followed is because it has

not true.

It

of it.

''that
no

The true reason is, upon
cannot be recovered after

it

SEC.
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has passed in currency.
So in case of money stolen, the true
owner cannot recover it, after
has been paid away fairly
and honestly upon a valuable and bona fide consideration; but

money has passed into currency, an action may be
brought for the money itself.
There was
case in
G,
at
the sittings, Thomas v. Whip, before Ld. Mansfield, which

i,

i

a

before

was an action upon assumpsit, by an administrator against the
defendant, for money had and received to his use.
The de-

a

fendant was nurse to the intestate during his sickness; and
being alone, conveyed away the money.
And Ld. Mansfield
held that the action lay.
Now this must be esteemed
finding at least.
he against the finder,

a

Apply this to the case of

bank-note.
An action may
not at all denied)
(and
And this
away in currency.
in the infancy of bank-notes.
" by reason of the
that
property in the (assignee or)
more proper expression

a

is

is

is

;

it

it

it

if

it

is

is

a

it,

)

a

is

J.

it

it

true
but not after
had been paid
point has been determined even
And Ld. C.
Holt there says,
course of trade, which creates
bearer."
(And "the bearer"
than assignee.
Here an inn-keeper took
bona fide, in his business
from a person who made the appearance of
gentleman.
Here
no pretense or suspicion of collusion with the robber;
for this matter was strictly inquired and examined into at the
for full and
trial; and
so stated in the case, " that he took
Invaluable consideration, in the usual course of business."
deed,
there had been any collusion, or any circumstances of
If
had
unfair dealing the case had been much otherwise.

I

''

I

'

Salk., 126.

10

Williams, 3.

Ld. Raym., 738.

J.

a

it

a

it

might have been suspicious;
note for 1,000 pounds
but
was a small note for twenty-one pounds ten shillings
only, and money given in exchange for it.
Another case cited was loose note^ ruled by Ld. C.
been
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in 1698; which proves nothing for the defendant's side of the question, but it is exactly agreeable to
what is laid down by my Ld. C. J. Holt in the case I have
The action did not lie against the assignee
just mentioned.
because he had it for valuable
(indorsee) of the bank-note;
consideration.
but
In that case he had it from the person who found
in the
the action did not lie against him, because he took
could not be followed in
course of currency; and therefore,
It never shall be followed into the hands of perhis hands.
in the course of currency, and in the
son who bona fide took
at

Guildhall,

it

a

it

it

it,

Holt

way of his business.

J.

3,

The case of Ford v. Hopkins was also cited, which was
at nisi prius, at Guildhall
coram Holt C.
in Hil. 12 W.
But
for million lottery tickets.
imposthis must be a very incorrect report of that case;
can be a true representation of what Ld. C.
sible that
It represents him as speaking of bank-notes, exHolt said.
chequer-notes and million lottery tickets as like to each other.
Now, no two things can be more unlike each other than a lotbank-note.
Lottery tickets are identical and
tery ticket and
They may prove exspecific; specific actions lie for them.
tremely unequal in value; one may be prize; another a blank.
not more specific than lottery tickets are.
there
Land
said, "that the delivery of the plaintiff's tickets to the defendant, as that case was, was no change of property."
And most
was no change of property.
So far the case
clearly
right.
"
here urged as a proof
But
that the true owner may folstolen bank-note into what hands soever
low
shall come."
Now the whole of that case turns upon the throwing
bank-notes as being like to lottery tickets.
But Ld. C.
Holt could never say "that an action
would lie against the person who, for a valuable consideration, had received a bank-note which had been stolen or lost
and bona fide paid to him;" even though the action was
brought by the true owner, because he had determined otherwise, but two years before, and because bank-notes are not
like lottery tickets, but money.
The person who took down this case, certainly misunderis

is

is

it

is it

J.

in

a

it

is

It

a

a

J.

it

it

and was an action of trover
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stood Ld. C. J. Holt, or mistook his reasons.
For this reasoning would prove (if it were true, as the reporter represents
it), that if a man paid to a goldsmith 500 pounds in banknotes, the goldsmith could never pay them away.
A bank-note is constantly and universally, both at home
and abroad, treated as money, as cash; and paid and received

and it is necessary, for the purposes of commerce,
that their currency should be established and secured.
There was a case in the Court of Chancery (Walmefly v.
Child, nth December, 1749) on some of Mr. Child's notes,
as cash,

payable to the person to whom they were given, or bearer.
The notes had been lost or destroyed many years. Mr. Child
was ready to pay them to the widow and administratrix of the
person to whom they were made payable upon her giving
bond, with two responsible sureties (as is the custom in such
to indemnify him against the bearer, if the notes
cases),
The administratrix
should be found and ever demanded.
brought a bill, which was dismissed, because she either could
not, or would not, give the security required.
No dispute
ought to be made with the bearer of a cash-note, in regard to
Fuller, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the case of Friedlander at al. v. Texas and Pacific R. R.
Co. (130 U. S., 416), said that " Bills of exchange and promissory
notes are representatives of money, circulating in the commercial
world as such, and it is essential to enable them to perform their
peculiar function that he who purchases them should not be bound
to look beyond the instrument, that his right to enforce them
should not be defeated by anything short of bad faith on his part."
It is certainly true that these commercial papers — bills of exchange,

promissory notes, checks, etc. — do in a large measure answer the
The character of negopurpose of money in the business world.
them to take the
has
enabled
them
tiability which has been given
use
as
representatives
place of the actual use of money, and their
of money, has made them indispensable in the transactions of the
daily business of to-day.
"Bills of exchange were probably the first instruments for the
payment of money that were accorded the negotiable quality, though
promissory notes, being simpler in form, were doubtless used as
evidences of debt before bills of exchange came in vogue amongst
Certainly these two securities were recognized as
merchants.
negotiable instruments before any other paper representatives of
money or property passed currently from hand to hand in like
manner as money; and from them, as fruitful parents, have sprung
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payment till inquiry can be made,
note came by it fairly or not.
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credit of these notes;
and customary to stay the
whether the bearer of the

the

the

court were all of the

now known."

Dan. on Neg. Inst.

2.

The existence of these commercial contracts were caused by
the necessities of commerce and trade between different nations.
So long as all trade was a mere exchange of commodities, neither
It was not
money nor a representative of money was necessary.
long, however, before the necessities of commerce demanded something of real value — of money — for the conveniences of trade.
Instead of a simple exchange of one commodity for another it became customary to exchange commodities for something having a
representative value which was called money. At first the precious
metals were used in bulk as the bases for the measurements of the
value of products; later the value of a certain quantity of these
metals was fixed by a stamp of the sovereign.
This for a long
time answered the purposes of commerce.
But in the course of
time — in the gradual development and extension of commerce between different nations — it was found that the transfer of these
precious metals, became not only burdensome and expensive, but
there was great danger of losing the same, by robbery and otherwise, in their transfer from one country to another, by the rude
methods of transporting them in vogue.
The great necessity for
something which represented money and which could be thus transferred with less expense and less hazard, was felt and supplied by
the ingenious merchants of that day in the form of the various
commercial contracts which in one form or another have been
adopted and improved from time to time by the commercial

world.

It is highly necessary for the purposes and conveniences of
commerce that the negotiability of commercial contracts should be
established and protected.
Mr. Joseph Chitty in speaking of the general utility of bills
of exchange said, "A bill of exchange is a security originally invented amongst merchants in different countries and kingdoms, for
the more easy and safe remittance of money, or rather for the purpose of avoiding the necessity of transmitting money itself, from
the one to the other, and has since been extended to commercial
transactions within the same kingdom."
Chitty on Bills, 4.
In the origin of bills of exchange, their principal utility was
the safe transfer of property from one place to another; but since
the great increase of commerce, they have become the evidence of
valuable property, and in a great measure equivalent to specie, en-

MILLER

SEC. 2.]

same opinion

concurred.

for the

Rule. — That

V. RACE.

plaintiff;

and that Mr. Just.

43

Wilmot

the postea be delivered to the plaintiff.

larging the capital stock of wealth in circulation, and thereby facilitating and increasing the trade and commerce of the country.

Gibson v. Minet, i Hen. Bla., 6i8.
Sir William Blackstone in speaking of the purposes of these
instruments puts the following instance: "If A. live in Jamaica,
and owe B., who lives in England, looO;^, now if C. be going
from England to Jamaica, he may advance B. this iooo;£, and
take a bill of exchange, drawn by B. in England upon A. in
Jamaica, and receive it when he comes thither: Thus B. receives
his debt at any distance of place by transferring it to C, who carries over his money in paper credit, without the risk of robbery
2 Bla. Comm., 466, 467.
or loss."

CHAPTER II.
Bibliography of Negotiable Contracts.

SECTION

3.

TEXT BOOKS AND CASES.
The subject of negotiable contracts has been discussed by
Among them may be mentioned the folmany text writers.

lowing: —
Ames on Bills and Notes;

Bayley on Bills;
Bateman on Commercial Paper (i860);
Beauves, Lex. Merc. — Bills of Exchange (1720);
Benjamin's Chalmers on Bills, Notes and Checks;
Bigelow on Bills and Notes;
Bigelow's Cases on Bills and Notes;
Bryant and Stratton's Commercial Paper;
Byles on Bills and Notes;
Chalmers on Bills, Notes and Checks;
Chitty on Bills of Exchange;
Cunningham on Bills of Exchange;
Daniel on Negotiable Instruments (2 vol.);
Edwards on Bills and Promissory Notes (1857);
Hartman on Bills of Exchange;
Hough's Article in Vol. 2, American and English Encyclopedia of Law;
Huffcut's Negotiable Instruments (1898);
Hulteau on Bills;
Johnson on Bills and Notes (1898);
Johnson's Cases on Bills and Notes;

Kyd on Bills;

Malynes Lex. Mercatoria (1622);
Marius on Bills and Notes (1670);
Norton on Bills and Notes;
Paige's Cases on Commercial

Paper;
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Parsons on Bills and Notes (1870);
Pomeroy's Smith's Mercantile Law;

Pothier de Exchange;
Randolph on Commercial Paper

(3

vol.);

Scrutten's Elements of Mercantile Law (1891);
Sharswood's Bayley on Bills;
Smith's Mercantile Law;
Story on Promissory Notes;
Story on Bills of Exchange (1843);
Tiedeman on Commercial Paper;
Wood's Byles on Bills and Notes.

SECTION

4.

Among the books which are most useful to the practitioner, engaged in the active practice of the law may be mentioned Daniel on Negotiable Instruments in 2 vols. (4th ed.)
(1891); Randolph on Commercial Paper in 3 vols, (isted. )
(1888); Tiedeman on Commercial Paper (ist ed.) (1889);
Ames on Bills and Notes in 2 vols. (1881) (discussion of
leading cases). These authors have each discussed the fundamental principles of the law of commercial contracts and
have cited numerous illustrations, thereby rendering their texts
valuable to the practitioner.

SECTION

5.

Among the texts which are valuable for class room purposes may be mentioned Chalmers (Benjamin's ed. ); Byles
on Bills and Notes (Wood's 8th ed. ); Norton on Bills and
Notes (2nd ed.); Bigelow on Bills and Notes (ist ed.); and
Ames on Bills and Notes; Tiedeman on Commercial Paper
and Huffcut on Negotiable Instruments (1898).

CHAPTER III.
Enumeration and Definition of Negotiable Contracts.

SECTION

6.

NEGOTIABLE CONTRACTS— ENUMERATED.
The following instruments have been generally held to be
negotiable: Bills of exchange, Promissory Notes, Checks,
Certificates of
Deposit, Bank Bills, Bank-notes, United
States Treasury Notes, Exchequer Bills, Government Bonds,
Receipts for Bonds to be issued, Bonds of Private Corporations, Coupon Bonds, Coupons, Gold Certificates, and Silver
Certificates.

SECTION

7.

QUASI-NEGOTIABLE CONTRACTS— ENUMERATED.
The following contracts may be considered Quasi-negoBills of Lading, Warehouse Receipts, Due
tiable contracts:
Bills, Letters of Credit, Bank Pass Books, and Receiver's
Certificates.

SECTION

8.

BILL OF EXCHANGE— DEFINED.

1

By an Act of Parliament in 1882, known as the "English
Bills of Exchange Act," a bill of exchange was defined to be
"An unconditional order in writing, addressed by one person
^Many definitions have been given for bills of exchange. Blackstone defined a bill of exchange to be "An open letter of request
from one man to another, designating him to pay a sum named
2 Com.,
therein to a third person on his account."
466.
Chitty says "It is defined to be an open letter of request from,
and order by one person on another to pay a sum of money therein
mentioned to a third person on his account."
Chitty on Bills, i.
on
Parsons
Bills says, "A written order for the payment of
i Parsons on Bills and Notes, 52.
money."
Judge Byles defines a bill to be "An unconditional written
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a

is

A

a

a

it

is

to another, signed by the person giving
requiring the person to whom
addressed to pay on demand or at
fixed or
determinable future time
sum certain in money to or to the
order of
specified person, or to bearer."
bill of exchange an unconditional tvritten^ order by one
a

a

a

C

B

B

order from A to
to pay
sum certain of money
directing
named therein.''
Byles on Bills and Notes, i.
bill to be "A written order or request by
Judge Kent defines
one person to another for the payment of money at
specified
time absolutely and at all events."
Kent Com., 74.
'Must be ^V^itten. — Chitty says,
bill of exchange
being an open letter of request by one person to another to pay
follows that
must be in writing." Chitty on Bills, 126.
money,
Story on bills of exchange says, "It must be in writing and
should be signed by the drawer, or by some person duly authorized in his name and on his behalf." Story on Bills, 33.
bill of exchange, there cerConcerning this requisite of
tainly can be no controversy; an unwritten note would be
contradiction in terms. This requisite applies to all negotiable
A verbal or oral promise, however valid and bindinstruments.
This
negotiable contract.
ing in law, can never be considered
obvious upon the slightest consideration.
proposition
May be ^A^ritten in Pencil or Ink. — In the case of
C, 234 (11 E. C. L., 442), (1826),
B.
Geary v. Physic,
action
of assumpsit as endorsee against
an
the plaintiff brought
the defendant as maker of
promissory note for the sum of
thirty pounds payable two months after, to the order of one
Folder, and indorsed by him, (Folder), to one Kemo, who subseAt the trial before
quently endorsed the note to the plaintiff.
term, 1825,
after
Hilary
London
the
sittings,
Abbott C. J., at
was in
to
the
plaintiff
appeared that the indorsement by Kemp,
was thereupon objected that the plaintiff could not
pencil, and
recover; an indorsement in pencil not being such an indorsement
as the law and custom of merchants recognizes to be sufficient to
bill of exchange, and promissory notes being
pass the interest in
Ann, c.
s. i, assignable or indorsable in
and
by the statute
the same manner as unpaid bills of exchange are according to the
sufficient,
The Ld. Chief Justice thought
custom of merchants.
verdict for the plaintiff, reserving
and directed the jury to find
liberty to the defendant's counsel to move to enter non-suit,
the court should be of opinion that the indorsement of the promF.
good and valid indorsement.
issory note in pencil, was not
nonrule nisi to enter
Pollock, in last Easter term, obtained
in pencil, was not a
writing
that
contended,
first,
He
suit.
Co. Litt., 229 a,
cited
and
he
law;
common
writing recognized at
to be
"Here
said,
deed,
where Ld. Coke, speaking of
is

it

a

a

a

a

a

a

if

a

it

9

4

3

a

it

it

a

S

&

is

a

a

a

it

it
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person upon another to pay to some third person or his order
For if
understood, that it ought to be in parchment or in paper.
a writing be made upon a piece of wood, or upon a piece of linen,
or on the bark of a tree, or on a stone, or the like, etc., and the
same be sealed or delivered, yet is it no deed, for a deed must be
written either in parchment or paper, as before is said; for the
writing upon these is least subject to alteration or corruption."
For the same reasons a writing ought to be made with materials
Now, writing made with
least subject to alteration or corruption.
a pencil is easily altered or obliterated, and therefore, for the reasons given by Ld. Coke, where the law requires a contract to be in
writing, it ought to be made with materials the least subject to
alteration.
Secondly, he contended, that it was not a writing
In point of
according to the custom and usage of merchants.
practice bills of exchange were generally written in ink and it lay
upon the plaintiff in this case to show by evidence that this was a
writing according to the custom of merchants.
Thesiger now showed cause. First. The passage cited from Co.
Litt.,229, a., regards only the materials upon which, not with which,
a deed must be written; and even assuming that a deed written in
pencil might not be good, it does not, therefore, follow that a bill
of exchange so written may not be so.
Deeds are more solemn
instruments, are intended permanently to go along with the inheritance, but bills of exchange are made to continue in force for a
Letters and words traced on paper by a pencil,
very short period.
In
constitute a writing in the ordinary acceptation of that term.
Walton,
i Stark, 267, a memorandum entered in pencil upon
Jeffryv.
a card was received as evidence of an agreement; and in Rymes
V. Clarkson, i Phil., 22. Sir John NichoU was of opinion that a
will written by a testator with a pencil would be valid, provided
that the court could be satisfied that he intended so to execute his
will.
In Green v. Skipworth, i Phil., 53, a disposition made by a
testator in pencil was carried into effect, and in Dickenson v.
Dikenson, 2 Phil., 173, alterations in pencil in a regularly executed
will were admitted to probate.
Sir John NichoU said, "There
was no doubt that in point of law they must be considered as
equally valid as if made in ink, provided the deceased intended
them to take effect."
Now, there can be no question as to the intention here.
For here Kemp, not only wrote his name on the
note in pencil, but he passed it from his hand to another, thereby
clearly showing that he intended to transfer the property in the
The authorities, therefore, show that this indorsement in
note.
pencil is an indorsement in writing within the legal meaning of
that term.
It is an indorsement in writing within the legal
Secondly.
It is an indorsement in writing within the
meaning of that term.
and
custom
of
merchants.
That usage requires that the inusage
dorsement should be in writing; it refers to the act to be done, and

SEC. 8.]

ENUMERATION AND DEFINITION.

or bearer, a certain sum of money therein named.

49

These

not to the particular mode or the materials with which it is to be
done.
The argument addressed to the court on the part of the defendant goes to confound the usage with the practice. If the usage
requires not only that the indorsement should be in writing, but
that it should be written in a particular mode, it will be a matter
of inquiry whether the color of the ink, or the species of paper
on which the bill is written, be such as is required by the custom.
F. Pollock, contra.
The passage from Co. Litt. was cited to
show that where the law required a contract to be in writing, it
required that it should be written on materials which were the least
subject to alteration; and from thence it was inferred that the law,
for the same reason, would require that it should be written with
materials having the same quality, general convenience certainly
requiring that negotiable instruments should be written with materials more durable than pencil.
It lay upon the plaintiff to show
that such a writing was a writing within the custom of merchants, and that he has not done.
Suppose the indorsement upon
the paper had been scratched with a pen, or with the inverted end
of a pencil, would that have been a writing according to the custom of merchants ?
Abbott, C. J.
There is no authority for saying that where the
law requires a contract to be in writing, that writing must be in ink.
The passage cited from Ld. Coke, shows that a deed must be written on paper or parchment, but it does not show that it must be
am of opinion that an indorsement
That being so,
written in ink.
There is not any
on a bill of exchange may be by a writing in pencil.
danger that our decision will induce individuals to adopt such a
The impermode of writing in preference to that in general use.
obliteration,
to
so
its
subject
being
fection of this mode of writing,
and the impossibility of proving it when it is obliterated, will prevent it being generally adopted. There being no authority to show
that a contract which the law requires to be in writing should be
written in any particular mode, or with any specific material, and
the law of merchants requiring only that an indorsement of bills
of exchange should be in writing, without specifying the manner
with which the writing is to be made, I am of opinion that the indorsement in this case was a sufficient indorsement in writing within
the meaning of the law of merchants, and that the property in the

I

bill passed by it to the plaintiff.
think that a writing in pencil is a writing within
Bailey, J.
the meaning of that term at common law and that it is a writing
cannot see any reason why,
within the custom of merchants.
to
be in writing, that contract
contract
a
when the law requires
If the character of the
in
pencil.
shall be void if it be written
handwriting were thereby wholly destroyed, so as to be incapable
of proof, there might be something in the objection; but it is not
thereby destroyed, for, when the writing is in pencil, proof of the

/
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instruments have been defined in some jurisdictions by statute.
character of the handwriting may still be given. I think, therefore,
that this is a valid writing at common law, and also that it is an
indorsement according to the usage and custom of merchants; for
that usage only requires that the indorsement should be in writing,
and not that the writing should be made with any specific material.
Holroyd, J., concurred.
Rule. — Discharged.
A note in pencil is valid while it is legible.
Neither will it
amount to a material alteration of a negotiable contract to trace the
Reed v. Roark, 14 Tex., 329 (1855);
writing in pencil with ink.

Chitty on Bills, 126, 127, 184, n.

Required. — Judge Bailey in the case of Green v.
Davies said "That no particular form of words is necessary to
Form

a negotiable contract."' 4 B. & C, 235.
(10 E. C.
L-, SS7-)
The following have been held sufficient as to form:
giooo.oo.
Ann Arbor, Mich., May 8, 1898.

constitute

Six months after date of this first of exchange (second and
third unpaid) pay to the order of E. F. one thousand dollars,
value received.

Charles E. Hiscock.
Bros.,
To Rothschild
London, Eng.
Ann Arbor, Mich., May 8, 1898.
^1000.00.
Ten days after sight, pay to Mr. A., or order, one thousand

dollars, value received.

To Mr. John Wanamaker,

Philadelphia,

Charles E. Hiscock,
Pa.

Must Not be Under Seal. — The definition

of a negoticontract is that it is "an open letter," for the payment
of money.
By the phrase "open letter" is meant that it must
" If a seal be affixed to a paper, in the
not be under seal.
ordinary form of a note, its character as such is destroyed;
and this rule applies to corporations as well as individuals."
Daniel on Negotiable Instruments,
§ 32; Rawson v. Davison,
Mich.,
Clark
607;
v.
Farmer's
Manuf.
Co., 15 Wend., 256;
49
Weeks v. Esler, 143 N. Y., 374; Brown v. Jordhal, 32 Minn.,
13s; Osborn V. Kistler, 35 Ohio st., 99; Osborne v. Hubbard, 20
Oregon, 318; Muse v. Dantzler, 85 Ala., 359; Mason v. Frick,
105
Pa. St., 162.
In Anderson v. Bullock, 4 Munf., 442, the following was held
to be a promissory note, and the scroll annexed as a seal to be
mere surplusage:
12,361.81.
Richmond, October 10, 1801.
"On or before the first day of February next, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, or administrators, to pay Thomas and
able
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collection of the various definitions of promissory notes,

Amos Ladd, or order, two thousand, three hundred and sixty-one
dollars and eighty-one cents.
"Austin & Anderson, (L. S.)"
14 Cent., L. J., 317; Story on Bills, § 62; Helper v. Alden,
3 Minn., 332; Tiedeman on Commercial
Paper, § 32.
In many jurisdictions the quality of negotiability has been
conferred upon sealed commercial instruments.
(See statutes of
This has been done in the following states:
your state).
Ohio,
Massachusetts, Colorado, Dakota, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Tennessee, Nebraska, and North Carolina.
Kinds of Bills. — Bills of exchange are either foreign or
inland.
They are said to be foreign when they are drawn in
one country and made payable in another.
If a bill is drawn
in one of the states of the Union and is payable in another
it is a foreign bill. The states of the Union are in this respect
An inland bill of exchange is one which,
foreign to each other.
is both
drawn and made payable in the same country.
A
bill is not necessarily foreign because the parties to it reside
in different countries.
Neither is it an inland bill because
the parties to it reside in the same state or country, for, if
the bill actually be drawn in one state by parties of the state
and made payable to parties within the state, but payable in
another state or county, it is a foreign bill. There is no necessary
difference in the form between inland and foreign bills; but there
are certain rules controlling foreign bills which do not apply to
inland bills.
For instance, a foreign bill must be protested while
inland bills need not be.
Ld. Holt in the case of Boroughs v.
Perkins (Holt's Rep., 121, Trinity term, 2 Ann.), said: "In inland
as well as foreign bills of exchange, the person to whom it is payable must give convenient notice of non-payment to the drawer;,
for if by his delay, the drawer receives prejudice, the plaintiff shall
A protest on a foreign bill was part of its constitunot recover.
tion; and on inland bills, a protest is necessary by this statute, but
Yet the statute doth not take away thewas not at common law.
plaintiff's action for want of a protest, nor does it make it a bar
thereto; but this statute seems to take place only in case there beno protest to deprive the plaintiff of damages or interest, and togive the drawer a remedy against him for damages, if a protest be
not made."
Foreign bills are usually drawn in sets or copies, usually three
and sometimes more; and these sets or copies are called in law a
"set of exchange" and constitutes but one bill.

Parties to Bills of Exchange — Enumerated and Defined.
— The parties to a bill of exchange are denominated as the drawer,

the

drawee, payee,

acceptor,

holders,

indorsees,

and transferees.

The person who makes or draws the bill is the drawer; the person
upon whom it is drawn and who is expected to accept and pay the
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bills of exchange and other negotiable contracts the student
is referred to Randolph on Commercial Paper.

SECTION

9.

PROMISSORY NOTES DEFINED.i
A promissory note is an unconditional written promise by
one person to pay to another or to his order, or bearer, a certain sum of money therein named.

A promissory note is defined by the English bills of exchange

Act Sec.

83

to be

"An

unconditional

promise in

the person in whose favor it is drawn is the
Subsequent parties may be denominated
as holders,
indorsers, indorsees, or transferees, according to the nature of the
transaction, and their particular liability will be discussed under
the head of Transfer by Indorsement.
When the drawee accepts
is
called
the acceptor.
the bill he
same is the drawee;

payee.

^

Other Definitions. — Blackstone

defines a promissory note
plain and direct engagement in writing to pay a sum
specified at a time therein limited, to a person therein named, or
sometimes to his order or often to the bearer at large." 2 Com.,
to be

467.

"A

Judge Kent adopts Bailey's definition, which is, " A written
promise by one person to another for the payment of money absolutely, at a specified time, and at all events."
3 Kent. Com., 74.
Judge Byles says, that a promissory note is, "An absolute
promise in writing, signed but not sealed, to pay a certain specified
sum at a time therein limited or on demand or at sight, to a person
therein named or designated, or to his order, or to the bearer."
Byles on Bills and Notes, 5.
Judge Story said. " It is a written engagement by one person
to pay another person therein named absolutely and unconditionally a certain sura of money at a time specified therein."
Story
on Bills and Notes, § i.
In California, the statute defines a promissory note to be,
" An instrument negotiable in form whereby
the signer promises to
pay a specified sum of money." Cal. Civ. Code, § 3244.
Must be in Writing.— A promissory note like a . bill of
exchange cannot exist in parol.
It must be reduced to writing;
but must not be under seal unless permitted by a statutory provision in the particular jurisdiction.
It way be written upon
parchment or paper and with pen or pencil.
See cases cited in the
note to § 8 upon this question.
Form Required. — No particular phraseology or form is
required for promissory notes, so long as they contain all the
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writing made by one person to another, signed by the maker,
engaging to pay, on demand, or at a fixed or determinable
future time, a sum certain in money, to, or to the order of, a
specified person, or to bearer."

SECTION

10.

OTHER NEGOTIABLE AND QUASI-NEGOTIABLE CONTRACTS.
The negotiable as well as the quasi-negotiable contracts
enumerated in Sections 1 and 2 of this chapter, and not defined in this chapter, will be defined and discussed in chapters
devoted to those particular subjects.
They may be written
essential elements of a negotiable contract.
to
be sufficient in form:
The following have been held
or printed.
Ann Arbor, Mich., May 8, 1898.
J500.00.
One year after date I promise to pay to E. F. or order, five
hundred dollars at the Ann Arbor Savings Bank of Ann Arbor, for
value received, with interest.
^500.00.

Charles E. Hiscock.
Ann Arbor, Mich., May 6, 1898.

On demand, we promise to pay to the order of E. F., five
hundred dollars, value received, with interest after maturity.

Charles E. Hiscock,
John R. Miner.
Mich., May 8, 1898.
Arbor,
Ann

gioo.oo.
Thirty days after date we, or either of us, promise to pay the

bearer one hundred dollars.

Charles E. Hiscock,
John R. Miner.

The first of these examples is known as a several note; the
secend as a joint note, and the third as a joint and several note.
Parties to a Promissory Note — Enumerated and Defined. — The parties' to a promissory note are designated as maker,
The
payee, indorsee, holders, indorsers, transferers and transferees.
subseand
the
others
first two parties might be called original parties
The one who gives the note and who is primarily
quent parties.
The person to whom the note
is
called the maker.
liable thereon
Whether a
the payee.
called
is
instance
first
is to be paid in the
party is an indorser, indorsee, transferer, or transferee, depends
altogether upon the nature of his contract, which relations will be
discussed under the head of "Transfer by Indorsement."

CHAPTER IV.
Essentials of Negotiable Contracts.

SECTION 11.
ESSENTIALS— GENERALLY.
1.

2.
3.

A bill of exchange must contain an order.
A promissory note must contain a promise.
The order and the promise must be absolute and

unconditional.
4.

The order and the promise must be for the payment

of money.
5.

The order and the promise must be for the payment

of a certain sum of money.
6.

The order and the promise must be to pay at some

time certain.
7.
8.

9.
10.

They must be in writing.
They must be signed by the parties giving them.
The parties must be definite and certain.
The contract must be delivered.

SECTION

12.

A BILL OF EXCHANGE MUST CONTAIN AN ORDER BY ONE
PERSON TO ANOTHER.
RUFF

V

WEBB.i

In the King's Bench; Easter Term,
{Reported in

i Espinasse

34

George

I2J;

star

III., May
p.

24,

1794.

I2g. j

Form of Action. — Assumpsit for work and labor, with
the common counts.

Plea of the general issue.

'This case is cited in Daniel on Nag. Inst., 35; Tiedeman on
Com. Paper, 23; Benjamin's Chalmers, Bills, Notes and Checks
Norton on B. &. N., 29; Randolph on Commercial
10, 56;
Paper, 105; Story on Bills of Ex., 33; Chitty on Bills, 118,
128, 129, 130, 154; Wood's Byles on B. & N., 31, 147.
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The action was brought to recover the amount of wages
due by the defendant to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff had been servant to the defendant, and on
him from his service, had given him a draft
for the amount of his wages on an unstamped slip of paper,
in the following words:
"Mr. Nelson will much oblige Mr. Webb, by paying J.
Ruff, or order, twenty guineas on his account."
This draft the plaintiff had taken, but it did not appear

his discharging

What Will Constitute

an Order. — Every bill of exchange
must contain an imperative order or a direction to pay; but this
Any form of
order may be expressed in polite, civil language.
a
on
the
the
drawer
part
right
words implying
of the bill to
of
will
be
No
word
or words
particular
demand payment
sufficient.
are essential to constitute the order or direction; the word or
words used, however, must be in the nature of a demand or a right,
The following expressions
and not the mere asking of a favor.
"Please pay,
order
or
direction:
held
to
be
a
sufficient
been
have
will arrange
let
bearer
have
150.00;
John Jones"; "Please " the
it with you this forenoon.
In the case of Rex v. Ellor, i Leech 323, the following instrument:
"Messrs Songer, — Please send 10 pounds by the bearer, as I
Elizabeth Wery."
am so ill I cannot wait upon you.
The court said, "This appears
was held not to contain an order.
to be a mere letter, rather requesting the loan of money than
The terms of it do not import anyordering the payment of it.
of
the drawee to pay it; and, in the
on
the
part
thing compulsory
determined,
by nine judges against
case of Mary Mitchell, it was
one, that the order was not within the meaning of the act; because
the direction of it was not positive, and the terms of it did not
import that the party giving it had a right to the goods ordered."
In Russell v. Powell, 14 M. & W., 418, the following instrument:
"To THE Executors of T. H., deceased:
We do hereby authorize and require you to pay to Mr. George
Powell, or his order, the sum of 250 pounds, being the amount
directed by the order of the 29th of July last, to be paid to our
We are, Gentlemen,
order.
Your very obedient servants,

I

John Mynn."

was held not to contain an order to pay but a mere warrrant for
A similar ruling is found in the cases of
the payment of money.
Hamilton v. Spottiswoode, 4 Exch., 200; Willoughby's Case i
Leech, 95.
In the case of Hoyt v. Lynch, 2 Sandf., 328, the following
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that he had ever demanded payment of it from Mr. Nelson,
to whom it was addressed.
It was given in evidence on the part of the defendant,
that he hved in the country, and kept cash with Mr. Nelson
in London, and that he paid all his bills in that manner, by
drafts on Nelson; that the plaintiff knew that circumstance
and took the draft without any objection; and that if he had
This evidence
applied to Nelson, it would have been paid.
was relied on as a discharge, and bar to the action.
statement attached to an ordinary statement of account was held
to be a good bill of exchange:
" WlLLIAMSBURGH, DeC. 16, 1847.
"Mr. J. Lynch, — Please pay the above bill — being the amount
for tinning your house on South Sixth Street — and charge the same
to our account; and much oblige,

Yours,

Smith & Woglom."
In the case of Wheatley v. Strobe, 12 Cal., 92, upon the following instrument:

"Mr. Strobe:

"Sac City, July

18,

1857.

Please pay the bearer of these lines two hundred and thirty-six dollars, and charge the same to my account.
E. D. Wheatley."
Field,
now of the Supreme Court of the U. S., said: "No
Justice
further particulars than these are essential to constitute a bill of
The insertion of the word "please" does not alter the
exchange.
character of the instrument.
This is the usual term of civility and
does not necessarily imply that a favor is asked."
In Woolley v. Sergeant, 8 N. J. L., 323, the following instrument: "Mr. David Sergeant, please to credit John Woolley, or
bearer, thirty dollars, and I will pay you by the tenth day of April
next, and you will oblige your friend,

"
John Miller

was held not to be a good bill of exchange.
Ford J. said:
"The
instrument is neither a bill of exchange nor a promissory note, for
it does not require payment; but only the giving of credit on a book

account."
In Spurgin v. McPheeters,

42 Ind., 527, the
was
held
to
all
ment
the characteristics of a
possess

"Mr. B.—

following instrubill of exchange;

Sir, Please pay to A. or order the sum of one hundred and
nineteen dollars on said bill of i^-in. lumber, and oblige the
firm of
C. & Co.

In

the case of Little v. Slackford, i
Tenderton held the following not to be a

B."

Mood. & Malk., 171, Ld.
bill of exchange:
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Argument of Counsel for Plaintiff. — Shepherd for the
plaintiff contended, that the only mode by which this could
operate as a bar to the action, was by taking the draft
in question as a bill of exchange; in which case, under
Stat. 3 and 4 Ann. c. 9, 7, it is declared that if any person

"Mr. Little: — Please to let the bearer have seven pounds
and place it to my account, and you will oblige,
Your humble servant,
J. Slackford."

An instrument in writing by which A. directs B. to pay C. or
bearer $400, and take up A.'s note of that amount, is not a bill of
Cook v. Satterlee, 6 Cow., 108. Chitty on Bills, 159.
exchange.
Language of civility merely ought not to be permitted to
change the nature and character of these instruments; but the language used must necessarily import the asking of a favor coupled
To illustrate
with the right to demand a compliance therewith.
in
order
a
man on his
to
an
of
"Please
by
pay"
the words
civility,
hands,
in
can
his
certainly
banker, who had money of the drawer
Whatever lanbe construed to be an order to pay absolutely.
guage used, in order to be a good order to pay money, it must
If the payamount to an absolute, unconditional order to pay.
the
whatever,
contingency
any
ment is made to depend upon
are
following
The
instrument will not be a negotiable contract.
not good bills of exchange: "Please pay when you collect, etc."
"Pay when a certain ship arrives, etc"; "Pay when a railroad is
constructed to a certain point"; "Pay on the return of this note";
"Pay out of the rents and profits received from my farm"; "Pay
"
out of the growing crops
Coolidge v. Ruggles, 15 Mass., 387;
See following cases:
Palmer V. Pratt, 2 Bing., 185; Blackman v. Lehman, 63 Ala., 547;
Morice v. Lee, 8 Mod. Rep., 363; Masonv. Metcalf, 8 Baxt., 440;
Roberts v. Peake, i Burr., 323; Powell v. Grey, 6 Grey, 340;
Gillilan v. Myers, 31 111., 525; Crawford v. Cully, Wright (Ohio),
453; Kinney V. Lee, 10 Texas, 155; Averett v. Booker, 15 Gratt
(Va.), 163; DeForest V. Frary, 6 Cow., 151.
The general rule is that the payment must be ordered, but

under certain circumstances a request may amount to an order.
Morris v. Lea, Ld. Raym., 1397; Brown v. Harraden, 4 T. R., 149;
But the order or request to pay must be a
Ruff V. Webb, supra.
Little v. Slackford, i Mood. &
matter of right and not of favor.
"
Pay" is not absolutely indispensable, for
Malk., 171. The word
"
Morris v. Lea, supra.
be
sufficient.
Deliver" will
the word
No stereotyped form of words is necessary to constitute a note
or bill; and, if it be doubtful for which of the two a particular instrument was intended, it may be treated as either. Block v. Bell,
I M. & Rob., 149; Edis v. Bury, 6 B. & C, 433-
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shall accept a bill of exchange, in satisfaction of a debt,
the same shall be deemed a full and sufficient discharge,
if the person so accepting such bill for his debt shall not
take his due course by endeavoring to get the same accepted and paid, and making his protest for non-acceptance

it

it,

But a note must in legal effect, contain a promise; and a bill,
The simple acknowledgement
an order for the payment of money.
of a debt, such as, " I. O. U." is not a promissory note; nor does
an entreaty addressed to a drawee to pay a certain sum amount to
a bill of exchange.
This rule is now changed by statute in some
of the states.
The theory is, in the case of a bill, that the drawer has funds
deposited with the drawee which he may demand as a matter of
Hence, if it appears from the tenor of the
right and not as favor.
instrument that the drawer has no right to order the money paid,
it is no bill of exchange.
Norton on Bills and Notes, 29.
But mere language of courtesy will not deprive the instrument
of its commercial character.
Judge story says: " The language is
not to be too closely scanned; nor is
because
has politeness

a

a

a

is

a

a

a

I

it

a

i

a

it

it

is

a

a

a

now generally introduced into commercial contracts and transactions, to be presumed to ask
favor, and not demand
right. The
true rule would seem therefore, to be, to hold the mere drawing of
bill to be the demand of right and not the asking of favor, in
all cases, where the language
susceptible of two interpretations;
favor only, when the language used repeals, in an
and to deem
claimed as
unequivocal manner, the notion, that
right."
Story on Bills, 45.
In Bissenthall v. Williams, Duval, 329, Kentucky court held
the following instrument to be sufficient to constitute
bill of ex"
Please
let
the
bearer have ;?5o.oo;
will arrange
with
change:
you this afternoon," and signed, " Yours, most obedient."
At the trial the plaintiff in the case insisted that the instrument
bill of exchange, but
was not
covenant, and was barred only
As
by the lapse of fifteen years.
basis for his contention, he relied upon the concluding words:
will arrange
with you this
afternoon," as well as upon the general tone of courtesy and supplication which pervaded the instrument.
He further contended
that an intention to make the instrument
bill would have been
manifested by employing some usual phrase to that effect, such as,
"And place to my account." But the court overruled the contention and sustained the instrument as
bill on the principle stated
usual, when the drawer of
by Bouvier that:
bill
debtor
to the drawee, to insert in the bill these words:
and put
to my
account
but where the drawee
debtor to the drawer, then he
inserts these words:
and put
to your account'; but
altoto
insert any of these words."
gether unnecessary
it is

is

it

it

'

';

is

'

a

is

"It

a

a

it

"I
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it

it

it

it,

it,

or non-payment; but he contended, that in point of substance
it was not a bill of exchange, but a mere request to pay
money, not accepted by Nelson, or such as coald put the
plaintiff into any better situation with respect to his demand.
But if it was taken as a bill of exchange, then it could not be
given as evidence at all, as it was not stamped.
Argument of Counsel for Defendant. — It was answered
by the defendant's counsel, that the plaintiff's having accepted the draft as payment, was a waiver of every objection
and that he was therefore bound by
and could not
to
recur to the demand for wages.
Decision of Court. — Lord Kenyon said he was of opinion
that the paper offered in evidence was a bill of exchange;
was an order by one person to another to pay money
that
to the plaintiff or his order, which was in point of form a bill
could not be given in evidence,
of exchange; that as such
without being legally stamped; and as the only mode in which
could operate as a discharge of the plaintiff's demand was,
as stated by the plaintiff's counsel, that the plaintiff in point
of law was therefore entitled to recover.
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A PROMISSORY NOTE MUST CONTAIN AN EXPRESS
PROMISE TO PAY.
CURRIER

V.

LOCKWOOD.i

In the Suprkme Court, Connecticut, October,
{Reported in 40 Connecticut,

1873.

S49-^

Form of Action. — An action in assumpsit upon

a

writ-

a

ten instrument described as a note, with the common counts;
justice of the peace and appealed
brought originally before
to the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield county, and tried
in that court, upon the general issue, closed to the court.

&

case

is

cited in Wood's Byles on B. & N., 45; Daniel
on Negotiable Instruments, 36, 39, 899; Randolph on Commercial
on B.
Paper, 106; Norton on Bills and Notes, 32, 34; Bigelow
Ames
278;
Checks,
and
Bills,
Notes
N., 11; Benjamin's Chalmers'
Paper,
23.
on'sills and Notes, 21; Tiedeman on Commercial

'This
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with notice that the action was barred by the statute of limitations.
The suit was brought June i, 1872.
The Facts. — In the special counts the plaintiff averred
"that the defendant, in and by a certain writing or note,
under his hand by him well executed, dated the 22d day of
January, 1863, promised the plaintiffs to pay to them for value
received, the sum of seventeen dollars and fourteen cents, as
by the said writing or note ready in court to be shown
appears."

Upon the trial the plaintiffs offered in court the following
writing:

"$17.14.

" Due Currier

Bridgeport, Jan.

& Barker

seventeen

22d, 1863.
dollars and fourteen

Frederick Lockwood."

cents, value received.

At the time the note was given the plaintiffs were partners under the name of Currier & Barker.
To this evidence the defendant objected, upon the ground
that there was a fatal variance between the evidence offered
and the special count in the declaration, and the court excluded the same as evidence to prove the special count, but
admitted it to prove an indebtedness under the common
counts.

It

was proved that sometime within three years before
the bringing of the suit, Barker, one of the plaintiffs, met the

if

is

I

.?"

is

.?"

defendant in the street, and reminded him of the note, and
that the defendant said, " I will give you a ton of coal for it,"
and no reply being made, passed along on his way.
It was further proved that, about the time the suit was
brought, the defendant came into Barker's store and said to
him, " Have you that note
or "Where
that note
and
" wish to settle it," or words to that effect, and that Barker
told him that the note was in Mr. Steven's hands and he
could settle with him, and that the defendant replied, " The
outlawed and good for nothing, and you can go ahead
note
you want to."
It was further proved that the note was given for clothing purchased of the plaintiffs by the defendant, which had
not been paid for.
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The plaintiffs

as a matter of law, that the writing was a
promissory note, not negotiable under the statute, and was

■claimed,

not barred until seventeen years from its date; also, second,
that the facts proved an acknowledgment of the debt, and a
new promise, which took it out of the statute of limitations.
Claim of Defendant in Court Below
The defendant
claimed adversely to each of these claims.
Holding of the Court Below — The court ruled adversely
to the claims of the plaintiffs, and held that the debt was barred by the statute of limitations, and rendered judgment for
the defendant to recover his costs.
Claim of Plaintiffs in Supreme Court
The plaintiffs
trial,
moved for a new
Thompson in support of the motion, contended.
First. That there is no variance. The writing imports
"
' '
a
promise to pay and it is set forth according to its legal
effect.' The acknowledgment of indebtedness implies a promise to pay, and constitutes it a promissory note.''
If the instru"
ment is a
note not negotiable," it is not barred by the statute of limitations, such notes running seventeen years.
But if within the statutes which limits it to
Secondly.
six years, yet it is taken out of the statutes by the acknowledgments of the debt made by the defendant within six years
of the bringing of the suit.
He admitted that it was justly
"
due when he said,
I will give you a ton of coal for it." He
afterwards went to settle it, asked for the note, and not until
•directed to settle with the agent did he say that it was outlawed, and even in declaring it to be outlawed he does not say
that he shall refuse to pay it on that account.'
'Smith V. Allen, 5 Day (Conn.), 337, where the note read as
follows: "Due A. B. one hundred dollars, on demand."; Edwards
on Bills, 131; I Am. Lead. Cas. (sth ed.), 383.
^
Cummings V. Freeman, 2 Humph., 143; Marrigan v. Page,
id., 247; Fleming V. Burge, 6 Ala., 373; Brenzer v. Wightman, 7
Watts & Serg., 264; Brewer v. Brewer, 6 Ga., 588; Lowe v. Murphy, 9 id., 341; Johnson v. Johnson, Minor (Ala.), 263; Harrow
V. Dugan, 6 Dana., 341; Kilgore v. Bulkley, 14 Conn., 383.
^Lord V. Harvey, 3 Conn., 372; DeForest v. Hunt, Sid., 184;
Austin V. Bostwick, 9 id., 501; Lee v. Wyse, 35 id., 384.
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Claim of Defendant in Supreme

Court — Lockwood,

contra for defendent said:

"A

contain a legal promise for the
certain payment of a certain sum.' An acknowledgment of a
The note must contain and
debt is not a promissory note.^
must express the promise of the debtor to pay the money."*

First.

note must

"The statute

Our
applies.
courts have never adopted the expedient which has prevailed
to some exextent in other states, of taking cases out of the
statute upon some doubtful or equivocal acknowledgment, but
have always held that the party must have intended to relinguish its protection, or that its provisions must be applied.*
An admission that the note was unpaid, accompanied by the
claim that it was "outlawed," is not sufficient to remove the
bar of the statute.^ An offer to pay a certain sum in satisfaction of a larger one, will not remove the bar of the statute,
Secondly.

of hmitations

even as it regards the sum actually offered,

unless

the offer is

accepted when made."'*

Decision of the Court. — The first question in this case
is whether the writing sued upon is a promissory note within
the meaning of those words in the statute of limitations.
The statute is as follows: "No action shall be brought on any
bond or writing obligatory, contract under seal, or promissory
note not negotiable, but within seventeen years next after an
action shall accrue." The instrument sued upon is as follows:
'

§

14;

I Parsons on Notes and Bills,
Bouvier's Law Diet., Due

I. O. U.

23,

24; Story on Prom. Notes,
Promissory Note, and

Bill,

on Notes and Bills, 25; Byles on Bills, 11, 28;
Smith V. Allen, 5 Day, 340; Beeching v. Westbrook, 8 Mees. &
Wels., 412; Melanotte v. Teasdale, 13 id., 216; Bowles v. Lambert, 54 111., 237.
^i Parsons

''

I Parsons on Notes and Bills,

25.

Hart's Appeal from Probate, 32 Conn., 539.
^Sanford v. Clark, 29 Conn., 460.
'Bell V. Morrison, i Peters, 531; Smith v. Eastman, 3 Cush.,
355; Mumford v. Freeman, 8 Met., 432; Brush v. Barnard, 8
Johns, 407; McLellan v. Albee, 5 Shepley, 184; i Smith Lead.
*

Cas.

(H.

& W. Notes),

part 2d, p. 876.
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"Bridgeport, Jan.

"Due Currier & Barker

cents, value received.

LOCKWOOD.

seventeen

22d, 1863.
dollars and fourteen

Frederick Lockwood.

notes not negotiable are by the statute
Promissory
above recited put upon the footing of specialties in regard to
the period of limitation, and for most other purposes such
notes have been regarded as specialties in Connecticut.
The

instrument however to which this distinction has been attached
is the simple express promise to pay money in the stereotyped
form familiar to all.
The writing given in evidence in this
case is a due bill and nothing more.
Such acknowledgments
of debts are common and pass under the name of due bills.
They are informal memoranda, sometimes here as in England
in the form of "I. O. U." They are not the promissory
notes which are classed with specialties in the statute of limitations.
The law implies indeed a promise to pay from such
acknowledgments, but the promise is simply implied and not
It is well said by Smith, J., in Smith v. Allen,'
expressed.
' '
Where a writing contains nothing more than a bare acknowledgment of a debt, it does not in a legal construction import
an express promise to pay ; but where a. zvriting itnports not
only the acknowledgment of a debt but an agreement to pay
it, this amounts to an express contract."
In that case the words ''on demand" v^ere held to import
and to be an express promise to pay.
That case adopts the
correct principle, namely, that to constitute a promissory note
there must be an express as contra-distinguished
from an
implied promise. The words "on demand" are here wanting.
The words ' ' value received, " which are in the writing signed
by the defendant, cannot be regarded as equivalent to the
words "on demand."
The case of Smith v. Allen went to
the extreme limit in holding the writing then given to be a
promisory note, and we do not feel at liberty to go further in
that direction than the court then went.
The writing then not being a promissory note, the plaintiff's action is barred by the six years clause of the statute,
unless revived by a new promise to pay.
'S Day (Conn), 337.
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ton of coal for the
It was a mere offer of compromise,
note was not accepted.
and clearly no acknowledgment to take the case out of the

The offer of the defendant to give

a

statute.

parties, recited in the
motion, taken together as one transaction, was held by the
Court of Common Pleas not to be sufficient evidence of a new
The result of the interview was a refusal to pay.
promise.
The opening of the conversation on the part of the defendant
would seem to admit the justice of the plaintiff's demand.
The expression of a wish "/(? settle the note" would seem to
imply that it was justly due; but the word ''settle^' is somewhat equivocal, and taking the whole interview together, we
think the Court of Common Pleas made no mistake in law in
deciding as it did.
A new trial is not advised.
In this opinion Park and Carpenter, Js., concurred.
Foster, J. That the paper before us is more correctly
described as a due bill, than as a promissory note, is unquestionable.
That it would be regarded among business men, in
the daily transactions of life, as conferring the same rights,
and imposing the same liabilities, as a promissory note, seems
to me equally unquestionable.
It was so regarded by the
parties to it; it was so treated and so spoken of whenever it
was alluded to.
This is manifest from the record; "The
defendant came into the store of said Barker (one of the
plaintiffs), and said to him: ' Have you that note }' or 'Where
is that note.'' and that he 'wished to settle it.'
Barker told
him 'the note was in Mr. Steven's hands, etc.'"
Any writing
importing a debt, and an obligation to pay
especially
contains the words ^for value received, " is, in the popular
This instrument
judgment, a note.
clearly of that character.
was clearly the intent of the parties so to make
and
evident that they supposed they had so made it. To
hold otherwise would seem to be contrary to the understanding and intent of the parties.
But
claimed that this instrument
not, in law,
note,
that
promissory
the legislature, in passing the statand
utes of limitation, could never have intended to put such
contracts on
footing with specialties.

a

is

is

a

it

is

it
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it,
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Now if we examine the various works on bills of exchange
and promissory notes, we do not find that the learned authors
of those treatises agree upon any exact and precise definition

promissory note.
Chitty, Bayley, Byles, Story, and
Parsons, however, all agree that no particular words are
necessary to make a bill or note.
"It is sufficient if a note
amount to an absolute promise to pay money."'
Chancellor
Kent, following substantially Mr. Justice Bayley, says, '-A
note is a written promise, by one person to another, for the
payment of money, at a specified time, and at all events. "^
Judge Parsons says, "A promissory note
in its simplest
form, only a written promise."^
These definitions imply that note must contain an express
And Mr. Justice Story says: "But
promise to pay.
seems
that, to constitute
good promissory note, there must be an
express promise upon the face of the instrument to pay the
mere promise implied by law, founded upon an
money for
acknowledged indebtment, will not be sufficient."*
Courts of
the highest authority, however, both in England and in this
country, hold otherwise; nor are all the text-writers so to be
No precise words of contract are necessary in
understood.
a promissory note, provided they amount, in legal effect, to a
promise to pay."^
What 'Words and Phrases are Equivalent to the W^ord
"Promise." — It is settled that a note need not contain the
there are other words of equivalent
words promise to pay,
import."'* What words are of "equivalent import," and are
sufficient to raise
pronjise to pay, has occasioned much dis"The distinction between the cases on this point,"
cussion.
note on the section above quoted,
says Mr. Justice Story, in
"is extremely nice, not to say sometimes very unsatisfactory."
English Cases. — As long ago as 1795, C.
Eyre, sitting
a

'

^

'

Parsons on Notes and Bills,
■'Story on Prom. Notes, 14.
Byles on Bills, 8.
Parsons on Notes and Bills,

I

"

J.

Chitty on Bills, 428.
Com., 74.

I '3

•■

^

a

a

'

if

'
'
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a
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"/.

O. U. eight guineas" to be merely
at Nisi Prius, held an
an acknowledgment of a debt, and neither a promissory note

In 1800, in the case of Guy v. Harris," Ld.
nor a receipt.'
Eldon, whose authority is certainly not inferior to that of C. J.
Eyre, held a similar paper to be a promissory note, and ruled it
out when offered in evidence, because it had not a stamp.
—
owe my father ^^470.
Jas. Israel:" This paper was offered
" I enterin evidence before Ld. Ellenborough, and he said:
tain some doubts whether this paper ought not to have been
stamped as a promissory note, but on authority of Fisher v.
Leslie,' I will receive it in evidence, though unstamped."*
a time be named for payment, these instruments are differIn Brooks v. Elkins, "I. O. U. ;£'20, to
ently construed.^
be paid on the 22d inst.," was held to be either a promissory
note, or an agreement for the payment o{ £10 and upwards,
"/. O. U. £Sj, to be
and in either case required a stamp.
paid May Sth,'' was held to be a good promissory note.*
The cases are numerous where an instrument has been
held to be a good note without an express promise to pay.
" I do acknowledge myself to be indebted to A. in ;^iO, to be
On demurrer to the
paid on demand for value received."
declaration, the court, after solemn argument, held that this
In the case of Morris v.
was a good note within the statute.'
Lee,' the words were,
promise to be accountable to J. S.,
or order, for ^50, value received by me," and it was held a
The court say they "will take the
good promissory note.

"I

//

"I

word accountable as much as

if it had been pay. "

notice the words value received.

Fortescue,

J.

They also
said,

"This

'Fisher v. Leslie, i Esp. , 425.
"Reported in Chitty on Bills, 526.
' I Esp.,
245.
Childers v. Boulnois, Dow.
^Israel v. Israel, i Camp., 499.
& Ry., Nis Prius cases, 8, decided by C. J. Abbot, is to the same
See also Tompkins v. Ashby, 6 Barn. & Cres., 541; 9
effect.
Dow. & Ry., 543; I Mees. & Wels., 32; S. C.
'2 Mees. & Wels.,

74.

'Waithman v. Elzee, i Car. & Kirw., 35.
' Cashborne v. Dutton, i
Selwyn, Nisi Prius, 320.
'i Esp., 426.
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is a debt, being for value received, and said on
S. C.

American Cases

— Turning

account."'

to tiie

is

a

it

is

is

a

a

is

it

is,

American cases, we
find in our own court the case of Smith v. Allen. ^ This was
brought on a paper in these words: " Due John Allen $94.91,
on demand."
The declaration counted on a promissory note,
and alleged a promise to pay in the usual form, setting out
the note in the declaration.
The defendants demurred, and
the Superior Court held the declaration sufficient. On writ of
error brought, the Court of Errors sustained the decision.
Here was manifestly no express promise to pay; but the
court held that there was one implied, and so sustained the
claim of the plaintiff.
The difference between this and the
case at bar is very slight.
This contains the words ' ' on demand" that at bar the words '■^value received." The one by
its terms is due on demand, and the promise to pay is, therefore, implied by law, the other
in legal effect, due on demand, and
difficult to see
good reason why the law does
debt, as one due
not as readily imply a promise to pay such
on demand by its own terms.
Besides a valuable considera" value retion
expressed in the case at bar by the words
ceived," while none
expressed in the case of Smith v. Allen.
Since the case of Edgerton v. Edgerton,' and the case of
Bristol V. Warner,*
quite clear that, by the law of this
state,
promissory note, not negotiable, and not purporting
on its face to be for value received, does not imply a consideration.
Smith v. Allen and the case at bar, are alike in omitting the words, " or order," and "or bearer," and so are alike
Such notes however are regarded as within
non-negotiable.

'5

Strange, 629;

2

3

362;

I

's Mod.,

4

Anne.'
and
Passing from this decision in our own court to the courts
of New York, where we are accustomed to find questions of
mercantile and commercial law as ably discussed and as Intelthe statute of

Day, 337-

Conn., 6.
19 Conn.,
Smith V. Kendall,
7.

6

^

*

^8

T. R.,

123.

Ld. Raym., 1396.
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ligently decided as in any of our sister states, we find the case
The suit was on this paper, "Due
of Russell V. Whipple.'
S., or bearer, $io." This differs from the case at bar in adding the words ''or bearer" and omits the words "value
received." The court says it was a promissory note, and that
the case was too plain for argument.
In Kimball v. Huntington, ^ this paper, "Due R. $325,
payable on demand," was held admissible in evidence as a
Judge Nelson says: "The acknowledgment
promissory note.
of indebtedness, on its face, implies a promise to pay the
plaintiffs, and the payment by its terms is to be in money,
absolutely, on demand."
there be
In Luqueer v. Prosser,^ Judge Cowan says: ''
in legal effect an absolute promise that money shall be paid,
all the rest is a dispute about words. * * * The whole
inquiry is, does the paper ifnport an engagem.ent that money
shall be paid, absolutely ? If it do, no matter by what words,

If

it is a good note."
In Sackett vs. Spencer,* this paper, ." Due S. or bearer,
"
" is a
$340, for value received with interest, the court says
good promissory note, and if it specifies no time of payment,
it is, in legal effect, payable immediately, and without grace."
In Franklin v. March," the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held this paper, " Good to R. C. or order, for $30, borrowed money," to be a good promissory note.
In addition to the cases above cited, the following are
very strong authorities to sustain the claim that this is a promIn Johnson v. Johnson,' the court say: "The
issory note.*
'

2 Cow.,
536' 10 Wend.,
675.
^i Hill, 259.
*

29

Barb., 180.

N. Hamp.,
"
Cummings v.
note read " Due J.
gan, 6 Dana, 341;
Shirley, 7 Mo., 42;
phy, 9, Geo., 338.
^6

364.

Freeman,

F.

^200

2

Humph., (Tenn.) 143, where the

— borrowed Oct. 21"; Harrow

Flemming

McGowan

v.
v.

v.

Du-

Surge, 6 Ala., 373; Finney v.
West, id., 569; Lome v. Mur-

'i

Ala., 263.
Promissory notes must contain

a

specific promise to pay. The
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acknowledgment of a debt, due for a valuable consideration,
clearly implies a promise to pay it on request."
No precise words of conpromise must be expressed or implied.
tract are necessary, provided they amount, in legal effect to a
promise to pay.
Byles on Bills, 8; Gordon v. Rundlett, 28 N. H., 435.
A
mere acknowledgment
of indebtedness is not sufficient to constitute a promise.
The Following Expressions have been held to Amount
to Promises: "Due C. or order"; "due C. on the first day of
May"; "due C. or bearer"; " good to bearer "; "due A. B. on
demand";
acknowledge myself indebted to C. to be paid on
demand". .The words "on demand " and "to be paid on
" and "or order", " or bearer " have been thought in themday
selves to show that the debtor intended to do more than merely
These words clearly recognize
state the balance due on account.
an obligation and a promise to pay.
Where a writing contained
nothing more than a bare acknowledgment of a debt, it does not,
in legal construction, import an express promise to pay; but where
a writing imports not only the acknowledgment of a debt, but also
this amounts to an express contract. Smith
an agreement to pay
Cow., 536; Currier v.
V. Allen,
Day, 337; Russell v. Whipple,
Lockwood, supra.
A mere promise implied by law, founded on an acknowledged
Brown v. Gilman, 13 Mass.,
indebtedness will not be sufficient.
good promissory note there should
In order to constitute
158.
be an express promise on the face of the instrument to pay the
While the promise need not be expressed in any particumoney.
lar form of words, the language used must be such that the written
Gay v.
undertaking to pay, may fairly be deduced therefrom.
Therefore the following instrument,
Rooke,
115.
151 Mass.,
"I. O. U., E. A. Gay, the sum of seventeen dollars for value
an acknowledgment of a
received.
(Signed) John R. Rooke,"
Gray v. Bowden,
not
but
promissory note.
debt by the maker,
v. Winslow,
Mass.,
Rooke,
Almy
115;
151
23 Pick., 282; Gay V.
Some of the states, however, have by statute
126 Mass., 342.
extended the law of bills and promissory notes to all instruments in
writing whereby any person acknowledges any sum of money to be
Rev. Sts. Ind., Sec. 5501; Rev. Sts. 111.,
due to any other person.
C. 98, Sec. 3; Code, Iowa, Sec. 2085; Gen'l Laws, Colo., no. Sec.
90; see also statutes of Idaho, Indiana and Mississippi.
must be said that there
Upon the subject of this requisite,
The general
of
conflict
authority.
and
quite
great confusion
are
some cases
but
there
true,
undoubtedly
rule as stated above
which hold to the contrary.
has been held that mere statements of indebtIn some states
Thus:
edness are promissory notes.
it

is

a

is

it

a

is

a

.5

2

it,
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The record discloses the fact that the paper before

4,

us was

given for the purchase of clothing, and that the price of it
has never been paid.
Our statute of limitation bars all right
"^525
Due G. S. Warren, on corn, five hundred and twenty-five dollars.
J. Jacquin."
Held to be a negotiable promissory note. Jacquin v. Warren,
40

111.,

459.

Again:
Due B. ^150. 00.

A".
Held to be a note. Brady v. Chandler, 31 Mo., 28.
Many cases have held that the addition of such words as, "on
demand", "payable on demand", "to be paid", etc., were sufficient to convert due bills into notes.
The principle may be best

illustrated by citing and condensing a few cases:
" $500.00.
Rome, September 10, 1846.
Due the Memphis Branch R. R. and Steamboat Co., of Georgia, five hundred dollars payable on demand.
D. R. Mitchell."
Held to be a good promissory note.
Ga.,
17
574.
" I do acknowledge myself to be indebted
to A. in 500 pounds,
to be paid on demand ior value received.
B."
Held to be a note. The words "to be paid on demand" being
held to amount to a promise to pay.
Cashburne v. Dalton, P. on
B. & N., 8th edit, 371.
In Brooks v. Elkins, 2 M & W., 74, the following instrument
was held to require a stamp:
"nth October,
"I. O. U. 20 pounds to be paid on the 22nd instant. 1831.
W. Brooks."
" I have received the imperfect books which
together with the
cash overpaid on the settlement of your account amounts to 80
pounds, which sum I will pay in two years."
Held to be a note.
Wheatly v. Williams, i M. & W., 533.
A few cases showing a negative construction will further illustrate the principle:
have received the sum of 20 pounds which I borrowed
from you and I have to be accountable for the said sum with interest."
Held to be a.nagreemejit but not a note. Horn v. Redfearne,
4 Bing.
N. C, 433. The phrase "to be accountable " is not an equivalent.
"I. O. U. 45 pounds 13 shillings which I borrowed of Mrs.
Melanotte, and to pay her 5^ till paid.

"I

Robert Teasdale."

Held, not to be a note. Melanotte v. Teasdale,
13 M. & ^\L, 216.
"Memorandum.
Mr. Sibree has this day deposited with me

1 3.

CURRIER

J
it it,

SEC.

LOCKWOOD.

V.

7

I

if

is

it

unless
recognized as a promissory note.
of action upon
will in my opinion do much less violence to
60 to recognize
law, than will be done to justice
we permit this defendant

&

a

500 pounds on the sale of 10300 pound 3% Spanish, to be returned
Tripp."
on demand.
James S.
W., 23.
Held, not to be
note.
Sibree v. Tripp, 15 M.

"nth

September, 1839.
undertake to pay to Mr. Robert Jarvis the sum of pounds
suit of clothes ordered by Daniel Page.
shillings for
W. WiLKINS."
note.
M.
and
not
to
be
guarantee,
Held
Jarvis v. Wilkins,

&

W., 410.

In

the above case

"

7

2i

a

S.

4

a

I

6

"

Baron Parke said that had "supplied " been
would have been
ordered "
good note.

The
there

&

6

a

is

it

is

2

is

4

&

a

if

it

a

it

a

it

is

a

it

a

J.

I

&

a

it

inserted instead of
Co.,
"At twelve months after date,
promise to pay R.
for
collateral
them
as
security
moneys
to
be
held
by
500 pounds
M., which they may be unable to receive on
now owing them by
realizing the securites they now hold and others which may be
placed in their hands by him."
Robbins v. May, 11 Ad. & E., 213.
Held not to be note.
that
seen
by no means essential that the
It will thus be
promissory
writing to make
word "promise" be inserted in
"promise " to
amounts to
If, in fair legal intendment,
note.
In accordance with this docas sufficient.
pay, courts will regard
trine, certificates of deposit have been held to be notes, the necessary
Miller
promise being inferred from the nature of the instrument.
V. Austin, 13 How., 218.
these certificates be payable to "A." or "Bearer,"
And,
to the
they are considered negotiable promissory notes payable
Fla.,
21
v.
Agnew,
Maxwell
riS4holder.
promise of
See also, "receipts" for money when containing
Green v.
are
negotiable,
re-payment are promissory notes and
C, 235.
B.
Davies,
true of receipts for money to be "returned when
also
This
Nott & McC, 585.
v. Leslie,
Woodfalk
called for."
merely for money " held
the
receipt
But otherwise, when
Roman v. Terna, 40 Tex., 306.
subject to order."
for money " to be accounted for,"
Or when the receipt
C, 541.
B.
note. Tomkins v. Ashby,
does not amount to

Promise to Pay.—
a
"promise to pay";
words
the
contract need not contain
It has been held
are other words of equivalent meaning.

What

Words

will Import

";

";

5

";

a

a

is

debt together with
an acknowledgment of
that wherever there
the other
the use of any of the following words, the contract (if
good negotiable instrument: "On deessentials appear) will be
" to be paid on May
promise
"• "value received
mand
"
"to
bearer";
"or
order
or
to be 'accountable 'on demand";

"I

CURRIER

72

V.

LOCKWOOD.

[CHAP. 4,

thus to escape the payment of an honest debt for the necessaries of Hfe.

paid"; " John Mason,

14th Feb., 1836, borrowed of Mary, his
sister, the sum of 14 pounds in cash, as per loan, in promise of payment, for which I am truly thankful," (Ellis v. Mason, 7 DowL, 598).
In some jurisdictions the word "due " has been held to import a
Jacquin v. Warren, 40 111., 459; Lee v.
a promise to pay.
Balcora, 9 Colo., 216; 11 Pac. Rep., 74; Anderson v. Pearce,
See statutes of
31 Mo., 28.
36 Ark., 293; Brady v. Chandler,
state.
your
Green v. Davis, 4 B. &
See upon the principal propositions.
C, 239; Wheatley V. Williams, i M. & W., 533; Casborne v. Button, Selwyn's Nisi Prius, 329; Kimball v. Huntington, 10 Wend.,
67s; Block V. Bell, i M. &R., 149; Israel v. Israel, i Camp., 499;
Brooks V. Elkins, 2 M. & W., 74; Waithman v. Elsee, i C. & K.,
35; Dullea V. Emery, 2 Cr. & D. C. C, 506; Ellis v. Mason, 7
Bowling, 598; White v. North, 3 Exch. Rep., 689 (18 L. J. Rep.
[N. S.] Exch., 316); Shrivell v. Payne; 8 Bowling, P. C, 441;
Forward v. Thompson, 12 Upper Canada, Q. B. Rep., 103; Robinson V. Bland, 2 Burr., 1077; Dickenson v. Teague, 23 L. T.
Rep., 65; Ball v. Allen, 15 Mass., 433; Gordon v. Rundlett, 28
N. H., 435; Smith v. Allen, 5 Bay (Conn.), 337; Russell v. Whipple, 2 Corv. (N. Y.), 536; Carver V. Hayes, 47 Me., 257; Bacon
V. Bicknell, 17 Wis., 523; Huyck v. Meador, 24 Ark., 191; Franklin v. March, 6 N. H., 364; Bank of Orleans v. Merrill, &c., 2
Hill(N. Y.), 29s; Miller v. Austen, 13 How., 218; Poorman v.
Mills, 35 Call., 118; Blood v. Northrup, i Kans., 28; Howe v.
Hartness, 11 Ohio St., 449; Gate v. Patterson, 25 Mich., 191;
Tripp v. Curtenius; 36 Mich., 494; Hunt v. Bivine, 37 111., 137;
Lafayette Bank v. Ringell, 51 Ind., 393.
Due Bills. — In some jurisdictions an ordinary due-bill such
as: "due A"; "I. O. U.", have been held to be good promissory
notes.
Jacquin v. Warren, 40 111, 459; Lee v. Balcon, 9 Colo.,
216; Fleming V. Burge, 6 Ala., 373; Brady v. Chandler, 31 Mo.,
28; St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Camden Bk., 47 Ark., 545.
This, however, is clearly against the weight of authority.
Currier v. Lockwood, 40 Conn., 348; Fisher v. Leslie, i Esp., 425;
Guy v. Harris (1800), Chitty on Bills, 426; Israel v. Israel, i
Gamp., 493; Gay v. Rooke, 23 N. E. Rep. (Mass.), 835; Brooks
V. Elkins, 2 M. & W., 74; Payne v. Jenkins, 4 Car. & P., 335;
Smith V. Smith, i F. & F., 539; Gould v. Courbs, i C. B., 543;
Bowles V. Lambert, 54 111., 237 (1870); Carson v. Lucas, 13 B.
Mon., 213 (1852); Garland V. Scott, 15 La. An., 143.
In order to amount to a promissory note the words used must
at least be words from which a promise to pay money can be imPrice V. Jones, 105 Md., 543; Strickland v. Holbrook, 7 s
plied.
be

Cal., 268.
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I

would admit the paper offered in evidence in support of
the first count in the declaration.
In this opinion Phelps J., concurred.
An I. O. U. which does not contain any promise to pay is
generally held not to constitute a promissory note, but is a mere
evidence of an account stated.
Gray v. Bowden, 23 Pick., 282;
Winslow,
v.
126
Mass., 342; Fisher v. Leslie, i Esp., 425.
Almey
Israel vs. Israel, i Camp. 499; Carnwright v. Gray, 127 N.

Y.,

93-

It has recently been held in New York that a written statement that a certain amount of money is due a payee therein
named, followed by the signature of the maker of the statement,
implies that the money is due from the maker and is an acknowlThe acknowledgment of the indebtededgment of indebtedness.
ness, and that it is due, implies a promise to pay it on demand.
Hageman v. Moon, 131 N. Y., 462.
An instrument merely acknowledging a deposit, cannot be
There must be some word or
regarded as a promissory note.
statement raising a promise to pay. Kilgore v. Bulkley, 14 Conn.,
6 Watts & Serg., 227; Sibree
363, 383; Patterson v. Poindexter,
In Tomkins v. Ashby, (6 B. & C,
v. Tripp, IS M. & W., 23.
541) (i M. & M., 32) it was held that the following memorandum,
" Mr. T. has left in my hands 200 pounds" was not a promissory
See also Payne v. Jenkins, 4 Car. & P., 335; Children v.
note.
Boulnois, Dow. & Ry., 8; Little v. Slackford, M. & M., 171.
Neither will the written acknowledgment, on the back of a contract, acknowledging it to be due, signed by the promissor, create
Gray v. Bowa promise to pay the sum named in the contract.
den, 23 Pick., 282; Almey v. Winslow, 126 Mass., 342; Daggett
v. Daggett, 124 Mass., 149; Biskup v. Oberle, 6 Mo. App., 583.
Promise to Give. — Where the words used in a negotiable
contract import a promise "to give" simply a certain sum of
money they will not create a promissory note. Caviness v. Rushton,
loi Ind., 500; Johnston v. Griest, 85 Ind., 503; Williams v. Forbes,
114 111., 167; Kirkpatrick v. Taylor, 43 111., 207; Pratt v. Trustees,
93 Ill-> 475-
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THE ORDER IN A BILL AND THE PROMISE IN A NOTE MUST
BE ABSOLUTE AND UNCONDITIONAL.
PEARSON

V.

GARRETT,!

In the King's Bench, Trinity Term,
\_Reported

Form of Action

in

4

5

Will

&

Mary,

1694.

Modern Rep. 242.^

John Pearson complains of John Gar-

rett, being in the custody of the marshal, &c. , for that, to wit,
Whereas the city of London is an ancient city; and also
whereas in the same city; to wit, at the parish of St. Mary le
Bow, in the ward of Cheap, there is and hath been, from time

immemorial, an ancient and laudable custom, approved and
used in the same, between merchants and other persons inhabiting in the same city, namely, that if any person inhabiting
in the said city shall make any bill or note in writing subscribed
under his hand, and by the same bill or note he should promise to pay any person any sum of money at any time or any
times in the same bill or note mentioned, such person who made
the same bill or note, by the same promise and consideration
aforesaid, among merchants and other persons aforesaid, so as
aforesaid used and approved, is bound to pay the same sum of
money in the same bill or note mentioned to the same persons
to whom promise of payment thereof by the same bill or note
was made to pay the same at the time or times in and by the
same bill and note for payment thereof is denoted, according
And whereas, on the 21st day of
to his promise aforesaid.
October, in the fourth year of the reign of the Lord William
and the Lady Mary, the now king and queen of England, &c. ,
at London aforesaid, to wit, in the parish of St. Mary le Bow,
in the ward of Cheap aforesaid, the same John Garrett was a

'This

case is cited in Chitty on Bills, 12, 135, 517; Story on
Bills of Exchange, 46; Wood's Byles on Bills & Notes, 168; Benjamin's Chalmers on Bills, Notes and Checks, 27; Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 41; Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, 25;
Randolph on Commercial Paper, 153; Norton on B. & N., 38;
Ames on B. & N., 30 n.
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person residing in the city of London aforesaid, and so there
residing on the same 21st day of October, in the fourth year
aforesaid, in the parish and ward aforesaid, by a certain note
in writing, subscribed with his own proper hand, promised to
pay to the said John Pearson, or his assigns, sixty pounds
within two months next after the aforesaid John Garrett should
be lawfully married to one Elizabeth Petty, that is to say, fifty
pounds thereof for himself, the aforesaid John Pearson, and
ten pounds thereof for his wife.
And the same John Pearson
in fact saith, that the aforesaid John Garrett afterwards, to
wit, on the 28th day of February, on the fifth year of the
reign of the said lord the now king and lady the now queen,
at London aforesaid, in the parish and ward aforesaid, to the
said Elizabeth Petty was lawfully married; by which, and by
force of the custom aforesaid, the aforesaid John Garrett became bound to pay to the said John Pearson the said sixty
pounds, according to his promise aforesaid; and thereupon in
consideration of the premises, the aforesaid John Garrett, then
and there, to wit, on the 28th day of February, in the fifth
year aforesaid, at London aforesaid, in the parish and ward
undertook, and faithfully promised the said John
Pearson, then and there, that he the said John Garrett the
said
to
the
aforesaid
sixty
pounds
John Pearson,
within two months next after the marriage aforesaid had,
Nevertheless the aforewell and truly to pay and satisfy.
not regarding his promise and undersaid John Garrett,
taking aforesaid, but contriving and fraudulently intending the
said John Pearson in this behalf craftily and subtilely to deceive and defraud, the said sixty pounds, or any part thereof,
Pearson hath not yet paid, although to do it
to the said
aforesaid,

John
John Garrett afterwards,

to wit,

on the 2d day of
May, in the fifth year aforesaid, at London aforesaid, in the
parish and ward aforesaid, by the same John Pearson was reGarrett to pay him the same, or
quired; but the same
the said

John

him for the same hitherto in any wise to satisfy, hath altoTherefore the said John
gether refused, and yet doth refuse.
Pearson says, that he is thereby injured, and hath received
And therefore
damage to the value of one hundered pounds.
he produces the suit, &c.
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Form of Defense. — To this declaration

the

4,

defendant

demurred, and the plaintiff joined in demurrer.
The action was brought upon a note for the payment of
sixty guineas when the plaintiff should marry such a person,
&c., in which the plaintiff declared, as upon a bill of exchange,
setting forth the custom of merchants, &c.'
The exceptions taken were, viz., ist, that the plaintiff
does not aver that he was a merchant, or 2d, that the note
and 3d,
was made secundum consuetudinem mercatorum;
neither has he laid any consideration.
This is not such a custom amongst merchants of which
this Court is obliged to take notice as part of the law of the
land; for in truth there is no such custom; it is only an agreement founded upon a brokage, and therefore cannot be within
the custom of merchants; neither was there ever yet any preIt
cedents to pay money upon such a collateral contingency.
is no more than a voluntary note given with a present consideration; and if such should be allowed to be within the custom
of merchants, then everything which is given without a consideration may be as well within the custom, which would
quite change the law.^

Reply of Plaintiff. — The question is, Whether this custom
it

is

is

.''

It sufficiently alleged in the declaration;
be good or not
not laid to be inter mercatores only, but inter alias personas

a

is

it

a

such

a

&c.; and

if

custom can be good, then
Dr. Witherly's son
admitted to be so by the demurrer.
note; and he was
gentleman,
brought the like action upon
merchant,
France,
but traveling into
and had
and no trading
was
in
affirmed
the exchequer chamber.* No
judgment, which
residentes,

An action brought by the payee of

3

2

2

i

i

a

is

a

a

a

'

contract (as
negotiawhich
the drawer or maker promises to pay
cerble contract), by
tain sum of money within two months after the drawer or maker
shall have married cannot be sustained; for such
contract
not
Salk., 129;
within the custom of merchants,
Strange, 674;
Burrows, 1637, 1670;
Bl. Com., 446;
Ld. Raymond, 757.

Mod., 265, 307, 362; 10 Mod., 286, 294; II Mod., 180;
12 Mod., 15, 36, 380.
'i Ld. Ray, 175, 281, 744, 759, 1481.
'Sarsfield v. Witherley,
Show., 125; Comb., 45;
Ventris.,
Holt,
292;
123.
2

i

^8
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reason can be offered why such a note should not bind as well

bond, since the consideration for which it was given was
very just, for it is lawful for one man to help another to a
wife.
The Decision. — If the note had been given by way of commerce it had been good, but to pay money upon such a contingency cannot be called trading, and therefore not within the
custom of merchants.
Judgment was given for the defendant.'
as a

& 4 Ann. c. 9 it is provided that, "All notes in writing
signed by any person, whereby such person shall promise to pay
to any other person, or his order or unto bearer, any sum of
money mentioned in such note, shall be taken and construed to be
due and payable to the person to whom the' same is made payable,
and shall be assignable or indorsable over in the same manner as
inland bills of exchange are or may be according to the custom of
merchants; and the person to whom such money is, by such note,
made payable, may maintain an action for the same as upon an
inland bill of exchange, drawn according to the custom of merchants, against the person who signed the same; and the person to
whom such note is indorsed may maintain his action for the money,
either against the drawer or any of the indorsees, as in cases of
This act being for the benefit of cominland bills of exchange."
merce, is to be liberally construed, 3 Wilf. i; but no notes are
within the benefit of it, unless they would, as bills of exchange,
Martin v. Chauntry,
have been within the custom of merchants.
Bull., N. P., 273; Joscelyne v. Lassere, Fort., 281;
2 Stra., 271;
Jenny v. Hale, 8 Mod., 265; Jefferies v. Austin, i Stra., 674; Kyd
'o 37> ^'^^ see Beardsley v. Baldwyn, 2
on Bills of Exchange,
Stra., 1 15 1, in point.
Payment Must Not Depend Upon a Contingency.—
The order and the promise contained in commercial contracts
must be simple, certain, unconditional and not subject to any conAnd hence, the general rule is, that a negotiable
tingencies.
contract must not be limited in payment to particular circumstances
and events, which cannot be known to the holder of such instruments ,
in the general course of its negotiations; and if the contract wants
upon its face this essential quality, or character of certainty, the
law oblidefect is fatal It is then nothing more than a common
v.
Earl of
Dawkes
R.
Fancourt,
Term
482;
v.
Carlos
gation.
5
126
Piollet,
Bk.
v.
Nat.
Black.,
Citizens
782;
Dolovaine, 2 Wm.
Bank,
v.
Mich.,
Siegel
237;
Pa. St., 194; Chandler v. Carey, 64
An
61 N. W. Rep., 854.
Nelson,
v.
Culbertson
569;
111.,
131
order or promise to pay out of a particular fund will render the
If however the order or promise simply
instrument conditional.
indicates a fund out of which reimbursement may be had, it is not
'

By

3

n
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159; Richardson v.
Worden v. Dodge, 4 Denio,
Carpenter, 46 N. Y., 660; Hunger v. Shannon, 61 N. Y., 251;
Cota V. Buck, 7 Mete. (Mass.), 588; Miller v. Poage, 56 la., 96;
Therefore, a promise to
Schmittler v. Simon, loi N. Y., 554.
pay "out of my father's estate;" "oroutof the growing substance;"
"or on the return of this certificate;" "or in one and one-half
years at my option;" or "a promise to pay with a right to extend
the time of payment," or " with an understanding that the contract
will be renewed at maturity," have been held not to be good comSo also will a prommercial contracts on account of conditions.
ise to pay, "out of rents" or "out of A's money when he shall
receive it," or "on the sale of certain property or produce" or
"out of a certain fund," or "on account of freight" or "when
the drawer shall come of age" or "thirty days after the ship 'A',
shall arrive," be bad for uncertainty.
Palmer v. Pratt, 2 Bing. R.,
185; Colehan v. Cooke, Willes R. , 393; Jenny v. Earle, 2 Ld.
Raymond, 1361; Goss v. Nelson, i Bun. R., 226; Banbury v.
Lisset. 2 Strange R., 1211; De Forrest v. Frary, 6 Cow. (N. Y.),
151; Ferris v. Bond, 4 Barn. & Aid. 679; Beardsley v. Baldwyn, 7
Mod, R., 417 (reported also in 2 Strange, ir5i); Willis, R., 399,
(where the promise was to pay, "when the drawer shall marry,"
which was held to be conditional and therefore bad).
Pearson v.
Garrett, 4 Mod. Rep., 242; Brooks v. Hargreaves, 21 Mich.; 255;
Chandler V. Carey, 64 Mich., 238; Gushing v. Field, 70 Me., 50;
Costello V. Crowell, 127 Mass., 293; Woodburry v. Roberts, 59
la., 348; ("when the estate of 'M' is settled up,") Husband v.
Eqling, 81 111., 772; Jennings v. Bank, 22 Pac. Rep., 777.
In some jurisdictions it has been held, that, where payment
was a certain time after sight, or when realized, it was upon
condition and therefore bad. Alexander v. Thomas, 16 Adol. &
Ellis, 333; 16 Q. B., 333; Charlton v. Reed, 61 Iowa; 166. See
also the following cases upon the general proposition; Blackman
v. Lehman, 63 Ala., 547; Power v. Ward, 6 Gray, 175; Stults v.
Silva, 119 Mass., 137; Worth v. Case, 42 N. Y., 363; Fleury v.
Tufts, 25 111. App., loi; Blake v. Coleman, 22 Wis., 396; White
V. Gushing, 88 Me.,
339.
If the bill or note contains, in addition to the order or promise to pay money, an order or promise to do an act it will not be
sustained as a negotiable instrument.
Davies v. Wilkinson, 10
Aid. & EL, 98; Killam v. Schoeps, 26 Kans., 310; Cook vs. Satterlee, 6 Con., 108; Leonard v. Mason, i Wend., 522; Valley
Nat. Bk. V. Crowell, 148 P. St., 284; Osborn v. Hawley,
19 Ohio,
130; First Nat. Bk. v. Slaughter, 98 Ala., 602; Hodges v. Shuler,
22 N. Y., 114.
The instrument may, however, contain a statement showing the
facts out which the transaction arose without becoming conditional.
Siegel of v. Chicago &c. Bank, 131 111., 569; Stevens v. Blunt,
240; Davis v. McCready, 17 N. Y., 320.
7 Mass.,

conditional.
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The Reason for the Rule. — Judge Story

has well stated
reason for this essential of bills and notes, to be " that it
would greatly perplex the commercial transactions of mankind,
and diminish and narrow their credit, circulation, and negotiability, if paper securities of this kind were issued out into the world,
encumbered with conditions and contingencies; and if the persons
to whom they are offered in negotiation, were obliged to inquire,
when these uncertain events would probably be reduced to certainty, and whether the conditions would be performed or not."
Story on Bills of Exchange, Sec. 46; Jenny v. Earle, 2 Ld. Raymond, 1361; Colehan v. Cooke, Willes, Rep., 393; Goss v. Nelson, I Burr., R., 226; Dankes v. Earl, etc., 2 W. Black., 782;
DeForest v. Frary, 6 Cow. (N. Y.), 151; Banbury v. Lisset, 2
Strange, 12 11.
In Clarke v. Perceval, 2 B. and Ad. 660, the instrument was
in the following form:
the

"Warrington, 4th March, 1824.
On demand, we promise to pay Mr. George Clark, or order.
Twelve hundred pounds, for value received, in stock, ale, brewing
";^i2oo.

etc., this being intended to stand against the undersigned
Mary Perceval as a setoff for the sum left me in my father's will
above my sister Anne's share.
Thomas Perceval,

vessels,

(Witness)

William Hall.

Mary Perceval."

King's Bench held that the twelve hundred
pounds was not payable at all events and the instrument was, therefore, not a promissory note.
The Bill or Note will be Sustained if the Condition is
Sure to Happen. — A negotiable contract may be made payable
upon some condition or the happening of some event, if the conThus a promise to
dition or the event is sure to come to pass.
pay "ten days after the death of A" will be sustained, for that
Roffey v. Greenwell, 10 Al. & E., 222;
event is sure to happen.
Price V. Taylor, 5 Hurl. & N., 540; Protection Insurance Co. v.
Bill, 31 Conn., 204; Goss v. Nelson, i Burr, 228. In the case
of Andrews v. Franklin, the promise was "to pay within two
months after the ship 'Swallow' is paid off." This was supported
on the ground that the paying off of the ship is a thing of a public
i Strange, 24 (1717);
nature and will therefore come to pass,
Evans v. Underwood, i Wils, 262; Beardsley v. Baldwin, 7 Mod.,
If the time of payment must surely come, though the
417, 419.
particular day is not mentioned, nor perhaps ascertainable at the
inception of the contract, the note or bill is good and negotiable.
Thus notes payable a certain time after a man's death, have been
Bristol v.
held good; for it is certain that every man must die.
Warner, 19 Conn., 7; Conn. v. Thornton, 46 Ala., 588.
"As soon as realized" and "to be paid during the coming
The court of
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season" occurring in the same note and read together have been
held not a condition, as payment must be due before the close of
harvest.
Cota v. Buck, 7 Mete, 588.
"
Notes Payable at the " Convenience of the Maker are
Payable W^ithin a Resonable Time.— In the cases, we find instances of notes containing statements of the time of payment
which, if taken literally, would enable the maker to refuse payment
In these instances, the courts have held the notes to be
forever.
Works v. Hershey, 35 la.,
due a reasonable time after their date.
Me.,
Holmes,
v.
Crooker
340;
65
195.
In the 35 la., 340, the promissory note was in the following
form:
' '
promise to pay to the order of Niks
On demand after date,
Brooks $2,^12.81 payable at Cincinnati when convenient."
Held, that the maker was bound to pay within a reasonable
In discussing the construction of
time after the date of the note.
the note. Beck, C. J., said: "The words 'payable at Cincinnati,
when convenient,' cannot be construed to nullify the other words
If any
of the instrument, viz., '■On demand, I promise to pay.'
force be given to them it will be that the maker bound himself
within a reasonable time to pay the amount, after the date of the

I

note.

"

In the 65 Me., 195, the language of the court was: "Where
the maker of a note promises to pay a certain sum when he shall
sell the place he lives on, the debt is absolute, though its payment
may be postponed; it is the duty of the maker to sell within a reasonable time, that he may discharge his indebtedness; he cannot
avoid liability by putting it out of his power to perform his
contract."

In De Wolfe v. French (51 Me., 420), it was held, that where
debt is due absolutely, and the happening of a future event is
fixed upon as a convenient time of payment merely, and the future
event does not happen as contemplated, the law implies a promise
In Sears v. Wright (24 Me., 278),
to pay within a reasonable time.
this rule was followed where the note was payable "from the
avails of the logs bought of M. M., when there is a sale made."
In Smithers v. Junckers (41 Fed. Rep., loi), Gresham, J., held
the following to be a good promissory note and payable within a
reasonable time:
''Chicago, III., Nov. i, 1883.
''For value received
promise to pay to S. F. Smithers two
thousand and forty-eight and 2^-100 dollars, payable at my convenience, and upon this express condition, that
am to be sole judge of
such convenience and time of payment.
a

I

I

A. Junkers."

The same rule was applied in the case of Lewis v. Tipton, 10
Ohio St., 88, where the promise was to pay "when I can make it
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Edwards on Bills of Exchange and Promissory
Notes, 154, note 4, Capron v. Capron, 44 Vt., 410.
Conditions may be Imposed by an Indorsement. —
A negotiable contract, absolute in form, may be made condiIn the case of
tional by an indorsement made before delivery.
Barnard et al. v. Gushing et al. (4 Mete, 230), the contract was
" We agree not to
an absolute promise to pay with the indorsement
compel payment for the amount of this note, but to receive the same
It was held that no
when convenient for the promissor to pay it."
See also Hartley
action could be maintained upon this promise.
V. Wilkinson, 4 Camp., 127; 4 M. & S., 25.
Inconsistent Conditions will be Disregarded. — Bayley
in his work on Bills cites a case (2 Atk., 32) where the note
"Borrowed of J. S. 50 pounds, which I promise never
read,
The court rejected the word "never" and held the
to pay."
A note payable "when payor and payee mutually
liable.
promissor
Page v. Cook, June 21,
in
a reasonable time.
agree" is payable
In the case of Ubsdell
189s (Mass.); 41 Northeastern Rep., 115.
was "as soon as colV. Cunningham
(22 Mo., 124), the promise
lected from my accounts at P.", and it was held to be an absolute

convenient."

promise to pay.

to pay if my brother does not" upon a continAppleby v. Biddolph, 8 Mod.,
gency will not be supported.
A promise to pay "at four years after date, if I am
303 (T717).
then living, otherwise this bill to be null and void, is payable upon
Braham v.
a contingency and not a good negotiable contract.
Bubb, Chitty on Bills of Exchange 87 (1826); Gillilan v. Myers,
Gwin, 19
525; Eldrhd v. Mallory, 2 Colo., 320; Hays v.
31
not
is
good,
be
paid,"
Ind., 19.
promise to pay or cause to
B.
Rep.,
Lovell V. Hill, 6 C. & P., 238; Shenton v. James, 5 Q.
61
Shannon,
v.
W.,
Munger
410;
&
M.
Wilkins,
v.
7
199; Jarvis
N. Y., 251; McGee v. Larramore, 50 Mo., 425; Blake v. Coleman,

A "promise

III,

22

"I

Wis., 415.

A Condition which Changes the Time of Payment
Does Not Destroy the Bill or Note.— It is no objection to a

note payable at a certain date that it permits payment before
Thus a note at twelve months "or sooner if made out
maturity.
Mahoney v. Fitzpatrick, 133 Mass.,
of a certain sale" is good.
Walker v. Woolen, 54
134; Ernst V. Steckman, 74 Pa. St., 13;
Woolen v. Ulrich, 64 Ind., 120; Palmer v. Hammer,

Ind., 164;
10 Kan., 464; Helmer v. Krolick, 36 Mich., 371.
If it is made payable absolutely at some time certain unconit
ditionally, it will be sustained, even though by some possibility
may be paid sooner.
To illustrate in the note

"Six

months

one hundred dollars,

property.

as

follows:

"Ann Arbor, Mich., May 24, i8g8.
promise to pay John Doe or order,
date
after
sell

for

I

value received, or as soon as T can

Richard Roe.

my
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There is an absolute promise to pay at a time certain, but mayThe fact that it may be paid before the
be paid at an earlier date.
Ernst v.
time stated does not make the promise conditional.
Steckman, 74 Pa. St., 13; Charlton v. Reed, 61 la., 166; Palmer v.
Hammer, 10 Kans., 464; Woolen v. Ulrich, 64 Ind., 120.
Nor does it invalidate the note, if it recites that on payment,
Hawley v. Bingham,
the payee shall sell a machine to the maker.
6

Or., 76.
Nor does

reservation in the note of a right to pay in United
States bonds invalidate the instrument as a negotiable security.
Dinsmore v. Duncan, 57 N. Y., 573.
The words, "payable on the return of this certificate," inserted in the document, if a condition at all, constitutes a lawful
one, being merely a demand for the surrender of the evidence of
Smilie v. Stevens, 38 Ver., 316.
indebtedness.
Conditions, to be Binding, must appear upon the Bill
or Note. — Conditions to effect negotiability must appear on the
face of the written instrument, and when not so appearing, cannot
be proven by parole.
Jones v. Shaw, 67 Mo., 667; contra 4 Mete.
230 supra.
In discussing this question, a Texas court laid down the following proposition: — "Where a bill, payable at a certain day is
presented for acceptance and dishonored, the payee may sue the
drawer at once; and a plea by the latter setting up an oral agreement made previous to or contemporaneous with the drawing of
the bill, that the drawer should not be liable to pay the amount of
the bill until the time stipulated, is bad; for the reason that it proposes to vary by oral evidence the legal effect of a contract in
a

writing."
During the American civil war, notes were frequently given
payable a certain time "after peace," or the "ratification of
In
peace" between the United States and the Confederate States.
some states, these obligations have been held actionable upon
the cessation of hostilities; while in others they have been declared
invalid as being conditioned upon the success of insurrection.
Brewster v. Williams, 2 S. Car., 455; Knight v. McReynolds, 37

Tex., 204.
A note or bill payable out of a particular fund is not payable
at all events and unconditionally, inasmuch as the fund may prove
Atkins v. Marks, i Cow., 6gi. There is an exception,
deficient
however, in case the person having possession of the fund drawn
upon accept the bill so drawn.
This establishes the negotiability
of the instrument at once, and, as between drawer and payee it
operates even before acceptance as an equitable assignment of the
fund it refers to.
Am. & Eng. Encyo., 320.
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MUST BE FOR THE PAYMENT OF MONEY ONLY.
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In the Suprkme Court of Ohio, December,
[Reported in

Form of Action — This

j

Ohio,

1827.

5/. ]

action of assumpsit,
upon a note of hand given by the defendant, to Hezekiah
Rhodes or bearer, promising to pay fifty dollars, at a day sub"in good merchantable whisky, at trade price."
sequent,
The declaration set forth, in terms, an assignment and delivery of the note to the plaintiff, and claimed to recover as
was

an

bearer.

Form

of

Defense
The defendant demurred, and
assigned as a cause of demurrer, that the note was not negotiable.
The court of common pleas in Trumbull county gave
judgment for the plaintff, and the defendant obtained this writ
of error, which was adjourned here for final decision.
Decision — At the common law, this paper was not assignable; neither is it assignable under our statute.
The plaintiff
admits this; but claims to recover, on the ground, that being
made payable to bearer, any person, who is the actual bona
Were it a
fide owner, may maintain the action as bearer.
note for money, this position would be a correct one.
But
that doctrine has never been applied to executory contracts for
the delivery of property, or for the performance of any particular act.
The case of Geddings v. Byington,' decided upon the circuit, at Ashtabula, is supposed to have settled this doctrine
This inference is deduced, not from the point dedifferently.

'This case is cited in Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 55;,
Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, 29; Norton on Bills and Notes,
See also 14 Am. Dec, at 422, where the case is reported
49.
with extended notes.
^

2

Ohio, 228.
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but from some remarks of the judge in giving the
These were only intended to apply to a note for the
opinion.
It
payment of money, made payable to a payee or bearer.
cided,

General Rule. — It

the first and principal requisite that
commercial contracts must be for the payment of money only, and
such payment must be absolute and not contingent, either as to
amount, event, fund or person; and if they are made payable in
is

anything else, such as merchandise or other property susceptible of
loss or variation in value, they will not be good commercial contracts, but of course will be sustained as common law contracts.
Chitty on Bills, 153; ("ook v. Satterlee, 6 Cow., 108; Worden v.
Dodge, 4 Denio, 159; Archer v. Claflin, 31 111., 306; Tibbits v.
Gerrish, 25 N. H. , 41; Horton v. Arnold, 17 Wis., 139.
Exception. — May be Payable in Merchandise if at the
Option of the Payee. — Neither will the contract be sustained as
a commercial contract if it is payable in money oj- merchandise in
the alternative, unless the option of accepting the money or merDan. on Negot. Inst., Sec.
chandise is exclusively in the holder.
Notes,
Bills
and
Sec.
Norton
on
23; Auerbach v. Pritchett, 858
55;
Alar. 451; Hosstatterv. Wilson, 36 BarL, 307; McClellan v. Coffins,
93 Ind., 456; Hodges v. Shuler, 22 N. Y., 114.
Exception. — Statutory Provisions. — By statute in some of
the states; however, contracts to pay in property, to order, or to
Prather v. McEvoy, 8 Mo., 661;
bearer, are made negotiable.
Hyland v. Blodgett, 9 Oregon, 166; Spears v. Bond, 79 Mo., 470;
Weil V. Tyler, 38 Mo., 545; Rev. Stat, of Mo. (1879), Sec. 663;
McClellan v. Coffin, 93 Ind., 456.
In Spears v. Bond, supra, the contract was as follows and was
held to be a good prommissory note under the statute:
"May 28, i8(pj,
' '
Eighteem months after date, we, or either of i/s, promise to
pay to the bearer the sum of 20, 000 feet of good salable lutnber, for
value received of him.
J. W. Fox,
his

Riley XBond."

According to the weight of authority

mark.

a

"promise to pay," in

goods and chatties, is nothing more than a special contract for the
delivery of particular articles, and such contracts are not negotiable.
Clark v. King, 2 Mass., 524; Auerbach v. Pritchett, 58 Ala., 451;
Quinby V. Merritt, 11 Humph., 439; Roberts v. Smith, 58 Vt., 494
(where the'promise was to pay "an ounce of gold," and held not to
be good); Jones v. State, 40 Ark., 347; Arnold v. Rock River Co.,
207; Gordon V. Rundlett, 29 N. H., 435; Sachett v. Pal5 Duer.,
mer, 25 Barb, 179; Dilley v. Van Wie, 6 Wis., 209;
Palmer v.
Ward, 6 Gray, 340; McCartney v. Smalley, n Iowa, 85; Wright v.
Hart, 45 Pa. St., 454; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich., 501;
Marine Bank v. Rushmore, 28 111., 463; Henschel v. Mahler, 3
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was only to that point that the attention of the court was
directed in argument.
The negotiable character of the note
was not made a subject of inquiry by either party. The
Denio., 428; Martin v. Chauntry, 2 Strange, 1271; Digberty v.
Darnel, 5 Yerger, 451; Jerome v. Whitney, 7 Johnson, 321; Hasbrook V. Palmer, 2 McLean, 10; Butler v. Paine, 8 Minn., 324;
Irwin V. Lowry, 14 Pet., 293; Lieber v. Goodrich, 5 Cow., 186;
Shamokin Bank v. Street, 16 Ohio St., i; Ellison v. Collinridge, 9
C. B., 570; Judah v. Harris, 19 Johns., 144; Pardee v. Fish, 60
N. Y., 265; Huse V. Hamblen, 29 la., 501; Lafayette Bank v.
Ringel, 51 Ind., 393; Chrysler v. Renois, at al., 43 N. Y., 209;
Thompson V. Sloan, 23 Wend., 71.

It is now well established that a Bill or Note, although possessing every other requisite of a negotiable instrument, is bad, if the
order ox promise be for labor or merchandise, and not for money.
The Reason for the Rule. — This requisite springs from the
necessities of commercial intercourse.
Money is the one standard
of value, established by the law, recognized by the courts and
"All other
demanded by the exigencies of trade and commerce.
commodities may rise and fall in value; but in theory, at least,
money always measures this rise and fall, and remains the same."
If the promise be to pay in wheat or corn, it is impossible to
determine from an inspection of the instrument on any given day,
This uncertainty
what its value will be on the succeeding day.
Such an instruand hazard necessarily destroy its negotiability.
For
unfitted
for
a
medium.
be
circulating
ment would obviously
cattle,"
a
to
in
and
neat
pay
promise
this reason, "a note payable
"in a good horse, to be worth ^80.00, and goods out of a store
amounting to ^20.00," are each non-negotiable.
Jerome v. WhitRoosa,
v.
Johns,
Thomas
Johns,
461.
322;
ney, 7
7
Money Defined. — The meaning of "money" as applied to
negotiable instruments has been defined by the Acts of Congress
Whatever is legal tender is
known as the "Legal Tender Acts."
The legal tender qualities of the money ordered or prommoney.
ised at the place of payment of the bill or note determine whether
the medium of payment specified is really legal tender or not. This
test is not fixed and universal, however, "When by the statute of
Victoria, ' Canada Bills ' were made legal tender, the court of Upper
Canada said: 'It may be that a person can make a promissory note
payable in a particular coin, as in gold or silver, because they are
respectively money and specie; but I think he cannot make it
payable in "Canada Bills," because they are not money or specie.
They have no intrinsic value as coin has; they represent only, and
Money itself is a commodity; it is not a sign;
are signs of value.
Gray v. Worden, U. C. Q. B., 535;
it is the thing signified.'"
Notes,
Norton on Bills and
51.
To the general rule, however, there seems to be at least an
5
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plaintiff in error claimed a reversal, on the ground that the
right of the original payee did not appear, by the declaration,
to have passed to the holder, by assignment, delivery, or

A bill or note made payable in money of a
apparent exception.
This arises from interforeign denomination is still negotiable.
national recognition of standard or bullion value in moneys.
Our
courts, "Under the statutes of the United States, will take judicial
notice of the fact that the value of foreign coin, as expressed in
the money of account in the United States, shall be that of the
pure metal of such coin of standard value; and that the value of
the standard coin of the various nations of the world in circulation
is estimated annually by the directors of the mint and proclaimed
on the first day of January by the Secretary of the Treasury.
These foreign denominations, therefore, can always be paid in our
own coin of equivalent value to which it is always reduced on a
recovery." 2 Chitty Bills (Am. edit.), 615-616.
Deberry v. Darnell, s Yerg., 451.
When action is brought upon a bill or note, however, it is
necessary to prove the value of the sum expressed in our own
money, as the courts can construe the instrument payable in no
other.
Thompson v. Sloan, 23 Wend., 71; Bayley on Bills, 23.
Equivalent \Vords and Phrases for Money. — Descriptive terms prefaced to the word "money" have been held not to
vitiate the instrument containing them.
21 Tex., 466; 38 Tex.,
214,

In the first of these cases the descriptive words were, "other
good cash notes"; in the second, "in good, solvent cash note."
In each case the court held that the descriptive words did not
vitiate the instrument.
The words "current funds" and "currency" have been held
to mean "money"; but the question is in dispute.
Among others, the following cases hold the affirmative: Emigrant Company v. Clarke, 47 la., 671; White v. Richmond, 16
Ohio, 5; Wood V. Price, 46 111., 435.
To the contrary: Nat. Bank v. Ringel, 51 Ind., 393; Johnson
V. Henderson, 76 N. Car., 227; Haddock v. Woods,
46 la., 433.
The rule under consideration forbids a promise to perform
other acts in addition to the payment of money.
The leading
authority on this point is Martin v. Chauntry, 2 Strange, 1271.
The language of the note was, "to deliver up horses and a wharf,
and to pay money."
This was held not to be a note within the
Statute of Anne.
Prof. Ames very clearly and concisely states the
" One could be
objections to such an instrument:
indorsed, the
other would have to be assigned.
In some jurisdictions, the action
could be brought by the indorsee in his own name, but as assignee,
he could only sue in the name of his assignor.
In the case of the
negotiable instrument being in the hands of a bona
fide holder, no
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otherwise, and that ground being considered sufficient for the
purpose, the judgment was reversed without further examinaIn this case, the direct question is presented, whether
tion.
defense of fraud or latent equity would avail; in the case of holder
as assignee, all would avail."

Contracts

When

we

Payable

say that

in

commercial

Bank

Bills or Currency. —

contracts

must

be

paid

in

"money," we mean that they must be paid in something which is
Rev. St. U. S., Sees. 3584, 3590.
Many
tenderable for debt.

expressions have been used which have been held to mean an order
or promise to pay "money," such as the following: "in current
funds of the State of Ohio"; "current bank notes of Cincinnati";
"currency of this place"; "in funds current in the City of New
York"; "in current Ohio bank notes"; "current money of Alabama"; "in good current money of this state." Sweetland v.
Creigh, 15 Ohio, 118; White v. Richmond, 16 Ohio, 5; Lacy v.
Holbrook, 4 Ala., i8. When the medium is expressed to be "good
current money" or "current money," it is not objectionable, as
See also Burton v. Brooks, 25
legal tender money is intended.
Mich.,
Ward,
v.
191; Frank v. Wessels, 64 N.
Ark., 215; Black
27
Y., 155; Warren v. Brown, 64 N. Car., 381; Swift v. Whitney, 20
111., 144; Phelps v. Town, 14 Mich., 374; Pardee v. Fish, 60 N. Y.,
265; Sweetland V. Creigh, 15 Ohio, 118; White v. Richmond, 16
Ohio, 5; Howe V. Hartness, 11 Ohio St., 449; Jones v. Fales, 4
Mass., 245; Bull v. Kasson, 123 U. S., 112; Haddock v. Woods,
46 la., 435; Klauber V. Biggerstaff, 47 Wis., 551.

"
An Order or Promise to Pay in "Bills of Exchange

is not a Promise to Pay Money.— In the case of First Nat. Bk.
of Brooklyn v. Slette 69 N. W. Rep., 1148, (Minn.), the promise
was to pay "by New York or Chicago exchange," and the court

said: "The holder of this instrument cannot demand in payment
dollars in money; for the maker is not bound to disthereof
charge his obligation, except by means of inland bills of exchange
Nor can the maker tender in payment
on New York or Chicago.
the promise is to make payment by
for
dollars in money;
The instruinland bills, which he must purchase in the market.
not a
therefore,
ment, then, is not payable in money, and is,
Easton v. Hyde, 13
promissory note within the law merchant."
v. Lowry, 14 Pet.,
Irvine
Mass.,
245;
Fales,
v.
Minn., 90; Jones
4
Bk.,
Nat.
&c.,
v.
Greenville
84 Tex., 40.
293; First Nat. Bk.,
in
the Money of
be
may
but
Must be Payable in Money,
be payable in
must
any Country. — While commercial contracts
in
money, it is not necessary that the money should be that current
be in the
the place of payment, or where the bill is drawn; it may
Dan.
Bills,
Sec.
43;
on
Story
money of any country whatever.
in
be
is
to
paid
the
contract
when
But
on Negot. Inst., Sec. 58.
of
the
denominations
the money of a foreign country, the specific
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such a contract as this can be so transferred as to authorize a
Our unanithird person to maintain a suit in his own name.
mous

opinion is that no such right can be transferred-

The

money should be given so that the court may be able to ascertain
Dan. on Negot. Inst., Sec. 58.
its equivalent value.
In Black v. Ward, Campbell, J., said: "A note payable in
Canada currency means no more and no less than that it is payable in Canada money at the Canada standard, and that it is
governed as to the amount it calls for by the same rules as if it had
been made in Canada, and payable in so many dollars without containing any further directions."
27 Mich., 193; 15 Am. R., 162.
York,
a
however,
note
In New
payable in "Canada money" was
In Thompson v. Sloan, Cowan, J., said: "A
held not negotiable.
promissory note must, in order to be negotiable, be payable in
money only, in current specie; or at least in what he can judicially
notice as equivalent to money."
23 Wend., 71; 35 Am. D., 546.
however,
the
court
intimates
that if the note had been
case,
In this
made payable in pounds, shillings and pence, the exact amount
might have been ascertained and been expressed in dollars and
cents and would have been negotiable.
Thompson v. Sloan, 23
The decision of Thompson v. Sloan was made in 1840, at
Wend.
" dollar" was not a denomination of the lawful
a time when the
But at the time when the case of Black v.
money of Canada.
Ward arose, this had been changed and the denomination of Canada money corresponded with that of the United States.
Upon
The opinion of Cowan
this theory these cases may be reconciled.
clearly indicates that if the money named in the note had been a
denomination of Canada money, so that its equivalent could have
been ascertained, his conclusion would have been different.
A
note payable in Mexican silver dollars has been held to be a good
The fact that a note is payable in the money of
promissory note.
a foreign country does not destroy its negotiability nor divest it of
any of the attributes of a promissory note; the recovery, however,
must be limited thereon to its value in American money.
Hogue
V. Williamson, 85 Tex., 553; Am. St. R., 823.
So also a negotiable contract may be payable in either gold or silver coin.

Strickland

v.

Holbrooke,

75

Cal., 268.

The Amount Must not

be Payable out of a Particular
Fund. — Commercial contracts must not be made payable out of a

For that would make their payment depending
particular fund.
upon the existence or supply of the fund, and therefore conditional.
Worden V. Dodge, 4 Denio., 159; Richardson v. Carpenter, 46 N.
Y., 661; Ehricks v. De Mill, 75 N. Y., 370; Turner v. P. & S.
Ry. Co., 95 111., 134; Corbet V. Clarke, 45 Wis., 403.
The Amount May be Charged to a Particular Fund.—
If, however, the amount to be paid is to be credited to some
particular fund; or if the person who is to pay the amount is
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and judgment

be given

for the

referred to some fund from which he may reimburse himself, the
contract will be sustained.
Spurgin v. McPheeters, 42 Ind., 527;
Hunger V. Shannon, 61 N. Y., 258; Macleod v. Luce, 2 Strange,
762; Turner V. P. & S. Ry. Co., 95 111., 133; Brill v. Tuttle, 81
N. Y., 457; Union Trust Co. v. Chicago & R. R. Co., 7 Fed. R.,

Brookland, 4 Hill, 263.
It Must not be for the Payment of Money and an
Act. — The bill or note must be for the payment of money only. If
it contains an order or promise to pay money, and also to do some
other act, this will destroy it as a negotiable contract. In the case
of Martin V. Chauntry (2 Strange, 1271), the order was "to pay
money at a particular day and to deliver up a horse and a wharf,"
In Cook v. Satand it was held not to be a negotiable contract.
terlee (6 Cow., 108), the order was "to pay money and take up a
"
See also Ayrey v.
certain outstanding note which was held bad.
v.
Myers, 31 111., 525;
Fearnsides, 4 M. & W., 168; Gillilan
Fletcher v. Thompson, 55, N. H., 208; "Wright v. Travers, 73
Mich., 484; Wise V. Charlton, 4 A. & E., 786; Follett v. Moore,
& E., 98; Overton v.
4 Ex., 416; Davies v. Wilkinson, 10 A.
River
Ry. Co. v. Smith,
Rock
v.
The
Arnold
Tyler, 4 Barr, 346;
513;

5

Kelly

V.

Duer, 207;

Hodges v. Shuler,

22

N.

Y.,

114;

Owen v. Barnum,

Hosstatter V. Wilson, 36 Barb., 307; Cate v. Patter7 111., 461;
son, 25 Mich., 191; Preston V. Whitney, 23 Mich., 260; Zimmerman V. Anderson, 67 Pa. St. 421; Fancourt v. Thome, 9 A. & E.
(58, E. C. L.), 312.

SMITH V. NIGHTINGALE.

-90

SECTION

[CHAP.

4,

16.

THE ORDER AND THE PROMISE MUST BE FOR THE PAY
MENT OF A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF MONEY.
SMITH

V.

NIGHTINGALE. 1

In the King's Bench, at Nisi Prius (Trinity Term), June
^Reported in

2

Starkie, 375, also in

j English

Common

ii,

1818.

Law Reports

45 ■2-

This was an action by the plaintiffs in right of the wife,
administratrix of James Easthng.
Form of Action. — The declaration contained a count
upon a promissory note alleged to have been made by the
defendant, on the I2th of October, 1807, for the payment of
64 1 to James Eastling, payable three months after the date:

as

'This case is cited in Story on Bills of Ex., Sec. 42; Chitty
on Bills, 133, 145, 160; Tiedeman on Negotiable Paper, 28; Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 53; Randolph on Commercial Paper, 134, 320; Wood's Byles on B. & N., 136; Norton on Bills &
N., 55; Ames on B. & N., 73; Benjamin's Chalmers Bills, Notes
and Checks,

17.

By the rule that the amount must be certain is meant that the
instrument must specify exactly the amount of money intended to
be paid.
The rule of construction is, however: "Id cerium est
quod cerium reddi protest."
Indefiniteness or uncertainty will not
vitiate the instrument if a simple mathematical calculation will
reduce it to certainty.
The leading case upon the subject is Smith v. Nightingale,
In this case, the writing purported to pay 65 pounds "and
supra
also all other sums which may be due."
Lord Ellenborough declared that the promise was neither definite, single, nor distinct;
that reference must be had to books before the amount specified
could be ascertained, and for this reason was void as a note.
For the reasons above stated, the courts have held that in all
such cases as a promise to pay 13 pounds "and all fines according
to rule" ; "whatever sums you may collect"; or "the demands of a
sick club," the instrument must be denied negotiability.
This
result does not follow, however, when the instrument contains such
terms as "with interest," "with current exchange," etc.
Johnson
V.

Frisbie, 15 Mich., 286.
Not only must commercial

contracts be made payable in
money, but the amount to be paid must be certain and stated in
the body of the contract.
If the amount can be ascertained upon
the face of the contract, it will be sufficient; but if reference must
be made to other papers or accounts in order to ascertain the
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the declaration contained also the money counts, and a count
upon an account stated.

It appeared that Eastling

had been employed by the de-

fendant as a servant in husbandry, and that the defendant
having in his hands monies belonging to James Eastling, gave
amount, the contract will not be sustained as a commercial contract.
Consequently a note which promises to pay without naming
the amount, but where the amount is given in the margin, the same
will be sustained.
Strickland v. Holbrooke, 75 Cal., 269.
If the note provides for a specified sum of money, and also
for the payment of something else, the value of which is not ascertained: but depends upon extrinsic evidence, it will not be sustained.
Lowe V. Bliss, 24 111., 168; Houghton v. Francis, 29 111.,
244; Laird v. Warren, 92 111., 204.

Provision for the Payment of Attorney's Fees. — The

fact that it contains a provision for the payment of interest without
naming the amount of interest will not render it uncertain in
amount, for the legal rate will be collected.
Upon the question
whether a condition to pay "collection
or attorney's fee"
in addition to the amount named affects the negotiability of these
Some of the
contracts or not, there is much conflict of authority.
states have sustained the negotiability of these instruments; others
have held that the condition destroys the negotiability of the
instrument; while still others have held that the stipulation renders
A careful examination of all the authorities,
the contract void.
of
the
more
recent decisions, will show that the weight
especially
of authority is found in favor of the doctrine that the negotiability
of a commercial contract is in no way affected by a stipulation for
In the
the payment of reasonable collection or attorney's fee.
following states commercial contracts are sustained where such
Oregon, Arkansas, Mississippi, Minnesota,
stipulation is added:
Iowa, Louisiana, Kansas, Illinois, Dakota, Nebraska, as well as
Benn v. Kutzschan, 24 Or.,
by the courts of the United States.
28; 32 Pac. R., 763; Overton v. Mathews, 35 Ark., 147; Meacham
V. Pinson, 60 Miss., 226; Hamilton Gin Co. v. Sinker, 74 Tex.,
Co. v.
52; Dietrich v. Bayhi, 23 La. An., 767; Harris Mnfg.
Arline,
Federal
Rep.,
v.
Anfinson, 31 Minn., 182; Schlesinger
31
648; Farmers' Nat. Bk. v. Sutton & Co., Fed. R., 191; Sperry v.
Horr, 32 Iowa, 184; Seaton v. Scoville, 18 Kan., 433; Hurd v.
The attention of the student is called
Dubuque Bk., 8 Neb., 10.
i L. R. A., 546; also 69 Md., 433.
Hall,
v.
to the case of Bowie
In the following states the contracts containing such stipulaThey may be
tions have been sustained but are not negotiable.
Missouri,
Pennsylvania,
enforced as common law contracts.
and
Maryland.
Wisconsin,
California
Minnesota,
Carolina,
North
They are denied negotiability upon the ground that the amount
to be paid is uncertain.
Johnson v, Speer, 92 Pa. St., 227; First
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him the following promise in writing, upon which the first
count in the declaration was founded:
''October, 12, i8oy.
' '
Eastling, my head carter,
I promise to pay to
the sum
months

James
with lawful interest for the same, three
after date, and also all other sums which may be

of 6§l,

dua to him.

"

Contention of Defendant. —On the part of the defendant it was objected, that this instrument could not be considNat. Bk. V. Gay, 63 Mo., 33; First Nat. Bk. v. Bynum, 84 N.
Carolina, 24; Jones v. Raditz, 27 Minn., 240; Savings Bank v.
Strother, 28 S. C, 504; Adams v. Seaman, 82 CaL, 637; First
Nat. Bk. V. Larsen, 60 Wis., 211; Maryland & Co. v. Newman,
60 Md., 584; 4S Am. R., 750.
While in the following cases the courts have held that such
Bullock v. Taylor, 39 Mich., 138;
stipulations are absolutely void:
Myer V. Hart, 40 Mich., 517; Wright v. Travers, 73 Mich., 494;
Altman V. Rellershofer, 68 Mich., 287; Tinsley v. Hoskins,
N. C, 340; Gaar V. Louisville Banking Co., 11 Bush (Ky.), 182;
Kemp V. Claus, 8 Neb., 24; State v. Taylor, 10 Ohio, 378;
Walker V. Woolen, 54 Ind., 163; Maynard v. Mier, 85 Ind., 317.
Statutory Provisions. — In Indiana it has been provided
by statute "that any and all agreements to pay attorney's fee
depending upon any condition therein set forth and made part of
any bill of exchange acceptance, draft, promissory note or other
written evidence of indebtedness are hereby declared illegal and
void." It has been held, however, that if the amount of fees
are stipulated and unconditional, that the stipulation would be
Maxwell v. Morehart, 66 Ind., 301.
sustained.
Mr. Daniel, in his valuable work on Negotiable Instruments,
to hold that instruments evidently
says: "It seems paradoxical
framed as bills and notes are not negotiable during their currency,
because when they cease to be current they contain a stipulation
to defray the expense of collection." So far from tending to check
the circulation of these contracts, such a provision, it would seem
in business circles, adds to its value, and thus renders it more
available for commercial purposes.
Stapleton v. Louisville Banking Co., 95 Georgia, 802; Montgomery v. Crossthwait, go Ala.,
553; 24 Am. St. Rep., 832.
There are at least four distinct holdings by our courts upon
the effect of astipulation to pay "collections or attorney fees ":
That the stipulation is valid and enforceable (i Daniel
ist.
Neg. Inst, 4th ed. sec. 62, Montgomery v. Crossthwait, 90 Ala.,
SS3i 24 Am. St. Rep., 832; Benn v. Kutzschan, 24 Oregon, 28;
Dorsey v. Wolf, 142 111., 589);

in
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note, since it was not made

for the

payment of any certain sum, and that it could not be given
in evidence under the count upon an account stated, since it
was an agreement, and for a larger sum than 20I., and ought
to be stamped.

Contention of Plaintiff. — The plaintiff, contended that
it was certain to the extent of 6^1. and therefore that to that
extent the plaintiff was entitled to consider it as a promissory
note; but that, at all events, it was evidence of an account
That the stipulation is valid, but such instruments are
not negotiable — simply common law contracts, (Johnson v. Spear,
92 Pa. St., 227; First Nat. Bk. v. Larsen, 60 Wis., 206; Bowie v.
Hall, 69 Md., 434; Bank v. Wheeler, 75 111., 546; Adams v. Seaman, 82 Cal., 637);
That the stipulation is void, and therefore does not affect
3d,
the contract (Gaar v. Louisville Bk. Co., 11 Bush (Ky. ), 182;
Gilmore v. Hirst, 56 Kans., 626); and
2nd,

Where such stipulation renders the transaction usurious,
4th,
and therefore subject to the operation of the statutes against usury
(Dow v. Updike, 11 Neb., 95; 7 N. W. Ref., 185; State v. Taylor, 10 Ohio, 378).

Payment of an Amount Certain "with Exchange." —

Some of the courts have held, where the negotiable contract
provides for the payment of "current exchange," that the addition
of these words destroys the negotiable character of the contract.
168; Hill
Read v. McNulty, 12 Rich., 445; Lowe v. Bliss, 24
where
these
v. Todd, 29
103; Clanser V. Stone, 29 111., 116,
C,
Bank v. Strother, 28 S.
words were treated as surplusage.
504.
While the above rule seems to have the best reason to support it,
the weight of authority in this country seems to be in favor of
Smith v.
supporting these contracts as negotiable instruments.
Mich.,
137; Legett
Kendall, 9 Mich., 241; Bullock v. Taylor, 39
Stevenson,
V. Jones, 10 Wis., 34; Hill v. Todd, supra; Saxton v.
V. Horr, 32 Iowa, 184; Hastings
23 Up. Can. C. P., 503; Sperry
Minn.,
184;
V. Thompson,
55 N. W. Rep., 968; Johnson's
54
Cases on B. & N., 33; Morgan v. Edwards, 53 Wis., 599; 11 N.
In the case of Hastings v. Thompson, supra, MitW. Rep., 21.
chell, J., in discussing this rule, said: "We have found no English
cases directlv in point, and none bearing on the question, except
Pollard V. Harries (3 Bos. & P., 33s), where such an instrument
exchange") was declared on as a
(one payable "with current
promissory note. We have been unable to find that the supreme
court of the U. S., or either Massachusetts, New York or PennNow, we think we
sylvania, have ever passed upon the question.
fact, that if
are safe in saying, and justified in taking notice of the
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that no stamp was essential to a mere acknow-

ledgment of a debt.

Decision. — Lord Ellenborough was of opinion, that the

instrument was too indefinite to be considered as a promissory
note: it contained a promise to pay interest for a sum not
specified, and not otherwise ascertained than by reference to
defendant's books; and that since the whole constituted one
He also
entire promise, it could not be divided into parts.
held, that since the instrument contained an agreement to pay
the money, it could not be received in evidence as an acknowlwithout a stamp.
The plaintiff was non-suited.

edgment

other business men accustomed to dealing in commerwere asked whether such an instrument is a promissory
whether they would deal with it as such, the answer
almost every instance, be unhesitatingly in the affirmative." Tied, on Com. Paper, Sec. 28a; Rand. Com. Paper, Sec.
200; Churchman v. Martin, 54 Ind., 380; Dodge v. Emerson, 34
Me., 96; Smith v. Marland, 59 la., 645.

bankers or
cial paper
note, and
would, in

The Amount Should be Expressly Stated. -The amount
to be paid should be stated with great caution in the body of the
It is sometimes expressed also in figures, in the upper
instrument.
left hand corner of the contract, as well as in the body, for greater
caution.
If the sum in figures, on the superscription, differs from
the sum written in the body of the instrument, the latter will control, and parol evidence is not admissible for the purpose of
showing that the sum intended was not that stated in words in the
body of the instrument, but was stated in figures in the margin.
Sanderson v. Piper, 5 Bing. , 425; Norwich Bank v. Hyde, 13
Conn., 281, 282; Master v. Miller, 4 Term R., 320.
The Amount,

When Certain. — The General Rule. —

The amount of the contract is certain even though it is to be
paid (i) with interest, or (2) by installments, or (Cooke v. Horn,
29 Law Times, 369; Riker v. Sprague Manufacturing Co., 14 R.
I., 402), (3) with a provision that upon default in payment of any

installment or interest the whole shall become due, or (Riker v.
Sprague Manufacturing Co., supra; Carlon v. Kenealy, 12 Mes. &
Wei, 139; Oridge v. Sherborne, 11 M. & W., 374; Chicago Ry.
Co. V. Merchants' Bk., 136 U. S., 268; Wilson v. Campbell, 68
N. W. Rep., 278), (4) with exchange, or (Hastings v. Thompson,
54 Minn., 184; Tiedeman Com. Paper, Sec. 28a; Daniel Neg.
Inst., Sec. 54), (5) with costs of collection or attorney's fees (see
cases supra).
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SECTION 17.
THE ORDER AND THE PROMISE MUST BE TO PAY AT
SOME TIME CERTAIN.
COLEHAN
In the

Common

Pleas,

Hilary

V.

COOKE.i

Term (16 Geo.

2),

[Reported tit Willes's Reports,

Feb. ioth,

1742.

jpj.]

Form of Action. — T/ie first

count is on a promissory
note dated 27th of May 1732, whereby the defendant promised to pay to Henry Delany or order 150 guineas ten days

after the death of his father John Cooke for value received;
which note after the death of the father (which is laid to be
the 2d of April 1741) was duly indorsed by Delany to the
The second count is on a promissory note dated the
plaintiff.
15th of

July

1732, whereby the defendant promised to pay to
Henry Delany or order six weeks after the death of his father
50 guineas for value received; the like indorsement laid after
the death of the father as before.
The third count is for

money had and received etc., 250/.; but this is out of the
case.
The damage is laid at 300/. ; and a general verdict for
the plaintiff on both notes.
Contention of Defendant. — It was insisted {a)^ on for
the defendant in arrest of judgment that these notes are not
within the stat. 3 and 4 Anne c. 9;" and if not that they are
not indorsable, or assignable, and consequently that the plaintiff who brings this action as indorsee cannot recover at law.
To show that these notes are not within the statute a
great many things were said on the argument of the case, and
a great many cases and authorities cited both out of the com'

This case is cited in Story on Bills of Exchange, 46, 47;
Chitty on Bills, 128, 135, 136, 137, 144, 150, 517, 520; Daniel on
Negotiable Instruments, 46; Wood's Byles on Bills and Notes, 146,
170; Tiedeman on Negotiable paper, 25; Ames on Bills and Notes,
Bills Notes and Checks, 26, 28, 65,
^2)! Benjamin's Chalmers,
276; Randolph on Commercial Paper, 146; Norton on Bills and
Notes, 39

"This case was several times argued.
^
A promissory note payable to A. or order after the death of
B. is assignable under the stat. 3 and 4 An. cr 9; and consequently

,the indorsee may maintain an action upon it against the maker.

COLEHAN

96

V. COOKE.

[CHAP.

4^

But I think that all the objectionsthat were made may be reduced to these two general positions: —
1st.
That the act of Parliament only intended to put
promissory notes on the same footing as bills of exchange; and
that therefore, if bills of exchange drawn in this manner
would not be good and consequently not assignable, it follows
that notes drawn in this manner are not made indorsable or
men and civil law books.

assignable

by the statute.
That the act was made

for the advancement of
trade ane commerce, and consequently was intended to extend
only to such notes as are in their nature negotiable, and that
these notes are not so.
Before I consider these objections, I will state the words
of the act of parliament on which the question must depend,
''An act for giving like remedy
3 and 4 An. c. 9, entitled
on promissory notes as is now used on bills of exchange, and'
2nd.

for

the better payment

of inland bills of exchange.

"

' '

Where-

it hath been held that notes in writing signed by the party
who makes the same, whereby such person promises to pay
to any other person or his order any sum of money therein
mentioned, are not assignable or indorsable over within the
custom of merchants, and that any person to whom such
note shall be assigned, indorsed or made payable could not
within the said custom maintain any action on such note
against the person who first drew and signed the same, therefore to the intent to encourage trade and commerce which
will be much advanced if such notes shall have the same effect
as inland bills of exchange and shall be negotiated in like
manner, be it enacted that all notes in writing which shall
after, etc., be made and signed by any person or persons, etc.,
whereby such person or persons do or shall promise to pay to
any other person or persons, etc. , his, her or their order or
unto the bearer any sum of money mentioned in such note
shall be taken and construed by virtue thereof due and payable to any such person or persons, etc. , to whom the same is
made payable, and also every such note shall be assignable or indorsable over in the same
manner as inland
bills of exchange are or may be according to the cusas
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torn of merchants; and that the person or persons, etc.,
to whom the sum of money is made payable by such
note shall and may maintain an action for the same in such
manner as he, she or they may do upon any inland bill of
■exchange, etc., and that the person or persons, etc., to
whom such note is indorsed or assigned, or the money therein mentioned ordered to be paid by indorsement thereon,
shall and may maintain his, her or their action for such
money either against the person or persons who signed such
note, or against any of the persons who indorsed the same,
in like manner as in case of inland bills of exchange."
The title of the act seems to refer to bills of exchange, and
they are likewise referred to in the preamble, and the remedy
But in the description of the notes which
is to be the same.'
are to be made assignable there is no reference to bills of exchange; but the words are very general, and I never understood
that the plain words of an enacting clause are to be restrained
It has indeed been often
by the title or preamble of an act.^
said, and I think very rightly, that if the words of an act of
parliament be doubtful, it may be proper to have recourse to
the preamble to find out the meaning of the legislature: but
where the words of the enacting part are plain and express, I
do not think that they ought to be restrained by the preamble;
for the preamble may only recite some particular mischiefs
which have happened, but the enacting clause may not only
was taken for granted in Tindal v. Brown, i D. and E.,
167; 2 D. and E., 186; both in the court of King's Bench and in
the Exchequer Chamber, and solemnly decided in the cases of
Brown v. Harraden, ib. 4 vol., 148, and Smith v. Kendal, ib. 6 vol.
in Dexlaux v. Hood, Bull
123 (in which the dictum of Denison J.
N. P., 274, and the determination of May v. Cooper, Fost., 376, to
the contrary were over-ruled), that three days' grace are allowed on
a promissory note (though it be a note payable to A. without adding "or to his order, or to bearer." Smith v. Kendal, 6 D. and
E., 123. ) as well as on a bill of exchange, by reason of the stat. 3
and 4 An. c, 9, which puts them both on the same footing in all
'

It

respects.

Gallant, i P. Wms., 320; Mace v. Cadell,
Cowp., 232; Pattison v. Bankes; ib., 543; Cox v. Liotard, H. 24
Geo. Dougl., 167, n. (55), oct. ed.; and Bradley v. Clarke, per
Buller J. 5 D. and E., 201.
^

Vid Copeman
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calculated to prevent these mischiefs but others also of a
like nature.
Now the words of the enacting part of this act
are plain and clear and very general; and in order to bring a
note within the description of that clause, it is only necessary,
1st, That the note should be in writing;
2d, That it should be made and signed by the person
be

promising to pay; and
3rd,

That there be an express promise to pay to another

is

a

a

is

it

if

a

it

it

it,

But as to the time of payment, the
or his order or bearer.
act is silent, nor is there any particular form prescribed.
And therefore, as to the first objection, that if a bill of
exchange had been drawn in this manner it would not have
been good; supposing it to be true, I do not think that it follows that these promissory notes may not be within the general words of the statute, if they answer all the descriptions
However for argument's sake I will suptherein contained.
would hold; but we do not think
pose that this consequence
that a bill of exchange drawn in this manner would be bad.
Upon this head it would be but mispending time to run over
all the passages which have been cited out of the civil law
books in relation to bills of exchange, because I put a question
to the counsel which will, I think, determine this point, whether
there is any limited time mentioned in any of the books beyond which if bills of exchange are made payable they are not
good, and it was agreed by the counsel that they could find no
such rule, and I am sure I can find none.
But if a bill of
exchange be made payable at never so distant a day, if it be a
day that must come, it is no objection to the bill.
There is
but one passage in the books wherein any notion to the contrary is so much as hinted at; and that is in Scacchius de commerciis, where it is said that it had been formerly an objection against a bill of exchange, as contrary to the nature of
that
was made payable at the end of seven months: but by
his making use of the word formerly,
plain that in his
opinion the law was then held to be otherwise.
If therefore
the distance of time would not have made
bill of exchange
drawn in this manner, since
bad
drawn at
time that
which must come, the only other objection that was made on
this head was that in all bille of exchangs there must be
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par pro pari, which there cannot

be in this case, because the
value cannot be ascertained.
But I shall show plainly that
the value may be ascertained, when I come to the objection
that these are not negotiable notes.

Having answered the objections against these notes con-

is

is

is

is

I

is

it

is

it

it,

sidering them on the same footing as bills of exchange, I come
now to the second objection, arising from the words and
intent of the statute.
And first I think that they are plainly
within the words.
They are made in writing; they are
signed by the person promising to pay, and there is an express
promise to pay to another or his order; and as no time of payment is mentioned in the statute, the distance of time is no
objection within the words of the act.
Let us see therefore in the next place whether any objection arises against them from the design and intent of the
act; though I think it would be pretty hard to construe a note
to be not within the intent of an act when it is manifestly
within the words of
and the words of the act are plain and
When the words of an act are doubtful and uncerexpress.
tain,
proper to inquire what was the intent of the legislature: but
very dangerous for judges to launch out too
far in searching into the intent of the legislature, when they
have expressed themselves in plain and clear words.
However we think that these notes are within the intent as well as
will here
the words of the act. And to show that they are so,
take notice of all the cases which were cited to the contrary,
and will show that they all stand on a different footing and are
For they are all of
plainly distinguishable from the present.
them cases where either the fund out of which the payment
ununcertain, or the time of payment
was to be made
certain and might or might not ever happen: whereas in theuncertain,
no pretence that the fund
present case there
and the time of payment must come, because the father after
whose death they are made payable must die one time or
other.
The case of Pearson v. Garrett,' was thus; the de-

4

■

it

,

a

note to pay 60 guineas when he married B.
fendant gave
was
and judgment was given for the defendant, because
Mod.

242

and Comb. 227.
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uncertain whether he would ever marry her or not, so the
In the case of Jocelyn
time of payment might never come.
V. Le Serre,' the bill was drawn on Jocelyn to pay so much
every -month out of his growing subsistence ; how long that
would last no one could tell, or whether it would be sufficient
for that purpose: and therefore the bill was holden not to be
In the case of Smith
good, because the fund was uncertain.
V. Boheme,^ the promise in the note was to pay jol. or sursender a person therein named: if therefore he surrendered
the person, there was no promise to pay anything, and therefore the note was uncertain and not negotiable.
In the case
of Appleby v. Biddulph," a promise to pay
his brother did
not pay by such a time; held not to be within the statute,
because it was uncertain whether the drawer of the note
would ever be liable to pay or not.
In the case of Jenny v.
Herle,* a promise to pay such a sum out of the income of the
Devonshire mines, held not a promise within the statute, because it was uncertain whether the fund would be sufficient to
So in the case of Barnsley v. Baldwyn,
pay it.
14 Geo. 2
B. R. ,'the promise was, as in the case of Peason v. Garrett,
to pay such a sum on marriage ; and held not to be within
the statute for the same reason.
And as these notes are
plainly not within the intent of the statute because not negotiable ab initio, so when the words themselves come to be
considered they are not within the words of
because the
statute only extends to such notes where there
an absolute
promise to pay and not
promise depending on
contingency, and where the money at the time of the giving of the
note becomes due and payable by virtue thereof {so are the
words of the statute), and not where
becomes due and payable by virtue of a subsequent contingency which may perhaps
never happen, and then the money will never become payable
it

a

a

is it,

if

in 10 Mod. 294, and 316; and cited in
Ld.
Mod. 364.
Raym. 1362, and in
^Cited in
Ld. Rayin. 1362.
Cited in
Mod. 363.
Ld. Raym. 1361.
Reported in
Since reported in
Mod. 417 oct. ed., and in
Str. 1151,
by the name of Beardesley v. Baldwin.
8

2

7

^

2

*

'

2

8

2

'Reported
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And it can be said that there is

promise to pay
money, or that money becomes due and payable by virtue of
a note, when unless such subsequent contingency happen the
drawer of the note does not promise to pay anything at all,'
But the present notes, and those cases where such notes
have been holden to be within the statute, do not depend on
any such contingency; but there is a certain promise to pay
at the time of the giving of the notes, and the money
by virtue thereof will certainly become due and payable one
time or other, though it is uncertain when that time will come.
The bills therefore of exchange commonly called Billce nundinales were always holden to be good, because though these
fairs were not always holden at a certain time, yet it was
certain that they would be held.
The case of Andrews
V. Franklyn,^ depends on the
same reason; for there the
note ''Nzs to pay suck a^sum two months after such a ship
was paid off; and held good, because the ship would certainly
be paid off one time or other.
The case of Lewis v. Ord,
was exactly the like case, and determined on the same reason.
As to the same objection that these are not negotiable
notes, because the value of them cannot be ascertained, the
argument is not founded on fact, because the value of a life
when the age of a person is known is as well settled as can
be: and there are many printed books in which these calculations are made.
But if it were otherwise, the life of a man
may be insured, and by that the value will be ascertained.
And the same answer will serve to the objection which I before mentioned against such bills of exchange.
There was another objection taken, that the drawer
might have died before his father, and then these notes would
have been of no value: but there is plainly nothing in this
objection, for the same may be said of any note payable at a
'

a

But there may be a conditional acceptance of a bill of exSmith V. Abbot, 2 Str. 115 2; Julian v. Shobrooke, 2
change.
Wilf. 9; Pierson v. Dunlop, Cowp. 574; and Sproat v. Matthews,
I D. and E. 182.
^
I Str. 24.
'T. 8 and 9 G. 2 B. R.; Cunningh. Bills of Exchange 113.
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distant time, that the drawer may die, worth nothing before
the note becomes payable.
We do not think that the averment of the death of the
father before the indorsement makes any alteration, because we
are of opinion that if the notes were not within the statute
ab initio, they shall not be made so by any subsequent conBut for the reasons aforesaid we are of opinion
tingency.
(and so was the Ld. C. J. Baron Parker) that the plaintiff is
entitled to his judgment,' and therefore the rule for arresting
the judgment must be discharged."'
'

This judgment was afterwards affirmed in the Court of King's

Bench on

a

writ of error.

2

Str., 1217.

^

See the following cases, in which the notes or bills of exchange (for they are both on the same footing) were holden not to
be good notes or bills, because they were payable out of a particular fund or on a contingency: Banbury v. Lissett, 2 Str., 1211;

Dawkes v. Ld. Deloraine, 2 Bl. Rep., 782; 3 Wils., 207; Roberts
Peake, i Burr., 323; Kingston v. Long, M. 25 G., 3 B. R. Bayley's Bills of Exchange, 71; and Carlos v. Fancourt, 5 D. & E.,
In these, the notes were holden to be good, because they
482.
were payable at all events: Burchell v. Burchell, 2 Ld. Raym.,
i Wils., 262; Poplewell v. Wilson, i
1545; Evans v. Underwood,
Str., 264; Chadwick v. Allen, ib., 607; Goss v. Nelson, i Burr,
226; and Haussoullier v. Hartsinck, 7 D. and E., 733.
V.

The Exact Time Need Not be Stated. —It is not necessary that the instrument state upon its face the exact time in days,
months and years; but it certainly loses its negotiable character, if
it is impossible to extract from the note any statement of the time
A case upon this subject is found in the First
of its maturity.
National Bank v. Beyman (84 N. Car., 125).
In this case the
note stated that payment might be demanded " at any time they
(the payees) may deem this note insecure, even before the maturity
of the same."
But it seldom happens that the courts find difficulty in applying this rule; for the most general and indefinite expression will be
so construed as to sustain the note or bill.
Thus "at sight," "on
demand," means on showing and demanding payment of the inDixon V. Nuttall, 6 C. & P., 320.
strument
"By Nov. I " means on that date. Preston v. Dunham, 52

Ala., 217.
So literally is this rule construed that if absolutely nothing is
said as to the maturity it is by legal construction payable on demand, and valid as a demand note.
Salinas v. Wright, 11 Tex.,
572; Porterv. Porter, 51 Me., 376; Pindar v. Barlow,
Ver.,
31

529'
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Lost Notes — When Due. — A

lost note is presumed to have
Tucker v. Tucker, 119 Mass., 79.
been payable on demand.
But a post dated note silent as to maturity is not due until the
Mohawk Bank v. Broderick, 10 Wend., 304.
date day.
If the time of payment is expressed, it must be pleaded and
McCrary v. Newproved; failure to do so is a fatal variance.
berry, 25 111., 496.
Notes Payable on Demand. — When Due. — Bills and
notes payable "on demand," are due immediately without grace,
Palmer v. Palmer,
unless the rule has been changed by statute.
Y.,
519.
36 Mich., 487; Wheeler V. Wilson, 47 N.
"When called for," "on request," "at such time as A. may
need for her support," have been held by the courts to be equivaBilderbeck v. Burlingame, 27 111., 338;
lent to "on demand."
Rowland v. Edmonds, 24 N. Y., 307; Corbett v. Stonemetz, 15

Wis., 187.

In

few cases, phrases seeming to give the debtor an option
Thus "when
paying at all have been similarly construed.
"when
canvenient,"
"when
my cirhave
agreed,"
both parties
held
to
be
have
all
been
equivalent to "on
cumstances will admit,"
demand after the expiration of a reasonable time." Ramot v.
Schotenfels, 15 la., 457; Works v. Hershey, 35 la., 340; Salinas
a

as to

V.

Wright,

II

Tex., 572.

is not necessary to express the time of payment by date; a
reference to any event, (as death), certain to occur, is enough.
Conn v. Thornton, 46 Ala., 587.
Marriage, however, is insufficient as to date or time of payBeardsley v. Baldwin, 2 Stra., 1151.
ment, being too uncertain.
of
a person coming of age, for he may
true
is
And the same
i Burr, 226.
Nelson,
Goss v.
die a minor.

It

Payment by installments does not invalidate a note; and a proviso that the whole note shall fall due upon the maker's failure to
v. Franck,
pay a single installment is valid. German Mut. Ins. Co.
22

Ind., 364.

Payable in Installments. — A negotiable contract may

be

payable in installments, and the fact that it contains a provision
whereby the whole amount shall become due and payable on failof
ure of payment of one installment, does not render the time
W.,
&
M.
12
139;
Kenealy,
v.
Carlton
payment uncertain.
Biddle, 13
Oridge v. Sherborne, 11 M. & W. 374; Miller v.
Co., 54
Ins.
Eq.
v.
Law Times, R. (N. S.) 334; Marrett
Smith,
v.
White
77
Me., 537; Wright v. Irwin, 33 Mich., 32;
Ward,
6
v.
Palmer
Cal.,
213;
v.
Page,
73
111., 351; Crossmore
The time of payment of each installment must be fixed
Gray 340
Moffat v. Edwards, i Car. & M., 16. A note payaand certain.
installment is overdue
ble in installments is overdue, when the first
be charged with
and unpaid, so that a purchaser thereafter may
equities.

Hart v. Stickney,

41

Wis. 630; Vinton v. King,

4

Allen,
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The fact that interest simply
562; Field V. Tibbetts, 57 Me., 359.
to charge a purchaser
is
not
sufficient
is overdue and unpaid,
Whitney, 45 Wis., no;
v.
Kelly
thereafter with existing equities.
National Bank v. Kirby, 108 Mass., 497; Cromwell v. County of
Sac, 96 U. S., — ; Railway Co. v. Sprague, 103 U. S., 762; McLane v. Sacramento, etc., Ry. Co., 66 Cal., 606; see notes to 30
Am. Rep., 702, 703.

Days of Grace. — Days of grace

are a certain number of days,

generally three, allowed to the maker or acceptor of a bill, draft,
or note, in which to make payment, after the expiration of the
These days were originally
time expressed in the contract itself.
debtor,
but it finally became
favor
to
the
of
a
matter
as
granted
merchants,
and
was given the force
an established custom among
of law by the courts and in some cases by statute, so that they are
The number
now, in many jurisdictions, demandable as of right.
of these days varies in different jurisdictions, from three in the
different States in the Union, Great Britain and Ireland to thirty
in Genoa.
Days of grace have been abolished in many of the
Wiffen v. Roberts, i Esp.,
See statutes of your State.
States.
261; for a history of "days of grace,'' seek Trask v. Martin, i E.
D. Smith, 506.
What Instruments are Entitled to Grace? — Days of
grace are allowed upon both promissory notes and bills of exIt may be stated that they are allowed upon all instuchange.
ments (unless abolished by statute) except those payable " on
They are allowed upon the contract whether it be paydemand."
able on a certain event, at a certain day, at a certain mumber of
If
days, weeks, months or years after date, or after or at sight.
in
installments, each installment is entitled
the contract is payable
Brown v. Harraden, 4 Tenn. Rep., 148; Griffin v. Goff,
to grace.
12 Johns, 423; Fridge v. Sherborne, 11 M. & W., 374; JVIacloon v.
Smith, 49 Wis., 20c; 5 N. W. Rep., 336.
Where Grace is Allowed. — When Must Payment be
Demanded. — Where grace is allowed, demand of payment before
the last day of grace would be premature; but in order to bind persons whose liability is conditional, the demand must be made on the
last day of grace. Donegan v. Wood, 49 Ala., 242; Pratt v. Eads,
I Blackf. (Ind.), 82; Bussard v. Levering, 6 Wheaton, 102. Protest may and should be made on the last day of grace; but an
action upon the contract cannot be commenced on the last day of
grace, for the reason that the debtor has all of that day (during
business hours) upon which to make payment.
Estes v. Tower,
102 Mass., 65; Gordon v. Parmelee, 15 Gray, 413.
Checks Not Entitled to Grace. — Checks are not entitled to
grace for the reason that they are payable "on demand."
Andrews et al. V. Blacklyet al., 11 Ohio St., 89; Morrison v. Bailey, 5
Ohio St., 13; Champion v. Gordon, 70 Pa. St., 476; Wood River
Bank V. First National Bank, 36 Neb., 744; 55 N. W. Rep. 239.
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Grace May Be Dispensed With. — The parties may, by

stipulation in the contract, dispense with "grace."
Bank, 21 Pick., 483; Duruford v. Patterson, 7 Marh.
U. S., 382.
Bell V. First N. Bank,

iii

a

Perkins v.

(La.),

460;

Where a Negotiable Contract Falls Due on a Holiday
— When Should Payment be Demanded? — Where a negotia-

ble contract matures on a holiday, if it is entitled to grace, it is
legally due on the day next preceeding and if that is also a legal
holiday then on the next preceeding; but if it is not entitled to
To illusgrace, then it is legally due on the day next subsequent.
trate: If a promissory note, payable "at sight or a certain time
after date," falls due (last day of grace) on a Sunday, it is due and
payable on the Saturday next preceding, and if that is also a legal
holiday, then on Friday; but if it is payable "on demand" and itfalls due on a Sunday, it is not legally due until the Monday folHirshfield v. Fort Worth Nat. Bank, 83 Tex., 452; i8
lowing.
S. W. Rep.,
743; Avery v. Stewart, 2 Conn., 69; 7 Am. Dec,
205; Barrett v. Allen, 10 Ohio,
250; Salter V. Burt, 20 Wend.,
426; Kuntz V. Temple,
48 Mo., 75; Morris v. Richards, 45 Law

T. R., 210.

Days are Holidays? — The question of what
legal "holidays" is one to which reference must be had to
W^hat

are
the

The folstatutes and decisions of the various states for answer.
lowing days are almost universally regarded as holidays: Christmas, New Year's Day, Labor Day, the 4th of July, the 2 2d of
February, and the days observed according to religious customs
Within the past few years many of the states have
or usages.
provided by statute that each Saturday afternoon shall constitute
a

legal holiday.

contracts are
usually made payable at a specified time after date, or after sight
If no time for payment is specified, they are payable
or at sight.
Convers v. Johnson, 146 Mass., 22;
immediately upon demand.
Dan. on Negot. Inst, Sec. 88; Bank v. Price, 52 la., 570; Jones
Mich., 487;
V. Brown, 11 Ohio St., 601; Palmer v. Palmer, 36
28
Mikeborg,
Keyes v. Fenstermaker, 24 Col., 329; Libbey v.
Minn., 38; Wheeler v. Warner, 47 N. Y., 519; Jackett v. Spencer;
v. Dollar Savings Bank, 56 Ga., 605; In
29 Barb., 180; Meador
178; Hitchre King's Estate, 94 Mich., 411, 425; 54 N. W. Rep.,
118;
Mass
ings v. Edmands, 133 Mass., 338; Ferms v. Gay, 146
v.
Hall
Y.,
456;
N. E. Rep., 87; McMullen v. Rafferty, 89 N.

Where no Time is Stated.— Commercial

15

Toby, no Pa. St., 318.

i,

.
.
fact that the note
time of payment is
provides for the payment of interest where no
not to be paid imwas
stated, does not raise a presumption that it
White,
Norton v. EUam, 2 M. & W., 461; Barrough v.
mediately.
2
Kerrison,
K. B., 227; Hanes v.
4 B. &C., 327; 3 L- J- ReP"
Schreiber v.
Taunton, 323; Mitchell v. Easton, 37 Minn., 335;

Where Interest is Provided for.— The

,
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Wis., 12; Wilks v. Robinson, 3 Rich. (S. C), 102;
Wheeler v. Warner, 47 N. Y., 519; Hill v. Henry, 17 Ohio St., 9;
Dunkle v. Nichols, loi Ind., 474.
"
Payable "On or Before a Day Named.— A negotiable
"
on or before" a day named is certain as to the
contract payable
It
is true that the maker may pay sooner if he shall
time of payment.
choose; but this option if exercised would make the payment beIf a time
fore the legal liability to pay arises and nothing more.
Richmond,

73

of payment is fixed once certain, it is no objection

that by some

Mattison v.
possibility it may be paid and discharged sooner.
Marks, 31 Mich., 421; Smith v. Ellis. 29 Me., 422; Jordon v.
Tate, 19 Ohio St., 586; Cisue v. Chidester, 85 111., 523; Noll v.
Smith, 64 Ind., 511; Ernst v. Steckman, 74 Pa. St., 13; Conn v.
Thornton, 46 Ala., 587 (where the promise was "One day after
date, I promise to pay, or at my death," etc.); Stevens v. Blunt,
240; Capron V. Capron, 44 Vt., 410; White v. Smith, 77
7 Mass.,
111., 351; Stillwell V. Craig, 58 Mo., 24; Stalls v. Silva, 119 Mass.,
137; Cota V. Buck, 7 Mete, 588; Brooks v. Hargreaves, 21 ]\Iich.,
254-

Time of Payment Depending Upon

an

Event Certain

to Pass. — They may be payable at some uncertain time, for instance upon the happening of some event, providing that event is
They may be made payable after the death of a
sure to happen.

But to make
particular person; for that event is sure to happen.
them payable when a particular person arrives at his majority, or
when he marries, would be bad on the ground of uncertainty of
time, for the reason that either event may never happen.
They
''
of the maker;
may be made payable, however, at the " convenience
or when the payor and payee mutually agree; or at the convenience
of the maker upon the express condition that he is to be sole judge
of what shall be a convenient time.
Page v. Cooke, 164 Mass.,
loi;
R.,
V.
Fed.
Junker, 41
116; Smithers
Capron v. Capron, 44
Vt., 412; Crooker v. Holmes, 65 Me., 195; Works v. Hershey, 35
la., 340; Lewis v. Tippon, 10 Ohio St., 88; Garrigus v. Hone &
Society, 3 Ind. App., 91; Carnwright v. Gray, 127 N. Y., 92.
It has been held that a promise to pay " After my death, date,
etc," is certain as to time and becomes due at once after the death
Shaw v. Camp, 160 111., 425.
of the maker.
A note payable " twenty-four " after date, etc., is not void for
uncertainty of time, nor a note on demand; but payable some time
Such a note is evidently payable at some time after
after date.
In a case like the above
the date, either days, months or years.
where the time of payment has been omitted by mistake, the holder
Coles v. Hulme, 15 Com. L. R.,
may insert the time intended.
where the word "hundred"
300; Waugh v. Russell, i Marshall,
was supplied by the holder where it had been omitted by mistake,
to render the amount certain; Loyd v. Lord, i Bro. Par. Cas., 379,
where the name of one of the parties was supplied; Boyd v. Broth-
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erson, lo Wend., 93, where a note which was intended to be for
" eight hundred dollars," the words "hundreds "and "dollars"
were omitted, and consequently the holder inserted these words;
Conner V. Routh, 12 How. (N. Y.), 176.
Time — Computation of. — In computing the time when a
commercial contract which is payable after date, or so many days
"after sight" or demand, or after a particular event, the day of
To
Avery v. Stewart, 2 Conn., 69.
the date is always excluded.
illustrate: A note dated Jan. ist, due thirty days after date, allowBy excluding the ist day of
ing grace, would fall due Feb. 3d.
January, the day of its date, it would be " nominally due" on the
31st day of January, that being the thirtieth day, and ''legally
If a note
due" three days thereafter, or the 3d day of February.
is dated Feb. ist, due in thirty days after date, excluding the day
of the date it would be nominally due the 3d day of March, and
In a leap year, however, the
legally due the 6th day of March.
When a commerMarch
due
on
would
be
legally
same note
sth.
number
of
days, the actual
cial contract is to run for a certain
If
number of days are counted, excluding the day of the date.
the contract is made payable a month or a certain number of
months after date, the time is computed by counting from the day
day of the month in which the
of the date to the corresponding
To illustrate: If a note is dated Jan. ist, due
contract matures.
one month after date, it is nominally due on Feb. ist, and legally
And, if a note should be dated on the 29th
due due on Feb. 4th.
of February in a leap year, due one month after date, it would be
nominally due on the 29th of March and legally due on the 1st day
Seaton v. Hinneman, 50 la., 395; Roehner v. Knickerof April.
bocker Ins. Co., 63 N. Y., 160; Story on Bills, sec. 330; Story on
Notes, see 213a; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheaton, 213; Bayley on
Bills, ch. 7; Chitty on Bills, ch. 9; Fisher v. State Bank, 7 Black.,
610; Ammidown V. Woodman, 31 Me., 580; Ripley v. Greenleaf,
2 Verm.,
129; Coleman v. Sayer, i Barn., 303; Taylor v. Jacoby,
2 Pa. St., 495.
If a note is dated on the 31st day of July, due in one month,
it will be nominally due Aug. 31st; but if it is dated Aug. 31st,
Wagdue in thirty days, it will be dominally due on Sept. 30th.
RobinMullen,
v.
Wood
3
ner V. Kenner, 2 Robinson (La.), 120;
son

(La.), 299.

is payable five days after sight and is accepted on
Mitchell v.
the ist day of the month, it is legally due the 9th.
Degrand, i Mason, 176.

If

a

bill

an Act.-computation of time is
Some of the courts have held that when
the act is
to be made from an act to be done, the day in which
Rex v. Adderley, 2 Doug., 463, 464.
done must be included.
Lester v.
been
rejected in the later cases.
But this rule has

Time — How Computed when Measured from
a

Garland,

15

Ves., 248.

Io8

COLEHAN

V. COOKE.

[CHAP.

4,

So that now the day of the date as well as the act is excluded.
Bemis V. Leonard, ii8 Mass., 502; Webb v. Fairmaner, 3 M. &
W. , 473, where the earlier cases are critically reviewed.
It may be stated as a general rule that where a power may be
exercised up to and including a certain day of the month and that
day is Sunday, it may be exercised on the following Monday.
Street v. United States, 133 U. S., 299; Sands v. Lyon, 18

Conn., 18.
And this is the general rule also in the performance of all
common law contracts.
Salter v. Burt, 20 AVend., 205; Avery v.
Stewart, 2 Conn., 69; Hammond v. American Mut. life Ins. Co.,
10

Gray, 307, where

the

payment of

a

premium on an insurance

policy which fell due on Sunday was permitted to be made on

When the time to file a pleading expires on a Sunday
Monday.
the same may be done on the next day.
Cox v. Bunn, 6 Johnson,
Borst
V.
Griffin,
326;
If, however, the time within
84.
5 Wend.,
which an act is to be performed is fixed by statute, the general
weight of authority is, that if the last day falls on Sunday, the
time cannot be extended and the act must be performed on the

day before.
Caupfield v. Cook, 92 Mich., 626; Simonson v.
Uurffy, 50 Mich., 81; Harrison v. Sager, 27 Mich., 476, where it
is held that a justice of the peace could not render judgment on
the fifth day after the trial where the statute required that the
judgment should be rendered within four days, the fourth being
Sunday; Brown v. Vailes, 14 L. R. A. 120.
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THE PARTIES* TO A NEGOTIABLE CONTRACT MUST BE
CERTAIN AND DEFINITE.
McCALL
In the

Common

V.

TAYLOR.'

Pleas, May

26,

1865.

Eng. C. L., joi, also
in 4 Law Journal {N. S.) Common Law, 365 ; 34 Law Journal {O. S.)365.-\
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Bench, 301;
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Form of Action. — This was

11^

upon an instrument in the following form, which was declared on as a bill
of exchange and also as a prommissory note:
' '

£300. 00.
' '

Four months ajter

Three hundred pounds,
' '
To Captain Taylor,
' '

for

Ship Jasper.

"

an action

\_No date.'\
date, pay to my order the sum

vahie received.
\^No drawei-'s name. J

of

Across this document was written, in the handwriting of
the defendant, the words "Accepted, William Taylor.'"
There was also a count for goods sold and delivered, and
the ordinary pleas.

The cause was tried before Byles, J., at the sittings at

'

This case is cited in Wood's Byles on Bills and Notes, pp.
i62j
Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, sec. 92; Benjamin's
156,
Chalmers Bills, Notes and Checks, p. 4; Norton on Bills and
Notes, p. 60; Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, sec. 34; Edwards
on Commercial

Paper, pp. 62, 290.

to Bills of Exchange — How Designated. —
The parties to a bill of exchange may be divided into: —
[a) Original, and

*Parties

{b)

Subsequent.

The original parties are: —
(a) The drawer who executes and delivers the instrument.
whom the order is given,
{b) The drawee, the person upon
called for therein.
the
to
money
pay
-and who is expected finally
order is delivered
to
whom
the
(c) The payee, the person
and in whose favor it is executed.

These three persons so designated may be the same person
a bill may be drawn by a party upon himself payable to himself.

in fact, that is,

no
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Guild-hall after the last Hilary Term.

[CHAP.

4,

The plaintiff was a
The defendant was

ship-chandler and provision-merchant.
the captain (and it was suggested owner also) of the ship
It appeared that the plaintiff had, in September,
Jasper.
1862,
pursuant to orders received through one Milne, the
ship's broker, delivered goods to the amount of 299/. 19.?. id.
on board that vessel for San Francisco, and had received in
payment a bill at six months accepted by one Bailey, which
bill was not paid at maturity; and that the instrument declared on was given to the plaintiff by Wilne about six months
It also appeared that Bailey had been debited
afterwards.
for the goods in the plaintiff's books, and that an invoice had
There was no
been delivered charging Bailey as the debtor.
The subsequent parties are: —
(a) The acceptor who is the drawee after acceptance;

Endorsers or subsequent transferers.
Endorsees
or subsequent transferees or holders.
((t)
The holder is the person who has possession of the instrument, and who by the law merchant is entitled to the payment
of the bill.
Of course a bill may be drawn by two or more persons made
payable to two or more persons and directed to two or more persons.
They may also be payable to a person or to his order or
to bearer.
Parties to Promissory Notes — How Designated. —
The parties to a promissory note maybe divided into two classes: —
(i^)

(a) Original.
(i^)

Subsequent.

promissory note are: —
The maker, or the person who executes and delivers the

The original parties to

(«)

a

contract.

(3) The payee or the person to whom the contract is executed and delivered and made payable.
The subsequent parties are:
(a) Endorsers or transferers.
\b) Tranferees or holders.
Parties to Checks — How Designated. — The parties to
checks are designated exactly as the parties to bills of exchange,
viz. : drawers, payees, and drawees.
Cheeks are not usually presented for acceptance, therefore there is no acceptor, but checks
being negotiable instruments there may be endorsers and endorsThe nature and liability of the respective parties to these
ees.
various instruments will be discussed in the subsequent sections of
this work.
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whatever to show that the defendant had any inter-

est in the goods.

Contention of Plaintiff.— The learned Judge intimating
pretty strong opinion that the instrument in question was
not a bill of exchange, it was submitted by the plaintiff that
it was a promissory note, for which reliance was placed on
a

Cruchley v. Clarence.'
Contention of Defendant. — On the part of the defendant it was insisted that the instrument declared on was not a
bill of exchange, being wanting in that which is essential to
constitute a bill of exchange, viz., a drawer and a payee; and,
further, that it was not either in form or in substance a promissory note — referring to Stoessiger v. The South Eastern

Railway Company.^
Upon the count for goods sold and delivered, the learned
Judge left it to the jury to say upon whose credit the goods

were delivered on board the Jasper — that of the defendant, or
of Bailey — reserving for the court the question whether the

instrument could properly be declared on either as a bill of
The jury returned a verexchange or as a promissory note.
dict for the defendant.''
Hannen, in Easter term last, pursuant to the leave
reserved, obtained a rule nisi to enter a verdict for the plaintiff, on the ground that the document declared on was a
He referred to Cruchley v. Clarence,* and
promissory note.
Armfield v. Allport.^ He submitted, that, though informal,
'

Maule & Selw. 90 (1813).

^

'■^3

2

J.

&

B. 549 (E. C. L. R vol. 77); 23 Law
Ellis
Q. B., 293.
In the course of the discussion at the trial, the learned Judge

Maude

^27

Law

J.

*2

&

&

4

it

a

is

3

Selw. 90. (1813).

Exch. 42.

a

a

is

a

it

is

a

case in this court, the name of which he could not
adverted to
It was probably Brown v. De Winton,
at the moment remember.
It was there held, that, although
6C. B., 336 (E. C. L. R. vol 60).
necessary to constitute a promissory
no precise form of words
Thus,
contract.
note, still
ought to have all the essentials of
negotiable
not per se
note payable to the maker's own order,
Anne, c. 9, s. i; a payee must be
instrument within the
But,
expressly named, or must appear by necessary implication.
in
circuand
put
indorsed in blank,
note in that form
when
becomes in effect payable to the bearer.
lation by the maker,
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it might, like a document drawn in favor of a fictitious payee,
be treated as a promissory note payable to bearer.
Argument of Counsel for Defendant. — The goods for
which the instrument was given were not delivered to the
■defendant,

but to

another

person,

and

the

plaintiff's jour-

nal and ledger, and also the invoice delivered of the goods,
all show that the defendant was not the person to be
charged: there is no reason, therefore, why the court should
The simple
■exercise any astuteness in favor of the plaintiff.
question is, zvhetlier the instrument amounts to a promissory
note.
It is submitted that it clearly does not. So far as it
professes anything, it professes to be a bill of exchange wanting
It is addressed to the defendant,
the name of a drawer.

"

is accepted by him.
The words "pay to my order
In truth, it is an
cannot mean the order of the defendant.
and

The defendincomplete bill of exchange, and nothing else.
ant does not promise to pay any sum on the demand of any
person, or at any particular time; and there is no endorsement.
[Willes, J. — The document seems sufficiently to explain itself.
It is an authority to some person to put his name to it as
drawer.
No one has done so.
It is therefore not a complete
—
•instrument.
Byles, J.
My strong impression at the trial was,
that it was neither a bill of exchange nor a note, but I thought it
better to reserve the point.] Stoessiger v. The Great Eastern
Railway Company' is precisel)- in point. There, a parcel delivered to a railway company for carriage contained 9/. io.f.
in cash and an instrument bearing a bill of exchange
" Tlirre months
in the following
terms,
stamp,
after
date pay to vie the sum of ill. los. , value received.
To Mr. Cruttenden" etc.: and written across it was
an acceptance by Mr. Cruttenden.
The parcel was addressed
Goold,
to
a creditor of Cruttenden; and the intention was
that Goold should put his name to the instrument as drawer.
In the course of transmission the parcel was opened,
and the instrument and what it contained were abstracted.
In an action against the company for the loss, it was held
'
293-

3

Ellis h B. 549 (E. C. L. R. vol. 77);

23

Law J. Q. B.,

iS.J
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that the instrument was a "writing," and not a "bill,
note,
or security for money," within the meaning of the
Carriers
Act;' but that it could not be considered of value, so as
under
that section to exempt the company from their common-law
liabity as carriers.
Ld. Campbell, in giving judgment, says:
am clearly of opinion that it is not a bill of
exchange, for
it has neither drawer nor payee; and it is not a
promissory
note, because it does not contain a promise to pay
any one,
and it is entirely inconsistent with Cruttenden's intention that

"I

any person who got possession

of it should put his name to it
as drawer."
The rest of the court agree that the instrument
was neither a bill nor a note: and Erie, J., says, "This was an
instrument in an imperfect state."
It is uttery impossible to

distinguish that from the present case.

Argument of Counsel for Plaintiff. — Though imperfect
bill of exchange, this instrument may well have effect

as a

to

given

it as

promissory note, as it must have been
intended by the party to be, viz., an engagement
to pay
the amount to a bona fide holder on demand.
The plaintiff might have put his name to it as drawer; and, if he
had done so, the defendant would have had no answer.
That is clear from Cruchley v. Clarance,^ Crutchley v.
Mann,'' and numerous other cases.
It is the same thing
LeBlanc,
observes
in
J.,
the
former case), as if the
(as
defendant (the acceptor) had made the bill payable to
bearer.
[Byles, J. — "What was wanting in Cruchley v. Clarance is present here; the marginal note is equivocal.]
The
name of the person sued is there: and it is held that he gives
authority to any one who is a bona fide holder, to fill up the
blank.
"As the defendant has chosen," says Ld. Ellenborough, "to send the bill into the world in this form, the world
The defendant, by
ought not to be "deceived by his acts.
leaving the blank, undertook to be answerable for it when
filled up in the shape of a bill." It is upon the same principle that a bill drawn in favor of a fictitious payee may be
a

II

G. 4 & I W. 4, c. 68, s. I.
Maule & Selw. 90 (1890).
"5 Taunt. 529 (E. C. L. R. vol.
'

^2

vol. 4).

i); i

Marsh.

29

fE. C. L..
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4

S.

606 (E. C. L. R. vol.
C. B. N.
99).
G. 576 (E. C. L. R. vol. 42),
Scott N. R. 204.

M.

&

^3
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a

a

it

a
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I

it

it,

In Fielder v. Mardeclared on as a bill payable to bearer.
shall,' an instrument purporting on the face of it to be a bill
of exchange drawn by A. , payable to the plaintiff or order,
was accepted by B., and handed to the plaintiff in satisfaction
In the place where
of a claim for rent due to her from A.
the direction to the drawee is usually found, the name and
The whole instrument
address of the payee were inserted.
(except the drawer's name) was in the handwriting of B.
It
that
the
was
held
entitled
to
recover
was
payee
upon it as a
—
note
of
B.
The
address in the corner
promissory
[Byles, J.
as
treated
no
address
at
all.
was
The instrument could not
of
It
could
a
bill
be
only be Marshall's promissory
exchange.
The court construed it so as to give effect to the obvinote.
ous intention of the parties.
Montague Smith, J. — There
were both maker and payee named there.]
There cannot be
in
difference
between
a
principle
blank left for the name
any
of a drawer, and a blank for the payee, or, which is the same
Erie, C. J., in that case says: "It
thing, a fictitious payee.
appears to me that the right way to deal with it is this, to
treat the direction to 'Mrs. Emma Fielder' at the foot of the
bill as a mere informal repetition of the words in the body
of
'pay to Mrs. Emma Fielder.' The effect of so conthat the defendant, who accepts the bill, thereby
structing
promises to pay the amount at maturity to Emma Fielder.
Feeling that we are at liberty so to construe the instrument,
have much satisfaction in giving effect to what must have
been the intention of the parties, by holding that the plaintiff
In the course of the argument, Willes,
entitled to recover."
case of Miller v. Thompson,^ where
J., referred to
was
held that an instrument in the form of a bill of exchange, drawn
joint-stock bank by the manager of one of its branch
upon
banks, by order of the directors, might be declared upon as
promisory note; Tindal, C. J., in giving judgment, says:
"It appears that the directors for whom the instrument in
question purports to be drawn by their manager, are members of the company whose name and character are presented

l8.]

MC CALL

V. TAYLOR.

it,

SEC.

I15

a

promissory

is

a

is

a

note,

if

it was clearly

,

if it

a

a

a

a

it

a

is

I

is

a

is

a

it

a

it

a

it

a

is

on the face of
and that the company
not
corporation,
but a mere private association.
We must, therefore, look
as
an
instrument
drawn
upon
by one of several members of
firm, purporting that the sum therein mentioned shall be
In effect
a
paid by the firm at a given time and place.
note,
and nothing else.
To constitute
bill of
promissory
essential that there should be two parties,
exchange,
drawer, and
drawn.'
amperson upon whom the bill
clearly of opinion that this
promissory note." And the
learned Judge (Willes, J.) adds, "If there be sufficient on the
face of the instrument to indicate
promise to pay,
In Peto v. Reynolds,^ the plaintiff's agent
promissory note.
at Cameroons, in Africa, drew an instrument in the form of
bill of exchange; but addressed to no one; across which the
defendant's agent wrote an acceptance in the defendant's
name, and delivered the bill to the plaintiff's agent, for value
In an action on the bill, the plaintiff attempted to
received.
prove that the bill was presented to the defendant, when he
promised to pay it. It being doubtful, however, from the evidence, whether the defendant had made an absolute or merely
conditional promise to pay the bill, the court, in granting
new trial; though disposed to think that the instrument was
not a bill of exchange, declined to give an express opinion on
was held by Parke, B., Alderson, B. and
the point; but
bill of exchange,
the instrument was not
Martin, B., that
there was evidence

of an

^9

a

'

And person to whom the money
Exch. 410.
'27 Law, J., Exch. 42.

is

if

a

In Armfield v. Allport," the cirabsolute promise to pay it.
cumstances were very similar to those of the present case.
It was there held that an instrument drawn in the form of
accepted in blank, and afterbill payable to bearer, even
wards filled up by the drawer, may be declared on by the
endorsee as a promissory note made by the drawer and ento be paid.
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In Byles on Bills,Mt is said:

dorsed by the drawee.'

"If

4,

the

bill be not made payable either to any payee in particular, or
to the drawer's order, or to bearer in general, it would seem,
according to the opinion of the majority of the judges,' to be
payable to bearer; but, according to the opinion of Eyre, C.
J., in the same case, it is mere waste paper": and reference
or
is made to Rex v. Randall,' where a bill "payable to

a

I

I

a

I

If
I

it

is,

order" was held 7iot to be a bill of exchange, because there
was no payee; and to Rex v. Richards,^ where the prisoner
drew a bill upon the treasurer of the navy "payable to
or order," and signed it in the name of a navy surgeon, and
it was held, that, to constitute an order for the payment of
money, there must be some payee, and that a direction "to
or order was not sufficient."
pay to
Decision of Court. — I am of opinion that this rule should
The instrument in question is declared upon
be discharged.
and
also as a promissory note.
as a bill of
exchange,
'^
Four inontlis after date, pay to
It was in this form,
my order the sum of three hundred pounds, for value received,'' and it was addressed to the defendant, but it had no
Across it was written an acceptdate and no draivers name.
ance by the defendant.
whether the holder of this document has
The question
either as
bill of exchange or as a
a right to declare on
It is clearly not a bill of exchange, and in
promissory note.
could be clearly satisform it is not a promissory note.
should be giving effect to the intention of the
fied that
promissory note,
parties by holding this instrument to be
But
am aware of no
would endeavor so to construe it.

'It

&

i

it

it

is

a

it is

a is

is

not easy to discoverer what was decided by this case. In
a considered judgment, the Ld. Chief Baron
reported to have
said: "A man who writes his name across
stamped paper as
direction to him upon the paper,
acceptor, there being
liable;
to
his
authority
anybody to draw upon him when
he gives
may be
convenient to do so, or when the person to whom the paper
advisable to apply
for this purpose."
given may think
^'Sth edit. 73.
A. Bl. 608.
'In Minetv. Gibson,
'Rnss C. C. 185.
R. C. C. 193.
'^R.
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learned counsel has discovered
none, which warrants us in holding this to be either the one
It is an inchoate and imperfect instrument. If
or the other.
the holder had authority to make it a complete instrument
either as a bill or a note, he was at liberty to do so; but, if
he had no such authority, he might if he attempted to do so
the

S49 (E. C. L. R. vol. 77); 23 Law J., Q. B. 293.
The meaning of the word "parties" in reference to negotiable
instruments is used in a more restricted sense than when relating
In the latter case, "parto "parties" to an ordinary contract.
in
are
those
who
a
strict
sense
are affected by the operlegal
ties"
ation of the contract; in the former case, "parties" as the courts
usually designate them are those whose names appear on the face
person is made a party by his
or back of the instrument.
or
some
other
written emblem upon the
his
signature
signing,
be
bound
A sigthat
he
intends
to
by the instrument.
instrument
nature in pencil, a signature made by another person, but attested
by a mark, an indorsement upon the back of the note in form of
'7, 2, 8,' made with the intention of indorsing, or such evidences
The question is whether the signer intended to bind
of intention.
Norton on Bills and Notes, 38.
Brayley v.
himself or not."
Kelley, 25 Minn., 160.

'3

Ellis & B.

"A

Certainty as to Parties is Promoted by Two Facts: —
(i) That the instrument bears upon its face means of identi-

fying the parties to it;
That these parties are capable of exact ascertainment.
(2)
The absence of either or both of these requirements renders
the instrument non-negotiable.
I put
Chief Baron Eyre, in Gibson v. Minet, declared:
demand,
on
to
pounds
'I
pay
promise
words:
these
in writing
500
If I
value received' without saying to whom it is waste paper.
for
value
date,
after
some
day
direct another to pay 500 pounds at
received, without saying to whom, it is waste paper."
This is necessary to the negotiability of the instrument. For,
under the law merchant, a negotiable instrument must show upon
its face by inspection who the parties are, except when made payable to bearer.
This then is the general rule, that without a maker or drawer,
a drawee or a payee the instrument is non negotiable.

"If

Exception in the Case of the Drawee.— The following

exceptions may be noted in the case of the drawee:
(i) If the drawee can be otherwise sufficiently identified
from the bill it is sufficient.
bill accepted or a bill accepted where
(2) An unaddressed
is
the drawer and acceptor are one and the same person, probably

Il8
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The case of
render himself liable to a charge of forgery.
Stoessiger v. The South Eastern Railway Company' seems to
me to be precisely in point, without going into any of the
Nothing is clearer to my mind than that, in the
other cases.
ordinary case of an acceptance with the drawer's name in
blank, it is important, in order to constitute a contract, that
to be treated as a promissory

Bills and Notes,

note, and is negotiable.

Norton on

57.

The Common Rules Concerning the Nomination
Payees may be Stated as Follows: —

of

(i) The payee of an instrument, except one payable to
.bearer, must be a person in being, natural or legal, and ascertained, at the time of issue.
(2) Where the payee and maker or drawer are the same person, the instrument is not issued until after its indorsement and
delivery by the maker.
(3) The payee may be a fictitious or non-existing person,
but the instrument is then construed as payable to bearer, and
Norton on Bills and Notes; 57.
title thereto is made by estoppel."
The parties to commercial contracts must be particularly desscribed and must be a person or persons who are capable of being
ascertained at the time the instrument is made.
Chitty on Bills,
But
the
be
made
certain
without
may
parties
inserting their
156.
for
that
is
certain
which
names;
may be rendered certain; and if
the payee be so certainly described or referred to as to be easily
ascertained by allegations and proofs the contract will be sustained.
Adams v. King, 16 111., 169.
The following contracts have been
held to be sufficient as to parties: " Pay to bills payable, " (signed)
E. F. ;
promise to pay to you," (signed) X.
Chalmers on
Bills and Notes, 7; "Pay to the administrators of Abner Chase,
deceased," (signed) C. D.
Adams v. King, 16 111., i6g; or a
promise to pay to "A or heirs," (signed) H. B.
Knight v. Jones,
21 Mich. 161.
Where a note reads, "We promise to pay to the
order of myself, etc.," extrinsic evidence is competent to show
which of the two obligors was intended as the payee.
Jenkins v.
In the case of Stoessiger v. The Southeastern
Bass, 88 Ky., 397.
Ry. Co. supra, (23 Law J. [N. S. ] [Q. B.] 293), the following
instrument;

"I

"

Three vionths after date pay
ten shillings, value received.
" To Mr. Cruttenden, Jeweller."
"Accepted, Cruttenden."

to

me the sum

of eleven pounds,

"
"\_Not signed.l

Was held not to be a negotiable contract.
Ld. Campbell, C. J.,
am clearly of opinion, that it is not a bill of exchange,
said:
for it has neither drawer nor payee; and it is not a promissory note.

"I
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it should be known who is to be the drawer. It may have been
important here that the instrument should be filled up as a
bill drawn by the owner of the ship or the broker upon the
And it may be that the plaintiff had no authority to
captain.
But, whatever may have been
add his name as the drawer.
the particular circumstances under which this document was
it does not contain a promise to pay any one, and it is
entirely inconsistent with Cruttenden's intention that any person
who got possession of it should put his name to it as drawer."
Schultz V. Astley, 2 Bing., 544; 5 Law J. Rep. (N. S.) C. P., 130;
Miller v. Race, i Burr. 452; Petilton v. Lorden, 86 111., 361; Gray
V. Milner, 8 Taunton, 739; Shuttleworth v. Stephens, I Camp. R.,
407; Harvey v. Kay, 9 B. and C, 364; Edis v. Bury, 6 B. and C,
433; Tevis v. Young, i Mete. (Ky.), 197; Allan v. Mawson, 4
Camp, 1:5.
In the case of Brown v. Oilman, 13 Mass., 158, the following instrument was held not to be a good promissory note for
the reason that all the parties were not certain:

because

" Good for

"Boston, 15th May, 1810.

one

hundred and twenty-six dollars on demand.
" Gilman &r Hoyi."

a

it

a

is

a

if

2

(3

2

is

is

),

8

5

it

,

2

4

a

if

a

a

)

6

3

is

if

8

a

a

it,

In this case Parker, C. J., said, "It is not a negotiable promIts legal effect is
It is not a note payable to bearer.
issory note.
nothing more than that of a memorandum between the parties to
receipt for money;
to operate as
promise to pay money; as
for, according to
accounted
to
be
sum of money
or as proof of
v. King, i6also,
Adams
See
the real intention of the parties."
106 Mass., 561; Yates v. Nash,
111., 169; Carpenter v. Farnsworth,
B.,
C.
P.,
L.
C.
J.,
306;
581 (98 E. C. L. Rep.)
29
It Is Sufficient to Describe the Parties. — It sufficient
They need not be named.
the parties are particularly described.
B.,
and
E.
V.
Storm
Sterling,
832 (77 E. C. L. R.); Cowie v.
L. R.
C.
E. and B., 333 (88 E.
Stirling,
If note gets into the hands of wrong payee, of the same
he
he indorses
title thereto; and
name, he cannot acquire
Term, R. 28; Foster
Mead v. Young,
will be guilty of forgery.
note
given to one in
also
So
H.
N.
V. Shattuck,
446.
and provedeclare
upon
he
own,
may
name different from his
Blackf.
Graves,
v.
Patterson
that he was the person intended.
If
the
nameEng. (Ark.), 43.
593; Jester V. Hopper,
(Ind.
admissable to show who was inmisspelled, parole evidence
E. C. L. R.). A noteStark.,
Barrett,
V.
Willis
tended.
29
of parties. Blanckfor
uncertainty
bad
payable to B. orC. will be
the father and
Where
AL,
B. and
417.
enhagen v. Blundell,
son have the same name.it will be intended payable to the father
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As it stands,
the thing is inchoate and incomplete, and affords no foundation for the holder to sue upon it.
Willes, J. — I am entirely of the same opinion.
I thought at the
Byles, J. — I am of the same opinion.
trial, and still think, that the instrument in question could not
given,

act upon the case

have referred to.

until the contrary is shown.
Sweeting v. Barrett, i Stark, io6.
may be payable to "the trustees of A's will" and parol
evidence is admisrible to show who the trustees are.
Adams v.
So
King, i6 111., 169; Megginson v. Harper, 2 C. and M., 322.
a
to
contract
"be
the
also may
administrator
negotiable
payable
Moody v. Threlkeld, 13 Ga., 56. The following
of A's estate."
is a good negotiable contract; "On demand I promise to pay 'A.,'
'B.' and 'C.,' or to their order, or the major part of them, the
Watson v. Evans, 32 D. J. R. Exch., 137.
sum of 100 pounds."
If the name be left blank, a bona fide holder may fill it up with
Crutchly v. Mann, 5 Taunton, 529.
his own name.
In Grant v.
Vaughn, the contract was payable to "ship Fortune or bearer,"
and it was held to be a good negotiable contract payable to
"bearer" simply. 3 Burr., 1516.
In the case of Knight v. Jones, 21 Mich., 161, the court held
the following instrument to be a promissory note.

A note

"

I promise

''Detroit,

Oct. 7, 1867.

pay to Mary Kfiight or heirs, the sum making
and
hundred
dollars, on the first day of January, 1868.
fifty
four
' '
William Jones. "
to

See also, Armstrong v. Harshman, 61 Ind., 52; Sittig v. Birkestack, 38 Md., 158.
Where a negotiable contract is issued in blank without the
name of the payee there is an authority to a bona fide holder to
insert a name.
Cruchley v. Clarence, 2 M. and S., 90; Crutchly
v. Mann, 5 Taunton,
529; Atwood v. Griffin, 2 C. & P., 368;
Rich v. Starbuck, 51 Ind., 87. A promise "to pay to the order
of the indorser's name," etc., was supported.
2 Hill,
(N. Y. ),
v.
III.,
Hall,
A promise
154; Kayser
511; 118 Mass., 439.
85
"to pay to the trustees of the Wesleyan Chapel, Harrogate, or
their treasurer for the time being," etc., was held good.
Holmes
V. Jaques,
i Q. B. L. R., 376; Storm v. Stirling, 3 E. and B.,
842; 23 L. J. R. (Q. B.), 301; Harlow v. Roswell, 15 111., 56;
Watson, etc. v. Evans, i Hurl, and C, 662; 7 E. and B., 234;
Adams v. King, 16 111., 169; Moore v. Anderson, 8 Ind., 18; Robertson V. Sheward, i M. & G., 511; Megginson v. Harper, 2 Cr.
and M., 322.
In Bowles v. Lambetr, 54 111., 237, a note payable
"to the estate of A.," was also held good. Tittle v. Thomas, 30

Miss., 122; Lyon

V.

Marshall,

11

Barb., 241.
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either a bill of exchange or a promissory
note.
It is not like a bill accepted iri blank.
Montague Smith, J. — I also think this case is not distinguishable from Stoessiger v. The South Eastern Railway

be declared on as

Parties — Capacity of, to make Negotiable Contracts. —

The general principles which govern the capacity of parties to
common law contracts control in their application to the law of
commercial contracts.
Want of capacity says Mr. Randolph in
his valuable work on commercial paper may be either natural,
legal or political, according as it proceeds from mental unfitness
or from the requirements of local or public law.
Examples of
natural capacity are found in idiots, lunatics and all persons of
unsound mind or insufficient understanding.
Among those who
are legally incapable may be mentioned infants, married women
and corporations so far as their power is restricted by law. Among
those who are politically incapable may be mentioned alien enemies and to a certain extent public officers and State and municipal governments.
Infants — Capacity of. — Persons under twenty-one years of
age are minors, or infants, and contracts made by them may be
void, when they are clearly to the infant's disadvantage, or voidable which may or may not be to his advantage according to the
circumstances, or they may be valid if entered into for the necesThe distinction
sities of the infant or in satisfaction for his torts.
between void and voidable contracts of infants is practically obsolete; so that now all the contracts of an infant, which are not in
themselves illegal are voidable only and may be ratified.
Chancellor Kent in his Commentaries says, " it is held that
a negotiable note given by an infant, even for necessities, is void,
and his acceptance of a bill of exchange is void; and a bond
It must be
with a penalty though given for necessities is void.
is in
decisions
modern
of
admitted, however, that the tendency
liberal
extension
favor of a reasonableness and policy of a very
of the rule, and that the acts and contracts of infants should be
deemed voidable only, and subject to their election, when they
If their conbecome of age, either to affirm or disallow them.
that
as
a
consequence
would
follow
tracts were absolutely void it
Comm.
2
Kent.
the contracts could have no legal effect whatever.
Lect. 31; Harner v. Dipple, 31 O. St., 72.
Liability of Infant for Necessaries. — The rule is well
settled that an infant may bind himself by a negotiable contract
Bradley v. Pratt, 23 Vt, 378.
fer necessaries.
He can not, however, bind himself for necessaries when he
has a parent or guardian who supplies his wants unless he has
authority from such guardian or parent to purchase them and bind
King v. Cole, Holt's Rep., 360; Coan v.
himself for them.
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There, upon an instrument precisely simithat there it was dated, Ld. Campbell says:
of exchange; there is neither drawer nor
a promissory note to pay any one who might
happen to be bearer; that Cruttenden should become liable

Company supra.
lar to this, except
"It is not a bill
Nor is it
payee.

2

if

a

is

it

if

a

is

a

it

if

it

it,

Boroles, ib., 358; Thompson v. Leach, ib., 357; 3 Mod. R., 301;
228; Rundell v.
196; Angell v. McClellan, 16 Mass.,
3 Salk.,
If an infant borrows money for necessarKeeler, 7 Watts, 237.
ies and gives his note for the same he is not liable on such note
unless he applies the money accordingly.
3 Salk., 196.
Liability of Infant for Torts. — Infants are liable for their
torts and injuries of a private nature, and for wrongs committed
If the tort be committed by force
by them the same as adults.
the infant is liable at any age; for in case of civil injuries, with
Tift v. Tift, 4 Denio, 175;
force, the intention is not regarded.
Bradley v. Pratt, 23 Vt., 378.
The law makes him liable for his tort, and if he elects to
settle or liquidate such liability by giving his promissory note or
other commercial contract, we see no reason why he should not
be held liable in an action upon the note, to the same extent that
he would be if the action had been brought upon the cause of
action which formed the consideration for the note.
The commercial contracts having been given in settlement of a claim for
which the infant was liable and no fraud or imposition having been
practiced in obtaining it the plea of infancy is certainly not available to defeat it.
Infant as Payee. — An infant, says Mr. Daniel, may undoubtedly be the payee of a bill or note, and may sue upon and
enforce
can not be but for his benefit
since
the consideration thereof does not move from himself, but from some third
be for
debt justly due to him.
But whether or
person, or
not an infant can personally receive payment
different question.
As
rule,
general
payment should be made to his guardian,
and
be made to the infant personally, and
thereby dissipated and lost, the payor would not be discharged.
Story on
Bills, Sec. 85; Dan. on Negot. Inst., Sec. 227; Phillips v. Paget,

Ark., 80.

Infant as Indorser. — An infant

is

a

may also become the indorser of
commercial contract made payable to him or order
and thereby pass the legal and equitable title so as to enable the
endorsee to recover against prior parties. This
upon the theory
that the prior parties by undertaking to pay to an infant or his
order are estopped to deny his capacity to order payment to be
made to the endorsee.
Story on Bills, Sec. 85; Hardy v. Waters,
would be ab38 Me., 450; Dan. on Negot. Inst., Sec. 227.
surd to allow one who has made
promise to pay one who
an
is

a

"It

SEC.

MC CALL

18.]

V. TAYLOR.

I23

generally to the bearer, was quite contrary to his intention."
So here, I think we should be going entirely against the intention of the defendant if we were to hold him liable upon this
instrument as upon a promissory note payable to bearer.
infant, or his order, to refuse to pay the money to whom the infant
has ordered it to be paid, in direct violation of his promise."
Nightingale v. Withington, 15 Mass., 272.
Liability of Infant Upon His Indorsement. — An infant,
as an indorser is no more liable than as maker or acceptor of commercial contracts.
While his indorsement operates to transfer the
title to the contract he is not liable thereon.
He may indeed disaffirm the contract of indorsement and intercept the payment to
the endorsee.
Or he may by giving notice to the anticedent parties of his avoidance of the contract of indorsement furnish them
But until
with a valid defense against the claim of the endorsee.
he does avoid the indorsement it is to be deemed, as to such
anticedent parties, a good and valid transfer.
Story on Notes,
Sec. 80.

Infants'

Liability — Ratification. ^Since

9

a

if

it

a

I

a

I

I

is

it,

the commercial
contract of an infant is not absolutely void but voidable only, he
may ratify it after reaching full age, when he will be bound to pay
For by ratification he valithe instrument according to its term.
dates the contract and it becomes the same as if it had been exeThe ratification enures to the
cuted and delivered by an adult.
benefit of all subsequent parties or holders.
A
No particular form of words is necessary to a ratification.
is
suffior
contract
debt
of
the
mere recognition
of the existence
cient.
The following statements have been held to amount to a
ratification by the infant after reaching full age: " I will pay the
justly
but not this year; all that
note as soon as I can make
return;
when
will
you
and
pay
owe
due
shall
be
you
your
paid;
will remit in short time." The promise to pay the contract to
amount to
ratification must be direct and certain and must be
made to the party with whom he contracted or his authorized
Mere
will not be sufficient.
made to a third person
agent;
amount
of
itself
not
will
maturity,
before
infant,
the
part payment by
Smith
to
ratification by the infant after reaching his majority.
H.,
N.
Eaton,
10
Mass., 62; Robbins v.
V. Mayo,
561.
In many of the states statutes have been enacted which provide that no action shall be maintained whereby to charge any
person, upon any promise made after full age; to pay any debt
contracted during infancy, or upon any ratification after full age,
of any promise or simple contract made during infancy, unless
such promise or ratification shall be made by some writing signed
by the parties to be charged therewith.
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Discharg^ed.

an Infant and Adult. — If an infant executes
a negotiable contract jointly with an adult, the latter will be bound
by his contract and suit may be brought against the adult alone.
Taylor V. Dansby, 42 Mich., 84; Reading v. Beardsley, 41 Mich.,
123; Burgess v. Merrill, 4 Taunton, 468; Slocum v. Hooker, 12
Barb., 563.
Joint Note of Infant Partner. — The same rule applies to
And the fact that an infant remains in the firm
infant partners.
after he reaches his majority does not necessarily ratify his conCrabtree v. May, i B. Men., 289; Bush v. Linthicum, 59
tracts.
Md. 344; Adams v. Beal, 67 Md., 53; Osburn v. Farr, 42 Mich.,
134; Continental Bank v. Strauss, 137 N. Y., 148, 553; Mehlhop
V. Rea, 90 Iowa, 30; 57 N. W. Rep., 650; Bixler v. Kresge, 169 Pa.
St., 405; 47 Am. St. Rep., 920; Shirk v. Shultz, 113 Ind., 571. His
interest in the partnership property remains liable, however, to the
Lovell v. Beauchamp, 19 Appeal Cases (L. R.),
partnership debts.
607; In re Howes, 3 Q. B., 628; In re Taylor, 8 D. M. and G., 254;
Ex parte, Adam, i V. and B., 494; Ex parte Blain, 12 Ch. D., 522;
Ex parte Henderson, 4 Ves., 163; Shirk v. Shultz, supra; Yates v.
Lyon, 61 N. Y., 344, Pelletier v. Conture, 148 Mass., 269. Neither
can the adult members of the firm repudiate these contracts upon
the ground of infancy, for by admitting the infant to the firm they
Adams v. Beal, 67 Md., 53;
have thereby made him their agent.
Am. St. Rep., 379; Sparman v. Keim, 83 N. Y., 245.

Joint Note of

It

Lunatics— Capacity to Contract — Effect of Insanity. —

may be stated as a general rule, that where contracts are made
with imbeciles or lunatics in ignorance of their weaknesses and no
advantage is taken of them and the acts are in good faith in every
Molton v.
respect, they are valid and binding upon the lunatic.
Cameroux, 4 Exch., 17; 2 Exch., 4S9; Beverley's Case, 4 Rep., T26;
Freed v. Brown, 55 Ind., 310; Edwards v. Davenport, 20 Fed. Rep.,
26 Wend., 299; West v. Russell, 48
756; Stewart v. Lispenard,
Mich., 74; Searle v. Galbraith, 73 III., 269; Moore v. Hershey, 90
Pa. St., 196; N. N. Ins. Co. v. Blakenship, 97 Ind., 535; Scanlon
V. Cobb, 85 111., 296.
Contra see Seavers v. Phelps, 11 Pick., 304;
v.
Reed,
S.
and M. (Miss.), 94; Anglo-California Bank
Fitzgerald
9
If, however, the lunatic has been
V. Aures, 27 Fed. Rep., 727.
put under guardianship his contracts are void.
Ingraham v. Bladuin, 9 N. Y., 45; Runnells v. Gerner, 80 Mo., 477; Mansfield v.
Felton, 13 Pick., 206; Lynch v. Dodge, 130 Mass., 458.

Capacity of Married Women to make Negotiable Contracts. — At common law the contracts of married women were

void; and this rule exists yet except so far as removal by statute.

In some of the states, by statute she may contract as dLfeme sole,
in others only as to her sole and separate property, while in others
the common law rule is still in force.
See statutes of your state;
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also Mason v. Morgan, 2 A. E., 30; Haly v. Lane, 2 Atk., 181;
In those states which permit her to
Lloyd V. Lee, i Strange, 94.
bind her separate estate by contracts, the contract must show in
some way that it was her intention at the time the contract was
executed and delivered.
Yale v. Dederer, 22 N. Y., 450; McVey
V. Cantrell, 70 N. Y., 295; Second Nat. Bank v. Miller, 60 N. Y.,
639; Kenton Ins. Co. v. McCIellan, 43 Mich., 564; Todd v. Ames,
60 Barb., 862; Wolf v. Van Metre, 23 Iowa 397.
If these contracts
are executed with a married woman as principal with a surety, the
At common law, where a man marsurety will alone be liable.
ried a woman, who was a party to a bill, or note, he became resi Black. Com., 443; Schonler's Doponsible for such contracts,
mestic Rel. 69.
She is not estopped by her own representation
Kemworth v. Sawyer, 125 Mass., 29;
that she is a feme sole.
Waterbury v. Andrews, 67 Mich., 282 and cases there cited.
Neither is she liable upon her promise made by her after her
husband's death to pay a bill or note which she executed during
Philhis life time unless upon some new and good consideration.
lips V. Wicks, 36 N. Y., 254; Hetherington v. Nixon, 46 Ala. 297.
A married woman may, however, be the agent for her husband
Abbott
and as such bind him by a note signed in her own name.
V. McKinley, 2 Miles (Pa.), 220.

Liability of Husband for the
mercial Contracts of the \Ai''ife. — If

Ante- Nuptial

Com-

woman executes and
and before the same
while
single,
contract
delivers a commercial
the payment thereliable
for
is paid marries, the husband becomes
This liability of the husband, however, terminates with the
of.
If the husband dies before proceedexpiration of the coverature.
contracts the wife alone will be
such
are
instituted
upon
ings
66.
Notes,
and
Bills
liable.
Byles on
If a commercial contract was given to a single woman and
she married the property vested in her husband and he alone could
At common law a note made payable
indorse it at common law.
to a married woman is in law a note to the husband and becomes
instantly his property; and her indorsement transfers no property
in the note unless the indorsement was made with the husband's
a

v. King, 17 Me., 301; Holland
Beals, 10 Cush. (Mass.), 291;
v.
v. Moody, 12 Ind., 170; Stevens
Miller V. Delamaker, 12 Wend., 433; Mason v. Morgan, 2 Ad. &
Ellis, 30 (29 E. C. L, R.); Prestwick v. Marshall, 7 Bing., 565

knowledge

(20

and consent.

Savage

E. C. L. R.).

to the General Rule.—
under which
circumstances
"There are certain exceptional
her:
upon
binding
be
(i)
the contracts of a married woman may
wife has
when
when husband is an alien enemy or civilly dead;
sole trader by special custom
separate estate; (3) when wife
when wife purchases necessaries; (s) when husband
or statute;
(4)

a

a

is

(2)

Liability of Wife— Exceptions
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adopts her name as binding on him; (6) when wife is agent of husband." Dan. on Negot. Inst. Sec. 244.
If the husband is an alien enemy, he is prevented by law from
coming to the aid of his wife; it is therefore necessary for her own
So
maintenance and support to be permitted to make contracts.
also a married woman may become liable upon her contracts when
in the execution thereof she intended to charge her sole and sepaIn these cases, however, it is necessary that her conrate estate.
tracts be entered into with reference to, and in the credit of, her
There must be an intention upon her part to
separate estate.
Some of the courts have held
make her separate estate liable.
that this intention must be expressed in the contract itself; while
others have held upon the contrary that it is sufficient if the intenWilliams v. Urnston, 35 Ohio St., 296; (See
tion can be implied.
Levi V. Earle, 30 Ohio St., 147); Frank v. Lilienfield, 33 Gratt.,
349; McVey v. Cantrell, 70 N. Y., 295; Conlin v. Cantrell, 64 N.

Y.,

219.

In many of

the states there are statutes empowering married
women to engage in business upon their sole and separate accounts,
and when so empowered they may execute and deliver and render
themselves
individually liable upon their commercial contracts.
Canden v. Mulen, 29 Cal., 566; Wieman v. Anderson, 42 Pa.
St., 311; Mudge V. Bullock, 83 111., 22.

Married Women— ^Right to Contract — Statutory Rules.
— By statute in many of the states the common law rule concern-

ing the right of a married woman to contract has been abrogated;
so that now the wife may enter into any engagement or transaction
which she might if unmarried.
Capacity of Partners to Bind the Firm upon Commercial Contracts. — It may be stated as a general proposition that
each partner (except secret or dormant partners) has implied
This authority is implied from the very
power to bind the firm.
a
nature and object of
It springs from the mutual
partnership.
This implied authority,
agency of the co-partners for each other.
however, depends largely upon the general character and purposes
or objects of the partnership.
If the partnership is a trading partnership the borrowing of money becomes an ordinary incident of
the trading and each partner has an implied authority to bind the
firm by making, drawing, endorsing or accepting in its name a
commercial contract for partnership
This is true
purposes.
whether he signs the name of the firm, or his own name.
Livingston V. Roosevelt, 4 Johnson, 251; Gayno v. Samuel, 14 Ohio, 592.
A partner has no right to bind his co-partners by a commer
cial contract except in a partnership transaction.
If, however, the
partnership is not a trading firm one partner has no implied authority to bind the firm by making, drawing, endorsing or accepting commercial contracts.
The reason therefor being that the
power of each individual of a partnership to make such contract in
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behalf of non-trading firms can only exist by virtue of the consent
of all the partners. Pease v. Cole, 53 Conn., 53; Walker v. Walker,
66 Vt, 285; Horn v. City Bank, 33 Kan., 518; Lee v. Bank, 45

Kan., 8.
Upon these principles

member of a law firm cannot bind the
partnership by a promissory note or other commercial contract
without the consent of all the members of the firm; neither can one
of the firm of practicing physicians bind it except for the necesDan. on Negot. Inst. Sec. 358; Tiedesaries of their profession.
man on Com. Paper, Sec. 97; Pease v. Cole, 53 Conn., 53; Bays v.
Conner, 105 Ind., 415; Levi v. Lathan, 15 Neb., 509; Dowling v.
National Bank, 145 U. S., 512; Crossthwait v. Ross, i Humph

(Tenn.),

a

23.

Partners— Form of the Signature of the Firm.— It

is a

9

a

&

if

if

is

is

if,

strict rule that the name of the firm in the making, drawing, endorsing
or accepting of commercial contracts, must be used, otherwise an
however, there
action cannot be maintained against the firm;
the signature.
will
be
bound
by
firm
the
variance
an immaterial
It has
material.
the
variance
bound
But the firm will not be
"
firm
Burton,"
the
the style of the firm was
been held that
John
Co."
note signed by, "John Burton
will not be bound on
M. & W., 284; Tiedeman on Com. Paper,
Kirk V. Burton,
Sec. 103.

a

a

"I

4

is

a

a

&

is

it

is

&

it

is

member of the firm to
signed by
When the firm name
may be done by using the name of the
commercial contract
partnership simply or the use of the partnership name per the
Co."
Thus the signature may be either "John Smith
partner.
formality
No
special
Smith.
&
Co."
by John
or "John Smith
must appear on the face of the paper that the
required; but
So also have these conthe obligation of the firm.
contract
promise," and signed by one of the firm for
tracts which read
Co. been held to bind the whole firm
the rest as A. B. for A. B.
Doty v. Bates, 11 Johns, 544and not the signing parties singly.
Make Negotiable Conto
Capacity of a Corporation
have only such powers as
rule
general
tracts.— Corporations as
imare expressly conferred upon them by their charters and such
plied powers as are necessary to the full and complete enjoyment
of their express power. In order, therefore, to determine whether
concorporation has authority to execute and deliver commercial
its
corporate
of
tracts, an examination of its express powers—
If express authority, therefore, can not
charter must be made.
this power necesarises
be found in its charter, then the inquiry
nature
sarily implied from the express powers or from the general
Case,
College
Dartmouth
or character of the institution.
Wheaton,

636.
According to the English rule all trading and banking corpor-

without
ations may execute and deliver commercial contracts
to the
necessary
acts are
express authority so to do, because such
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Broughton v. Manchester, Water
very object of their existence.
Wks., 3 B. 7. Aid., 1.
In the United States it may be regarded as settled that the
power of corporations to become parties to commercial contracts,
Whenever a
is co-extensive with their power to contract debts.
execute
a negocorporation is authorized to contract a debt it may
Every corporation, therefore, may
tiable contract to pay it.
become a party to commercial contracts for some purposes if it
A religious corporation which
has the power to contract debts.
Parfor
its
rooms
need
fuel
may give its note for the same.
may
v.
I.
&
Society, 46
sons on Bills and Notes, 164, 165; Catron
Iowa, 108; Dan. on Negot. Inst., Sec. 381.
A corporation, in order to obtain its legitimate and corporate objects, may deal precisely, through its agents and officers,
the same ends.
as an individual may who seeks to accomplish
Y.,
Averill,
10
N.
Moss V.
447, 449.
Where a corporation has power to purchase property or procure money on a loan in the course of its business, the seller or
lender may exact, and the purchaser or borrower must have the
power to give, assurances which do not fall within the prohibitions,
Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y.,
express or implied, of some statute.
66; Olcott V. Tioga R'y Co., 40 Barb., 179; Monument Nat. Bk.
V. Globe Works, loi Mass., 57.
Corporations Not Allowed to Become Accommodation Parties. — Unless the corporation, however, has been expressly authorized to become a party to commercial contracts it
has not the power to bind itself upon accommodation paper; for
an accommodation paper cannot be considered to be issued in the
But if the contract reaches
regular course of the corporation.
the hands of an innocent endorsee the common law rule of negotiable paper applies, viz.: that the endorsee takes the paper free
from the equitable defenses existing against it.
So also will the
corporation be liable upon its commercial contract in the hands of
bona fide holders where the amount issued by the corporation is in
excess of the amount authorized.
Ellsworth v. St. Louis R'y Co.,
Y.,
N.
National
Bank
v.
Wells, 79 N Y., 498; National
553;
98
Park Bank v. German Am. & Security Co., 5 L. Rep. A, 673.
It may be stated as a general rule that when a corporation has
power under any circumstance to issue negotiable securities, the
bona fide holder has a right to presume that they were issued under
the circumstances which gave them the requisite authority.
Lexington V. Butler, 81 U. S., 14-

Corporations — Power to Indorse

tracts.— Corporations,
Paper, having

a

Commercial

Con-

Daniel in his work on Commercial
right to receive bills or notes in payment of debts,
says

indorse them, or to dispose of them by
assignment without indorsement as may suit their purposes.
Marvine v. Hymers, 12 N. Y., 223; Hardy v. Merriweather, 14 Ind.,
have the implied right to
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And if authorized to bor203; Dan. on Negot. Inst., Sec. 385.
row money they may borrow a bill or a note and indorse it or
jn it.
Corporations — Form of Their Contract. — As a general
rule, a corporation can only contract by a writing under its common seal. But to this rule there are certain exceptions: (i) Where
the contract is executed; (2) Where the acts done are of daily
necessities to the corporation, or are too insignificant to be worth
the trouble of affixing the common seal; (3) Where the corporation as a head, as a mayor, or a dean, who may give command
which a party may obey without the sanction of a common seal;
(4) Where the acts to be done must be done immediately and it
would be impossible to wait for the formality of attaching the
common seal; (5) Where the corporation is incorporated for the
purposes of trade the very object of these institutions requires
that they should exercise the right to execute and deliver commercial contracts which if executed and delivered under seal would
Warren v. Lynch, 5
destroy their very object, "negotiability."
Johnson, 339; East London & Co. v. Bailey et al., 4 Bing., 283;
13 E. C. L. R., 435; Story on Bills, Sec. 62; Tiedeman on ComPaper, Sec. 117.
Corporations — Authority of Agents. — Corporations can
only act through their agents and therefore the power to appoint
Usually the charter or by-laws of
agents is necessarily implied.
corporation provide or indicate the officers or agents of the corporation who shall have authority to bind the corporation in contract.
In such cases contracts executed and delivered by other
officers or agents purporting to bind the corporation would bear
upon their face evidence of irregularity and be notice to all.
Therefore every purchaser or holder of a promissory note of a
corporation takes it at the peril of the officers' lack of authority
Davis v. Rockto execute and deliver that particular contract.
The
corporation may be estopped
ingham & Co., 89 Va., 290.
to deny the authority of its officers or agents to execute and deliverer promissory notes after they have received and used the
proceeds.

Corporations — Public— Power to Execute Commercial

Contracts. — Unless there is some restriction

in the organic law
there is no doubt that both the state and federal governments may
through the proper agents become parties to any specie of comMiller, J., said "the authority to issue bills of
mercial contract.
exchange not being one expressly given by statute, can only^ arise
When it beas an incident to the exercise of some other power.
distant
at
a
point, he
comes the duty of any officer to pay money
usual
and apmay do so by a bill of exchange, because that is the
propriate mode of doing it so when an officer or agent of the government at a distance, is entitled to money here, the person holdAnd, whenever, in conducting
ing the funds may pay his drafts.
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any of the fiscal affairs of the government, the drawing of a bill of
exchange is the appropriate means of doing that which the department, or officer has a right to do, then he can draw and bind the
But the obligation resting upon him to
government in so doing.
perform that duty, and his right and authority to effect such an
object is always open to inquiry; and if they be found wanting, or
if they be forbidden by express statute then the draft or acceptance
Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall.
is not binding on the government.
679.

Corporations — Municipal or Public — Power to Execute
and Deliver Commercial Contracts. — The term public or

municipal corporation is here used to include counties, townships,
cities, towns and incorporated villages as well as school districts,
These corporations differ only in
parishes, and police districts.
the relative quantity of powers conferred by the state government.
As a general rule the state in creating these public corporations,
either under general or special laws, defines and determines their
power. And it is a well settled rule of construction of grants by
the legislature to corporations, whether public or private, that only
such powers and rights can be exercised under them as are clearly
comprehended within the words of the act, or derived therefrom by
necessary implication, regard being had to the objects of the grant.
Minturn v. Ladue, 23 Howard 435.
Upon the question whether a
municipal or public corporation may become a party to a commercial contract through its lawful agents, there is much conflict
in the authorities.
It has been the subject of much discussion by
text writers and of numerous decisions by the legal tribunals of the
There is a marked distinction between the powers of
country.
private and public corporations in their powers to execute and deliver commercial contracts.
As has been stated the right of private
or trading corporations to issue commercial contracts or other evidences of indebtedness, unless restrained by their charters or the
law of the land, may be conceded.
Private corporations are organized for the purposes of trade and business, and the borrowing
of money and the issuing of obligations therefor may be necessary to
carry the very object of the corporation into effect.
The objects
of municipal corporations are very different.
The ends and objects of municipal corporations are the comfort, protection and
well-being of the people found within their geographical limits. In
the case of the City of Williamsport v. The Common Wealth,
Paxon, J., in discussing the rights of municipal corporations to
borrow money and issue commercial contracts says, " taken in its
broad sense, the power to borrow money and issue bonds therefor
cannot be said to be among the implied powers of municipal corFor general purposes he continues such power does not
porations.
exist, for the reason that it is not necessary for the objects for
which it was created.
Thus it has never been contended that a
municipality may borrow money and issue bonds or notes for ob-
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jects having no necessary relations to the performance of municiTo admit such a principle would be destructive of
pal duties.
such organizations, and place the tax-payers of a city at the mercy
of the first band of plunderers who should happen to obtain the
temporary control of its affairs." 84 Pa. St., 487, 494.
Judge
Dillon says in his valuable work on Municipal Corporations that
"we regard as a like unsound and dangerous that a public or municipal corporation possesses the implied power to borrow money for
its ordinary purposes, and as incidental to that, the power to issue
commercial securities.
The cases on this subject are conflicting,
but the tendency is to the view above indicated."'
Whether it is a
wise policy or not certainly the legislature in creating municipaL
corporations may grant them full power and authority to execute
and deliver commercial
contracts.
This power, however, has
seldom ever been granted.
Parties — Executors and Administrators. — The rule is
well settled that the executors or administrators have no power to
bind the estate of the decedent by making, drawing, endorsing or
accepting commercial contracts.
King v. Thom, i Term R., 489;
Austin V. Munro, 47 N. Y., 360; Kessler v. Hall, 64 N. C, 60;
Cornthwaite v. Nat. Bank, 57 Ind., 268; Rittenhouse v. AmmerIf, however, the executor or administrator does
man, 64 Mo., 197.
execute and deliver a commercial contract he thereby makes himself personally liable even though it is stated in the most explicit
manner to have been executed and delivered in his representative
Edwards on Bills, Sec. 79; Christian v. Moris, 50 Ala.,
capacity.
586; Wisdom V. Becker, 52 111., 346; Kirkman v. Benham, 28

Ala., 501.

Parties — Power of Personal Representatives to Transfer by Endorsement or Assignment. — While the personal re-

presentatives of deceased persons may not bind the estate of his
decedent, yet he may transfer negotiable contracts belonging to
In case, howthe estate by either an endorsement or assignment.
ever, such instruments are dishonored the personal representative
is personally bound in such transfer unless he has expressly exempEdwards
ted himself from liability by the terms of the transfer.
Where there are two
on Bills, 248; Foster v. Fuller, 6 Mass., 58.
or more executors or administrators any one of whom may transfer negotiable contracts, (unless by the terms of their trust forbidden), which were executed and delivered to the decedent during his
life time.
Dwight v. Newell, 15 111., 333; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 9,
Cow., 34.
It has been held, however, where the negotiable contract was made payable to the executors or administrators, that
they must all join in the endorsement or assignment; Smith v.
But the better opinion seems to recognize
Whiting, 9 Mass. 334.
no such distinction and in both cases an endorsement or assignment by the one representative is considered as effectual as that of
all. Bogert v. Hertell-, 4 Hill, 492; Danielon Negot, Inst. Sec. 266.
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Parties— Agents— Capacity of to Make Negotiable
Contracts. — It may be stated as a general rule that whatever a

Combe's Case
man may do by himself he may do by his agent.
office,
therefore inministerial
mere
a
An
is
agency
9 Rep. 75.
aliens and
out-lawed,
attainted,
fants, married women, persons
account,
own
so
their
others, though incapable of contracting on
Bills,
Chitty on
as to bind themselves, may become agents.
36.
Parties — Agents — Authority of. — Agents may be appointed
The
either verbally or by a writing, or by subsequent ratification.
be
concontracts
commercial
may
to
transfer
authority of an agent
ferred by any one of these methods whether the principal be an inTrudy v. Farrar, 32 Me. 225; Handydividual or a corporation.
No particular form of appointment
side v. Cameron, 21 111. 588.
is necessary to enable an agent to execute and deliver a commercial
He may be specially apcontract so as to charge his principal.
or
his
may derive
power from some impointed for this purpose
It has been held that a verbal authority from the
plied authority.
principal to his agent to transact all his business confers the power
The authority of the
to assign and transfer negotiable paper.
however,
must
the
construction of the
always
depend
upon
agent,
v.
words used in his appointment.
Bailey
Rawley, i Swan (Tenn.)
205; Rossiter v. Rossiter, 8 Wend. 494; Ward v. The Bank of Ky.
The authority of an agent will be presumed to
7 Mon. (Ky.) 93.
continue till due notice of its revocation has been given.
The
of
course
cannot
his
unless
authority
delegate
specially auagent,
Combe's Case 9 Rep. 75; Breuster v. Hobart,
thorized so to do.
15 Pick. 302; Lord v. Hall, 9 L. J., C. P., 147; 8 C. B. 627 (65
E. C. L. R.)
Parties — Joint Agents. — It is a general rule of the common
law, that where an authority is given to two or more persons to do
an act, the act is valid to bind the principal only when all of them
concur in doing it; for the authority is construed strictly and the
power is understood to be joint and not several unless words of
severality are used.
Story on Agency, Sec. 42; Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. V. Wilcox, 57 111. 180; Union Bank v. Beirne, i Grat. 226,
234, 539-

Parties — Agents — Signatures of. — It may

be stated as a
general rule that no one is bound upon a commercial contract who
Therefore, the agent should be very
is not expressly a party to it.
explicit in his signature in order to make his principal liable and
The signature of the agent followed by the word
not himself.
" agent" as follows, A. B., Agent, of C. D. is not sufficient to bind
the principal and the agent alone is liable.
Such a suffix is deemed
to be a mere descriptio persona and does not constitute any notice of the agency to the holder or endorsee.
Collins v. The Buckeye Ins. Co., 17 Ohio St. 215; Williams v. Robbins, 16 Gray 77;
Kenyon v. Williams, 19 Ind. 45; Bishop v. Rowe, 71 Me. 263;
Bartlett v. Tucker, 104 Mass. 338.
The following have been held
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principal: " A.
B. by his agent C. D., or A. B. by C. D., or C. D. agent for A.
B." Story on Agency, Sec. 274, 278; Long v. Colburne, 11 Mass.
The rule that no person is
97; Haight V. Naylor, 5 Daily 219.
liable upon a commercial contract unless his name, in some way,

to be sufficient signatures by the agent to bind the

is disclosed upon the face thereof has been modified so that when
" added, is, in
the person signing his name with the word "Agent
fact the agent of the principal, and the writing is executed in the
course of the business of such agency, the principal is bound.
Green v. Skeel, 2 Hun. 486; Larned v. Johnson, 9 Allen 419.

Parties — Guardians — Trustees — Power to Make Negotiable Contracts. — Guardians and trustees have no power to bind

If, therethe estate which they represent by commercial contracts.
fore, they execute and deliver commercial contracts in such capacity
they will be personally liable even though they sign themselves as
"Guardians or Trustees." Dan. on Com. Inst., Sec. 271; Story
If a guardian or trustee as such takes a comon Notes, Sec. 63.
mercial contract payable to him or to his order that he may transfer the title to the same by endorsement or assignment; but in case
of default of payment he of course will be personally liable.
Thornton v. Rankin, 19 Mo. 193; Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass.
382; Strong V. Straus, 40 Ohio St. 87.
Parties — Drunkards — Power to Make Negotiable Contracts. — It is a general rule at common law that a contract made

by a person in a state of intoxication may be subsequently avoided
Anson on Contracts,
by him, but if confirmed is binding on him.
In order, however, that a drunken person may avoid his
150.
contract on account of intoxication it must appear that he did not
Bush v.
understand the effect and consequence of his contract.
to a
a
held
that
been
party
also
It
has
Pa.
St.
Breinig, 113
310.
another
unless
intoxication
of
account
it
on
contract cannot avoid
Smith v. Wilparty to it uses means to induce such intoxication.
liamson, 30 Pac. R.
Parties— Lunatics — Insane Persons — Power to Make
Negotiable Contracts. — A contract of a lunatic or an insane
person is voidable at his option if it can be shown that at the time
of making the contract he was absolutely incapable of understanding what he was doing and that the other party knew of his
condition. Molton v. Camroux, 4 Exch., R. 19; Mutual Life Ins.
Co. V. Hunt, 79 N. Y., 541; Dehrens v. McKenzie, 23 Iowa, 333;
Wilder v. Weakly, 34 Ind., 181; Shoulters v. Allen, 51 Mich., 530.
It has been held, however, that the "fairness of the defendant's
conduct cannot supply the plaintiff's want of capacity." Many
benefit
courts have held that where the insane person receives no
whatever under the contract, the contract cannot be enforced
of value he
against him, and if executed he may recover whatever
may have
the
contract
to
partedwith, notwithstanding the other party
Seavers
infirmity.
acted in good faith without knowledge of the
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Pick., 304; Van Patton v. Beals, 46 Iowa, 63; WierPhelps,
bach V. ist. Nat. Bank, 97 Pa. St., 543; Moore v. Hershey, 90
Pa. St., 196; N. W. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Blankenship, 94 Ind.,
Mere weakness of mind, however, not amounting to imbe535.
cility or insanity is no ground of defense provided no fraud has
been practiced on the party.
Dan: on Negot. Inst., Sec. 211;
Stewart v. Lispenard, 26 Wend., 299.
V.
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In the Supreme Court, Michigan, Oct.
\_Reported in 21 Mich., 41

j;

4 American

iith,
Dec,

1870.

4^7.

J

This cause was brought into the Circuit Court for the
County of Kalamazoo by appeal from the judgment of a
Justice of the Peace, in an action in which Walter S. Huntington was plaintiff, and John W. Burson defendant.
Form of the Action. —^The justice's transcript states that
the plaintiff declared verbally on the common count in assumpsit and upon a promissory note, which was filed at the
time of declaring, and of which the following is a copy, viz. :

"Schoolcraft, Mick., Apr. 12th, 1866.

to

''Ninety days from date, for value received, T promise
pay A . N. Goldwood, or order, one hundred and twelve

dollars, and fifty cents, zuith interest.

John W. Burson."
Indorsed on the back,

'M.

N. Goldwood."

Form of the Defense. — The defendant filed an affidavit
denying the delivery of the note, and also a plea and notice
in writing.
The defendant, in the affidavit filed, with his plea and
notice, deposed "that the written instrument, declared on in
this cause by said plaintiff, was never delivered by this defendant, to the said A. N. Goldwood, mentioned in said written
instrument, nor to any other person for the said A. N. Goldwood, or 'any other person, and that this defendant never
authorized any other person to deliver the written instrument

'This

Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, 282;
Edwards on Commercial Paper, 326, 328, 331, 335; Daniel on
122, 838; Wood's Byles on Bills and
Negotiable Instruments,
Notes, 254; Norton on Bills and Notes, 70, 250; Bigelow's Cases
on B. and N., 227; Bigelow on B. and N., 176, 178, 227; Benjamin's Chalmers on Bills, Notes and Checks, 59, 62.
case is cited in
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for him, (this defendant), to the said A. N. Goldwood, or to
any other person; and defendant further says that this deponent never placed any United States internal revenue stamps
upon said written instrument, and never authorized any other
person to do so for him, or to cancel the same; that saidwritten instrument was taken from the house of this defendant, in this defendant's absence from the same, by the said
A. N. Goldwood, without the knowledge or consent of the
deponent at the time."
On the trial before the justice, the jury found a verdict
for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.
On the part of the defense in the Circuit Court, it was
shown that Ellen Burson had been sworn as a witness before
the justice, and that she had since died; " That Goldwood
came to the house of defendant and told defendant he had
They sat down, and Goldcome to finish up that matter.
Defendant signed it.
Goldwood said
wood wrote this note.
or
a
Defendant
said he would go
signer.
he wanted security
his
uncle.
His
uncle was at the barn at the time.
out and see
the
note
on
table, and told plaintiff not to
laid
the
Defendant
Defendant went out of the house
touch it until he came back.
barn,
and
before
returned,
he
Goldwood picked up the
to the
out
doors
with
it.
She told Goldwood to let
note and started
table
until defendant came back.
the note be on the
Goldnote,
he
was
to
take
the
going
or proposed to have
wood said
that
it, or something to
effect, and went off with it.
He
Kalamazoo.
She said there was no stamp on
started towards
the note at the time Goldwood took it away."
The counsel for the defendant then asked the court to
charge the jury:
That if they find that A. N. Goldwood, the payee
1st.
named in the note, took this note after it was drawn and
signed by defendant, without the knowledge, and against the
will and consent of the defendant, and before the defendant
had delivered the note to any person, the note thus obtained
would be void in the hands of said Goldwood.
That such note would be void in the hands of any
2d.
subsequent holder, deriving possession of the same from said
Goldwood, whether for value or not.
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jury shall find that the plaintiff had notice of

the means and

manner used by A. N. Goldwood, as above
stated, in getting possession of the note at the time he indorsed and delivered it to the plaintiff, the plaintiff could not be
considered an innocent holder of the note.
That whether the plaintiff in this cause had such
4th.
notice, or not, is a question of fact to be found by the jury
from all the testimony in the case.
That the fact of the plaintiff having such notice need not be proved by positive testimony, but may be proved by circumstances.
That this note in suit, if drawn and signed by the
5th.
defendant, and if not afterwards delivered by him or by his
authority to some other person, has no legal existence, and is
therefore void.
And thereupon the Court charged the jury as follows:

The present is an action of assumpsit, brought to recover

the principal and interest moneys claimed to be due

upon a

negotiable promissory note.
The plaintiff claims to be the
holder of said note by purchase. The action is brougnt in the
form prescribed by statute.
The declaration consists of the
common counts, with a copy of the note appended.
The defendant having failed to deny the execution of the note on
oath or by affidavit duly filed, it becomes unnecessary for the
plaintiff to prove such execution on the trial of the case.
By
offering the note in evidence, then proving it to have been indorsed and delivered to him, the plaintiff in such case makes
out a prima facie case for its recovery.
The real questions raised upon this trial are those stated
in the defense set up, and had reference almost solely to the
doctrine of our commercial law and the rights of the parties
interested in negotiable or commercial paper. As between
first parties to such paper, as maker, payee, the right of defense is generally as ample in range, as the facts which would
invalidate the contract or claim; as, for instance, illegality,
fraud, want or failure of consideration or any unwarrantable
A like rule prevails in an action bemeans for obtaining it.
tween the maker and a subsequent indorser, or holder, coming
into possession or ownership after the note has matured, and
become due and payable by its terms.
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between the maker and
holder by purchase before maturity and for value, but with notice of existing infirmities in the paper, or its surroundings,
which would invalidate the same, as, for instance, that the
note had been given upon the sale and purchase of intoxica-

The same rule governs

also

as

ting liquor in this state.
But when the action is between the maker and bona fide
holder for value of negotiable paper, purchased before its maturity and without notice that the same is different, such
holder is not subject to equities that may exist between first
The law commercial protects such holder from the
parties.
In
defenses which might be set up, as between the parties.
general terms facts going to impeach or invalidate the paper
The rule itself is one
cannot be resorted to on the defense.
of commercial necessity in order to impart confidence and
steady value to this class of papers in commercial and business
transactions.
The counsel for defendant has presented to the court a
series of seven requests to charge the jury, and to which the
court will now direct your attention.
As to the first request,
the court declines to charge as requested, but modifies the
request to charge (in this form provisionally) that if a party
negligently allows his negotiable note to get into circulation,
or if after it has passed from his possession he either acknowledged or by silence acquiesced in a claim of its validity, by
the holder; to which refusal to charge as requested, and also
to said modification of the request, the counsel for defendant
excepted.

As to the second request, the court declines to charge as
requested; to which refusal to charge as requested in said
second request, the counsel for defendant excepted.
As to the third request, the court charges you as requested, with the addition, that if they also find that Goldwood
obtained the note by unlawful means of which the plaintiff
had notice, then the plaintiff cannot be considered an innocent holder of the note.
To the charge contained in the
addition made by the court to the request, counsel for defendant excepted.
As to the fourth request, the court charges as requested.
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As to the fifth request, the court charges that such note
would be invalid in a suit between the original parties, but in
the hands of an innocent holder for value before maturity and
without notice, the rule would be subject to the qualifications
and limitations already expressed in this charge.
To the
refusal of the court to charge as stated in this request, and to
the charge as given by the court in relation thereto, counsel
for defendant excepted.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, and judgment
being entered thereon, the defendant brings the cause into
this court by writ of error.

The Claim of the Plaintiff.— That
1st.

the court erred:

In refusing to charge the jury that, if this note was

delivered by the maker, or some person authorized by
him, to any other person, but was fraudulently or stealthily
taken from the possession of the maker and in his absence by
never

the payee, the note in the hands of the latter would be void.'
2d.
In refusing to charge the jury that such note in the

of any other person deriving title from such payee
would be void whether he gave value for it or not.^
In refusing to charge the jury that, if they shall
3d.
find that the note in question upon its face showed, at the
time the plaintiff received it of Goldwood, or during the time
Goldwood had the note, and plaintiff saw the same, that it
was not properly executed and was invalid under the laws of
the United States, for the want of a proper stamp, then the
plaintiff cannot be considered as a bona fide holder, though he
hands

may have given value for the note.^
In refusing to charge the
4th.

jury that if the note bears

upon its face an illegal stamping by the payee therein named,
and did so bear such illegal stamping at the time it was indorsed to and obtained by the plaintiff, this fact alone should
have been sufficient to put the plaintiff on inquiry as to its
'Story on Bills, §§ 185, 187, 203: i Cow. T. 209;
28; 8

Vt,

^3

Green. /,

94.

Caines, 217;

9

'Int. R. L., June

Peak, 173;

4

4

B. and

Johns, 295;

C,

12

Do., 306.

30, '64, § 158;
235; 6 D. and

3

Parsons on Cent., 313;
3 Camp., 103.

R., 306;
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a

is

a

it,

a

A

if

it,

he failed to do this he
and
validity when he obtained
cannot be deemed an innocent purchaser for value.'
The Claim of Defendant. — The other question, as to
parthe delivery of the note, had been long since settled.
tial or total want, or failure, or illegality of consideration,
or even fraud or
defect or infirmity of title, in the perno defense to the title or
son from whom he received
holder for value without notice before
bar to
recovery by
maturity.^

if

it

it

it

^

if

it

is

|^it

a

it

a

it

is

A

not void in the hands of an indorsee except in
transferred
so; and
statute makes
the instances where
cannot be shown that
before due to
bona fide holder,
has never been delivered.
By making the note, and leaving
where
liable to be stolen or otherwise fraudulently put
in circulation, he has enabled the fraudulent holder to impose
an innocent person must suffer,
upon the public; and
should be that one who, by his acts, has enabled the third
person to commit the fraud.
Decision. — The defendant below having appeared before
the justice and pleaded to the plaintiff's declaration, and twice
obtained adjournments of this cause,
was too late, on the
trial of the appeal in the circuit, to make any objection for
want of proper service of the summons.
After joining issue
was immaterial whether there had, in fact,
upon the merits,
ever been a summons issued.
There was no error, therefore, in overruling the defendant's objection to the introduction of evidence
upon this
note

ground.

The note declared upon was filed with the justice at the
time of declaring; and by the statute,* the plaintiff was therefore entitled to read the note in evidence
execution,

unless defendant denied its

without

proving its

"execution on oath"

at

the time of pleading.

*Comp.

L.,

§

2

4
6

§

i

4

i

6

3

§

'Story on Notes,
197; 12 Johns., 310;
Kent Com., 103;
Pick., 258; 14 Pick., 268;
Hill, 442.
Doug., 413;
'Story on Bills,
t88; Bostwick v. Dodge,
Doug., 413;
Outhwite V. Porter, 13 Mich., 533; Vinton v. Peck, 14 Mich., 287.
nVoodhull V. Holmes, 10 Johns. R., 231; Vallet v. Parker,
Wend., 615; Rockwell V. Charles,
Hill, 499.
Mass., 370;

3767.
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Defendant pleaded the general issue, with a notice that
he would prove that the note was obtained from him by fraud
and without consideration, and other facts substantially the
same as set forth in his affidavit made and filed with the plea
This affidavit simply denied the delivery of the
and notice.
note by the defendant, or any other person on his behalf, to
the payee or any other person for him, or that defendant ever
placed any stamp upon it or authorized any other person to do

or to cancel such stamp, and stated that the paper was
taken from deponent's house, in his absence from the same, by
the payee, without the knowledge or consent of deponent.
It is unnecessary to determine here whether the execution of the note under this statute would include its delivery
as a part of the execution; since, granting the affirmative, the
so,

part of its execution, and the
the execution generally,
but merely the delivery and the affixing and canceling of the
stamp, — admits, by a very clear implication, his signature to
the instrument, and clearly indicates that he intends to con-

signature certainly constitutes

a

affidavit being special, — not denying

only the delivery, the stamping and canceling of
stamp, and not his signature; otherwise, he would have
nied the execution generally and brought himself within
The plaintiff, therefore, was
language of the statute.
bound to prove such portion of the execution as was not

test

the

dethe

not
de-

the signature of the defendant.
The case upon the trial stood in all respects as if the signature of the defendant had been admitted in open court.
And this admission is to have at least as full effect as the
nied, but admitted, viz.

:

clearest proof of such signature.
Now proof of such signature, together with the fact that
the note is in the hands of, and produced by, the plaintiff (the

is

if

it

is

is,

indorsement being proved as it was here), furnishes strong
presumptive evidence of delivery by the maker to the payee;
in fact, all the proof ordinarily given by the plainand this
denied.
tiff of such delivery when the execution of the note
for
It establishes 2. prima facie case upon this point; and
he contests the fact of delivery, to sustain
the defendant,
his denial by proof.
The indorsement by the payee having been proved, there
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allowing the note

to be read in

evidence.

We think the court erred in striking out the testimony of
Fletcher, showing what the sister of the defendant testified to on the trial of this cause before the justice, she
The ground upon which this was stricken
having since died.
out seems to have been, because the witness did not recollect

the witness,

the precise words of the former testimony, though he stated
We think the obthat he recollected and gave the substance.

under such circumstances, untenable, and that the
An additional ground of objection
evidence was admissible.'
was stated, viz. : that plaintiff was shown to be a bona fide
holder of the note; but the court could not have stricken out the
evidence on this ground, as there was some evidence of circumstances tending to show he was not such bona fide holder,
and the court left this question to the jury.
But this note was indorsed by Goldwood, the payee, to
the plaintiff, before maturity, for a valuable consideration, and,
as plaintiff claims, in good faith and without notice of a want
of delivery or of consideration, or any other circumstance
tending to invalidate it in the hands of Goldwood; and his evidence tended to show this, though there was evidence of some
circumstances tending to show that he had notice of the circumstances under which the paper had been obtained.
There was also evidence on the part of the defendant,
strongly tending to show that the note never was delivered by
the defendant, but that Goldwood, to whose order it was
drawn, was endeavoring to sell to the defendant a patent
and that the
right, or the right of certain territory under
parties had so far progressed towards the making of an arwas understood and verbally
rangement to this end, that
agreed that Goldwood was to give him a deed of certain ternote for the
ritory, upon defendant's executing to him
amount, with some other person signing
as surety. That the
house,
and defendant's sister
parties being in the defendant's
being present, Goldwood wrote this note, and defendant signed
it; but as
surety was to be obtained, he laid the note on the
See

I

'

a

it

a

it

it,

jection,

Greenl. Ev. Sec. 165, and authorities cited.
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table and went out to find his uncle for that purpose, telling
Goldwood, as he went out, not to touch it till he came back;
but that while defendant was gone, Goldwood picked up the

of territory
this time, was not stamped, and defendant never stamped or
authorized
to be stamped; that some four days after, Gold-

it

deed

out doors with it; that defendant's sister
let the note be on the table till defendant
to which Goldwood replied he was going
and went off with
without giving any
or anything else for it.
That the note, at
it,

paper and started
then told him to
should come back,
to have the note,

if

wood wrote to defendant requesting him to come immediately
to Kalamazoo "and sign stamp on the note," and saying
defendant was not there by Tuesday evening
shall consider that you refuse your signature, and shall act accordThe evidence also tended to show that defendant
ingly."
called upon Goldwood about that time, while the latter had
the note, and demanded
accusing him of stealing
to
"
which Goldwood replied,
Never mind, we can fix that up,"
and said he was ready to do as he had agreed, and wanted defendant to get another signer, and he would give him
deed
of territory; but defendant said he did not want the deed, but
wanted the note.
Goldwood refused to return the note, or to
give a deed till he got another signer.
These facts,
found by the jury, would show, not only
that, the note was never delivered to the payee, and that
therefore never had
note between the
legal existence as
■original parties, but that there was yet no completed or binding agreement of any kind, and was not to be until defendant should choose to get
surety on the note, and the payee
should give him
deed of territory.
Until thus completed,
the defendant had a right to retract.
a

a

a

a

it

if

a

it,

it,

"I

The General Rule

as to the

Necessity of

a

Delivery. —

it

a

a

As
general rule,
negotiable promissory note, like any other
written contract, has no legal inception or valid existence, as
such, until
has been delived in accordance with the purpose
and intent of the parties.'

i

'See Edwards on B. and N., 175, and authorities cited, and
Pars, on B. and N., 48 and 49, and cases cited and see Thomas v,
Watkins, 16 Wis., 549; Mahon v. Sawyer, 18 Ind., 73; Carter v.
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is
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a

a
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Delivery is an essential part of the making or execution
of the note, and it takes effect only from delivery (for most
purposes); and if this be subsequent to the date, it takes
This is cereffect from the delivery and not from the date.'
tainly true as between the original parties.
But negotiable paper differs from ordinary written contracts in this respect: that even a wrongful holder, between
whom and the maker or indorser the note or indorsement
would not be valid, may yet transfer to an innocent party,
who takes it in good faith, without notice and for value, a
And the quesgood title as against the maker or indorser.
tion in the present case
how far this principle will dispense
with delivery by the maker.
When
note payable to bearer, which has once become
operative by delivery, has been lost or stolen from the owner,
and has subsequently come to the hands of a bona fide holder
for value, the latter may recover against the maker, and all
indorsers on the paper when in the hands of the loser; and
the loser must sustain the loss.^
In such
case there was
complete legal instrument
the maker
clearly liable to pay
to some one; and the question
only to whom.
But in the case before us, where the note had never been
delivered, and therefore had no legal inception or existence as
note, the question
whether he
liable to pay at all, even
to an innocent holder for value.
The wrongful act of a thief or
trespasser may deprive
the holder of his property in a note which has once become a
note, or property, by delivery, and may transfer the title to
an innocent purchaser for value.
But note in the hands of
McClintock,

Mo., 464; Walker v. Ebert, 29 Wis., 94; Hillsdale College
Thomas, 40 Wis., 6,1; Purviance v. Jones, 120
Ind., 162; Worth v. Case, 42 N. Y., 362; Contra, see Kinyon v.
Wohlford, 17 Minn., 239; Shipley v. Carrol, 45 111., 285 (stolen
Duer. (N. Y.), 268; Cooke v. U. S., 91
note); Gould v. Seger,
S.,
U.
389.
I

'

5

29
V.

Pars., ubi supra.

^In the case of Burson v.

it

never as
all the requisites necessary to give
complied with.

a

Huntington, however, the note had
contract, for the reason that
yet received any vitality as
an existence had not yet been
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the maker before delivery is not property, nor the subject of
ownership, as such; it is, in law, but a blank piece of paper.
Can the theft or wrongful seizure of this paper create a valid
contract on the part of the maker against his will, where
none existed before ? There is no principle of the law of
contracts upon which this can be done, unless the facts of the
case are such that, in justice and fairness, as between the
maker and the innocent holder, the maker ought to be
estopped to deny the making and delivery of the note.
But it is urged that this case falls within the general
principle which has become a maxim of law, that when one
of two innocent persons must suffer by the acts of a third, he
who has enabled such third person to occasion the loss, must
sustain it.
This is a principle of manifest justice when confined within its proper limits.
But the principle as a rule,
has many exceptions; and the point of difficulty in its application consists in determining what acts or conduct of the
party sought to be charged, can properly be said to have
"enabled the third person to occasion the loss, " within the
If I leave my horse in the stable, or
meaning of the rule.
in the pasture, I cannot properly be said to have enabled the
thief to steal him, within the meaning of this rule, because he
found it possible to steal him from that particular localityAnd upon examination it will be found that this rule or maxim is mainly confined to cases where the party who is made
to suffer the loss, has reposed a confidence in the third
person whose acts have occasioned the loss, or in some
other intermediate person whose acts or negligence have
enabled such third person to occasion the loss; and that the
party has been held responsible for the acts of those in whom
he had trusted upon grounds analogous to those which govern
the relation of principal and agent; that the party thus reposing confidence in another with respect to transactions, by
which the rights of others may be affected, has, as to the
persons to be thus affected, constituted the third person his
agent in some sense, and having held him out as such, or
trusted him with papers or indicia of ownership which have
enabled him to appear to others as principal, as owner, or as
possessed of certain powers, the person reposing this confi-
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who have been deceived into parting^
with property or incurring obHgations on the faith of such
appearances, to be held to the same extent as if the fact had
dence

is, as

to

those

accorded with such appearances.

Hence, to confine ourselves to the question of delivery,
the authorities in reference to lost or stolen notes which have
become operative by delivery, have no bearing upon the question.
If the maker or indorser, before delivery to the payee,
leaves the note in the hands of a third person as an escrow, to
be delivered upon certain conditions only, or voluntarily deliver it to the payee, or (if payable to bearer) to any other
person for a special purpose only, as to be taken to, or discounted by a particular bank, or to be carried to any particular place or person, or to be used only in a certain way, or
upon certain conditions not apparent upon the face of the
paper, and the person to whom it is thus entrusted violate the
confidence reposed in him, and put the note into circulation;
this, thotigh not a valid delivery as to the original parties,
must, as between a bona fide holder for value, and the maker
or indorser, be treated as a delivery, rendering the note or
indorsement valid in the hands of such bona fide holder ; or
if the note be sent bj- mail, and get into the wrong hands; as
the party intended to deliver to some one, and selects his own
mode of delivery, he must be responsible for the result.
These principles are too well settled to call for the citation of
authorities, and manifestly it will make no difference in this
respect, if the note or indorsement were signed in blank, if
the maker or indorser part with the possession, or authorize a
clerk or agent to do so, and it is done.'
And when the maker or indorser has himself been deceived by the fraudulent acts or representations of the payee
or others, and thereby induced to deliver or part with the
note or indorsement, and the same is thus fraudulently obtained from him, he must, doubtless, as between him and an
innocent holder for value, bear the consequences of his own
'1 Parsons on Bills and Notes, 109 to 114, and cases cited,
especially Putnam v. Sullivan, 4 Mass., 45, which was decided
expressly upon the ground of the confidence reposed in the third
person, as to the filling up, and in the clerks as to the delivery.
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^7 C. B.
^See also

(N. S.).,

it

it)

credulity and want of caution.
He has placed a confidence
in another, and by putting the papers into his hands, has
enabled him to appear as the owner, and to deceive others.
Cases of this kind are numerous; but they have no bearing
upon the wrongful taking from the maker, when he never voluntarily parted with the instrument.
Much confusion, however, has arisen from the general language used in the books
and sometimes by judges, in reference to cases where the
maker has voluntarily parted with the possession,
though
induced to do so by fraud; when it is laid down as a general
rule, that it is no defense for a maker, as against a bona fideholder, to show that the note was wrongfully or fraudulently
obtained, without attempting to distinguish between cases
where the maker has actually and voluntarily parted with the
possession of the note, and those where he has not.
We do not assert that the general rule we are discussing —
that "where one of two innocent parties must suffer," etc. —
must be confined exclusively to cases where a confidence hasbeen placed in some other person (in reference to delivery),
and abused.
There may be cases where the culpable negligence or recklessness of the maker in allowing an undelivered
note to get into circulation, might justly estop him from setting up non-delivery; as if he were knowingly to throw it
into the street, or otherwise leave it accessible to the public,
with no person present to guard against its abduction under
circumstances when he might reasonably apprehend that it
would be likely to be taken.
Upon this principle the case of Ingham v. Primrose' was
decided, where the acceptor tore the bill into halves (with the
into the street, and the
and threw
intention of canceling
drawer picked them up in his presence, and afterwards pasted
the two pieces together and put them into circulation.'^
82.

29

Smith,

22

Mich.,

4

Com.
by analogy Foster v. Mackinnon, Law Rep.
B., 704. See also the cases where the execution and delivery were
obtained through fraud and misrepresentation, Chapman v. Rose,
N. Y., 313; Clark v. Pease, 41:
56 N. Y., 137; Page v. Krekey, 137
Wis.,
194; De Camp v. Hanna,.
N. H., 414; Walker v. Ebert, 29
Ohio St., 467; Green v. Wilkie, 66 N. W. Rep., ^046; Puffer v.
479.
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But the case before us is one of a very different characNo actual delivery by the maker to anyone for any pur-

The evidence tends to show that when he left the room

it

it,

in his own house, the note being on the table, and his sister
remaining there, he did not confide it to the custody of the
and no final agreement bepayee, but told him not to take
tween them had yet been made, and no consideration given.
Under such circumstances he can no more be said to have
to the payee's custody or confidence, than that he
trusted
trusted his spoons or other household goods to his custody or
confidence; and there was no more apparent reason to suppose he would take and carry off the one, than the other.
The maker, therefore, cannot be held responsible for any
a

a

negligence; there was nothing to prove negligence, unless he
knave,
thief or a crimwas bound to suspect, and treat as
inal, the man who came to his house apparently on business,
This, we
because he afterwards proved himself to be- such.

are satisfied there

is

no adjudged case in the

a

a

think, would be preposterous.
We therefore, see no ground upon which the defendant
bo7ia
could be held liable on
note thus obtained, even to
He was guilty of no more negligence
fide holder for value.
than the plaintiff who took the paper, and the plaintiff shows
no rights or equities superior to those of the defendant.
Such, we think, must be the result upon principle.
We
have carefully examined the cases, English and American, and

English courts,

far as their reports have reached us, which would warrant
a recovery in the present case.
Some dicta may be found,
the general language of which might sustain the liability of the
maker; such as that of Alderson Baron in Marston v. Allen,' cited by Duer. J., in Gould v. Segee,^ and that used by
Williams J., in Ingham v. Primrose.'' But a reference to the
cases will show that no such question was involved, and that
these remarks were wholly outside of the case.
so

W., 494.
Duer. (N. Y.
260.
and

"7 C. B.

),

^'S

'8 M.

(N. S.), 82.
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On the Other hand, Hall

v. Wilson,' contains a dictum
fully sustaining the views we have taken.
There are, however, two recent American cases, where
the note or indorsement was obtained without
delivery, under
circumstances quite as wrongful as those in the present case,
in one of which the maker, and in the other the indorser,
was
held liable to a bona fide holder for value: Shipley v. Carroll,
et.

al.,' (case of maker) and Gould

v.

Segee.'

But in neither

of these cases can we discover that the court discussed or considered the real principle involved; and we have been unable
to discover anything in the cases cited by the court to warrant
the decision.

It

is possible that the case in

Illinois may de-

pend somewhat upon their statute, and the note being made
as a mere matter of amusement,
and the making not being

justified by any legitimate pending business, the maker might
perhaps justly be held responsible for a higher degree of diHgence, and therefore more justly chargeable with negligence
under the particular circumstances, than the maker in the
present case.

There is another case, Worcester Co. Bank v. Dorchester
& Milton Bank,* where bank bills were stolen from the vault
of the bank, which though signed and ready for use, had never
been yet issued, and on which a bona fide holder for value was
held entitled to recover.
This, we are inclined to think, was
correct.
The court intimated a doubt whether the same rule
should apply to bank bills as to ordinary promissory notes,
and as to the latter, failed to make any distinction between
the question of delivery and questions affecting the rights of
the parties upon notes which have become effectual by delivBut we think bank bills which circulate universally as
ery.
cash, passing from hand to hand perhaps a hundred times a
day, without such inquiries as are usual in the cases of ordinary promissory notes of individuals, stand upon quite different
And, considering the temptations to burglars and
grounds.
robbers, where large masses of bank bills are known to be
'

16

Barb., 548, 555. and 556.

^45 111-,

285.

'5 Duer. (N. Y.),

*io

Cush., 488.

266.

BURSON

15°

V.

HUNTINGTON.

[CHAP.

4,

kept, and the much greater facihty of passing them off to innocent parties, without detection or identification of the bills

or the parties, and that the special business of banks is dealing in, and holding the custody of money and bank bills; it is
not unreasonable to hold them to a much higher degree of

Delivery Defined. — " Delivery, "

it

it,
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a
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it,

says Mr. Daniel, "is the
final step necessary to perfect the existence of any written contract; and, therefore, as long as a bill or note remains in the hands
And even though it be
of the drawer or maker it is a nullity.
placed by the drawer or maker in the hands of his agent for delivery, it is still undelivered as long as it remains in his hands, and
Dan. on Negot. Inst., Sec. 63.
may be recalled."
Kinds of Delivery. — The delivery may be actual or constructive; but it is essential to the validity of a commercial contract
that it be delivered.
Palmer v. Poor, 121 Ind., 138; McFarland
V. Sikes, 54 Conn., 250.
The mere act of signing a commercial contract, without delivdoes not make
the contract of the signer.
ering
Burrage v.
Exch. R., 32; Brind v. Hampston,
Lloyd,
W,, 365;
M.
Hill V. Wilson, 16 Barb., 548; Mahon v. Sawyer, 18 Ind., 73.
No particular form of delivery, however,
required. Whether
there was
delivery or not, must in
great measure depend upon
the peculiar circumstances of each case.
The question of delivone of intention.
The delivery
ery
complete when there
an intention manifested on the part of the maker of the contract
to make himself liable thereon.
The intention always controls the
determination of what constitutes a sufficient delivery. The intention may be manifested by words or acts and in the most informal
manner.
The act of delivery
not necessarily
transfer of the
possession of the instrument to the payee.
It
any act of the
maker, indicated by acts or words or both, which shows an intention on his part to perfect the transaction.
It may be to the
maker or to some third person for his use and benefit.
Thatcher
v. St. Andrews Church, 37 Mich., 269; Woodward v. Campbell, 22
Conn., 459; Martin v. Flaharty, 13 Mont., 96; 32 Pac. R., 287;
Hathaway v. Payne, 34 N, Y., 92; Newton v. Bealer, 41 Iowa,
334; Shults V. Shults, 158 111., 654,
The delivery may be, upon condition, to an agent or in escrow.
Delivery— Sufficiency of.— While delivery, either actual or
constructive,
essential to the validity of commercial contracts,
need
not
yet
pass into the personal possession of the payee.
If
made to
dehvery
person for the benefit of the payee unconditionally, such delivery
sufficient. Gordon v. Adam, 127 111., 223.
It must appear by the act of the party that he intended to
make the contract an enforcible obligation against himself according to its terms by surrendering control over
and intentionally
under the control of the payee or of some third person
place
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care, and to make

them absolutely responsible for their safe
"We do not therefore regard this case as having any
keeping.
material bearing upon the case before us.
Purviance v. Jones, 120 Ind., 162; Webber v. Chris91; Stone V. French, 37 Kang., 145.
Delivery — Conditional. — A commercial contract may be
delivered upon condition. And the maker will not be liable to the
original parties or to those who take with notice of the condition,
If, however, the contract comes
unless such conditions happen.
into the hands of a bona fide holder, he will be liable thereon
whether the condition happens or not. Fisher v. Fisher, 98 Mass.,
303; Whitmore v. Nickerson, 125 Mass., 496; Oilman v. New
Orleans &, 72 Ala., 566.
Where one signs a commercial contract upon the express condition that it shall be signed by others before delivery, he is not
Germanbound thereby unless such signatures are procured.
American Nat. Bk. V. People's Gas & E. Co. (Minn. ), (1895), 65
N. W. R., 90; Ward v. Johnson, 57 Minn., 301; McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Faulkner, 64 N. AV. R., 163; Ware v. Allen,
128 U. S., S90.
Whether a commercial contract has ever been delivered or
not upon a condition may always be proved in order to avoid its
Roberts v. McGrath, 38
effect as between the original parties.
Wis., 52; Cline v. Guthrie, 42 Ind., 227.
If, however, the contract has actually been delivered and is
complete upon its face and has been obtained without fraud, evidence of an oral agreement between the parties to it will not be
received to contradict the obligation of the maker as stated in it.
Chicago Cottage Organ Co. v. Swartzell, 60 Mo. App., 490; Hassmann v. Holscher, 49 Mo., 87.
If the condition imposed upon the delivery is meaningless when read in connection with the rest of the note, it will
Cooper v. Chicago Cottage Organ Co., 58 111.
have no effect.

for his use.
ten, 121

111.,

App., 248.

Delivery — When

Made. — The delivery of

a

commercial

contract must be made during the life-time of the maker; it follows, therefore, that no delivery can be made after the death of
Clark v. Sigourney,
the maker, by his executor or administrator.
17

as

Conn., 511; Clark v. Boyd, 2 Ohio, 35.
Neither can it be delivered by the maker's agent after death,
death revokes the agency. Turnan v. Temke, 84 111., 286; Bar-

III,

rows v. Barrows, 138
654.
If there be an unconditional delivery to a third perdeath,
son who holds as the agent of the payee, until after the
The maker thereby lost conof the maker it is a good delivery.
60 111., 244; Gordon v..
Candor,
v.
trol of the note. Thompson
Adams, 127 111., 223.
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We think the Circuit Court erred in refusing to charge
upon this point, as requested by the defendant below.
We do not think there was any error in refusing to charge
that the want of a stamp on a note would be such circum-

In every case where if a party places his commercial contract beyond his control he will be liable thereon without reference to conditions imposed if it gets into the hands of a 3ena fide
Collins v. Gilbert, 94 U. S. &, 53; Redlich v.
holder for value.
Dall, 54 N. Y., 234; Clarke V. Thayer, 105 Mass., 216; Kohn v.
Watkins, 26 Kan., 691; 40 Am. R., 336.
It has been held that where the maker is induced by false and
fradulent representations to execute and deliver a commercial contract to a fictitious person or order, supposing him to be real, and
delivers the same with instructions to deliver it to the payee on
receiving a mortgage security, and the fraudulent receiver negotiates the bill to an innocent person, the maker is liable,
Phillips
V. ImThurn, 114 E. C. L. R., 694; Forbes v. Epsy, 21 Ohio St.,
474; Kohn v. Watkins, supra.
Delivery may be Compelled. — Where the payee has been
induced to part with consideration or to advance money on the
faith that a commercial contract has been delivered to a third person for his benefit, he is entitled to compel the delivery to be perPurviance v. Jones, 120 Ind., 162; t6 Am. St. R., 319.
fected.
Delivery— Presumption as to the Time of. —In the absence of any proof to the contrary, there is a presumption of law
that a commercial contract was delivered on the day it was executed.
Morgan v. Burrow, 16 So. R., 432.
This presumption, however, may be rebutted by parol evidence showing that the contract was actually delivered on some
other day.
Lovejoy v. Whipple, 18 Vt., 379.
Where, however, the contract is made payable at a certain
time after date, the fact that it was not delivered at the time of its
date will not be allowed to vary the time of maturity.
Powell v.
Watters, 8 Cow., 669; Tied, on Commercial Paper, sec. 34b.
Delivery in Escrow.— Commercial contracts, like other
contracts, may be delivered in escrow, which is a delivery to some
third person to be delivered to the payee finally upon the performance of some condition or conditions, when the title is to pass to
the person for whom it is intended.
A delivery in escrow to be good, the maker of the contract
must part with the possession and divest himself of all power and
dominion over it.
Preutsman v. Baker, 30 Wis., 644; Lehigh
Coal & Iron Co. v. West Superior Iron & Steel Co., 91 Wis., 122;
Shults V. Shults, 159 111., 654; see also 37 Am. St. R., 259; 83 Am.
Dec, 246; 6 L. R. A., 470; 7 L. R. A., 746; 11 Am. St. R., 313.
In order that a writing may be in escrow, it must be placed in
the hands of a third person to be delivered upon the happening of
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stance of suspicion as to put the indorsee upon inquiry in taking the note.
Under our decisions the note would be vaUd
and could be enforced in our courts without a stamp.
Some other minor questions were raised, but we do not

think they will be likely to arise upon

a

new trial.

It must not be delivered into the hands of the
contingency.
Webber v. Christen, 121 111., 91; Wright v. Shelby &, 16
B. mon., 4; Scott v. State Bank, 9 Ark., 36.
If the contract is delivered to the payee, the delivery will be
absolute notwithstanding
conditions were imposed and the title
Fairbanks v. Metcalf, 8 Mass., 230; Jane v.
passes to the payee.
The maker will be liable thereon should the
Gregory, 42 111., 416.
reach
the
hands
of an innocent dona fide holder without
contract
Vallett
the happening of the condition on which it was delivered.
V. Parker, 6 Wend., 616; Fearing v. Clark, 16 Gray, 74; Graff v.
Logue, 61 Iowa, 704.
The delivery in escrow may be made to the payee if the condition is placed upon its face, and the maker thereof will not be
liable thereon until the happening of such condition, even in the
Some cases have held, however, that
hands of a third person.
where a contract was delivered in escrow and the custodian, without authority, delivers the same to the payee before the performance of the conditions, that the maker is not liable thereon even
to a bona fide holder.
Chipman v. Tucker, 38 Wis., 43; Skaaraas
v. Finnegan, 31 Minn., 48; Benton v. Martin, 52 N. Y., 574; Belleville Bank v. Borneman, 124 111., 205; Roberts v. Wood, 38 Wis.,

a

payee.

60.

Where one signs a negotiable contract upon condition that
certain other persons shall sign it also and delivers it to the payee,
he is not liable thereon unless such other signatures are procured
unless the same shall get into the hands of a bona fide holder.
German- American Nat. Bk. v. Peoples Gas & Co., 65 N. W. R.

Johnson, 37 Minn., 30T. McCormick Harvesting
Mach. Co. V. Faulkner, 64 N. W. R., 163.
It has been held that a bona fide holder for value, without no90;

Ward

V.

tice, is entitled to recover upon any commercial contract which he
has received before it has become due, notwithstanding any defect
or infirmative in the title of the person from whom he derived it;
as, for example, even though such person may have acquired it by
Kinyon v. Wohlford, 17
fraud or even by theft or by robbery.
Minn., 239; Story on Promissory Notes, sec. 191; Goodman v.
Simons, 20 How., 365; Wheeler v. Guild, 20 Pick., S45; Foy v.
Blackstone, 31 111., 538.
It is a general rule that the maker of a commercial contract
which has not been delivered, is not liable thereon. If, however,
and
through his negligence the contract gets into circulation
reaches the hands of a bona fide holder, he is liable upon the well
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The judgment must

be

reversed
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with costs, and a new

trial awarded.
The other justices concurred.
settled principle that where one of two innocent persons must suffer, the loss should fall upon him who put it in the power of the
third person to cause such loss.
Delivery on Sundays. — In the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, commercial contracts may be executed and
delivered on Sunday.
There was no rule at common law forO'Rourke, 43 Mich., 58; State Capital
it.
O'Rourke
v.
bidding
Bank v. Thompson, 42 N. H., 369; Mackalley's case, 9 Coke,
66b.

In many of the states there are statutes which make contracts
executed and delivered on Sunday void as between the original
parties, but they are valid in the hands of bona fide holders. Stevens V. Wood, 127 Mass., 123; Sayre v. Wheeler, 31 Iowa, 112.
If the note is executed on Sunday but not delivered until a
week day it will be valid,
^^inton v. Peck, 14 Mich., 287; Conrad
V.

Kinzie,

105

Ind., 2S7; Hilton v. Houghton,

35

Me., 143.

The maker may ratify a contract executed and delivered on
Sunday.
King v. Fleming, 72 111., 21.
Parol evidence is admissible to show that the note was actually delivered on a different day from its date.
King v. Fleming,
supra.
The rule which controls in the execution and delivery of commercial contracts on Sundays applies also to contracts of endorseState Capital Bank v. Thompson, 42 N. H., 370.
ments.
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CONTRACT MUST BE SIGNED.
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RY. CO.'

In the Court of Queen's Bench, Easter Term, April
{^Reported

in 3

Ellis

155

Ssf

Law, 548); 23 Law

21,

1854.

Blackburn {Q. £.), 5^9/ (77 £„g. Com.
Jr. Rep. {N. S.) {Com. Law), 2p3.]

The Form of Action.— The declaration

stated that defendants were proprietors of a railway, to wit, a railway from
Strood in Kent to London, and were common carriers of
goods and chattels for hire: and plaintiff caused to be delivered to defendants, as such common carriers, a certain parcel
and divers goods and chattels of plaintiff contained therein,
to wit, certain papers and documents of small value, and the
sum of 9/. io.f. in cash, to be safely and securely carried and
conveyed for plaintiff by defendants from Strood upon the
said railway, and upon and by other railways and conveyances, and to be caused by defendants to be safely and securely delivered for plaintiff to the consignee of the said parcel,
to wit, one Gideon Goold, at a certain other place, to wit,
Birmingham, for certain reasonable reward: yet defendants,
not regarding their duty as such common carriers, but contriving, etc., did not nor would safely or securely carry, etc.,
the parcel to Birmingham, nor there cause the same to be
safely and securely delivered for plaintiff to the consignee,
but, being such carriers, so carelessly and negligently conducted themselves in the premises that, by and through the

conduct of defendants
in that behalf, the said parcel was opened after the same had
been delivered to defendants as aforesaid, and before the same
was delivered to the consignee: and the said sum of gl. lOs.
in cash, being part of the contents of the said parcel, was
abstracted therefrom by some person or persons whose names
or name are to plaintiff unknown: and the parcel and part
carelessness,

'This

negligence,

and improper

in Norton on Bills and Notes, 60; Daniel
Instruments, 92; Tiedeman on Commercial Paper,
11; Randolph on Commercial
Paper, 62, 290; Wood's Byles on
Bills and Notes, 156.
case is cited

on Negotiable
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only of the said goods and chattels contained therein, to wit,
the said papers and documents of small value, were delivered
to said consignee; and the residue of the goods and chattels
contained in the parcel, to wit, the said sum of 9/. lOs. in
cash, was never delivered to the consignee: whereby the said
sum of 9/. lOf. was not safely or securely carried or conveyed,
or caused to be delivered as aforesaid, but became and is

wholly lost to plaintiff.
Form of Defense. — That the said parcel, at the time of
the said delivery thereof to and receipt by defendants of the
same, contained property of a certain description, to wit,
money and current coin of the realm, and a bill of exchange
for the payment of money; and the value of the same exceeded the sum of 10/.: and that the said parcel, with its
said contents, was delivered to defendants, as common carriers of goods by land, to be by them conveyed and carried as
in the declaration mentioned at a certain office or receivinghouse of defendants for the receipt of goods to be carried by
That, before and at the
them, as such carriers as aforesaid.
time when the said parcel with its said contents were so delivered at the said office or receiving-house, defendants had
caused to be affixed, and there was then affixed, according to
the form of the statute in such case made and provided, in
legible letters or characters, in a public and conspicuous part
of the said office or receiving-house, a notice stating that a
certain increased rate of charge therein mentioned was required to be paid, over and above the ordinary rate of carriage, for the safe conveyance of certain articles in the said
notice mentioned; and among which money and bills of exThat the nature and value
change were included and stated.
of the said contents of the said parcel were not declared by
plaintiff or by the person who sent or delivered the said parcel and its contents at the said office or receiving-house; nor
was the said increased charge, nor any engagement to pay the
same, accepted by the person receiving the same at the said
office or receiving-house.
Replication. — That the value of the said parcel, and its
contents, did not exceed the sum of 10/.
On the trial the following facts appeared: The plaintiff
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was a commercial traveller in the employment of Gideon
Goold, named in the declaration, who resided at Birmingham.
A person named Cruttenden, residing at Chatham, being indebted to Goold to the amount of ii/. los. gave to the
plaintiff at Chatham, to be by him transmitted to Goold, an
instrument of which the following is a copy:

" £11 :

10: o.
"Birmingham, Sept., 18^2.
Three months after date pay to my order the sum of
eleven pounds and los., value received.
' '

[Across the face of this instrument was written
ted payable at
Bank.
G. Cruttenden. "]

"

Accep-

Goold was to complete this instrument, which was
stamped with a two shilling bill stamp, by signing his own
name as drawer.
The plaintiff had no authority to draw or
He accordingly enclosed the docuaccept bills for Goold.
ment, together with gold and silver to the amount of 9/. loj. ,
on account of a private debt of his own to Goold, in a parcel,
which he directed to Goold at Birmingham,.and
delivered to
defendants, at their station at Strood, to be carried; and which
they received for that purpose.
There was affixed, in a conspicuous part of the office where the parcel was received, a
notice, requiring an increased rate of charge, according to
Stat. 1 1 G. 4 and i W. 4 c. 68, ss. i and 2, for the articles
No notice of the value or contents of the
specified in sect. i.
parcel was given, nor any increased rate paid or agreed for.
The cash was abstracted from the parcel, by some means
which did not appear, before it reached Goold: the remainder
of the contents came safely to hand.
Claim of Defendant. — On this evidence, the counsel for
the defendants contended that the parcel contained, within the
meaning of the Carriers' Act, stat. 1 1 G. 4 & i W. 4 c. 68, s.
I, gold or silver coin of the realm, and a bill, note, or security
for payment of money, or writing, the value of the whole exceeding 10/., and that, no notice of the value or contents having been given, or increased rate paid or contracted for, the
defendants were not liable for the loss.
Claim of Plaintiff. — The plaintiff's counsel contended
that the document, being incomplete, was of no value as a
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security or writing, and that therefore the parcel contained no
articles, within the meaning of the statute, of the value of
more than 9/. io.y.
The learned Judge directed a verdict for the plaintiff for
io.y.
for the
, reserving leave to move to enter the verdict
9/.
defendant if the skeleton bill was an article within the Carriers' act, and was of such a value as to make together with
It was agreed that the jury were to
9/. los. more than 10/.
be taken as finding, so far as it was a question for them, that
the writing was of no value.
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The question
whether this document was of any value
as
bill or note, security or writing, within the meaning of
the statute.
It was not bill of exchange; for there was no
drawer.
In Petro v. ReyNor was
a promissory note.
nolds,
Exch. 410,
bill of exchange without
person drew
any direction; and another person accepted
in defendant's
name, professing to do so as agent for defendant.
The Court
bill of exappeared disposed to consider that this was not
the defendant ratified the promise to pay,
change, though,
But there the
might be treated as his promissory note.
document, whether a bill or promissory note, was
promise
by
person named, to pay to the order of another named:
here Goold has not become
he
party in any way; nor
named.
There
neither drawer nor payee.
The only name
on the document
that of Cruttenden; and he does not engage to pay, except to the order of
person not named, and
who has in fact made no order.
Cruttenden can not have
meant to pay the bearer generally.
Nor does
fall under the
head of "securities for payment of money."
In Rex v.
Hart,'
person signed a blank acceptance on a paper which
had
six shilling stamp:
was afterwards taken away and
Littledale,
filled up as a bill of exchange for 500/.
Holland, B., and Bosanquet, J., held that this, at the time of
" bill, note, warrant, order, or other
such taking, was not
security whatsoever for money or for payment of money,"
within Stat.
G. 4, c. 29, s.
Littledale, J., said that
"
the instrument was
only in a sort of embryo state."
[Ld.
—
It
more like an authority for making
Campbell, C.
C. L. R., vol. 25).
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Further, if it is contended
security than an actual security.]
that this was a writing of the value of ill. los., the answer
is that the value which is to bring the case within the statute
must be a value existing at the time of the delivery to the
But, as no one had the authority to complete the
carrier.
instrument besides Goold, the paper could never acquire any
value till it reached Goold's hands, that
till the duty of
the carrier was over.
The value at the time of the delivery, was merely that of the paper; no value derived from
the writing on
The supposed value
existed at that time.
in the piece of paper plus the authority to do something to
which has not been done here.
The piece of paper was sent
by the carrier; the authority could not be sent: and neither
sufficient to make
of these elements apart from the other
the instrument of value.
similar reasoning was pursued in
party to an
Rex V. Clark.' There are many oases in which
incomplete instrument becomes liable upon the completion;
class of
an instance, and represents
Schultz V. Astley^
cases.
But the liability never arises, and consequently the
created, unless the complevalue of the instrument never
Suppose this instrument to
tion
by an authorized party.
lost, no one except by means of forgery, or at
least of some fraud, like that in Reginav. White,' could make
Goold had died during the transit, could his
valuable.
They could not.
executors have completed the instrument
the carrier had lost the
Whose name could "they sign
by an
paper, could Goold have recovered the sum named in
He could not. And
action for damages against the carrier
this shows that the object of the statute does not require the
interpretation for which the defendants must contend; because,
been

>

it

If

.?

?

it

If

have

I

J.

if

be worthless, the carrier requires no protection from the consequences of its loss.
— am of opinion that
Decision.— Ld. Campbell, C.
the instrument

'Russ
''2

'i

&

R., 181.

New Ca., 544.
Den. Cr. C., 208.

i

&

I

ii

4

is

The case of the defendants
this rule ought to be discharged.
clearly .untenable unless this paper can be brought within
It
W. 4, c. 68.
G.
Sect.
of the Carriers' Act,
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bill, order, note, or security for payment of money, or writing, of such value as to make up, with
It is not a bill of exchange;
the 9/. loj-., more than lo/.
Nor is it a promissory
there is neither drawer nor payee.
note to pay any one who might happen to be the bearer; that
Cruttenden should become hable generally to the bearer was
quite contrary to his intention. Nor is it a security for money;
for we must look at the time of the delivery to the carrier;
I think it is
and at that time nothing could be claimed on it.
a writing; it would be very difficult to define a writing so as
must be shown to be

a

not to include this paper. Then the question is as to the
value.
If this writing possesses any value beyond that of the
Now can it be
paper material, that value must be \\l. lOs.

What Constitutes

Negotiable Paper. — It

a

Signature — \A^ho are Liable upon

is necessary to the validity of all these
that
the name of the party who is liable
commercial contracts
No perthereon should appear upon the face of the instrument.
son is liable as a party to a commercial contract whose signature
does not appear upon it.
It does not matter upon what portion of
the instrument the name of the person who is to become liable
thereon appears, so long as it was added with the intention to become liable.
It is usual to place the signature at the lower right
hand corner.
This is not important, however. The name need
not necessarily appear if it be indicated who the party is.
The
full name should be given; but this is not necessary absolutely —
the initials simply will be sufficient.
And it has been held that
any mark which the party uses to indicate the intention to bind
himself will be as effectual as his name.
So also a note which
A. B., promise to pay, etc.," is as good a commercial
reads
contract as if the note read
promise to pay, etc.," subscribed
by "A. B." Brown v. Butcher's Bank, 6 Hill, 443, where the figures " I, 2, 8," were held to take the place of the signature of the
Taylor v. Dabbins, i Strange, 399, where it is held that
parties.
A. B.," will take the place of a signature if the contract is
written by A. B. himself.
Sanders v. Anderson, 21 Mo., 402,
where it was held that a note signed "Steam Boat Ben Lee and
owners" was a sufficient signature to bind the owners of the boat.
Where the note is signed by some mark or initials simply,
which the party uses to indicate his intention to bind himself, it
should be witnessed.
This is not absolutely necessary, however.
Shank v. Butsch, 28 Ind., 19; Willoughby v. Moulton, 47 N. H.,
205; Hilborn v. Alford, 22 Cal., 4S2; Flowers v. Billing, 45

"I,

"I

"I,

Ala., 488.

It frequently happens that a person carries on a business
under an assumed or fictitious name in which case he will be liable
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said that the writing bore that value at the time of its delivery to the carrier.' I do not see that it was of intrinsic value
to any person.
It empowered a particular individual to claim
to that amount, by putting his name to it; but that had not
been in fact done by the individual, Goold.
I cannot agree
that the executors of Goold could have made it valuable by
putting to it his name, or their own, or any name whatever.
who, not being
Nor could any one have bestowed value on
therefore in
contemplated by Cruttenden, had found it.
accordance with all the authorities, to hold that this writing
was of no value at the time of delivery to the carrier.
— The question
whether that which beWightman,
yond all doubt was
writing was, at the time of its delivery to

42

is

it

upon commercial contracts executed and dehvered in that name.
Bartlett V. Tucker, 104 Mass., 336; Lockwood v. Coley, 22 Fed.
Rep., 192.
By Whom Made. — The signature, however, need not be
made by some one havmade by the party himself provided
Woodbury v. Woodbury, 47 N. H., 11. The
ing authority.
authority to execute and deliver commercial contracts for another
Right, etc., v. First Nat. Bk.,
may be either express or implied.

Mich., 461.

it

Form of the Signature — It May be Written or
may be in
Printed. — The signature may be written or printed;

v. Baehr, 48 Cal. 565; Brown v.
Cress.,
Barn.
v. Physic,
Geary
443;
Butcher's
Rorak,
Tex.,
When
the
printed
signature
234; Reed v.
14
329.
signature has been
the holder must show that that particular
adopted by the maker of the coutract. Brown v. Butcher's, supra;
Pennington v. Baehr, 48 Cal., 565.
5

Hill,

,

Pennington

6

Bank,

is &

ink or in pencil.

Signature by Two or More Persons — Nature of Their
Liability. — Of course two or more persons may join in the execu-

and delivery of commercial contracts, in which case their
liability will be joint or joint and several depending altogether
If two or more persons
upon the language used in the contract.
that
the
liable
who
are
presumption
contract
are named in the
are
used.
of
severance
words
Johnjoint unless
their liability
If the contract reads " we promise "
son v. King, 20 Ala., 270.
joint; but
and signed by two or more persons their liability
the contract reads "I promise, etc.," signed by two or more perjoint and several, and they may be sued
sons, their liability
Maiden v. Webster, 30 Ind., 317; Bill v.
jointly or severally.
If the note reads "We or either of us
White, 52 Wis., 169.
First Nat. Bk. v.
will be joint and several.
promise to pay,"
Fowler, 36 Ohio St., 524.

it

is

if

is

is

is
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The fallacy of the arthe carrier, of a value exceeding lo/.
gument lies in attempting to make the power of conferring the
value at the end of the destined carriage the criterion of the
value at the time of the delivery.

I think

the rule should be

discharged.

Erie, J. — I am of the same opinion.

This being an im-

bill, order, note, or
security for money, but clearly a wjiting, we are not bound to
I use that expresssay that, in point of law, it was of value.
ion, because it may be that, this being, except for the absence
of the name of the drawer, an accepted bill of exchange, a
jury may in a similar case find that the writing is of value;
and I do not wish to preclude myself from considering whether
such a finding might not be sustained.
Rule. Discharged.
perfect instrument, and not a complete

Signature by Agent — His Liability. — An

agent may have
authority to execute and deliver negotiable contracts for his prinIf his signature is in the form "A." "agent," he alone is
cipal.
liable.
He must use some word or words which are not designatio persona: simply, but which indicate that his act is for and on
behalf of his principal, as
or "B" by "A,"
agent for
his agent, or "B" per "A" agent.
Owen v. Van Uster, 20 L.
J. Rep., 61; O'Kell v. Charles, 34 L. T. Rep., 422; Bartlett v.
Tucker, 104 Mass., 336; White v. Madison, 26 N. Y., 117.
It is undoubtedly well settled that, where an ordinary simple
contract is signed by an agent in his own name, with the addition
of the word " agent" thereto, the principal may be made liable
thereon, whether his (the principal's), name appears on the paper
or not.
Story on Agency, Sec. 160 a.
But for commercial reasons, a distinction is made, between ordinary contracts and negotiable paper.
As to negotiable contracts, the agent must either
sign the name of the principal to the contract, or at least it must
appear on the face of the paper itself, in some way, that it was
drawn for him, or the principal will not be bound.
Edwards on
Bills, 80; Andenton v. IShoup, 17 Ohio St., 125; Eastern R. R.
Co. V. Benedict, 5 Gray, 561; Emly v. Lye, 15 East, 7; Becham
v. Drake, 9 M. & W., 92; Dewitt v. Walton,
Seld. (N. Y. ),
5
571; Sparks v. Dispatch Transfer Co., 104 Mo., 531.
Some courts have held where the commercial
paper was
signed by the officers of Banking Corporations as A. B., Cashier,
or C. D., President, and where the name of the principal appears
in the heading, that the principal was liable.
Chipman v. Foster,
Mass.,
Hitchcock
v.
198;
Buchanan,
119
105 U. S., 416.

"A"

"B"

CHAPTER

V.

Non-Essentials of Negotiable Contracts.

SECTION
(i).

21.

NEGOTIABLE CONTRACTS NEED NOT BE DATED.
DE LA COURTIER

v.

BELLAMY.i

In the Court of King's Bench, Michaelmas Term,
\Reported in

2

36

Chas. II. (1683.)

Showers 411. ]

The Form of Action. — Action

on the case on

a

bill of

exchange from parts beyond the seas, payable at double usance
from the date thereof: custom alleged accordingly; and the
fact was alleged to be, that the party beyond the sea drew
such a

bill such

a day,

and the same was afterward presented

to, and accepted by the defendant.

And exception was taken, that the date of the bill was
not set forth:
And per totam Curiam held, it was well enough, and
they would intend it dated at the time of drawing it.
Jndq'ment for the plaintiff.^
'

This case is cited in Chitty on Bills, 148, 149, 563; Story on
Bills of Exchange, 37; Wood's Byles on Bills and Notes, 142;
Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 66, 83; Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, 10; Randolph on Commercial Paper, 85, 88, 275,
342.

In an action on a foreign bill of exchange, if the date be
omitted, the court will intend it dated at the time it is stated to
have been drawn.
In the case of Hague v. French, 3 B. & P., 173 (1802), it was
argued that the action could not be sustained for the reason that
the bill contained no date; the bill being payable at two months,
without date, it was impossible to ascertain the time of payment.
The court held that it might be intended that the date of the bill
The court in this case cited and
was the day of the drawing.
In the case of
approved the case of De la Courtier v. Bellamy.
^
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Giles V. Bourne, 6 Maule & Selevin, 74 (1816), the case of Hague
See also Clark v.
V. French, supra, was discussed and approved.
Dorwin,
Sigourney, 17 Conn., 511; Woodford v.
3 Vt., 82; Mehlberg V. Tisher, 24 Wis., 607; Seldonridge v. Connable, 32 Ind.,
375.

Date. —
a blank
the
indorwill
bind
note, without sum or date or time of payment,

A Bill or Note Delivered Without Sum or
Authority to fill Such Blanks. — "An indorsement on

ser for any sum, payable at any time, which the person, to whom
Mechanics and Farmthe indorser intrusts it, chooses to insert."
ers Bank V. Schuyler, 7 Cow. (N. Y. ), 337.
" Such a note is a letter of credit for an indefinite sum: Russell v.
Langstaffe, Dougl., 514; 5 Cranch, 151; 2 M. & S., 90; 4 Mass. Rep.,
If there is an implied discretionary authority in such case
54, 5.
to fill all the blanks, it would seem to follow that such an authorAccordity must equally exist to supply one, if only one be left.
be
if the
blank,
inserted;
if
amount
be
left
sum
the
any
may
ingly,
time of payment, it may be fixed at the pleasure of the holder, and
in the hands of a bona Jide indorsee the indorser cannot question
the transaction, though the blanks may have been filled in a manner entirely different from the understanding and expectation of
the indorser when he put his name upon the note."
the case of M. & F. Bank v. Schuyler, supra, it is said
that the note in this case was perfect without a date.
is true
that the date is not essential to the validity of a bill or note; for
•where they have no date the time,
necessary, may be inquired into,
and will be computed from the day they were issued: 2 Ld. Raym.,
1076; 2 Show, 422; Chitty on Bills, 78; 3 B. & P., 173; 2 John,
Nor is it necessary to the validity of a note that
303; 13 East, 5.
a time of payment should be expressed in it.
If none be fixed it
is payable on demand:
Chitty on Bills, 79; 7 T. R., 427.
But if
a note is indorsed, perfect in every respect but the time of payment, and that is left blank, can there be any question of the authority of the maker, if the note be redelivered to him, to insert
any time of payment he may think proper before he puts it in circulation? Can the indorser, in such a case, protect himself from
liability on the ground of an alteration of the note?
If not, upon
what principle can the insertion of the date, where that is left
blank, be considered an alteration ? If it be conceded, as it must
be, that the maker in this case had an implied authority to fill up
the blank at all, the indorser, and not the innocent indorsee, must
suffer the consequence of an abuse of that authority, if it has been
It is not, in judgment of law, an alteration of the note.
abused.
The defendant must have contemplated the addition of the date
before the note was to be passed, for it was payable at the Mechanics' and Farmers' Bank.
It is believed to be the invariable custom of banks to discount paper without a date."
Mechanics, etc..

"In

It

if

Bank

v.

Schuyler,

supra.
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Parol evidence is admissible to show from what time an undated instrument was intended to operate.
Davis v. Jones, 17
C. B., 625.
It may also be shown that there was a mistake in the
date.
Drake v. Rogers, 32 Me., 524; Seldonridge v. Connable, 32
Ind., 37S; Almich v. Downey, 45 Minn., 460; Germania Bank v.
Distler, 67 Barb., 333; McSparran v. Neely, 91 Pa. St., 17; Giles
V. Bourne, 6 M. & S., 74.
Effect of Dating on Sunday. — A negotiable contract
signed and delivered on Sunday, but bearing date on another day,
is valid in the hands of a bona fide holder.
Love v. Wells, 25
Ind., 503; State Bank v. Thompson, 42 N. H., 376; Vinton v.
Peck, 15 Mich., 287. If in fact it is dated on Sunday but actually
'delivered on another day, it will be sustained. Bank v. Mayberry,
48 Me., 198; King v. Fleming, 72 111., 21; Benson v. Drake, 55
Me., 556. At common law there was no rule forbidding the execution and delivery of commercial contracts on Sunday.
Date — ^Vhere Placed. — It is customary to place the time
or the date on which commercial contracts are executed and delivered at the upper right hand corner of the instrument.
The
date, however, is not essential to the validity of commercial contracts.
Michigan Ins. Co. v. Leavenworth, 30 Vt., 11; McSparran V. Neely, 91 Pa. St., 17; Mechanics, etc. Bank v. Schuyler, 7
Cow., 337; Mehlberg v. Fisher, 24 Wis., 607. Where there is no
date, the time, if necessary, maybe inquired into and will be comMechanics, etc. Bank v.
puted from the day they were issued.
If the bill or
Schuyler, supra; Lean v. Lozardi, 27 Mich., 424.
note bears no date it will be considered as dated at the time it was
made or at the time of its delivery.
Seldonridge v. Connable,
the
date
is
not
essential to the validity of
Ind.,
While
32
375.
commercial contracts it may become a matter of importance. For
time after date,"
instance where the note is payable "
from
or
where
the statute of
date;
interest
draw
or where they
limitations is interposed as a defense.
Ante-Dating and Post-Dating. — A commercial contract
maybe ante-dated or post-dated and parol evidence is admissible toshow on what day such contract was actually delivered and it will
take effect from that date; but such evidence will not be admitted,
McSparran
however, to invalidate the title of a bona fide holder.
V. Neely, 91 Pa. St., 315; Knox v. Clifford, 38 Wis., 651; Frazier
V. Troy. Printing Co., 24 Hun., 281; Almich v. Downey, 45 Minn.,
If by reason of the ante-dating or
460; I Parsons on B. & N., 49.
to have been executed and
should
appear
contract
post-dating the
the date, — coverature, inof,
reason
delivered at a time when by
fancy, — or anything by reason of that date the contract is invalid
it may be shown by parol evidence in behalf of any of the parties,,
that at the time of its actual date or delivery no such facts existed.
Story on Notes, Sec. 48; Daniel on Negot. Inst., Sec. 85; Tied,
Post-dating or ante-dating will not be
on Com. Paper, Sec. 11.
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allowed when it is done for the purpose of evading rules of law
which render contracts invalid.
Bailey v. Taber, 5 Mass., 286;
Dan. on Com. Inst., Sec. 85.
Ante-dating or post-dating does
not vitiate the paper.
Burns v. Kohn & Furst; Brewster v. McCardel, 8 Wend., 479; Almich v. Downey, 45 Minn., 460.
Mistake as to the Date. — Where a bill or note is intended
to bear a date as of the time of its delivery, but by mistake
another date is written on the face of the instrument, such mistake may be corrected, by parol, unless innocent indorsees or
purchasers would be prejudiced thereby.
2 Parsons
Notes and
Bills, 574; Brutt v. Picard, R. & M., 37. See Miliary. Gilleland, 19 Pa. St., 119, for the effect of such correction upon the
rights and liabilities of sureties.
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WILSON.i

Hilary

Teem

I Strange,

The Form of Action.— Error of

(6

Geo.),

1719,

265.]

judgment in C. B., in
case upon
promissory note entered into by A. to pay so much
to B.for a debt due from C. to the said B. And it was objected,
a

a

'This

case is reported in Wood's Byles on Bills and
Notes,
154, 219, 223; Story on Bills, 63, 183; Edwards on Negotiable
Paper, 276; Tiedeman on Negotiable Paper, 31, 152, 170; Daniel
on Negotiable Instruments,
108, 186; Ames on Bills and Notes,
See
also
the
upon
principal
proposition: — 2 Ld. Raym.',
635.
Clark,
11
Garnet
v.
Mod., 226; Smith v. Knox,
1481;
3 Espinasse, 46; Buchanan v. Bank, 78 111., 500; Grant v. Ellicott,
7
Wend., 227; Brown V. Mott, 7 Johnson, 361; Brix v. Braham', i
Bingham, 281; 2 Black. Com., 446.

Rule — Consideration
General
Commercial Contracts.— It may be stated

The

Presumed

In

general rule
that a bill of exchange or a promissory note imports a consideration whether it is negotiable or not.
In the case of Carnwright v.
Gray, 127 N. Y., 92, the following instrument was held to be a
good negotiable contract without words of "negotiability" or a
statement of "consideration":

" Thirty
■wright

" Quarryville,

days after death,

I promise

to

pay

as

Sept. 2, 187 1.
to

fifteen hundred dollars, with interest.
Samuel

In this

a

Cornelius Carn-

P. Freligh."

case the defendant moved to dismiss, upon the ground

proof had been given that the instrument sued upon had
This motion was denied, and the court inany consideration.
structed the jury that the instrument was a promissory note and
that no

therefore a consideration was imported, and that the burden rested
upon the defendant to show that it was without a consideration.
Downing v. Backinstoes, 3 Caines, 137; President v. Hurtin, 9
Johnson, 217; 6 Am. Dec, 273; Kimball v. Huntington, 10 Wend.,
675; 25 Am. Dec, 590; Hatch v. Trayes, 11 Ad. & E., 702; Hall
v. farmer, 5 Denio, 484; Siegel v. Chicago, etc. Savings Bank, 131
In this last case the consideration was executory and
111., 569.
was supported.
19 Am. St. Rep., 51; Davis v. McCready, 17 N.
Y., 230; State Nat. Bank v. Cason, 39 La. Ann., 865; McGowen
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it was not within

Mo., 569; 38 Am. Dec, 468; Chapman v. Remington,
80 Mich., 552; County, etc. v. Auckley, 9c Mo., 126.
V.

West,

7

Where no consideration is recited, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show that there was a consideration between the original
Green v. Shepherd, 5 Allen, 589; Martin v. Stubbings,
parties.
See also, as between the orig126 111., 387; 9 Am. St. Rep , 620.
inal parties, may a different consideration be proved than that exMiller V. McKenzie, 95 N. Y., 575; Johnson v. Sutherpressed.
land, 39 Mich., 579; Everhart v. Puckett, 73 Ind., 409.

The Use of the Phrase "Value Received." — Necessity
" are almost universally inof. — The words for " value received

serted in bills and notes, but it is in no wise necessary to do so.
Dean v. Carruth, 108 Mass., 242; Grant v. DaCosta, 3 M. & S.,
351; 4 Douglass, 427; Benjamin v. Fillman, 2 McLean
(U. S. ),
213; Townsend V. Derby, 3 Mete. (Mass.), 363; Bourne v. Ward,
There are some old cases which hold that words ex51 jMe., 191.
pressing a consideration are as necessary in these contracts as they
Cramlington v. Evans, i Showers,
are in common law contracts.
the consideration may always
the
original
As
between
parties
5.
be inquired into; and if it is shown that there was no consideration,
Rice v. Howor that it has failed, a recovery will be defeated.
Me.,
v.
81
Mass.,
Monson
24;
land, 147
Tripp,
407;
Cooper v.
King, 73 Iowa, 136; Chenault v. Bush, 84 Ky., 528; Slade v. Halsted, 7 Cow., 322; Collis v. Emmett, i H. Blk., 313; Molloy v.
Delves, 7 Bing., 428; 5 M. & P., 275; 4 C. & P., 492 (19 E. C. L.)
And where the actual consideration between the original parties is
less than the amount of the bill or note, no recovery can be had
Brown v. Mott, 7 Johns. (N. Y.),
beyond the real consideration.
obtains,
however,
A
different
rule
where the instrument gets
361.
In this case the quesinto the hands of an innocent third party.
tion of consideration between the original parties cannot be raised,
provided he secured it before maturity, for value, in the due
course of business and without knowledge of any equities existing
against it.
Effect of a Failure in the Consideration. — A want or failure of consideration will, as between the original parties, or persons standing in no better situation, defeat a commercial contract
in the same manner as other contracts, even though it is expressed
to be for "value received;" Thatcher v. Densmore, 5 Mass., 299;
Parish v. Stone, 14 Pick., 198; Stevens v. Mclntire, 14 Me., 14.
In an action upon these contracts the onus probandi Hes on the defendant and the holder is not bound to prove that he gave value
until the defendant has first made out a case showing:
That the plaintiff is not a bona fide holder; or
1.
That there was fraud in the inception of the contract; or
2.
That there was suspicion of fraud which would make him
3.
guilty of bad faith.
Jennison v. Stafford, 1 Cush., 168, 170; Saw-
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of another and is no

25 Me., 337, 339; Lewis v. Parker, 4 Ad. & EL,
Martin, i B. & P., 651; Hayly v. Lane, 2 Atk., 182;
Mason, 2 T. R., 71; Ford v. Beech, 11 Adolph. &

yer V. Vaughn,
838; Collins V.

Lickbarrow v.
E., 854.
^Vhat Consideration will Support a Negotiable Contract. — Love and Affection not Sufficient. — As between the
original parties the rule relating to consideration in common law

A valuable considercontracts applies to negotiable contracts.
ation is necessary; a good consideration will not support these
In an action upon the following note:
contracts.

"

Whereas,

personal services

''Pleasant Valley, III., Oct., 2Sth, 1875.
has performed for me
my niece, Lillie Williams,
a
desire shall
time,
period
long
of
for which
for

I

receive ample cojupensation from my estate, and feeling able at present to fully compensate her, T therefore and hereby acknowledge myself indebted to her in the sum of $2, §00, with interest, but not to be
due until my death, unless at my option.

Deliliah Deeds."

" A note executed without any other
Scholfield, C. J., said:
consideration than that of natural affection, or one without any
valuable consideration, intended as a mere gift, cannot form the
A gift is always revocable
ground of recovery in an action at law.
until it is executed; and a promissory note, intended purely as a
The gift is not
gift, is but a promise to make a gift in the future.
v.
Taylor,
Kirkpatrick
is
executed until the note
paid.
43 111.,
Trustees,
Pratt
v.
207; Blanchard v. Williamson, 70 111., 647;
93
III, 475. It is not pertinent for us here to inquire how slight. a
valuable consideration would support this promise, for the appellate court finds as a matter of fact that it is supported by no valuable consideration, — that the promise is to make a gift only."
Williams V. Forbes, 114 HI-, 167; 28 N. E. Rep., 463- A negotiable contract, executed and delivered as a gift to a son or other
Fisk v. Cox, 18 Johns,
relation, is not sufficient to support it.
While some cases
Mood.,
&
r
Pinkers,
V.
Ryan.
125.
145; Blogg
consideration,
a
was
good
this
[Tate
have attempted to hold that
V. Hilbert, 2 Ves. Jr., irr; Seton v. Seton, 2 Bro. Ch., 610; Dawson v. Kearton, 25 L. J. Ch., r66], the rule seems well settled now
that a promissory note is ineffectual to perfect a gift either ''inter
vivos " or "causa mortis." Williams v. Forbes, supra; Fink v. Cox,
v.
18 Johns., 145; Richardson V. Richardson, 148 111., 563; Shaw
L.,
Pope
N.
494;
Combs,
J.
33
Camp, r6o 111., 425; Voorhees v.
v. Dodson, 58 111., 360, (gift inter vivos); Raymond v. Selhck, 10
Conn., 480, (gift causa mortis); Parish v. Stone, 14 Pick., 198; Second Nat. Bk.

v.

Williams,

13

Mich.,

282.
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Decision. — But the court held it to be within the statute,
In the case of Rice v. Rice, 68 Ala., 216, it was held that the
"presumption of consideration" fails in a negotiable contract
when it shows on its face that it was given for the purpose of a
gift.

Than
Money Consideration — Consideration Other
Money — Total or Martial Failure of Consideration. —

There is a distinction between a money
ble consideration
other than money.
consideration will support the promise
former will only support the promise
forming the consideration.
In the case of Sawyer v. McLough
was brought to recover the amount
proved to have been given by Joseph
testate, in June or July, 1861.
The
words and figures:

if

of

"For

value reicivcd, [promise

to

consideration and a valuaIn the latter the s light es/
to the full extent, while the
to the extent of the money
(46 Barb., 350), the action
of a note without date, but
Sawyer, the defendant's innote was in the following

pay

I. M.

Sawyer,

if livi/ia-^

not, to his son Joseph Sawyer, fifteen hundred dollars, on the
first
October, 1862.
Joseph Sawyer."

if

if

it

it

it

it

it

it

it,

Upon the trial at the Ontario circuit, in May, 1865, the plaintiff gave evidence tending to show the execution of the note by the
testator, by proving the signature to be genuine, and by the testimony of Edward S. Gray, who testified that he was present and
saw the testator sign the note, and deliver it to the plaintiff.
He
further testified that on the occasion of the execution of the
note, the plaintiff handed the testator, his father, a roll of bills,
who took
and looked
over, and said
was all right, and then
handed the plaintiff the note; that the witness did not count the
roll of bills; that he saw the intestate count it; that there was
nothing said as to the amount, and the witness had no knowledge
as to the amount; that he did not see the denomination of any of
the bills; that he saw the size of the roll; that
was rolled up;
that he could not tell as to the amount; that the plaintiff handed
to the testator, and asked him
was all right, and he said he
believed
was.
There was no evidence showing that the amount of the money
paid or delivered by the plaintiff to the testator, on the occasion
of giving the note, except what might be implied or inferred from
the amount of the note, and the fact that the giving the note and
the payment of the money were concurrent acts, and one and the
same transaction.
The theory of the defense was, " that
the money so handed
to the testator was the only valuable consideration of the note,
and of less amount than the note, the plaintiff could recover nothing beyond the amount of such money consideration."
It was contended on the argument, in behalf of the defend-
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being an absolute promise, and every way as negotiable as if
distinction between a valuable consideration
other than money and a money consideration; that while in the
former case the slightest consideration would support a promise to
pay the largest amount, to the full extent of the promise, in the
latter the consideration will support a promise only to the extent
of the money forming the consideration; that this leaves the measure of the value of a valuable consideration, other than money,
for a promise to pay money, to the parties to the contract; but
money, being the standard of value, is not subject to be changed
by contract, and will support a promise to pay money, only to the
It seems to me this is a correct
amount of the consideration.
statement of the law on the subject.
Judge Story, in his treatise on promissory notes, states the
law as follows: "The objection to a note may be, that there is a
total want of consideration to support it; or that there is only a
In the first case it goes to the
partial want of consideration.
In the latter case it
and
avoids it.
note,
of
the
entire validity
The same rule aptanto.
with
nulity, only pro
affects the note
plies to cases where there was originally no want of consideration,
but there has been a subseqent failure thereof, either in whole or
in part.
For a subsequent failure of the consideration is equally
fatal with an original want of consideration, not indeed in all
cases, but in many cases; at least where it is a matter capable of
definite computation, and not mere unliquidated damages." Story,
Prom. Notes, § 187.
It was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove any consideration for the note, as it imported a sufficient consideration; and if
it was inadequate or illegal for any reason, or had failed in whole
or in part, it was incumbent upon the defendants to prove it. The
testimony of the witness Gray did not tend to prove inadequacy
and there was no other evidence in the case
of consideration,
the jury in finding an inadequate consideraauthorize
which would
tion.
Gray's testimony on that subject was given on cross-examination, and was an attempt on the part of the defendants to prove
It
such inadequacy, but which attempt was an entire failure.
intesproved that, when the note was made and delivered by the
tate to the plaintiff, the latter handed the former money, the
amount of which the witness did not know; but, after the testator
was all right; that the testator executed
he said
had counted
doubt,
and delivered the note to the plaintiff was put beyond
to
prove
and the testimony of Gray, as before stated, did not tend
There
the
note.
of
amount
the
than
less
that the money paid was
and upon
was no evidence to contradict the testimony of Gray,
adthe
money
that
was
believed, the legal presumption
that,
the
by
secured
vanced by the plaintiff was equal to the amount
be
would
note; and until that presumption was rebutted, the jury

if

a

it

it,

ants, that there was a

bound so to find.
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And the judgment

was affirmed.

Pre-existing Debt as a Consideration for a Commercial Contract. — The weight of authority now clearly supports

who takes negotiable paper in payment of an
antecedent or pre-existing debt, before maturity, and without
notice, actual or otherwise, of any defects, thereby receives it in
Swift v.
due course of business and becomes a holder for value.
Norris,
2
E.
&
B. (75
i6
v.
Pet. (U. S.), i (1842); Poirier
Tyson,
E. C. L.), 89; Bank v. Gilliland, 23 Wend., 311 (1840); First
Nat. Bk. V. McAllister, 46 Mich., 397; Merchants Ins. Co. v.
Abbott, 131 Mass., 397; Evans v. Speer Hardware Co., 45 S. W.
Rep., 370 (1898), (Ark.); Phcenix Ins. Co. v. Church, 81 N. Y.,
225; Mix V. Nat. Bk., 91 111., 20; Bardsley v. Deep, 88 Pa. St.,
The antecedent debt must, however, be cancelled by the
420.
bill or note when given and accepted. Mix v. Nat. Bank, supra;
Carlisle V. Wishart, 11 Ohio St., 172.
If the commercial contract is given as a conditional and not an absolute payment of the
pre-existing debt then it will not be a good and valuable consideration.
See the leading case contrary to this general doctrine.
Bay V. Coddington, 5 Johnson's Ch., 54; Coddington v. Bay, 20
the rule, that one

Johnson, 637.
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NEED NOT STIPULATE A

PLACE OF PAYMENT.

There is no requirement that the place of payment of
commercial contracts shall be expressly named upon its face.
Mehlberg v. Tisher, 24 Wis., 607; Maiden Bk. v. Baldwin,
In the absence of a place of payment
13 Gray (Mass.),
154.
named there is a presumption that it is payable at the place
The place of payment may also be in the
of execution.
Pollard v. Herries, 3 B. and P. (1791), 335. If
alternative.
no place of execution, however, is named there is a presumption that it is payable at the place of business or residence of
It has
McCruden v. Jonas, 173 Pa. St., 507.
the maker.
been held that if no particular place of payment is specified
in a commercial contract, the law of the place where it is
made determines, not only its construction, but also the obliBarrett v.
gation and duty it imposes upon the maker.
In some of the
Dodge, 16 R. I., 740; 37 Am. St. R., 777.
states, however, the law of the place of payment and not the
place of execution governs in its construction as well as the
'
Dan. on
obligation and duty it imposes upon the maker.
Negot. Inst., Sec. 90 a. The contract may provide, however,

whether it is to be construed by the laws of the state where
made or by the rules of the place where it is to be executed.
New England, etc. Co. v. McLaughlin, 87 Ga., i. If no
place of payment is named in a note, the place of payment is
understood to be where the maker resides; and if a bill, then

at the place where the drawee resides.
While there is no requirement that a "place" of execution or performance shall be named in a commercial contract,
yet it may become a question of a good deal of importance in
the construction, interest, liability of parties, time and place
of presentment for payment or acceptance, etc. These questions will be discussed under their respective heads.
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A COMMERCIAL CONTRACT NEED NOT CONTAIN THE
INDICIA OF NEGOTIABILITY.

(d).

KENDALL ET AL.

v.

GALVIN.'

In the Supreme Court, Maine, June,
{_Reported in 15

Maine, 131.

The Form of Action. — The action

1838.
]

assumpsit, on an
account, charging the amount paid N. K. Seaton on the deThe declaration also contained the money
fendant's order.
On the trial the plaintiffs offered in evidence a paper,
counts.
of which the following

was

is a copy:

''Messrs. Kendall & Kingsbury,
K. Seaton four hundred fifty-five

N.

— Please pay
dollars, thirty-six

Gents.

cents, and charge the same to my account.
' ' Calais,
Geo.
7, /<?jo.

June

I. Galvin.

"

proved by Seaton the acceptance and
The defendant's counpayment of the order or bill by them.
sel contended, that the plaintiffs had not entitled themselves
to recover, and requested the judge to instruct the jury that
the acceptance and payment of the order, by the plaintiffs was
prima facie evidence of funds of the defendant in their hands,
and that it was incumbent on the plaintiffs to rebut that presumption to entitle them to recover. The Judge refused to
give this instruction, and did instruct them, that if the plaintiffs have shown an order drawn by the defendant on them,
that makes out their
and that they accepted and paid
case; that the plaintiffs were not bound to show that they had
Galvin
not funds of the defendant in their hands; and that
was competent for him to show it.
had funds in their hands,
The verdict was for the plaintiffs, and the defendant excepted.
Claim of Defendant. — It was argued for the defendant
bill of exchange.^ The
that the instrument relied on was
also

a

it

if

it,

The plaintiffs

'

is

cited in Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 88,
This case
See also Mehl108; Wood's Byles on Bills and Notes, 155, 604.

Tisher, 24 Wis., 607.
50; Bayley on Bills, i.
Chitty on Bills,

i,

V.

^

burg
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acceptance of a bill of exchange is prima facie evidence of effects of the drawer in the hands of the acceptor.'
Where the
law presumes the affirmative of any fact, the negative of such

fact must be proved by the party averring it.' And in an action for money paid, the acceptor must prove such facts as he
ought to state in the special count.'
Claim of Plaintiff. — The plaintiff, contended that this
was a mere order, or request to pay a sum of money for the
defendants, and not a bill of exchange.
It wants the essential requisities of a bill:
1st.
In not being payable to order or bearer.
2d.
It does not appear to be for value received.
No time is fixed for the payment.
3rd.
It is not made payable at any particular place, nor
4th.
is even the residence of the party on whom the order is drawn
stated.
The law does not require the negative to be proved,
and yet the defendant's case requires it.*
Decision. — The acceptance of a bill of exchange by the
drawee, is presumptive evidence that he had effects of the
drawer in his hands.
It is so stated by the elementary writers
upon bills, and the authorities authorize it.''
Whether the instructions given were correct must depend, therefore, upon the instrument offered in evidence by
the plaintiffs.
If it is to be regarded as a bill of exchange,
the instructions were erroneous, because no testimony was offered to rebut this presumption at law.
If it can be regarded
as an order or request to pay money, and not a bill of exchange, and so not within the rule applicable to them, then
the instructions were correct.
No precise form of words are necessary in a bill of exThere are certain essential requisities; such as, that
change.'*
it be payable at all events, not on a contingency, not out of a
Chitty on Bills, 365,
Stark. Ev., 276.
'

3

T. R., 183; i Wilson,

185;

2

Harrison's Dig., 1115; 3 East, 192; 3 Campb., 10; Varrill
Heald, 2 Greenl., 91; 2 Stark. Ev., 276; Chitty on Bills, 399.
' Bayley on Bills,
312.
*
Chitty on Bills, 212; note i.
'2 Stark Ev., 167, 8; Vera v. Lewis, 3 T. R., 183.
°
Morris v. Lee, Ld. Ray., 1396.
^2

V.

410;
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particular fund, that it be for the payment of money only, and
that it exhibit so clearly the drawer, drawee, and amount,
that these may be known to strangers into whose hands it may
come.

The plaintiffs counsel contends that the instrument in
this is defective in several particulars, and that it
be regarded as a bill of exchange for the following
1st.
That it is not made payable to order or
is well settled, however, that the words order or

should not
reasons:
bearer. It
bearer are

not essential.'
2nd.

That it has not the words

"value

received."

These are not regarded as essential.^
It is not payable at a day certain, or at any usance
3d.
It has been decided, that it is not necesor time after date.
sary to constitute it a bill of exchange, that it should be.
In the case of Boehm v. Sterling,^ the writing declared
on was in these words;
Bartholomew Lane., London, ly February, 17^6.
Messrs. Down, Thornton, Free, and Cromwell, pay to
Mr. Dob son or bearer, 2.f..^.^l. 14.S.
' '

'^

Sterling, Hunters & Co.

"At

"

time of the trial, I thought
there was a difference between bankers' checks and bills of
exchange; and that the rule adopted with regard to the latter
•did not apply to the former; but on further consideration, I
do not think that that distinction is well founded."
It was
held to be a bill of exchange and to be properly declared on

Ld. Kenyon

says,

the

as such.

It is not payable at any particular place or address
4th.
to the drawee stating his residence.
In the case of Shuttleworth

v.

declared on was in these words,

Stephens,* the instrument

" 2ist

"

October,

1804..

Two months after date pay to the order of John Jenk"
ins £y8, IIS. , value received.
Tlios. Stephens.
'Bailey, 29; Ld. Ray., 1545;

^Bayley, 33; Ld. Ray., 1481;
"7
*

T. R., 423.

I Camp., 407.

6
8

T. R., 123;
Mod., 267.

9

Johns., 217.
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No place of payment or place of residence of any party
is stated in this case or in the case of Boehm v. Sterling, yet
they were held to be properly declared on as bills.
A request

is

it

it

it,

a

if

a

a

it,

to pay the amount of a note written underneath
has been
held to be
bill of exchange.^ The instrument in evidence in
this case might have been declared on as
bill of exchange;
and
so, and
recovery could have been had, then the rule
of law respecting bills applied to
although not declared on
as such; for the law applicable to
cannot be different on
account of the different manner in which
presented in
evidence.

It would

or orders, payable out of ai
particular fund, or upon a contingency, or not payable in
money only, or which are liable to any other objection preventing them from being regarded as bills of exchange, do
not come under the rule of law, that acceptance
prima
facie evidence of effects of the drawer in hand.^
To enable the plaintiff to maintain this suit, he must
rebut the prima facie evidence arising from his acceptance.
new trial granted.
Exceptions sustained, and
^Weston

V.

Penniman,

Wend., 522.
Mason, 306.

i

'Leonard v. Mason,

i

a

is

seem, that requests,

C H A

PT E
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Acceptance.

SECTION

25.

THE DRAWEE OF A BILL OF EXCHANGE IS NOT LIABLE
THEREON UNTIL HE HAS ACCEPTED THE SAME.
SWOPE

V.

ROSS

ET AL.'

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, July
^Reported

in 40 Pa. St., 186; 80 Am.

The Form of Action. — This

25,

D.,

i86i.

567.^

was an action of assumpsit

in the Common Pleas, entered February Term, i860, between
George Ross & Co., plaintiffs, and Swope & Karns, in which

following case was stated for the opinion of the court in
the nature of a special verdict.
Ross Forward gave to Swope & Karns the following
instrument of writing:

the

"

"Somerset, Pa., August i8tli, i8^p.
Ross & Co., Bankers, pay to Swope & Karns,
ninety days from date, six hundred and sixteen
Ross Forivard."

$616.00.
" George

or order,
dollars.

On or about the ist of September thereafter, Swope, one
of the firm of Swope & Karns, delivered this paper (indorsed
Swope & Karns) to the plaintiff's bank, had the same discounted, and received the money thereon less the discount,
$16.40.
At the time this check was given, and when it was discounted at the bank, Ross Forward was one of the firm of
George Ross & Co., but went out on the 19th of September,
1859-

'This case is cited in Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 480,
501; Wood's Byles on B. & N., 406; Bigelow on B. & N., 42,
243; Bigelow's Cases on B. & N., 361; Norton on B. & N., 81,
84, 281; Benjamin's Chalmers Bills of Exchange and Promissor)Notes, 44, S3, 233.
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When the day of payment named in the check came round,
Forward had no funds in the bank, and the paper was regularly protested for non-payment on the 19th of November,
1859.

If

the court be of the opinion that on the above state of
facts the plaintiffs are entitled to recover, the judgment to be
entered in favor of plaintiffs for $616, with interest from November 19th, 1859; otherwise judgment for defendant with
costs.

Notice of dishonor of the bill was admitted in the arThe court below entered judgment for plaintiffs for
gument.
$616, with interest from November 19th,
1859.

Argument of Plaintiff.— The plaintiffs in error, argued

a

it

it

a

,

'3

&

if
If it

&

is

&

If

is,

that the drawee of a check, payable in the future, who discounts
it to the payee before it is payable, is not entitled to recover
the money from the payee on account of the insolvency of the
A check
drawer.
in form and effect,
bill of exchange.
Co. had accepted this check, their liability
George Ross
to pay at maturity would not be questioned, whether the
drawee had funds or not; the acceptor being the principal
debtor.'
Payment before maturity
equally conclusive, and the
bank can only resort to Forward for reimbursement.
As the check was to the order of Swope
Karns, their
indorsement was necessary, of course, and would have been
so
were payable on demand.
they had received the money on this from any other
party than the drawee, their endorsement would have made
them liable on failure of payment by the drawee; but here the
drawee pays the money according to the request of the drawer,
and receives from the holder $16.40 for present payment.
Besides, the drawer was a member of the firm of George Ross
Co. the drawees, so that the doctrine of the court below is,
that a man may draw
check on himself, payable in future,
before maturity, and, on his insolvency, comspeculate on
pel the payee to refund the whole amount.
Argument of Defendant. — The paper in controversy,
not being due, was not presented, for payment, nor did the
to be paid when due, but they did
plaintiffs agree to accept
Kent., 85.
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agree to discount it on defendant's endorsement, as other unThis indorsement by plaintiff, withdue paper is discounted.
out acceptance, waived the acceptance, and guaranteed the

other member of the firm of George Ross & Co., that Forward would pay it at maturity, which having failed to do, the
indorsees become liable.
Although a check is in effect a bill of exchange, it is also
true that bills payable to order are negotiable; and a transfer
by indorsement is similar to making a new bill, the indorser
A blank indorsement is an equivocal
being a new drawer.'
fact, and it is in the power of the holder to use it as an acquittance to discharge the bill, or as an assignment to charge
the indorser.^

Forward,
their own paper.
though a member of the firm of Ross & Co., was as much a
stranger in this transaction as any other person.
Decision. — The question presented by the case stated is
quite novel, and we have not been able to find that it
It was not

a

payment

of

the acceptor of a
Undoubtedly
bill of exchange is the principal debtor, and the drawer and
Of course the acceptor, even after
indorsers are but sureties.
payment, cannot sue either the drawer or indorser of the bill
His payment of the
unless his acceptance was supra protest.
bill extinguishes it; but the case stated finds that the plaintiffs
discounted the bill for the payees before it became payable,
not that they accepted it or paid it.
Discounting a bill,
though it be done by the drawee, is neither acceptance nor
Acceptance is an engagement to pay the bill acpayment.
cording to its tenor and effect ivken it becomes due. A bill is
paid only when there is an intention to discharge and satisfy
In Burbidge v. Manners,' Ld. Ellenborough said "that
it.
even payment of a bill before it became due, does not extinguish it any more than if it were merely discounted," and
added that "payment means payment in due course and not
His lordship evidently thought that disby anticipation."
has

been

'

adjudicated.

I Wheaton's Selwyn, 285.

^2

Id.,

287.

"3 Camp.,

T94.
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counting a bill by a drawee is neither payment nor extinguishment.

In Attenborough

v.

McKenzie/

in the

English Court
it was held that if the acceptor of a bill discounts
he may reissue
so as to charge the drawer; that
will
nothing
discharge the drawer but payment,
e. payment
when due, or payment for the purpse of discharging and satisfying the bill.
Therefore
the acceptor discounts the bill
for the drawer and then indorses
away, the drawer will be
liable upon
to the holder, and the transfer by the drawer to
the acceptor will operate as an indorsement, although, at the
time, the drawer does not intend to transfer by way of indorsement, being under the impression that the bill
discharged
by coming into the hands of the acceptor.
Nor will the payment of the amount less the discount, be deemed a payment
of the bill by the acceptor.
In that case the holder of the
bill took
by indorsement after
was due, from the transferee of the acceptor.
The ruling goes to the length that
even the accepting drawee of a bill may take
as an indorsee,
,

it

it

it

is

it

it

if

i.

it

it,

of Exchequer,

and as such

It

may issue it.

a

it,

it

also decides that he does take
as an indorsee when he discounts it.
Can then the drawee
bill, payable on time, who has discounted
of
maintain an

it

if

it

action on
against the drawer or indorser
be protested
for non-payment and notice be given.?
He is not a party to
the bill until he has accepted it.
Until then, he has not assumed the position of principal debtor, nor undertaken any

His discounting has neither paid
obligation in regard to it.
nor extinguished it, and it is not a promise to pay accordingto its tenor and effect.
Is he precluded from becoming an
indorser by the fact that the bill was directed to him.?
The Drawee May Become

an

Indorser. — It seems well

it,

'36 Eng. Law and Eq., 562.
^Chitty on Bills, 375.
11

it

if

a

it,

settled that the drawee of
bill may accept or pay
supra
protest, for honor of the drawer or indorser, and
he takes
up he stands in the position of an indorsee paying full value forhas the same remedies to which an indorsee would beentitled against all prior parties, and can of course sue the
In such cases the fact that thedrawer or prior indorsers.^
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bill was drawn upon him does not incapacitate him from acNo reason is apparent for
quiring the rights of an indorsee.
a different rule where the drawee becomes the holder by disUncertain whether the
counting the bill before its dishonor.
drawer will put funds into his hands to meet the bill at maturity, he may well refuse to accept, and yet may discount it on
If he does not accept
the credit of both drawer and indorser.
he is as much a stranger to it as any other person discounting
He is but purchasing the conit for the drawer or indorser.
tract, and the contract thus purchased is that the drawee will
pay the bill on presentment, when it shall fall due, or in case
of his failing to do so, that the parties whose names are already
upon it will pay, if due notice of its dishonor be given to
The
The promise is made by the parties to the bill.
them.
purchaser enters into no engagement.
These views accord with the doctrine laid down in Desha
Shephard & Co. v. Steward,^ a case which more closely resem^

6

Alabama, 852.

Acceptance Defined. — An acceptance

is the act, by which
the person, on whom a bill of exchange is drawn, gives his assent
In other words an acto comply with the request of the drawer.
is
an
the
drawee of a bill of exchange to pay
undertaking by
ceptance
2 Bl. Com.,
the same according to its terms.
469; Swope v. Ross,
St.,
Norton
on
Bills
and
Notes,
Pa.
186;
Ellison v. Colling80;
40
It has also been defined "-'as a promise
ridge, 9 B. and C, 570.
to pay a bill of exchange in money when due."
Gallagher v. Nicholas, 60 N. Y., 438 (1875); Ray v. Faulkner,
73 111,, 469 (1874);
Bonnell V. Mawha, 8 Vt, 200; Spear v. Pratt, 2 Hill (N. Y. ),
582.

Form of an Acceptance. — There

is no particular form refor
an
under
the
law
acceptance
quired
merchant.
No form of
words were necessary under the Lex Mercatoria to constitute a
valid acceptance of a bill of exchange.
It was sufficient if the
drawee, in fact, undertook or promised to pay the bill, by any
Coffman v. Campbell, 87 III., 98; Espy v.
form of expression.
Cincinnati First Nat. Bk., 18 Wall., 604.
May be by Parol or in Writing.— Under the law mer{a).
chant an acceptance might be either by parol or in writing; and it
might be upon a separate piece of paper even.
Sturges v. Fourth
Nat. Bk., 75 111., 595; Wilden v. Merchant's Bank, 64 Ala., i;
Miller v. Neihaus, 51 Ind,, 401.
Many of the states now require

See statutes of your state.
acceptance to be in writing.
May be of a Bill not yet Drawn. —So also might there
( b. )
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bles the present than any case we have been able to find.
In
it the Supreme Court of that state ruled that the drawees of
a bill may sue the drawer or indorsers after it has been dis-

honored, even though they obtained the bill before its disbe an acceptance of a bill not yet drawn, and this acceptance
might be either by parol or in writing; and the acceptance would
be binding even though the exact amount of the bill and the time
for payment have not been fixed. Parker v. Greele, 2 Wend., 545;

Ala., 581; Bank of Michigan v. Ely, 17
Wend., 508; Coolidge v. Payson, 2 Wheat., 66; Jones v. Council
Bluffs Bank, 34 111., 313; Burns v. RoUand, 40 Barb., 368; Bank
of Rutland v. Woodruff, 34 Vt., 89; Mason v. Dousay, 35 111.,
424; Sturges V. Fourth Nat. Bk., 75 111., 395; Hall v. First Nat.
A promise to accept a bill not yet drawn may operate as an
Bk.
acceptance if the bill is drawn within a reasonable time, and this
Kennedy

V.

Geddes,

3

is true not only as to the drawer, but as to every party who takes
Plumer v. Lyman, 49 Me.,
the bill on the faith of such promise.
Harrison,
Pa.
St.,
v.
Stevman
49; Riggs v. Linsay, 7
229;
42
It has beenheld
Cranch, 500; McEvers v. Mason, 10 Johns., 207.
that an authority to draw a bill of exchange if the same is particThis authority
ularly described, implies a promise to accept.
must be strictly complied with, however, and be acted upon within a reasonable time. Ulster Bank v. McFarlan, 3 Den. (N. Y.),
553; Naglee v. Lyman, 14 Cal., 450; Beech v. State Bank, 2 Ind.,
488; Gates V. Parker, 43 Me., 544; Burns v. Rowland, 40 Barb.,
Upon the question
368; Spalding V. Andrews, 48 Pa. St., 411.
whether there may be a parol acceptance of a future bill, there is
Kennedy v. Geddes, 8 Port (^Ala. ),
some conflict of authority.
263; Mercantile Bank v. Cox, 38 Me., 500; Plumer v. Lyman, 49

Me., 229; Spalding

v.

Andrews, 48 Pa. St., 411.

May be by Telegram. — An acceptance may also be by
(
)
In re Armstrong, 41 Fed. Rep., 381; North Atchison
telegraph.
(T.

Bank V. Garreston,
Pa. St., 411.
May be
{d.)

51

Fed. Rep., 168; Spalding

v.

Andrews,

48

Implied from the Detention or Destruc-

a Bill. — An acceptance of a bill of exchange may be imacts, such as the detention for a long time, contrary to
from
plied
the usage of the parties under such circumstances as to give credit
Dunavan v. Flynn, ii8 Mass., 537; Storer v. Logan,
to the bill.
Whether a detenMass., 55, 60; Rousch v. Duff, 35 Mo., 312.
9
tion of the bill will amount to an acceptance or not, must depend
A mere detention of the bill
upon the circumstances of the case.
Mason v. Barff,
an
to
acceptance.
not
amount
by the drawee will
for more
the
drawee
detained
is
jby
If the bill
2 B. & Aid., 26.
to
enable
the
than twenty-four hours, or for a period long enough
drawee to ascertain the state of the account between he and the
drawer, the better doctrine is that such detention should be treated

tion of
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it,

honor; and that until acceptance they are strangers to the
and stand in the same conbill, and may acquire rights to
no legal
It was said that there
dition as any other holder.
th^ drawee comes into possession of the hill
presumption

a

it

)

it

it

)

a

a

it

)

a

a

a

7

8

if

is

a

it

2

it

is

it

a

a

non acceptance of the bill and should be protested, when
bill with the drawee for acWhen the holder leaves
necessary.
within
reasonable time,
his duty to call for
ceptance, and
has been accepted or not,
for the purpose of ascertaining whether
the detention, of course, will not amount to an acceptance. Jeune
If the drawee, however, retains the bill
Starkie, 326.
V. Ward,
or not,
and does not notify the holder of his intention to accept
and subsequently destroys it, he will be liable as an acceptor.
Mr.
Jeune v. Ward, supra; Matteson v. Moulton, 11 Hun., 268.
Daniel, in his valuable work on Negotiable Instruments, says.
"As general rule, the mere detention for an unreasonable time
Daniel on Nenot considered as amounting to an acceptance."
This, of course, must depend
gotiable Instruments, Sec. 499a.
upon the circumstances in the particular case or upon the custom
The better doctrine seems to be, in the absence of
of the parties.
the drawee detains the bill for more
any understanding, that
than 24 hours, without indicating his intention to accept, he should
be treated as having refused acceptance and due notice should be
Barb., 396;
Bank v. Bank,
N. Y., 459;
given to the drawer.
Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, Sec. 492.
A Promise to Pay Amounts to an Acceptance. —
(c.)
It has been held that promise to pay a bill at maturity
amounts to an acceptance.
Spaulding v. Andrews, 12 Wright, 411.
bill of exchange with
So also has, the authority "to draw'"
promise to pay the same, been held to be an implied acceptance.
(/. May be Upon the Bill or Upon a Separate Paper. —
The acceptance may be written upon the bill itself, either upon its
back or upon its face, or
may be upon
separate piece of paper.
If upon
separate piece of paper, the language indicating the
acceptance must be clear and unequivocal and should clearly
point out the particular instrument accepted.
Need Not be Dated.
The acceptance need not be
(g.
It may be before
has been signed by the drawer or
dated.
It may be before or after maturity.
afterward.
It may also be
before or after dishonor.
The drawee may accept
after he has
once refused to accept or pay the same.
Need Not be Accepted When Drawer and Drawee
(/;.
as

are the Same Person, Corporation, or

Partnership. — No

a

is

a

i

is

a

a

bill of exchange drawn, by person or corformal acceptance of
poration upon himself or itself,
necessary, the act of drawing
deemed
an
being
acceptance.
Hasey v. White Pigeon Co.
So also will the act of drawing
Doug. (Mich.), 193.
bill by
one partner, in his own name, on the firm of which he
mem-
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previous to its dishonor, that he takes it with the obligation
to accept.
Such being in our opinion the law, it was not error that
for the use of the partnership, in law amount to an acceptance by the drawer in behalf of the firm.
Dougal v. Chowles, 5
her,

Day (Conn.), 511.
States Require the Acceptance to be in
(?'. ) Some
—
Writing. At common law the acceptance might be either by
parol or in writing, but many of the states have by statute provided that no acceptance shall be good unless the same shall be
It has been held that an acceptance may be
reduced to writing.
and
that this form of acceptance is sufficient to
made by telegram
comply with the statutes requiring the acceptance to be in writing;
Central
a telegram standing upon the same footing as a letter.
Savings Bank v. Richards, 109 Mass., 414; Nevada Bank v. Luce,
98; Lindley v.
87
139 Mass., 488; Coffman v. Campbell,
Bk.,
Brinkman
v.
Hunter, 73 Mo., 172;
First Nat.
76 Iowa, 630;
First Nat. Bank v. Clark, 61 Md., 401; Molson's Bank v. How-

III,

ard, 40 N. Y. Sup. Ct., 15.
— The usual
{J. ) The General Method of Acceptance.
mode of making an acceptance is by writing the word "accepted"
upon the face of the bill and subscribing the drawee's signature.
If it is payable after sight, the date of the acceptance should be
It has been held that the drawee's name alone, written
given also.
upon the face or any part of the bill, would be a sufficient acceptance; so also has the word "accepted," "presented," "seen,"
"honored," or a direction to a third person to pay, or the day of
will pay this bill," have all been held to be a
the month, or
good acceptance even though such statement was not signed.
Powell V. Monnier, i Atk., 611; Dufaur v. Oxenden, i M. & R.,
90; Spear v. Pratt, 2 Hill, 582; Ward v. Allen, 2 Mete. (Mass. ), 53;
Cook V. Baldwin, 120 Mass., 317, where the signed statement
take notice of the above," was held to be an acceptance; Brannin
will see the with12 B. Mon. (Ky.), 61, where
V. Henderson,
Any
in paid eventually," was held to be a good acceptance.
intenwhich
an
from
words,
of
form
of
use
any
statement or the
tion to accept can be inferred, will amount to an acceptance.
What Bills Must be Presented for Acceptance.—
All bills of exchange need not be presented for acceptance. None
need be presented for acceptance unless they are payable after
All bills of exsight or a certain number of days after demand.
are payable at
unless
they
change may be presented for acceptance
reimbursement
for
The holder can not look to the drawer
sight.
until after the bill has been presented for acceptance or payment
to the drawee unless such presentment has been excused.
The Liability of the Drawer.— The drawer's liability is a

"I

"I

"I

conditional one, depending:
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the Court of Common Pleas gave judgment for the plaintiff
The fact is not distinctly found that
upon the case stated.

notice of dishonor of the bill was dulvgiven to the defendants,
ist

Upon presentment for acceptance or demand of pay-

ment, and
2d.
Upon receiving due notice of a failure to accept, or to
pay the bill at maturity.
The drawee by accepting the bill, assumes the same liability as
that of a maker of a promissory note — being the principal debtor.
Wallace v. McConnell, 13 Pet., 136.
If, however, the bill is payable at a particular time after date,
Commercial Bank v.
presentment for acceptance is unnecessary.

Perry,

10

Rob. (La.),

61.

It is always sufficient to present a bill for payment at maturity.
Varieties of Acceptances — Defined. — There are but two
general kinds of acceptances: (i) Absolute or general, and (2)

Conditional or qualified.
The various authors upon negotiable
instruments have given other kinds of acceptances depending
largely upon the method of acceptance.
They mention express,
verbal,
local,
virtual,
and
written.
implied,
partial,
(a.) Absolute Acceptance — Defined. — An absolute acceptance is one by which the drawee promises to pay the bill
according to its tenor.

Acceptance — Defined.
{b.) Conditional
acceptance is one where the drawee promises
according to some condition imposed.

— A conditional
to pay the

bill

Effect of a Conditional Acceptance.— If the holder
accepts a conditional acceptance, he thereby releases all prior
parties from liability unless they assent to such conditional acceptance in some way.
An express acceptance may be either absolute or unconditional.
It is usually indicated by writing the words "Accepted," or
"Seen," "Honored," or
will pay the bill," or "A direction to
some third person to pay the bill," or any statement either verbally or in writing by which the drawee indicates his intention to
accept and pay the bill.
Phillips v. Frost, 19 Me., 77; Spear v.
Pratt, 2 Hill, 582; Cook v. Baldwin, 120 Mass., 317.
But in Iowa it was held that the statement " Kiss my foot,"
signed by the drawee, was a rejection of the bill.
Norton v.

"I

Knapp, 64 la., 112.

It

has been repeatedly held that any word or statement by the
drawee which does not in itself negative the request to accept,
may be treated as a valid acceptance.
Dufaur v. Oxenden, 1

Moody & R.

,

90.

Implied Acceptance — Defined.— An implied

acceptance is
any act on the part of the drawee which clearly indicates an intention on his part to comply with the request of the drawer.
This
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but it was conceded on the argument that such was the fact,
and that such is the meaning of the case stated.
The judgment is affirmed.
act may be either in words or conduct in the absence of statutory
Anderson v. First National Bank, 2 Fed. Rep., 125;
regulations.

McCutchen v. Rice, 56 Miss., 455.
The implied acceptance may arise from

is

a

is

is

is

is

a

it,

a detention or a
destruction of the bill or from some other unwarranted use of it.
If the drawee, however, destroys a bill after he has notified the
drawer or holder that he would not accept
such destruction
will not amount to an acceptance.
Hall v. Steel, 68 111., 231;
Dunavan V. Flynn, 118 Mass., 537.
It has been held that
part payment of the bill would not
an
in
amount to
writing. Cook v. Baldwin, 120 Mass.,
acceptance
317; Bank of Rutland v. Woodruff, 34 Vt., 89.
A detention of the bill may or may not amount to an implied
said at the time the
acceptance, depending upon: ist — What
bill
left with the drawee, and 2nd, the custom between the
Chitty on Bills, 334.
parties.
Local Acceptance— Defined. —A local acceptance, may be
made payable at some pareither absolute or conditional, but
ticular place. Troy City Bank v. Lauman, 19 N. Y., 477.
Partial Acceptance — Defined. —Pi. partial acceptance one
part of the amount of
where the drawee undertakes to pay but
the bill.
Petit V. Benson, Comberbach (1697), 452.
a
Virtual Acceptance — Defined. — A virtual acceptance

mere promise to accept.
a

Acceptance — When Excused. — The presentment for acbill of exchange will be excused under the following
ceptance of
circumstances: —
a

b.

is is

dead; or
Where the drawee
fictitious person; or
Where the drawee
or
absconded;
has
drawee
c.
Where the
cannot be found.
the
drawee
d.
Where after due diligence
An irregular presentment will be held good where the drawee
refuses to accept upon other ground.
a.

PETIT
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26.

AN ACCEPTANCE SHOULD BE ABSOLUTE AND IDENTICAL
WITH THE TENOR OF THE BILL. A PARTIAL, CONDI-

TIONAL OR QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE WILL RENDER
THE PARTIES TO SUCH AN ACCEPTANCE LIABLE ACCORDING TO THE TERMS OF THEIR ACCEPTANCE.
PETIT V. BENSON. 1
Trinity Term, 1697.
\_Reported in

Coviberbach,

452.

]

A bill was drawn upon the defendant, who accepted it by
indorsement, in this manner:
"I do accept this bill to be
And the question was,
paid, half in money and half in bills."
whether there could be a qualification of an acceptance; for it
was alleged that this writing upon the bill was sufficient to
'

This case is cited in Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, Sec.
5(6; Story on Bills of Exchange, 239; Ames on Bills and
Notes, 146.
Benjamin's Chalmers on Bills, Notes and Checks,
51; Norton on B. and N., 84.
508,

In

the case of Wegerfloffe v. Keene, (i Strange, 214), Strange
" This was an action upon the case
attorney for defendant said:
upon the custom of merchants brought by the person to whom a
foreign bill of e.xchange is made payable, against the acceptor.
The declaration set forth, that one James Collet, being a merchant
residing in Christiana in Norway, according to the custom of merchants drew his first bill of exchange upon the defendant, requesting him to pay the plaintiff such first bill (his second not being
paid) of 127/. iSj-. 4(2'. which bill was afterwards, viz., December
9th, 1717, shown to the defendant, who accepted to pay 100/, upon
the 8th day of February following, by virtue whereof he became
chargeable, et in consideratione inde eisdem die et anno ultimo supradictis super se assumpsit, to pay the same on the said 8th day
of February tunc prox' sequentem, which he has not done accordThere is likewise a count for monies had
ing to his undertaking.
and received, and an insimul computassent.
The defendant as to
two
those
counts pleads non assumpsit, and as to the count upon
the bill, he pleads, that the said James Collet drew another bill for
100/ only, wherein he countermands the payment of the odd 27/.
i8j-. 4^'. by virtue whereof the defendant paid the 100/ in satisfaction of the first bill, and the plaintiff accordingly received it in
satisfaction.
The ■^XsSraAH protestando that the defendant did not
pay it in satisfaction; for plea saith, that he never received it in
satisfaction.
And to this replication the defendant demurs.
I shall not trouble the court with an
Strange pro defendente.
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But it was proved by divers

exception which has formerly been taken to these replications, that
the payment in satisfaction has been admitted, the traverse of the
acceptance is immaterial; for I am sensible, it has been adjudged
to be well enough in the case of Young v. Ruddle, Salk., 627, and
of Hawshaw v. Rawlings, in this court, upon the ground, that
there can be no payment in satisfaction, without an acceptance in
satisfaction; and therefore a traverse of the acceptance is an argumentative denial of the payment; for if the plaintiff did not accept
it in satisfaction, the consequence of that is, that it was not paid
in satisfaction.
Laying therefore the plea and replication aside, I shall take
up the case as it stands upon the declaration, and upon that, offer
some things distinctly, both as to the matter, and as to the manner
of it.
As to the matter of it, the case is no more than this; the person to whom a foreign bill of exchange is made payable, brings his
action against the drawee, upon a partial acceptance for so much
of it as he undertook to pay, and counts upon the custom of merchants.
The single point which will arise upon this case is, whether a
partial acceptance be good or not within the custom of merchants.
And I shall endeavor to prove, that this acceptance is a void acceptance, and consequently the plaintiff has no cause of action.
That I may not be misunderstood when I call this a void acceptance, I would premise, that I do not mean, it is so absolutely
void as to exclude any remedy against the acceptor, for I must admit, that this acceptance will create a contract between the parties,
But what I
upon which an action upon the case would have laid.
within
the cusis
a
void
acceptance
this
shall insist upon is, that
his
case;
founded
has
tom of merchants, upon which the plaintiff
whatever
and if it be void within the custom of merchants, then,
effect it would have as a private contract between the parties, will
be a matter foreign to the present question, in as much as the plaintiff has not relied on it as such, but has brought his action upon
the custom.
I have inquired into the practice of merchants in this case,
but have not been able to get any certain account of this matter.
The true reason of which I apprehend to be, that it is a case
which seldom or never happens amongst merchants, for they
honor one another's bills, though there are no effects of the
drawer in their hands; and they would esteem it the greatest
blemish that could be cast upon them, if their correspondent should
once refuse to answer their bills any further than they had effects

in his hands.
What account

have received, I shall submit to the court.
Some are of opinion, that an acceptance for part is an acceptance
for the whole, in as much as it deprives the party of the benefit 3 i
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merchants that the custom amon^ them was quite otherwise,
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protesting, and so resorting back to the drawer. But I apprehend
To say that because commonly
there is no reason at all for this.
a man does honor another's bill beyond what effects he has in his
For
hands, that therefore he must do it, is a strange conclusion.
suppose he has but 20/. of the drawer in his hands, and is bound
to answer a bill for so much; it would be highly unreasonable, that
in case the other should draw for 10,000/. this man must either pay
of
the whole, or subject himself to an action for non-performance
the condition.
But if this notion should prevail, that an acceptance for part
is an acceptance for the whole; yet as on the one hand it charges
the acceptor with the entire sum, so on the other hand it discharges
him of this action.
For then there can be no color to split the
demand into two actions, but the plaintiff, in declaring for part
Salk., 65.
ought to show, that the rest is satisfied.
Others are of opinion, that the party ought not to have taken
this acceptance, but protested the bill as to the whole, and sent
for another to the value of what the drawee would answer. This
likewise makes for the acceptor the defendant.
I am informed indeed, there is one gentleman who does
attend to say, that this matter has happened in his own experience;
but he, by what I find, is alone in that opinion, and perhaps may
not have considered the consequences of it.
As there is this diversity of opinions upon a matter which seldom or never comes in practice, I shall take it upon the reason of
the thing, with a view likewise to the many inconveniences which
will follow as a consequence of establishing this partial acceptance.
The better to come at this, it may not be improper to state
When the party to whom
the method of transacting these affairs.
he immediately apa bill of exchange is made payable receives
the
drawee
to
his
to
he
get
acceptance:
accepts it, nothing
plies
done till the day of payment, and then
further
be paid the
end.
at an
But
the drawee will not accept
matter
then the
to protest the bill, and send back the protest by the next
party
post. When the time of payment comes, he tenders the bill again, and
or refuse it:
then the drawee may either pay
he refuses it, then
second protest for non-payment, and the bill itself
there
rehe accepts
and afterwards refuses to pay
turned. And so
would infer, that there can be no partial proFrom all this
it.
am informed
test for non-acceptance, which as
protest not
in the memory of any but one of the notaries public.
The words
exhibited the original bill to the person to whom
of all protests are;
directed, and demanded his acceptance thereof.
Now an acceptnot an acceptance thereof, no more than payment
ance of part
of part
book which goes by
payment of the whole. There
the name of "Advice Concerning Bills of Exchange " and
esteemed amongst those who are most conversant in these affairs.
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And in fol 33, of that book it is said, that nothing but an acceptance to pay secundum tenorem billce can deprive the party of the
And in fol. 16 of the same book he puts the
benefit of a protest.
case of a bill drawn on A. and B., who are not joint-traders, and
an acceptance by one only: this says he goes for nothing, and the
These are
party must protest the bill as in case of no acceptance.
the words of the book: and by putting the case of two who are not
joint- traders, I should apprehend he means, that each being charged
with a moiety, the acceptance of one is but an acceptance to pay a

moiety, which is but a partial acceptance, and therefore void: and
this is explained by the case of Pinkney v. Hall, (Salk., 126), where
one joint trader accepted a bill, and it was held to be the acceptance of both, because both were equally liable to pay the whole.
And to this purpose likewise, is Molloy de Jure Maritime in the
chapter concerning bills of exchange.
If there can be no protest for non-acceptance of part, I would
consider how the case would stand in regard to allowing this partial acceptance: the natural and plain consequence of that will be,
to put it in the power of the drawee, to defeat the other of the
benefit of protesting a bill for 10,000/. by his acceptance to pay
one penny only; for this I would submit, that if the party may take
such an acceptance, he must take it: if it will be good, he cannot
refuse it, for it is not at his election to charge the drawer but upon
the other's default; the drawee is the person to whom he must first
resort, and if he refuses, then and not till then, is there a proper
remedy against the drawer; and therefore in the action against the
drawer the plaintiff must show a protest, which is an endeavor to
Salk., 131.
receive the money of the drawer.
But even admitting there may be a partial protest for non-acceptance, yet the inconveniences which will follow of course are
so great, that I hope it shall never be established by the judgment

a

is

it,

it,

of the court.
It would be endless to put cases where it has been held, that
rent-charges and the like cannot be apportioned; and therefore I
shall rely entirely upon the reason of the thing, that in this case
the contract between the drawer and the person to whom the bill is
By this contract the drawer
payable is entire and not divisible.
himself to an action if
(and consequently the indorser) subjects
the money be not paid at the time: but though he becomes liable to
one action, yet there is no reason, that by transactions between the
he is
party to whom the bill is payable, and the drawee, to which
not privy, this contract should be branched out into several actions,
which will unavoidably be the case of every partial acceptance; for
I do not apprehend how this can be reduced to one action by rebefusing this partial acceptance: and protesting for the whole;
take
he must
cause (as I observed before) if the party may take
default in
there
than
farther
no
and can charge the drawer
the drawee.
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it in part. But

As therefore two actions are the tewest he can be charged
with, I would beg leave to instance how he may be charged with a
The acceptor will charge him as far as his undertakgreat many.
ing: then another for the honor of the drawer (as is usual amongst
the same reamerchants) may undertake for another part, and by
it shall stop:
where
can
no
say
body
son a third, and a fourth, and
so many different persons may accept for so many different
pence, and every one of these has his distinct remedy against the
drawer.
This is too great an inconvenience to be got over; and it is
such an inconvenience (I mean the multiplicity of suits) as the
In the case of
common law has always endeavored to meet with.
Hawkins v. Cardee, Salk., 65, it was held, that the indorsee of part
could have no action, because says Ld. C. J. Holt, the drawer having only subjected himself to one action, it cannot be divided so
If the grantee of a rent charge levies a
as to subject him to two.
fine of part, the conusee cannot compel an attornment, for that
So if a feoffment
would be to give two actions against the tenant.
were made to a man and his heirs with warranty, and he makes a
If two take lands jointly
feoffment to two, the warranty is gone.
with warranty, and one makes a feoffment: the warranty is gone to
him, but remains as to his companion, so as he may vouch for a
moiety; and at common law if they had made partition, the warAnd all this goes upon that
Co. Lift., 187a.
ranty was lost.
that
it
res
inter
alios
acta, it shall not turn to the
being
ground,
of
a
third
But
this
partial acceptance is a matter
prejudice
person.
transacted between mere strangers; and therefore shall not hurt the
drawer, who was no party to it.
No act of theirs, which would be
prejudicial to him, shall bind him. But the subjecting him to several actions will be a prejudice; therefore he shall not be subjected
to several actions.
The great benefit arising to the public from these bills is, their
being negotiable and passing about as money; for everybody is
sensible, that without the assistance of these bills our trade could
never be carried on for want of sufficient specie; not to mention
the trouble and danger in returning money, which is avoided by
this expedient.
It is this benefit which the public receives from
these bills, that has entitled them to all the favor they have received, of which innumerable instances might be given
For this
reason it has been held, that the bare drawing or accepting a bill,
Makes a merchant for that purpose,
i Salk., 125; Show., 125; 2
Vent., 295. Now if what is contended for on the other side should
prevail, the public will be deprived of this great benefit; for no
man will take this bill as so much money in the way of trade, when
he is to resort to one man for one part, and perhaps send out of
the kingdom for the other to a place where he has no correspondent.
In the case of Jocelyn v. Laserre, which was in this court.
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I93;

and

Ann. rot.,

214), where the bill was to pay (?«^ <?/ ?;;)'
growing subsistence, it was held, that in this regard, his growing
subsistence might never amount to the sum drawn for, therefore
this was not a bill of exchange within the custom of merchants,
for nobody would take it upon such a contingency.
And the cases
notes
since
the
statute
have
of promissory
gone upon the same
Smith v. Roheme (Mich., i Geo. in B. R.), which was
reason.
And the case of
to pay money or surrender a man to prison.
Appleby v. Biddle (B. R. HiL, 3 Geo.), which was to pay so
much to A. if I do not pay so much to B., and both these were
held not to be within the statute, upon that only reason that they
were not negotiable.
Another inconvenience which naturally occurs upon this occasion is, that the drawee will insist to have the whole bill delivered
For according to the authors
up, when he pays but a part only.
who treat of this subject, he can never charge the drawer, when
they come to make up their accounts, with more than he has
In Lex Mercatoria,
vouchers for under the hand of the drawer.
274, it is said, that if the bill be lost, the drawee cannot justify
And this refutes
the payment, though he has a letter of advice.
or
a
special receipt for
giving
all the expedients of indorsing part,
so much, because in neither of those cases will the drawee have
If the
any authority to produce under the hand of the drawer.
drawer then refuses to allow what the other has paid, his only
remedy will be to bring his action; and how he will be able to
maintain it upon the custom of merchants, I must confess myself
at a loss to find out, for he will want the necessary evidence to
maintain such an action, which is the bill itself that was drawn
upon him.
If this then will be the case, where he pays the money without
taking up the bill; I must contend that by all the rules of prudence
and justice he may insist to have the whole bill delivered up to
him, when he only pays part of it according to his acceptance.
Supposing him then in possession of the whole bill, I would
consider in what a condition we have left the party to whom it was
He must be supposed to have advanced a conmade payable.
sideration adequate to the whole sum, and consequently is in jusIt will be
tice entitled to his whole money of somebody or other.
said, that he may get what he can of the drawee, and then go
It is true he may do so, and the
back to the drawer for residue.
honor as to pay him every
much
drawer may be a man of so
But what must he do when he finds he is mistaken in
farthing.
his man: when the drawer (instead of ordering him the money as
he expected) shall tell him, "No, you have nothing to produce
under my hand, and if you have been so foolish as to deliver up
I know of no remedy
the bill, you must take it for your pains."
disease, and therethe
in this case but what would be worse than
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protest it so as to charge the first drawer; and though therebe
tore the most prudent thing he can do will be to sit down by the
loss.

And this will be so far from being a trick in the drawer, that
For if
it will be no more than what every prudent man will do.

upon the report of what has been done he should advance the
residue of the money, yet still there is a bill standing out against
him for the whole, upon which bill it cannot appear he has paid
the money which the drawee had left unpaid. And whether in that
case he would not afterwards be answerable for the whole, may be
proper to be considered.
I have now done with what I had to offer in maintenance of
the negative of the question I proposed to speak to, and shall
therefore proceed to take notice of what was hinted at upon the
former argument in behalf of the plaintiff in this case.
It was said that the drawee may (and very often does) accept
to pay the money at a different time from what is appointed in the
bill. I must admit he may do so, but surely that case can bear
It is not liable to any of the inconno proportion to this case.
veniences I mentioned; it is the same as if the bill had at first
given him a longer time, and it is well known that after acceptance
a month or two will break no squares where the man is good; with
this further, that amongst merchants such an acceptance is esteemed a general acceptance to pay the money according to the
Besides, Molloy says, that in such a case the
tenor of the bill.
bill must be protested, which cannot be done in our case.
It was further urged to be highly reasonable, that the drawee
I admit this to be
should honor the bill as far as he had effects.
and
it
would
not
been
reasonable,
have
perhaps
impossible for the
plaintiff to have declared in such a manner, as to have charged the
defendant to the amount of his acceptance; but we are here upon
the custom of merchants, and whatever might be reasonable in
case of private property, will cease to be so, when it appears to be
pregnant of so many inconveniences to the public as I have menAnd if the plaintiff has it in his power to frame a case
tioned.
wherein he may do himself justice, that makes the argument
stronger against suffering him to break in upon the public convenience for his private benefit.
The policy of the law is, rather to
one
man
suffer, than to introduce a general inconvenience: but
let
here we are to be led into the greatest inconveniences,
even in a
case where there is no danger of the party's suffering in the least;
for he has a remedy, which stands clear of all these inconveniences, and there will be no harm in leaving him to that.
It was said, that if the drawer (who is supposed to know what
effects he has in the other's hands) by drawing for more, subjects
himself to several actions, it is his own fault.
The answer to this
is, that the very drawing for more, destroys the presumption that
he knew how accounts stood.
But amongst merchants, as I ob-
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served before, that is not the case, for they often honor one another's bill, where there are no effects at all.
But even admitting that, the drawer does not stand altogether
clear of this objection, yet still this may be the case of one who
cannot be supposed to know how the accounts stood between the
drawer and the drawee: for it may happen this bill may be indorsed, and then the indorser is to be charged in the same manner
The indorser will be liable to several actions,
as the drawer.
though he is in no ways privy to any of the transactions between
the indorsee and the drawee.
Upon breaking the case upon the former argument a difference
was taken between the case of the acceptor and that of any other
person: that he should not come and discharge himself against his
own acceptance, whatever the other might have done as to refusing
this partial acceptance.
If this was his case only, it might be reasonable to extend this acceptance as far as it will go; but the hardship is, that what is law in his case, must likewise be law in the
so that here are two innocent
case of the drawer and indorser;
persons who are to be involved in the same common fate; and that
is never to be suffered, especially when the drawee may be charged
in another name, which will not affect the drawer or indorser.
But if this partial acceptance should be thought good within
the custom of merchants: yet the plaintiff can never recover in
this action, in regard to the manner in which he has declared.

a Partial or Condiis entitled to an absoto give such an
refuses
drawee
If
the
lute acceptance of the bill.
for
non-acceptance and
acceptance, the holder may protest the bill
look to the drawer for payment. Wintermute v. Post, 24 N. J. L.,
420; Gibson v. Smith, 75 Ga., 33; Stevens v. Water Co., 62 Me.,
498; Wallace v. Douglas, 116 N. C., 659; i Daniel on Neg. Inst.,
sec. 509; Boehm v. Garcias, i Camp., 425; Shaver v. Western

The Payee or Holder May Refuse
tional Acceptance. — The payee or holder

Y., 459; Green v. Raymond, 9 Neb., 298.
Antecedent Parties are Discharged by a Qualified or
Conditional Acceptance. — When the payee or holder of a bill
Union Tel. Co.,

57

N.

of exchange accepts a qualified or conditional acceptance, he
thereby releases all prior parties unless he can secure their assent
Rowe v. Young, 2 B. & B., 165; Walker v.
to such an acceptance.
Mod., 190; Russell v. Phillips, 14 Q. B., 900; EdAtwood,
wards on Bills, 429; Story on Bills, 272; Daniel on Neg. Inst.,
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AN ACCEPTANCE MUST BE BY THE DRAWEE. A STRANGER
DOES NOT BECOME AN ACCEPTOR BY THE
ACCEPTANCE OF A BILL OF EXCHANGE.
DAVIS

V.

CLARKE."

In Court of Queen's Bench,
S^Reporied in 6 Adolphus

6-=

Ellis, N. S., i6;

51 Eng.,

C.

L.,

1S43.

6 Queen's Bench,

i6;
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The Form of Action. — Assumpsit. The first count stated
that "one John Hart," on the 8th day of March, 1838,
" made his bill of exchange in writing and directed the same
to the defendant, and thereby required the defendant to pay
to him or his order lOO/. ," value received, at twelve months

after date, which had elapsed before the commencement, etc. ;
" and the defendant then accepted the said bill, and the said
John Hart then indorsed the same to plaintiff;" averment of
notice to defendant, promise by him to pay plaintiff, and that
he did not pay.
There was also a count on an account stated.
The first plea denied the acceptance; the second the
promise; the third alleged a discharge of the defendant by the
Insolvent Debtor's Court.
The replication joined issue on the first two pleas, and
traversed the discharge alleged in the third; on which traverse
issue was joined.
On the trial, before Parke, B., at the Essex Summer assizes, 1843, a written paper, in the following terms, was given
in evidence on behalf of the plaintiff.
This case is cited in Story on Bills of Exchange, 35, 58, 121,
254; Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 97, 98, 362, 485, 486;
Wood's Byles on Bills and Notes, 158, 300; Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, 15, 219, 228; Bigelow on Bills and Notes, 37; Bigelow's Cases on Bills and Notes, 45; Paige's Illustrative Cases on
Commercial Paper, 43; Benjamin's Chalmers, Bills, Notes and
'

Checks, 48.
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"

'' London, 8th March,
£100.
1838.
' '
Twelve months after date pay to me or my order one
hundred fotmds, value received.
" To Mr.
Hart."
John Hart.

John

Across the face of this instrument was written the following:

"Accepted.

"H. J.

Clarke.
paj'able at 319 Strand."
This writing across the face was proved to be the defendant's handwriting.
No other evidence being produced, the learned baron directed a non-suit.
In Michaelmas term, 1843, Petersdorffl
obtained a rule nisi for a new trial.

"

The Claim of Defendant.— The defendant

has not

accepted the dill described in the declaration: the instrument
produced is indeed no bill of exchange.
In Gray v. Milner,^ where the instrument was not addressed to any one, but
had only a place of payment added, and in other respects resembled the document here proved, the acceptor was held hable, as having admitted himself, by the acceptance, to be the
party pointed out by the place of payment.
Here the drawer
addresses himself; and the instrument more nearly resembles
a promissory note.
It may be that the defendant might have
been sued as a surety.

The Claim of Plaintiff. — This principle

ner,'' applies.

The defendant, by his acceptance,

self from disputing his own character

Milestops him-

of Gray v.

and the nature of theWalter,^
In Polhill v.
indeed, it was said that na
instrument.
one could be liable as acceptor, unless he were the person towhom the bill was addressed, or an acceptor for honor.
But
the question of acceptance in this form was not then distinctly
Here it may be contended that the defendbefore the court.
ant identifies himself as the person addressed under the nameThe judge at nisi prius was requested, but reof John Hart.
fused, to allow an amendment, by calling the instrument a
'
2

12

8
8

Taunt., 739.

Taunt,

739.
114.

'3 B. & Ad.,
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promissory note made by the defendant; the writing the name
was a new making, according to the principle of Penny v. Innes.

'

authority, either in the English law or the general law merchant, for holding a party to
We
be Hable as acceptor upon a bill addressed to another.
must take it on this instrument that the defendant is different

The Decision.— There

is no

Polhill v. Walter, ^
from the party to whom it is addressed.
and Jackson v. Hudson^ are authorities showing that the deIn Jackson v. Hudfendant here cannot be sued as acceptor.
son, Lord Ellenborough treated an acceptance by a party not
addressed as "contrary to the usage and custom of merchants."
No

In
previous case seems to be exactly like this.
Jackson v. Hudson,* there was one acceptance by the party to
whom the bill was addressed, prior to the acceptance by the
In Gray v. Milner, no* party was named in the
defendant.
address; and I must say that the decision in that case appears
It may
to me to go to the extremity of what is convenient.
be considered as having been decided on the ground that the
acceptance was not inconsistent with the address, so that the
acceptor might be deemed to have admitted himself to be the
But here another person, the drawer himparty addressed.
I do not know that a party
self, is named in the address.
may not address a bill to himself, and accept, though the
Then it is said that the
proceeding would be absurd enough.
defendant is estopped: but that cannot be supported where
the instrument shows, on its face, that he cannot be the
acceptor.

The only question is, whether the defendant is such an
acceptor as is described in the declaration; that is of a bill of
No doubt this can be so only
directed to him.
where he is the drawee; but here the bill is not addressed to
exchange

I C. M. & R., 439; S. C, 5 Tyrwh., 107; he referred also to
Jackson v. Hudson, 2 Camp., 447.
Ad., 114.
^3 B. &
'

^

*2

Camp., 447.
Camp., 447.

*8

Taunt., 739.

2
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defendant at all.
This is therefore not an acceptance
within the custom of merchants.
The safe course is to adhere to the mercantile rule that

the

made only by the party addressed, or for
Here the last is not pretended; and the first can

an acceptance can
his honor.

be

If the John Hart addressed is different
not be presumed.
from the John Hart who draws, there is still no acceptance;
the same, then the instrument is a promissory note and

if

not a

bill of

Rule.

exchange.
Discharged.'

'

May V. Kelly, 27 Ala., 497; Keenan v. Nash., 8 Minn., 409;
V. Lockridge, 8 Bush., 425.
If the Name of the Drawee is Left Blank the Acceptance May be by a Stranger. — It has been held, in cases

Smith

where the name of the drawee is left blank, that a stranger to the
bill may fill the blank with his own name and accept the bill.
Gray v. Milner, 8 Taunton, 739; Wheeler v. Webster, i E. D.

i; i Parson's B. & N., 289.
An Acceptance by a Member of a Partnership Binds
the Firm. — An acceptance by a member of a partnership of a
Smith,

bill drawn upon the firm will bind all. Mason v. Rumsey, i
But see contra
Camp., 384; Tolman v. Hannahan, 44 Wis., 133.
See also Rumsey v. Briggs, 139
Herman v. Nash, 8 Minn., 407.
N.

Y.,

323.

Where

All Should

a

Drawn Upon Two or More Jointly
—
Accept. Where a bill is drawn upon two or more,

Bill

is

jointly, they must all join in the acceptance. If any of the joint
parties refuse to accept the bill should be protested for non-acceptIf any of the joint parties do accept they will be bound.
ance.
Smith V. Milton, 133 Mass., 369; Chitty on Bills, 73, 321.
Acceptance May be by an Agent. — Of course an acceptance may be by an agent if he has proper authority to act for
Daniel Neg. Inst., 487; Byles on Bills and Notes,
his principal.
i Esp., 269; Sternan v. Harrison, 42
113; Richards v. Barton,
Pa. St., 49; Moeise v. Knapp, 30 Ga., 942; Goodrich v. DeForrest, 15 Johnson, 6.
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UNTIL DELIVERY,
INCOMPLETE
EITHER ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE, AND MAY BE
REVOKED*
IS

ACCEPTANCE

COX ET AL.

In the King's Bench,
{Reported in 5 Barnwell

6^

V.

TROY.i

Hilary

Alderson,

Term,

4J4;

7

1822.

Eng. C. L., 260.

The Form of Action. — Assumpsit upon

a

j

bill of ex-

change, for 938/., dated the 20th day of May, 1820, drawn by
Stephen and James Roch, upon the defendant and W. T.

a

it,

Robarts, since deceased, by the names and firm of Messrs.
W. T. Robarts & Co., London, payable 61 days after sight
to Michael Murphy, and indorsed by him to the plaintiffs, and
alleged to have been accepted by the defendant and W
Tierney Robarts, payable at Messrs. Robarts, Curtis & Co.
The first count stated these facts, and a presentment for payment when due, and refusal to pay at Messrs. Robarts, CurThe second count was on a general acceptance;
tis & Co.
and the third was special, stating that the bill was delivered
to the defendant and W. T. Robarts, to determine within a
reasonable time, whether or not they would accept the same:
and that they promised to take due care of the same, and
return the same without defacing or spoiling
which they
do,
did not
but returned the same bill in
defaced and inThe declaration also contained the usual money
jured state.
Plea,
counts.
general issue.
The cause was tried at the
a

sittings after Trinity term, 1821, before Abbott, C. J., when
verdict was found for the plaintiffs, subject to the following
case: —

*Dunavan v. Flynn,

'

is

2

J.

118 Mass., 537; Trent Tile Co. v. Fort
L.,
N.
Fort Dearborn v. Carter, 152 Mass.,
33;
54
Stark, 326; Lindsay v. Price,
34; Jeune V. Ward,
33 Tex., 280!
'This case
cited in Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 63,
490. 493; Wood's Byles on Bills and Notes, 253, 314; Story on
Bills of Exchange, 252; Benjamin's Chalmers on Bills, Notes and
Checks, 61; Chitty on Bills, 308, 243, 296; Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, 34, 221, 250; Ames on Bills and Notes, 209; Norton on Bills and Notes, 70, 90, 95; Randolph on
Commercial
Paper, 88, 334.

Dearborn,
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admitted on the trial, that the bill of exchange
mentioned in the declaration was drawn by Messrs. T. &
J.
Roch on the defendant and W. T. Robarts, since deceased,
as stated in the declaration,
and that the same was duly
indorsed to the plaintiffs by the payee. The plaintiffs in London received the bill from Cork, on the 24th of May, 1820;
and on the same day their clerk, by their directions, left it
for acceptance at the defendant's counting-house in Old Broad
street, London, in the usual way.
He did not call for it until
Saturday, the 27th of May, upon which day one of the defendant's clerks delivered back the bill of exchange to him
without any observations being made at the time.
The words
"24th May, 1820, at Messrs. Robarts, Curtis & Co." (signed)
" W. T. Robarts & Co." were written upon the bill by the
defendant, or some one authorized by him, whilst the same
was in his custody: and the jury found by their verdict that
the defendant and the said W. T. Robarts did accept the bill
of exchange: but at the time the clerk re-delivered the bill of
exchange to the clerk of the plaintiffs, the words " 24th May,
1820, at Messrs. Robarts, Curtis & Co., W. T. Robarts &
Co.," were inked and written over, so as with great difficulty
to be deciphered.
The defendant did not offer any evidence
The bill
to account for the obliteration of the acceptance.
itself was not obliterated, or any part of it rendered illegible.
The Claim of Plaintiff. — In this case the acceptance,
It
when once made, could not be revoked by the defendant.
a
loose
is so laid down in Marius,' although that is only
But in MoUoy' it is said, that when a party has once
dictum.
And
subscribed, he can not afterwards blot out his name.
the Hamburg ordinance lays it down in general terms, that an
Trimmer v.
acceptance once made can not be revoked.
Oddy, cited in Bentinck v. Dorrien,'' is an authority in point.
There Ld. Kenyon was of opinion, that if a drawee deface
the bill, that makes him liable as acceptor; and in Thornton
v. Dick,* this point was expressly ruled by Ld. Ellenborough.

'p.

^

was

83.

Book

2, c.

'6 East,

10,

200;

*4 Esp., 270.

s. 28.

Chitty on Bills,

160,

S.

C.
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seems also to have been considered as the law in Bentinck
And it is treated as
V. Dorrien, and in Fernandey v. Glynn.'
the law of France at the present day by Fardessus, a modern
writer.'
In Adams v. Lindsell,' the defendant was held to

It

be bound by the plaintiff's acceptance of the contract, although
Here the jury have found that
not communicated to him.
there was once an acceptance by the defendants, and that

some one in his behalf, did write an acceptance on

it,

being so, they had no right afterwards to revoke it.
Decision. — I am of opinion, that, in this case, the deIt is true, that the jury have
fendant is entitled to judgment.
found that he did accept the bill; but connecting that finding
with the other facts of the case, it does not seem to me that
it means more than that, at one period, the defendant, or
and at

it

is

The question will then
that time was minded to accept it.
at the time, and having
be, whether having that intention
written his acceptance, he was at liberty, on an alteration of
circumstances, to erase those words before he delivered out
the bill to the holder.
Upon that question, there appears, in
In Bentinck v.
the books, to be some difference of opinion.
Dorrien, Lawrence, J., says, "When the general question
not
will be worth considering how that which
shall arise,
is

it

communicated to the holder can be considered as an acceptance, while
yet in the hands of the drawee, and where

&

le

le

J.

is

I

'

Camp., 426, n.
'The passage referred to in the Cours de Droit Commercial,
M. Pardessus, Paris, 1814, part 2, tit. 4, chap. 4, sect. 4, s. i,
by
This writer, speaking of the effect of an acceptance, says:
p. 400.
" EUe est irrevocable, et celui qui la donee ne serait pas libra de la
rayer, meme du conseutement de celui sur la presentation duquel
la lettre auroit 6te acceptee, parce que I'acceptation n'oblige pas
porteur; qu'elle forme 6galement
simplement I'accepteur envers
un contrat entre le tireur et I'accepteur." In the next paragraph,
the same learned writer says: "Cependant comme le bonne foi doit
etre avant tout considerde, et que la seule crainte de la fraude no
doit pas empgcher des operations legitimes,
tire qui auroit trop
precipitamment accept^, et voudroit revoquer son acceptation
avant que la lettre qui en est revetue circuit, pourroit la rayer et
assurer la date et I'existence de ce changment par un protet, ou par
tout autre acte semblable, qui ne permettroit pas de croire que
jamais la lettre ait circuit revetue de I'acceptation non rayee."
A., 681.
'2 B.

28.
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it before any communication is made to the
holder."
That expression was used after the decision, in the
cases of Thornton v. Dick and Trimmer v. Oddy.
And at a
later period, in Raper v. Birkbeck,' Ld. Ellenborough said,
" I remember Pothier, in his treatise on bills of exchange,
speaking of an acceptor who has put his signature to a bill,
but has not parted with
says, that before he does part with
il pent changer de volonte, et rayer son acceptation';
fortiori, then
third person who cancels an acceptance by
mistake, shall not be held thereby to make void the bill, but
shall be at liberty to correct that mistake, in furtherance of
the rights of the parties to the bill."
The manner in which
Ld. Ellenborough quotes the treatise of Pothier, seems to
indicate that, at that time, he did not retain the opinion which
In a case
he had delivered in the case of Thornton v. Dick.
like the present, which depends on the law-merchant, the
opinions of learned lawyers and the practice of foreign and
commercial nations, though they can not, strictly speaking,
be quoted as authorities here, yet are entitled to very great
laid
find, therefore, that
When
weight and attention.
down in Pothier's treatise, that
party who has given an acbefore the bill goes out of his hand,
ceptance may erase
affords
strong argument in support of the view which take
of the question.
think the rule there laid down far better
cannot perthan the one contended for by the plaintiff.
bill, or any antecedent party,
ceive how the holder of
to him the same thing, whether
prejudiced by it; for
to him unacback, they deliver
when the drawees give
cepted, or whether he finds that the drawees have withdrawn
their acceptance, having at one time intended to accept
Thinking, as
but having subsequently changed their mind.
do, that no prejudice can arise to the holder, or any other
parties to the bill, and that they are placed in precisely the
it

I

is

I

it,

it

is a

it

it

I

I

is

I

a

it

it

a

is

a

a

^

it,

it,

he obliterates

'

defendant
15

is

it

East,

entitled to our judgment.
20.

it

if

seems to me,
no acceptance was given,
was competent for the acceptors to erase their acceptthat
ance before they delivered out the bill, and therefore that the
same situation as
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By the bill the drawer requires the drawee to come under
The question is, when
an engagement to pay it when due.
the drawee comes under an engagement, whether by the act
■of writing something on the bill, or by the act of communicating what has been written to the holder, and I have no diffi-

it,

an engagement

"I

is

it,

culty in saying, from principles of common sense, that it is not
the mere act of writing on the bill, but the making a communication of what is so written, that binds the acceptor; for the
making the communication is a pledge by him to the party,
But while it remains
and enables the holder to act upon it.
in the drawee's hands, it seems to me, the acceptance is not
and he
at liberty
fully binding on the person who signed
have not yet entered into
to say, before he parts with
to accept."

is

if

it

it

it

I

it

it

if

it

if

it

it

is

it

I

think, that in this case the party was at liberty to canwas delivered
cel his acceptance prior to the time when
In the old books there are dicta which import that an
back.
In some of them
acceptance once made cannot be revoked.
said, anything which amounts to an assent to pay the bill,
whether in writing or otherwise,
in point of law an accepthas been on that principle that the case
ance; and
suppose
of Thornton v. Dick was determined; but the two subsequent
cases seem to show that Ld. Ellenborough had doubts as to
his former opinion.
In Fernandey v. Glynn, the cancelling
of the check was with a view and under the idea that
would
was probably contended,
actually be paid, and in that case
either that the crossing or cancelling the bill amounted to actual payment, so that an action tor money had and received
would lie for the amount against the bankers, or that
not,
was to be considered in the nature of an acceptance.
yet
Ndw that case seems to me to apply strongly to the present;
for there according to the usage,
a check was intended to be
not, nothing was done, but
was returned to the
paid, but
was received.
And when the check in
parties from whom
that case was cancelled,
was done with the intention of payment, and not really by mistake.
In consequence, however,
of the large payments made in the course of the day on account of the drawer, the bankers changed their intention; yet
there the check was delivered back, and the original drawer

;SEC.
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was considered bound to pay it.
The opinion of Pothier,
stated in Raper v. Birkbeck, is precise on this subject, and is
far better authority than the passages cited from Marius.
Where a man accepts a bill, and delivers it out accepted, he
must remain irrevocably bound by it.
In contract? made between parties at a distance, if a man writes his acceptance,
and sends it out of his hands, he can not revoke it afterwards.
I am satisfied, however, that this is not a binding acceptance
on the party, having been cancelled anterior to the time when
the bill was delivered back.
This is a question of the law-merchant, and it is desirable
that that laA? should be the same in this as in every other
commercial country.
We ought to act according to the judgments of the courts in our own country, but in the absence of
these authorities, we may with great advantage take into our
consideration the opinions of learned writers on this point.
There seems to be no authority in the English law, except the
-case of Thornton v. Dick.
I agree with Ld. C. J., that Ld.
Ellenborough seems to have changed the opinion which he is
The passage in Molreported to have delivered in that case.

■only

loy is probably applicable to the case where the bill has been
delivered out, for it does not speak of cancellation, but revocation.
But the authority of Pothier is expressly in point.
That is as high as can be had, next to the decision of a court
It is extremely well known that he
of justice in this country.
is a writer of acknowledged character; his writings have been
constantly referred to by the courts, and he is spoken of with
great praise by Sir William Jones, in his Law of Bailments,
and his writings are considered by that author equal in point
of luminous method, apposite examples, and a clear manly
style, to the works of

Littleton on the laws of this country.

than Pothier on
this subject.
As to the opinion of Pardessus, I should understand him as rather speaking of bills delivered out, accepted
That seems to me perfectly clear from the
and not erased.

We can not, therefore, have

a

better guide

next passage, where he says that, though a man does accept a
bill, still if he cancels that acceptance before he delivers it out,
But considering this as a question merely
that is sufficient.
sense, and judging from analogy, is it not clear
■of common
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that the party is not bound in such a case as this ? It may be
said, that the defendants here ought to have shown that this
How is it possible to do that 1 The
was done by mistake.
He may have written an acceptthing looks like a mistake.
ance, and afterwards find when he has written it, that it is on
the wrong paper; and not meaning to accept that bill, he does
that which shows that it was his intention not to enter into

When the
Nobody can be injured by it.
The party
bill goes back it is in as good a state as it came.
It appears to me, thereis still placed in the same situation.
fore, not only on authority, but on the principles of common
sense, that the defendant was not bound by this as an acceptance, and that our judgment ought to be in his favor.

such a contract.

Judgment for the defendant.'
'See Wilde V. Sheridan, 21 L. J. Rep., 260, which Ames in
his valuable work on Bills and Notes cites for a contrary doctrine;.
I Ames on Bills & Notes, 214-218.

The Early Rule. — It

earlier held that an acceptance
Ld. Ellenborough, in the case
without a delivery was irrevocable.
of Thornton v. Dick (4 Esp., 270), (1803) said, " But the acceptance having been proved to have taken place, he had no hesitation
in saying that the act of acceptance was irrevocable; and that, if a
party once accepted a bill of exchange, he had done the act, and
could not retract.
The moment the bill was accepted, he was
bound, and the bill began to run; and the holder had a right to
hold him to that liability which he had undertaken, and from which
he, by his own act, could not discharge himself."
In the case of Bentinck v. Dorrien (6 East, 199) (1805), where
after acceptance and before delivery the acceptance was cancelled,
Ld. Ellenborough said,
was struck at first with consideration
how far this might affect the right of third persons; but on further
consideration, if this be an acceptance in law, notwithstanding the
obliteration before delivery to the holder, it will still remain so as
to such third persons."
After Acceptance and Delivery it is Irrevocable. — When
a bill of exchange is once accepted and delivered to the holder it
then becomes a binding obligation according to its terms and is irIt has been said that it cannot be revoked even with
revocable.
the consent of the holder, for the reason that the drawer and all
prior parties have a vested interest in the contract.
Chitty on
Bills, 308; Thornton v. Dick, 4 Esp., 270; Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, 221.
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AN ACCEPTANCE

MAY BE EITHER BY PAROL (UNLESS
OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY STATUTE) OR IN WRITING;
BEFORE OR AFTER THE BILL IS DRAWN AND BEFORE
OR AFTER MATURITY.
JOHNSON ET AL.

v.

In King's Bench, Nov.
\_Reported in

COLLINS.i
25TH,

i East,

1800.

g8. ]

The Form of Action.— The plaintiffs declared in

the first

is

This case
cited in Wood's Byles on Bills and Notes, 302,
Norton on Bills and Notes, 93, 95, 98, loi; Ames on Bills

'

303;

is

it,

count against the defendant as the acceptor of a bill of exchange drawn by one Ruff, dated the 25 th of October, 1799;
and directed to the defendant, whereby he was required two
months after date to pay to the order of the drawer 23/. los.
6d., value received, which bill was afterwards indorsed by
Ruff to one Jane Ruff, and by her to the plaintiffs.
There
were other general counts for money had and received, money
paid, and upon an account stated.
To which there was a
plea of the general issue.
At the trial before Le Blanc, J., at the last Worcester assizes, it appeared in evidence that Ruff, having furnished
goods to the defendant to the amount of the bill, apphed to
him for payment, when the defendant excused himself at that
time, but said that if Ruff would draw on him a bill at two
months from the 25th of October for the amount he should
then have money and would pay it.
Ruff afterwards drew the
bill in question, dated 25th of October at two months, but it
never was in fact presented to the defendant for his acceptance; nor did he ever in fact accept
otherwise than as

it

(2

(i

and Notes, 171; Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, 5b, 220, 226;
Benjamin's Chalmer's on Bills, Notes and Checks, 44; Daniel on
Negotiable Instruments, 555, 558, 559.
East,
Note. — This case (Sec. 29) of Johnson v. Collings
with
case
in
connection
the
must
be
studied
(Sec.
98) (Eng),
Whea., 66); which latter case con29a), of Coolidge v. Payson
has not been moditains or lays down the present rule, where
fied by statute.
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It was said at the

trial to be the practice at Bristol, where the defendant lived,
not to accept bills or to have them presented for acceptance.
Ruff, to whose own order it was made payable, having indorsed the bill, afterwards passed it to the plaintiffs in discharge
of an old debt; but no communication took place at the time
After this and bebetween the plaintiffs and the defendant.
fore the bill became due Ruff became a bankrupt; and when
the bill was due the plaintiffs presented it to the defendant for
payment, who then declined it on account of Ruff's bankruptcy
without an indemnity, admitting however that he owed the
The learned
money either to Ruff or to Ruff's assignees.
judge was of opinion that a mere promise, such as this, to accept a bill when it should be drawn, at least unless made to a
third person, or accompanied at least with circumstances
which might induce a third person to take the bill, (which was
not the case here), did not amount to an acceptance, and
therefore the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover on the first
count.
And that as there has been no communication between these parties at the time, nor any consideration having
passed as between them, there was no evidence to warrant a
finding for the plaintiffs on either of the money counts: whereupon he directed a non-suit to be entered, with liberty to the
plaintiffs to move to set aside and enter a verdict for the
amount of their demand, if the court should be of opinion
that they were entitled to recover on either of the counts.
A rule nisi was accordingly obtained for this purpose on
a former day.
A promise to
In support of the rule it was argued: — ist.
accept a bill when drawn amounts in law to an acceptance.
In Pillans and Rose v. Van Mierop and Hopkins (1765)' the
plaintiffs having advanced money to one White upon the
faith of a written assurance by letter from the defendants
"that they would accept such bills as the plaintiffs should in
a month's time draw upon them for 800/. upon the credit of
White," the court after much deliberation held that whether
it were an actual acceptance or a loan to White upon the
credit of the defendants, it would equally bind the latter.
'3 Burr., 1663 (1765).
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But Ld. Mansfield there said," "This amounts to the same
thing as an acceptance.
will give the bill due honor is m
effect accepting it.
If a man agree that he will do the formal
part, the law looks upon
in the case of an acceptance of
bill, as
actually done."
"An agreement to accept a bill to
be drawn in future would, as
seems to me, by connection
and relation bind on account of the antecedent relation.
And
see no difference between its being before or after the bill

I

it

if

a

it,

I

was

"This

drawn."-

to honor the bill was
virtual acceptance
"A promise to accept
thesame as an actual acceptance." "The defendants have undertaken to honor the plaintiff's draft, therefore they are bound
to pay it."
The same doctrine was admitted in Mason v.
Hunt (1779);* but that was a conditional acceptance, and
the condition was afterwards broken.
In Powell v. Monnier
(1737)^ there was an assurance by letter that the bill should
be accepted, which was holden sufficient to bind the drawee:
but that was after the bill was drawn.
2dly. — Supposing this not to amount in law to an acceptance, yet there
sufficient consideration to sustain
verdict
for the plaintiffs on the money counts.
The defendant owed
Ruff this money; and his promise to honor the bill when
drawn was an agreement to take as his creditor any person to
whom Ruff should appoint the money to be paid.
He then
having by his indorsement appointed the money to be paid to
the plaintiffs,
raises an assumpsit in law by the defendant
to pay them so much.
And the authority having been given
by Ruff before his bankruptcy that event cannot vary the
case.
was holden in Fenner v. Mears' that general indebitatus assumpsit would lie by the assignee of
respondentia
bond against the obligor, who had before engaged by an indorsement on the bond to pay the same to any assignee:
a

It

it

a

is

is

a

agreement
of it.'"*
Again,

'lb.,

1669.

^Ib., 1673.

nb.,

1674.

a

8

*Dougl., 297 (1779)°i Atk., 611 (1737)Term
Vide also Innes v. Dunlop,
*2 Blak.
Rep., 1269.
Scotch
bond
was
deemed
a.
of
where
the
assignment
Rep., 595,
good consideration

to support an assumpsit here.
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though it was agreed that no action could have been maintained on the bond itself by the assignee in his own name.
It was there also admitted that if the obligor had paid the
assignee, the former might have pleaded payment to an action
on the bond brought by the obligee. And it was there considered that the agreement amounted to a particular promise to
the assignee whenever any such should be.
It was said, that the contract was devised to operate upon
subsequent assignments, and amounted to a declaration that
upon such assignment the money borrowed should no longer
be the money of A. but of B. his substitute.
So here the
agreement to accept amounts to a particular promise to the
holder of the bill to whom it is negotiated to pay him the
amount: it is money had and received to his use.
Thus in
Tatlock v. rfarris' a bill was accepted by the defendant payable to the order of a fictitious person whose supposed indorsement was put upon it; so that being incapable of proof, no
action could be maintained as upon the bill.
But the court
held that a bona fide indorsee for a valuable consideration
might recover against the acceptor upon an impHed assumpsit
for money paid and money had and received.
Ld. Kenyon
in giving judgment said, "it was an appropriation of so much
money to be paid to the person who should become the holder
of the bill."
Again, in Israel v. Douglas^ A. being indebted to
B. for brokerage, and B. to C. for money lent, B. gave an
order to A. to pay C. the money due from A. to B., which
order A. having accepted, a majority of the court held that C.
might maintain an action against A. for money had and reAnd Gould, J., expressly likened it to the case of a
ceived.
man having money due to another in his hands, which that
other orders him to pay to a third person: and that there was
no substantial difference, whether one in fact pays money to
another for a third person, or whether he gives the other an
order to pay over so much money, to which he assents: that
in reason and sound law it was money had and received to
the use of such third person.
Wilson, J., who differed on
3

I

''■

'

Term Rep., 174.
H. Blac, 239.
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that point, yet agreed that the action was maintainable on the
count for the insimal computassent.
There is this further reason for holding the defendant
liable, because his conduct was calculated to deceive third

persons and put them off their guard: for if there had been
no such promise to pay, the plaintiffs would have resorted to
Ruff at once, and not have deferred their application till after
the bankruptcy when it was too late.
Besides, there was a
subsequent promise by the defendant to pay the bill to the
plaintiffs if they would indemnify him against Ruff's assignees;
and as the law will indemnify him that is the same thing.
of

An Acceptance May be by Parole. — This is a question
It is much to be lamented that anything
great moment.

has been deemed to be an acceptance of a bill of exchange
besides an express acceptance in writing; but I admit that the
cases have gone beyond that line, and have determined that
there may be a parole acceptance: that perhaps was going too
far; but at any rate, the determinations have gone no further;
and I am not disposed to carry them to the length now con-

Serjt. Williams.

v. Stanton,

Saund. Rep., 210, 211, and n.

2

'Vide Forth

i

it,

it,

I

I

is

if

a

is,

tended for, and to say that a promise to accept a bill before
it is drawn is equally binding as if made afterwards.
It is not generally true, that a promise to do a thing is
the same thing in law as the actually doing it; it certainly is
not so as applied to this case.
This was a promise to accept
a non-existing bill, which varies this case from all those which
have been decided upon the same subject; and I know not by
what law I can say that such a promise is binding as an acThe consequence
that the plaintiffs cannot
ceptance.
recover upon the count as upon an acceptance of
bill of
we were to suffer the
As to the other ground,
exchange.
plaintiffs to recover on the general counts, we must say that
a chose in action
will
assignable,' a doctrine to which
cannot, as at present advised, and upon
never subscribe.
the general view of
agree with the case of Fenner v. Mears
however, seems to be this,
in Blak. Rep.
The result of
that the determination having been made according to equity
and good conscience, the court would not disturb the verdict;
by
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dy

doubt whether the decision can be sustained on any
The undertaking there indeed was in writings
other ground.
but I am not prepared to say that that makes any difference:
in
though a distinction of that kind was much dwelt upon
another case as supplying a want of consideration:' but that
has never been adopted since, and was afterwards expressly
over-ruled in the case of Rann v. Hughes in the House of
However, no question of that sort can arise here;
Lords."
and I am clearly satisfied that there is no evidence to support

I

and

the promises laid in any of the counts.
would be of most dangerous conseGrose, J., said,
quence to relax the rule of law to the extent here contended

"It

in action is not assignable,
The assignment of a
except by the custom of merchants.
chose in action by a bill of exchange is founded on that law,
and cannot be carried further than that will warrant it; and
no authority has been cited to show that by the law merchant
a mere promise to accept a bill to be drawn in future amounts
Then we
to an actual acceptance of the bill when drawn.
have no authority to extend the rules which have been hitherto
As to the general counts, if we were to permit
established.
the plaintiffs to recover on this evidence, it would be making
all choses in action assignable, which cannot be contended
for, and would throw the whole system into confusion."
Le Blanc, J., said: In the case of Pierson v. Dunlop,^
Ld. Mansfield limited, and truly limited, the doctrine which

By the general rule

for.

a chose

He
before laid down in Pilans v. Van Mierop.
there says "It has been truly said as a general rule, that the
mere answer of a merchant to the drawer of a bill, saying,
He will duly honor it, is no acceptance; unless accompanied
with circumstances which may induce a third person to take
the bill by indorsement: but if there are any such circumstances, it may amount to an acceptance, though the answer
Therefore, he exbe contained in a letter to the drawer."
been

had

Vide the opinion of Wilmot, J., delivered in Pillans v. Van
Mierop, 3 Burr., 1670, i.
Rep., 350 n.
■■=7Term
[S. C, 4 Bro. Pari. Ca., 27, Toml.
edit.]
'

'Cowp.,

573.
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plains and limits his own rule which he had before delivered
concerning such an acceptance, confining it to the case where
credit is given by a third person upon the faith of such an
assurance, on which he acts, and by which he is induced to
take the bill.
Ld. Kenyon, C. J., added, that he thought that the admitting a promise to accept before the existence of the bill to
operate as an actual acceptance of it afterwards, even with
the qualification last mentioned, was carrying the doctrine of
implied acceptances to the utmost verge of the law; and he
doubted whether it did not even go beyond the proper boundary: though this case was not helped even by that opinion.
Rule discharged Q).

'Vide Clark

v. Cook, 4 East, 57; Wynne at al. v. Raikes et
East,
v. Mason et al. , 10 Johns. Rep., 207;
McEvers
514;
5
Wilson V. Clements, 3 Mass. Rep., 9, etc. seq. : McKim v. Smith
& Steene, i Hall's Amer. Law Journ., 486; Havens v. Griffin,

al,

Chip., 42.

"If

In Beawes' Lex Merc,

a

is

it,

a

a

13

it

it,

is

it

e.

a

(i.

the pos454, pi. 16, it is said,
of
bill of exchange) hath neglected to demand
acceptance before the drawer's failure, and the person to whom
directed has advice thereof, he cannot be compelled to accept
the draft, though previous to the knowledge of the drawer's misfortunes he had acquainted him with his intention to honor his bill,
had
and even afterwards confesses that he should have done
been presented and the acceptance demanded before the advice of
And again, p. 466, pi.
the drawer's failure had reached him."
112, "He that verbally or by letter has promised to accept any
bills drawn on him for
third person's account, and he to whom
the promise was made does in consequence thereof give the third person
credit, relying on
punctual compliance; in this case, he that has
or be answerable for all
obliged to fulfill
engaged his word
thereof,
etc."
breach
damages that shall proceed from
sessor
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PAYSON ET AL.'

In the Supreme Court U.
\_Reported in 2 Wheaion's Rep.,

S., Feb.,

1817.

66; Condensed Reports

4, P-

U. S., vol.

JJ-]

Decision. — (Mr. C. J. Marshall delivered the opinion of
the court.)
This suit was instituted by Payson & Co., as indorsers of
a bill of exchange drawn by Cornthwaite & Gary, payable to
the

order of

John Randall, against

Coolidge

& Co.

as the

acceptors.
At the trial the holders of the bill on which the name of
Randall was indorsed, offered, for the purpose of prov-

John

ing the indorsement, an affidavit made by one of the defendants in the cause, in order to obtain a continuance, in which
he referred to the bill in terms which, they supposed, implied
a knowledge on his part that the plaintiffs were the rightful
The defendants objected to the bill's going to the
owners.
jury without further proof of the indorsement; but the court
determined that it should go with the affidavit to the jury,
who might be at liberty to infer from thence that the indorseTo this opinion the counsel for
ment was made by Randall.
the defendants in the Circuit Court excepted, and this court
is divided on the question whether the exception ought to be
sustained.
On the trial it appeared that Coolidge & Co. held the
proceeds of part of the cargo of the Hiram, claimed by
Cornthwaite & Cary, which had been captured and libelled as

'This

case is cited in Benjamin's Chalmers Bills, Notes and
Checks; Norton on Bills and Notes, 97; Wood's Byles on Bills
and Notes, 304, 308; Paige's Illustrative Cases on Commercial
Paper, 60; Chitty on Bills, 284, 286; Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 551, 560, 1799; Story on Bills of Exchange,
249, 462;
See also the folTiedeman on Commercial Paper, 220, 226, 500.
lowing well discussed cases, Bank of Michigan v. Ely, 17 Wend.
(N. Y.), 508 (1837); Exchange Bank v. Hubbard, 62 Fed. Rep.,
112; Bank v. Recknagel,
109 N. Y., 482; Lindley v. First Nat.
Bk., 76 la., 629; Exchange Bank v. Rice, 98 Mass., 288; Frank-

lin Bk.

V.

Lynch,

52

Md., 270.
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The cargo had been acquitted in the District

Circuit Courts, but, from the sentence of acquittal, the

captors had appealed to this court.
Pending the appeal
Cornthwaite & Cary transmitted to Coolidge & Co. a bond of
indemnity, executed at Baltimore with scrolls in the place of
seals, and drew on them for two thousand seven hundred
dol-

This bill was also payable to the order of Randall, and
indorsed by him to Payson & Co.
It was presented to Coollars.

idge & Co.,

protested for non-acceptance.
After its
protest Coolidge & Co. wrote to Cornthwaite & Cary a letter,
in which, after acknowledging the receipt of a letter from them,
with the bond of indemnity, they say, "This bond, comformably to our laws, is not executed as it ought to be; but it may
be otherwise in your state.
It will therefore be necessary to
satisfy us that the scroll is usual and legal with you instead of
a seal.
We notice no seal to any of the signatures." " We
shall write our friend Williams by this mail, andjwill state to
him our ideas respecting the bond, which he will probably determine.
If Mr. W. feels satisfied on this point, he will inform you, and in that case your draft for two thousand dollars
will be honored."
On the same day Coolidge & Co. addressed a letter to
Mr. Williams, in which, after referring to him the question
respecting the legal obligation of the scroll, they say, "You
know the object of the bond, and, of course, see' the propriety
of our having one, not only legal, but signed -by sureties of
unquestionable responsibility, respecting which we shall wholly
You mention the last-'surety as being
rely on your judgment.
responsible; what think you of the others.'"
In his answer to this letter, Williams says, " I am assured
that the bond transmitted in my last isisufficient]for the purpose for which it was given, provided ^the partiesci possess the
means; and of the last signer, I have nojhesitation in expressing my firm belief of his being able to meet the whole amount
himself.
Of the principals I cannot speak with so much conUnfidence, not being well acquainted with their resources.
der all circumstances, I should not feel -inclined to withhold
from them any portion of the funds for which the bond was
given."

and
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On the day on which this letter was written, Cornthwaite & Gary called on Williams, to inquire whether he had
Williams
satisfied Coolidge & Co. respecting the bond.
stated the substance of the letter he had written, and read to
One of the firm of Payson & Co. also
him a part of it.
called on him to make the same inquiry, to whom he gave the
same information, and also read from his letter book the letter he had written.

Two days after this, the bill in the declaration mentioned
drawn by Cornthwaite & Cary, and paid to Payson & Co.
in part of the protested bill of two thousand seven hundred
dollars, by whom it was presented to Coolidge & Co. , who rewas protested, and this action
on which
fused to accept
brought by the holders.
On this testimony, the counsel for the defendants insisted
verdict.
that the plaintiffs were not entitled to
The court, instructed the jury, that
they were satisfied
that Williams, on the application of the plaintiffs, made after
Co. to Cornthwaite
seeing the letter from Coolidge
Cary,
did declare that he was satisfied with the bond referred to in
that letter, as well with respect to its execution, as to the
&

&

if

a

it

it,

vv^as

&

&

a

is

A

&

&

&

sufficiency of the obligors to pay the same; and that the plaintiffs, upon the faith and credit of the said declaration, and
Carv, and without having
also of the letter to Cornthwaite
seen or known the contents -of the letter from Coolidge
Co.
to Williams,, did receive and take the bill in the declaration
mentioned, they were entitled to recover in the present action:
and that it zvas no legal objection to snch recovery that the
proTuise to accept the present bill was made to the drazvers
thereof, previous to the existence of such bill, or that the bill
had been taken in part payment of a pre-existing debt, or that
the said Williams, in making the declarations aforesaid, did
exceed the private instructions given to him by Coolido-e
Co. in their letter to him.
To this charge the defendants excepted.
verdict was
given for the plaintiffs, and judgment rendered thereon, which
now before this court on
judgment
writ of error.
The letter from Coolidge
Co. to Cornthwaite
Carey
contains no reference to their letter to Williams which mio-ht

2ga.]
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suggest the necessity of seeing that letter, or of obtaining information respecting its contents.
They refer Cornthwaite &
Gary to WilHams, not for the instructions they had given him,

but for his judgment and decision on the bond of indemnity.
Under such circumstances, neither the drawers nor the holders of the bill could be required to know, or could be affected
by, the private instructions given to Williams.
It was enough
for them, after seeing the letter from Coolidge & Co. to
Cornthwaite & Cary, to know that Williams was satisfied
with the execution of the bond and the sufficiency of the obligors, and had informed Coolidge & Co. that he was so satisfied.

This difficulty being removed, the question of law which
arises from the charge given by the court to the jury is this:
Does a promise to accept a

bill

amount to an acceptance to a
person who has taken it on the credit of that promise, although the promise was made before the existence of the bill,
and although it is drawn in favor of a person who takes it

pre-existing debt?
In the case of Pillans & Rose v. Van Mierop & Hopkins
(1765),' the credit on which the bill was drawn was given be-

for

a

fore the promise to accept was made, and the promise was
made previous to the existence of the bill.
Yet in that case,

after two arguments, and much consideration, the Court of
King's Bench (all the judges being present and concurring in
opinion) considered the promise to accept as an acceptance.
Between this case and that under consideration of the
court, no essential distinction is perceived.
But, it is contended,, that the authority of the case of Pillans & Rose v.
Van Mierop & Hopkins is impaired by subsequent decisions.
In the case of Pierson v. Dunlop et al. ,^the bill was
drawn and presented before the conditional promise was made
on which the suit was instituted.
Although, in that case, the
holder of the bill recovered as on an acceptance, it is supposed
that the principles laid down by Ld. Mansfield, in delivering
his opinion, contradict those laid down in Pillans & Rose v.
Van Mierop & Hopkins.

'3 Burr., 1663
'Cowp., 571.

(1765).

His lordship observes,

"it

has been
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truly said, as a general rule, that the mere answer of a merchant to the drawer of a bill, saying, 'he will duly honor it,'
is no acceptance,
unless accompanied with circumstances
which may induce a third person to take the bill by indorsement; but if there are any such circumstances, it may amount
to an acceptance, though the answer be contained in a letter
to the drawer."

If

the case of

Pillans & Rose

v.

Van Mierop & Hopkins

had been understood to lay down the broad principle that a
naked promise to accept, amounts to an acceptance, the case

Dunlop, certainly narrows that principle so far
as to require additional circumstances proving that the person
on whom the bill was drawn, was bound by his promise, either
because he had funds of the drawer in his hands, or because
his letter had given credit to the bill, and induced a third
person to take it.
It has been argued, that those circumstances to which
Ld. Mansfield alludes, must be apparent on the face of the
But the court can perceive no reason for this opinion.
letter.
It is neither warranted by the words of Ld. Mansfield, nor by
the circumstances of the case in which he used them.
"The
mere answer of a merchant to the drawer of a bill, saying: he

will duly honor

is

v.

it,

of Pierson

no acceptance unless

accompanied with

" accompanied vfith

is

is

A

it

a

it

if

If

it

a

it

circumstances," etc.
The answer must be
circumstances;" but
not said that the answer must contain
those circumstances.
In the case of Pierson v. Dunlop, the
answer did not contain such circumstances.
They were not
found in the letter, but were entirely extrinsic.
Nor can the
court perceive any reason for distinguishing between circumstances which appear in the letter containing the promise, and
those which are derived from other sources.
The great
motive for construing
promise to accept, as an acceptance,
is, that
gives credit to the bill, and may induce a third
the letter be not shown, its contents,
person to take it.
whatever they may be, can give no credit to the bill; and
be shown, an absolute promise to accept will give all the
full confidence that
credit to the bill which
will be acconditional promise becomes absolute
cepted can give it.
when the condition
performed.
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of Mason v. Hunt (1779)', Ld. Mansfield
said, "there is no doubt but an agreement
to accept may
amount to an acceptance; and it may be couched in such
words as to put a third person in a better condition than the
drawee.
If one man, to give credit to another, makes an
absolute promise to accept his bill, the drawer, or any other
person, may show such promise upon the exchange to get
credit; and a third person, who should advance his money
would have nothing to do with the equitable circumupon
stances which might subsist between the drawer and acceptor.''
What
that "the drawer, or any other person, may
the promise to accept — the
show upon the exchange.'"
The motive to this promise need not, and
naked promise.
The promise itself, when shown, gives
cannot be examined.
bound by it.
the credit; and the merchant who makes
The cases cited from Cowper^ and Douglass are,
admitted, cases in which the bill
not taken for pre-existing
debt, but
purchased on the credit of the promise to accept.
But in the case of Pillans v. Van Mierop, the credit was
given before the promise was received or the bill drawn; and
bill in payment of
in all cases the person who receives such
debt, will be prevented thereby from taking other means to
Any ingredient of fraud
obtain the money due to him.
would, unquestionably, affect the whole transaction; but the
pre-existing
mere circumstance, that the bill was taken for
debt had not been thought sufficient to do away with the effect
the

is

a

a

a

is

a

is

it

is

it

is

It

it

is

it,

case

of

is

it

a

promise to accept.
In the case of Johnson and another v. Collings (1800),^
Ld. Kenyon shows much dissatisfaction with the previous
not believed, that the judgdecisions on this subject; but
ment given in that case would, even in England, change the

Doug., 296 (1779).

Cowper, 571.
East, 98 (1800).

I

^

''

I

'

a

is

law as previously established.
In the case of Johnson v. Collings, the promise to accept
not stated to have been
letter to the drawer, and
was in
Consequently, the bill does not apshown to the indorser.
It
pear to have been taken on the credit of that promise.

See Sec. 29 of this text.
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witli circumstanThe counsel con-

that this naked promise amounted to an acceptance;
In giving his opinion,
but the court determined otherwise.
Le Blanc, J., lays down the rule in the words used by Ld.
Mansfield, in the case of Pierson v. Dunlop.
Ld. Kenyon said, in that case, that "this was carrying
the doctrine of implied acceptances to the utmost verge of
the law; and he doubted whether it did not even go beynd it.
In Clarke and others v. Cock,^ the judges again express their
dissatisfaction with the law as established, and their regret
that any other act than a written acceptance on the bill had
Yet they do not underever been deemed an acceptance.
On
take to overrule the decisions which they disapprove.
the contrary, in that case (Clarke v. Cock), they unanimously
declared a letter to the drawer promising to accept the bill,
which was shown to the person .who held
and took
on
the credit of that letter, to be
virtual acceptance.
It
true, in the case of Clarke v. Cock, the bill was made before
the promise was given, and the judges, in their opinions, use
some expressions which indicate a distinction between bills
drawn before and after the date of the promise; but no case
has been decided on this distinction; and in Pillans
Rose v.
Van Minerop
the
letter
was written before the
Hopkins,
bill was drawn.
The court can perceive no substantial reason for this distinction. The prevailing inducement for considering a promise
to accept, as an acceptance,
that credit
thereby given to
Now, this credit
the bill.
letter
given as entirely by
written before the date of the bill as by one written aftera

is

is is

&

&

a

is

it

it,

tended,

wards.

It

is

is

of much importance to merchants that this question
should be at rest.
Upon a review of the cases which are rethis
court
of opinion, that a letter written within
ported,
a reasonable time before or after the date
of a bill of exchange, describing it in terms not to be mistaken, and promising to accept it, is,
shown to the person who afterwards

U

if

East,

57.
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credit of the letter, a verbal acceptance
binding the person who makes the promise.
This is such a
case.
There
therefore, no error in the judgment of the
circuit court, and
affirmed with costs.
Judgment affirmed.'
on the

is

it

is,

takes the

2

)

it

a

I

a

a

3

&

4

'See the case of Boyce v. Edwards,
Peters, 121; Parsons v.
Peters, 426; Townsley v. Sumrall,
Oakey,
Peters,
182.
In order that promise to accept bill not yet drawn shall
be binding upon the promissor the bill must be taken:
St, by the holder upon the faith of the promise;
2d, the bill when drawn must follow the terms of the promise;
3rd, the promise should describe the bill to be drawn;
4th, the bill must be drawn within
reasonable time;
and,
be
unconditional;
the
must
promise
5th,
6th, the promise should be in writing.
(In some jurisdicdons
must be in writing.
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DISHONORED MAY BE
ACCEPTED FOR HONOR OR SUPRA PROTEST. SUCH
ACCEPTOR IS NOT LIABLE THEREON UNTIL THE BILL
HAS BEEN PRESENTED TO THE ORIGINAL DRAWEE
FOR PAYMENT AT MATURITY AND AGAIN PROTESTED.

A BILL

OF

EXCHANGE

HOARE ET AL.

WHEN

v.

CAZENOVE ET

In the Court of King's Bench, Nov.
{^Reported

in 16 East's Rep.,

The Form of Action. — In

AL.^

27TH,

1812.

jpi.]

by the indorsees
of the bill of exchange hereinafter set forth against the
the declaration contained the usual averments,
acceptors,
(the 1st count averring that the bill was presented for payment to the drawees and refused, the 2d count omitting that
averment,) and charged that the bill having been refused
acceptance by the drawees, and being thereupon duly protested for non-acceptance, the defendants, having notice
thereof, accepted the bill for the honor of the first indorsers.
The defendants pleaded the general issue; and at the trial
before Ld. Ellenborcugh, Ch. J. (1811), a verdict was found
for the plaintiffs for 816/., subject to the opinion of the court
an action

on the following case.

The bill of exchange stated in the declaration was drawn
by S. Hanbury at Hamburgh, on the 23d of July, 1810, upon
Penn and Hanbury of London, in favor of Quevremont
Balleydier & Co. , for 800/. sterling, at 130 days after date.
It was specially indorsed by Quevremont Balleydier & Co., to
Perier Freres; by them to F. Farmbacher, all of whom reside abroad; by F. Farmbacher to Greffuhle, Freres & Co.,
who reside here; and by the latter to the plaintiffs, who are
bankers in London.
The first of the set of bills was trans-This case is cited in Chitty on Bills, 347, 344, 345, 349, 350;
Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 521, 1527; Wood's Byles on
Bills and Notes, 402, 404; Benjamin's Chalmers on Bills, Notes
and Checks, 53, 181, 229; Story on Bills of Exchange, 121, 123,
125, 254, 256, 261, 344, 363, 396, 423; Norton on Bills and Notes,
149, 152; Tiedeman on Commercial
on Bills and Notes (Vol. 2), 790.

Paper, 228, 310, 313; Ames
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mitted, with the first special indorsement only, to the defendants, to procure acceptance: and they accordingly
presented it for acceptance to Penn & Hanbury, who refused;
whereupon the defendants caused a protest to be duly made
The second of the set of bills was afterfor non-acceptance.
wards transmitted, indorsed so as to pass the property of
Greffuhle, Freres & Co. , with a reference upon the face of the
Greffuhle, Freres
bill to the defendants in the case of need.
& Co., applied to the defendants for the first bill, and to
know if it had been accepted:
upon which the defendants
delivered the first bill to them with the following acceptance
" accepted under protest for the honor of the
by themselves:
The bill became due on the 3d of December,
first indorsers."
1 8 10, but was not presented to the drawees, Penn & Hanbury,
for payment ; nor was it proved to have beeji protested for
The defendants refused to pay the bill, in connon-payment.

If the plaintiffs
sequence of orders from the first indorsers.
were entitled to recover, the verdict was to stand; if not, a
This case was argued in 181 1,
non-suit was to be entered.
and the court reserved it for further consideration.
Ch. J., delivered
Decision.— Ld. Ellenborough,

judgment.

the

action founded upon a set of bills of
the
exchange for 800/., accepted by the defendants for
The set was drawn by Samuel
honor of the first indorsers.
Hanbury at Hamburgh, 23d July, 18 10, upon Penn & Hanbury
of London, and was payable to Quevremont Balleydier&Co.,
The first of the set was transmitted
at 1 30 days after date.
but
to the defendants, that they might procure acceptance,
Penn & Hanbury refused to accept, and the defendants
The second of
caused it to be protested for non-acceptance.
it
the set was indorsed to Greffuhle, Freres & Co. ; they applied
to
to the defendants for the first, and the defendants delivered
first
them the first, accepted by themselves, for the honor of the
The
indorsers, that is to say, Quevremont Balleydier & Co.
bill became due the 3d oi December, 18 10, but was not preat
sented to Penn & Hanbury, the drawees, for payment
In the first count
maturity, nor protested for non-payment.
to
it was stated, contrary to the fact, that it was presented

This was

an
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second count
The defendants, (in conthis averment was wholly omitted.
sequence of orders from the first indorsers,) refused to pay it.
The Nature of the Liability of an Acceptor for

the drawees for payment, and refused:

Honor.— The question, in this case,

in the

whether a presentment
to the drawees, Penn & Hanbury, for payment at maturity,
and a protest for non-payment by them, is, or is not essential
as a previous requisite to the maintaining an action against
these defendants, the acceptors for the honor of the first
indorsers; and this depends upon the nature and obligation of
If an
an acceptance for the honor of the drawer or indorser.
acceptance in these terms be
giving it, that he will pay the

is,

an engagement
by the person
bill when it becomes due, and

entitles the holder to look to him in the first instance, without
a previous resort to any person, the plaintiffs are in that case
entitled to recover upon their second count: but if such an
acceptance be in its nature qualified, and amount to a collateral engagement only, z. e., an undertaking to pay if the
original drawee, upon a presentment to him for payment,
should persist in dishonoring this bill, and such dishonor by
him should be notified, by protest, to the person who has
accepted, for the honor of the indorser, then the necessary
steps have not been taken upon this bill, and the plaintiffs
cannot recover.
And such, after much consideration, we are
of opinion is the case.

It is remarkable that no directly adjudged case upon this

I

'

it,

question is to be found; although the custom of merchants
relative to this subject, is stated in the case of Brunetti v.
Lewin,' in K. B., affirmed in error in the Exchequer Chamber,
in favor of the original plaintiff, Brunetti.
Lutwytch, in his
report, says that he could not discover that any exception was
taken to the validity of the custom, which he states as shortly
this, "that if any merchant
(for the honor of him to whom
a foreign bill of exchange was first payable, and who had first
indorsed the bill to another) shall pay the said bill to the last
indorsee of
t/ic bill being before then protested for nonpayment, then the merchant to whom the bill was first payLutw., 896 (1781).
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who first indorsed the bill, shall have an action
against the merchant who first took upon himself the obligation to pay the bill for the honor of the drawer (the bill
having been first protested likewise for non-acceptance, for
value of the bill and all charges)."
Thus two protests, i. e. , for non-payment as well as nonacceptance were in this case held necessary by the custom of
merchants.
The immediate point argued in error appears to
have been whether it was sufficienly shown, agreeably to the
custom alleged, that payment was, in that case, in fact made
to the last indorsee, so as to found the claim of the first
indorser, to payment to be made by the acceptor for honor,
able,

and

with the terms of the custom; but it certainly was also open
to the plaintiff in error, to have insisted upon the validity of
any part of the custom alleged; of which custom the protest
for non-payment previously to the payment to the indorsee,
and the subsequent claim upon the acceptor for honor, was
a material part.
In that case the undertaking for the honor
of the drawer was not in the form of an acceptance upon the
bill, but of "a note in writing for the honor of the drawer to
pay the bill upon return;" but this, "according to Pothier on

substituted by "recent usage
in the place of a signature by the person giving the caution
"
and though the mode be different, the effect
on the bill itself;
is for all substantial purposes the same.
Malyne, p. 273, in his 5th observation, says (speaking
of the acceptor for the honor of the bill, whom he had just
" if this man at the
mentioned in his foregoing observation),
time doth pay the said bill, because the party upon whom it
was directed doth not, yet he is to first make, before he doth
pay the same, a protest, with a declaration that he hath paid
the same for the honor of the bill of exchange, whereby to re-

Bills of Exchange,"' is

a mode

ceive the money again of him that hath made the bill of exBut it may be said that according to this position in
change.
made
Malyne, though a protest may be necessary to be
him to
against the drawee by the acceptor for honor, to entitle
recover against the party for whose honor he has accepted,
yet that such protest for non-p ayment is not equally necessary
'

4
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holder to

recover against the acceptor for honor himself.
But the next observation, in same page of Malyne, lays
down the obligation more generally, and as attaching upon
every holder of a bill (whether accepted, or not accepted, in
whose hands it remains unpaid, up to the time of the appointed payment), the duty of making a protest for the nonpayment of it.

His words are these:

" If

a

bill of exchange

not paid, and that it be not accepted as aforesaid, and remaineth unpaid, then must you
cause the notary to make a second protest (assuming that the
bill had been already protested for non-acceptance) for the
be accepted,

and nevertheless

I

'

a

a

if

if

(/.

is

a

I

it

it,

non payment of it."
" When after a protest made for want of
Pothier said:
acceptance on the part of him upon whom the bill is drawn,
a third person has intervened, and has accepted the bill for
the honor of the drawer, or some indorser, all agree that at
the expiration of the time of grace, the protest ought to be
made not only to him upon whom the bill is drawn, and who
but to the third person, who has achas refused to accept
am aware that Beawes in his Lex
for honor."
cepted
Mercatoria, p. 421 s. 43, says, " He that accepts
bill upon
protest, puts himself absolutely in the stead of the first acobliged to make the payment without any exceptant, and
c. the holder) hath the same
ception, and the possessor
right and law against such an acceptor as he would have had
he had accepted."
The litagainst the first intended one,
eral sense of these words certainly seems to place this writer
that were
at variance with the authorities above cited; and
necessarily the case, one would not be disposed very readily
to surrender the custom of merchants, as alleged on record,
and not questioned in error in the case of Brunetti v. Lewin,'
and the positions which are to be found in Malyne and Pothmost learned and eminent writer upon every
ier (the latter,
subject connected with the law of contracts, and intimately
acquainted with the law merchant in particular).
The use and convenience, and, indeed, the necessity of
protest upon foreign bills of exchange, in order to prove, in
Lutw., 896.
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many cases, the regularity of the proceedings thereupon, is
too obvious to warrant us in dispensing with such an instrument in any case where the custom of merchants, as reported
in the authorities of law, appears to have required it. And, indeed, the reason of the thing, as well as the strict law of the
case, seems to render a second resort to the drawee proper,
when the unaccepted bill still remains with the holder; for effects often reach the drawee,

who has refused acceptance in
the first instance, out of which the bill may and would be satisfied, if presented to him again when the period of payment
had arrived.
And the drawer is entitled to the chance of
benefit to arise from such second demand, or at any rate to
the benefit of that evidence which the protest affords, that
the demand has been made duly without effect, as far as such
evidence may be available to him for purposes of ulterior resort.
Upon the whole, therefore, we are of opinion that the
postea must be delivered to the defendants.*
*

The Contract of

an Acceptor Supra Protest. ^When a
person accepts a bill for honor he thereby agrees that he will, on
due presentment for payment at maturity, pay the bill according
to the terms of his acceptance, provided it shall not have been
paid by the drawee and provided further that it shall have been
protested for non-payment and notice of dishonor duly given him.
Schofield v. Bayard et. al., 3 Wend., 488; Baring v. Clark, 19

Pick., 220.

Acceptance for Honor. — For Wliom Made. — Unless

the

acceptance for honor expressly states for whom it is made it is to
be presumed to have been made for the honor of the drawer.
Acceptor for Honor — To Whom Liable. — An acceptor
for honor is liable to the holder and to all parties to the bill subHoare
sequent to the party for whose honor he has accepted it.
v. Cazenove, 16 East, 391.
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THE DRAWEE, BY ACCEPTING A BILL, THEREBY ADMITS
THE GENUINENESS OF THE DRAWER'S SIGNATURE
AND IS THEREAFTER ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THE
SAME.*
PRICE

V.

NEAL.i

In the King's Bench, Nov. i6th,
{^Reported

in

j

17G2.

Burrows, 1334.]

The Form of Action. — This was

action upon the
case brought by Price against Neal; wherein Price declares
that the defendant Edward Neal was indebted to him in 80/.
for money had and received to his the plaintiff's use; and
The general issue was pleaded;
damages were laid to 100/.
an

and issue joined thereon.

The Facts. — It was proved

trial, that a bill was
Six
22 November,
drawn as follows: "Leicester,
1760.
weeks after date pay Mr. Rogers Ruding or order forty pounds,
value received for Mr. Thomas Ploughfor; as advised by, Sir,
at

the

To Mr. John Price
your humble servant Benjamin Sutton.
in Bush-lane, Cannon-street, London; indorsed ' R. Ruding,
Received the
Antony Topham, Hammond and Laroche.
contents, James Watson and Son: witness Edward Neal.'"
*This question arose for the first time in 1733, ^^^'^^ case of
This was an action by
Jenys v. Fawler et al. (2 Strange, 946).
an indorsee against the acceptor.
The defendant (acceptor)
offered to prove that the bill was forged, by calling persons who
were acquainted with the handwriting
of the drawer, and who
would swear that they did not believe it to be his hand.
But the
Chief Justice held that such evidence was not admissible, from the
danger to negotiable contracts, and because a man might with design write contrary to his usual method.
He strongly intimated
that even actual proof of forgery would not excuse the defendant
against their own acceptance, which had given the bill credit to
the indorsee (plaintiff).
'This case is also cited in Daniel on Negotiable Instruments,
533, 1225; Norton on Bills and Notes, 58, 143, 144, 313; Wood's
Byles on Bills and Notes, 319, 493; Benjamin's Chalmers on Bills,
Notes and Checks, 242; Story on Bills, 113, 262, 263, 411; Chitty
on Bills of Exchange, 307, 261, 291, 361, 431, 504, 638; Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, 230.
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That this bill was indorsed to the defendant for a valuable consideration; and notice of the bill left at the plaintiff's
house, on the day it became due.
Whereupon the plaintiff sent
his servant to call on the defendant, to pay him the said sum
of 40/. and take up the said bill: which was done accordingly.

That another bill was drawn

follows: "Leicester, ist
Sir, six weeks after date pay Mr. Rogers
February, 1761.
Ruding or order forty pounds, value received for Mr. Thomas
Ploughfor; as advised by, Sir, your humble servant Benjamin
Sutton.
To Mr. John Price in Bush-lane, Cannon-street,
London." That this bill was indorsed, "R. Ruding, Thomas
Watson and Son. Witness for Smith, Right & Co." That
the plaintiff accepted this bill, by writing on
"accepted,
John Price;" and that the plaintiff wrote on the back of
"Messieurs Freame
Barclay, pray pay forty pounds for
&

it,

it,

as

John Price."
That this bill so accepted was indorsed to the defendant

a

for a valuable consideration, and left at his bankers for payment: and was paid by order of the plaintiff, and taken up.
Both these bills were forged by one Lee, who has been
since hanged for forgery.
The defendant Neal acted innocently and bona fide,
without the least privity or suspicion of the said forgeries
or of either of them; and paid the whole value of those bills.
verdict for the plaintiff, and assessed
The jury found
damages 80/. and costs 40J. subject to the opinion of the

it

court upon this question: —
"Whether the plaintiff, under the circumstances of this
case, can recover back, from the defendant, the money he
paid on the said bills, or either of them."
Claim of the Plaintiff. — The plaintiff argued that he
was
ought to recover back the money, in this action; as

it

paid by him by mistake only, upon the supposition "That
these were true genuine bills;" and as he could never recover
against the drawer, because in fact no drawer exists; nor
is

hanged.
against the forger, because he
He owned that in a case at Guildhall,

of

Jenys

v.

Faw-
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ler et al.' (an action by an indorsee of a bill of exchange
brought against the acceptor), Ld. Raymond would not admit
the defendants to prove it a forged bill, by calling persons
acquainted with the hand of the drawer, to swear "That
they believed it not to be so;" and he even strongly incHned,
"That actual proof of forgery would not excuse the defend-

ants against their own acceptance, which had given the bill a
credit to the indorsee."
But he urged, that in the case now before the court, the

bill does not rest in belief and opinion only;
but has been actually proved, and the forger executed for it.
But the
Thus it stands even upon the accepted bill.
plaintiff's case is much stronger upon the other bill which was
It is not stated, ''T\\-a.\ that \i\\\ ^-as accepted
not accepted.
before it was negotiated;" on the contrary, the consideration
forgery of the

for it was paid by the defendant, before the plaintiff had seen
it.
So that the defendant took it upon the credit of the indorsers, not upon the credit of the plaintiff; and therefore the
reason, upon which Ld. Raymond grounds his inclination to
be of opinion "That actual proof of forgery would be no excuse," will not hold here-.
Claim of Defendant. — The defendant argued that the
plaintiff was not entitled to recover back this money from the
defendant.
He denied it to be a payment by mistake; and insisted
that it was rather owing to the negligence of the plaintiff; who
should have inquired and satisfied himself " Whether the bill
Here is no
was really drawn upon him by Sutton, or not."
fraud in the defendant; who is stated " to have acted innocently and bona fide, without the least privity or suspicion of
the forgery; and to have paid the whole value for the bills."
(Ld. Mansfield stopped him from going on; saying that
this was one of those cases that could never be made plainer
by argument.)
Decision. — It is an action upon the case, for money had
In which action, the plainand received to the plaintiff's use.
tiff can not recover the money, unless it be against conscience
2 Strange, 946.
See other cases upon same point; White v.
Continental Bk., 64 N. Y., 316; Ellis v. Ohio Ins. Co., 4 Ohio
., 628; Bank of U. S. v. Bank of Georgia,' 10 Wheat., 333; Peoa R. R. Co. V. Neill, 66 111., 269.
'

.
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allowed, in this sort of action.
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liberality is always

But it can never be thought unconscientious in the defendant, to retain this money, when he has once received it
upon a bill of exchange indorsed to him for a fair and valuable
consideration, which he has bona fide ^■saA, without the least
privy or suspicion of any forgery.
Here was no fraud; no wrong.
It was incumbent upon
the plaintiff, to be satisfied, "That the bill drawn upon him
was the drawer s hand,'' before he accepted or paid it: but it
was not incumbent upon the defendant, to inquire into it.
Here was notice given by the defendant to the plaintiff of a
bill drawn upon him: and he sends his servant to pay it and
take it up.
The other bill, he actually accepts: after which
acceptance, the defendant innocently and bona fide discounts
it.
The plaintiff lies by, for a considerable time after he has
paid these bills; and then found out " That they were forged;"
and the forger comes to be hanged.
He made no objection
to them, at the time of paying them.
Whatever neglect
there was, was on his side.
The defendant had actual encouragement from the plaintiff himself, for negotiating the
second bill, from the plaintiff's having without any scruple or
hesitation paid the first: and he paid the whole value, bona
It is a misfortune which has happened without the defide.
If there was no neglect in the
fendant's fault or neglect.
plaintiff, yet there is no reason to throw off the loss from one

The Drawee of a Bill or Check Must Know the Hand•writing of the Drawer. — The rule is well settled that the drawee
of a check is bound, at his peril, to know the handwriting of the
drawer; and if he pays a check to which the signature of the

drawer was forged, he must suffer the loss, as between himself and
the drawer, or an innocent holder to whom he has made payment.
As between himself and the drawer, he undertakes that he will payno checks, except such as have the genuine signature of the drawer,,
which he assumes and is presumed to know.
The drawee is presumed to know or to be acquainted with the
signature of the drawer and will not be permitted to recover the
money back from an innocent holder who is not presumed to know
or to have such knowledge.

Presumed to be Acquainted with the
Handwriting in the Body of a Bill or Check. — While the
Drawee

not

drawee is presumed to be acquainted

with the handwriting

of the
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innocent man upon another innocent man: but, in this case,
if there was any fault or negligence in any one, it certainly
was in the plaintiff, and not in the defendant.
Rule. — That the postea be delivered to the defendant.
drawer, there is no presumption that he is acquainted with the
handwriting in the body of the bill or check, in as much as these
contracts are often filled up in the handwriting of persons other
than the drawer.
If the rule were otherwise, the drawee could
never safely pay a check filled up in a handwriting that was new to
him, until he had first satisfied himself by inquiry from the drawer,
whether the contract had been properly filled up.
Such a rule
would greatly interfere and delay commercial transactions and
would to a very large extent defeat the very purpose for which these
contracts were created.
The rule is, therefore, well settled, that
if the drawee, in good faith, and without negligence, pay even to
an innocent holder a bill or check, which has been fraudulently altered in its body, — in amount — after it left the hands of the drawer,
he will, ordinarily, be entitled to recover back, from the persons to
whom it was paid, the excess over the true amount of the check.
In the Bank of Commerce v. Union Bank, 3 Const., 234, Ruggle, J.,
in discussing this specific question says:
". The payment of a bill
of exchange by the drawee is ordinarily an admission of the drawer's signature, which he is not, afterwards, at liberty to dispute.
The drawee is supposed to know the handwriting of the drawer,
who is usually his customer or correspondent.
As between him,
therefore, and an innocent holder, the payer (drawee), from his imputed negligence, must bear the loss." To support this statement
Ruggles, J., cites Price v. Neal, supra, and "\Wilkinson v. Suteridge,
I Strange, 648. See for a general discussion of these questions, U.
S. Bank v. Bank of Georgia, 10 Wheaton, 333, 353; Canal Bank v.
Albany Bank, i Hill, 287, 295; Redington v. Woods, 45 Cal., 406,
418; Holt v. Ross, 54 N. Y., 472, 475; Peoria Ry. Co. v. Neill, 16
III, 269, 270; McKIeroy v. Southern Bank, 14 La. An., 458;Jenys
V. Fawler, 2 Strange, 946 (1732); Ellis v. Ohio life etc., Co.,
4
Ohio St., 628; Goetz v. Bank, 119 U. S., 556.

What the Drawee Warrants or Admits by Accepting a
Bill— The General Rule.— It may be stated as a general rule

that the drawee by his acceptances admits and is therefore
estopped from denying:
1.
The signature of the drawer.
2.
That he has funds, in his hands, of the drawer with which

bill.
That the drawer has capacity

to pay the

to draw, /. e., that the
bankrupt, or a fictitious person; and
That the payee named in the bill has full capacity to in4dorse the bill.
Hortsman V. Henshaw, 11 How., 177- Braithwaite V. Gardnier, 8 Q. B., 473; Taylor v. Croker,
4 Esp., i8qDrayton v. Dale, 2 Barn. & C, 293.
3.

drawer is not an infant,

a
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THE DRAWEE, BY ACCEPTING A BILL, IS NOT THEREBY
ESTOPPED FROM SHOWING, SUBSEQUENTLY
THAT
THE BODY OF THE BILL HAS BEEN ALTERED.
BANK OF COMMERCE

v.

UNION BANK.'

In the Court of Appeals of New York, April,
[^Reported

1850.

in 3 Comstock, 230 ; 3 N. Y., 230. J

The Form of Action.— The Bank of Commerce brought

assumpsit in the Superior Court of the city of New York,
against the Union Bank, to recover money paid by mistake.
On the trial before Sanford, J., the case was this:
On the 1 8th of December, 1847, the New Orleans Canal
and Banking Company drew a draft on the Bank of Commerce
in New York, payable to the order of
"J. Durand,'' for one
hundred and five dollars.
After the draft was issued it was
fraudulently altered in several respects, and among others, by
the substitution of the word "thousand" for "hundred," and
the name " Bonnett" instead of "Durand," so that it appeared to be a draft for one thousand and five (instead of one
hundred and five) dollars, and payable to the order of J.
Bonnet (instead of J. Durand).
In this altered condition the
Union Bank in New York received the draft from the State
Bank of Charleston for collection, and credited the amount to
that bank.
The Bank of Commerce, on the draft being presented by the Union Bank, paid it to the latter.
Two days
afterwards the Bank of Commerce received advices from the
New Orleans Canal and Banking Company, and then ascertained the alterations in the draft.
Thereupon the draft was
returned to the Union Bank, and the money, which had been
paid, demanded; but payment was refused.
The evidence being closed, the court charged the jury
'

This case is also cited in Daniel on Negotiable

Instruments,
533; 349a, 540, 1361, 1362, 1384, 16543, 1651, 1659; Norton on
Bills and Notes, 58, 143, 145, 148, 238; Story on Bills of Exchange, 113, 264; Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, 230, 394, 399,
451; Benjamin's Chalmers on Bills, Notes and Checks, 215; Bigelow on Bills and Notes, 188.
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a
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that if they were satisfied the draft had been altered in the
manner before mentioned, after it was issued by the drawers,
as altered, by
and that the plaintiffs paid the amount of
mistake, and without knowledge of or reason to suspect the
alterations, they were entitled to recover the amount of money
banker to know the
Also that the rule requiring
so paid.
check or
handwriting of his customer, as to the signature to
draft, did not extend to the filling up of the body thereof;
and that paying the draft in question under the circumstances
was not of itself evidence of any negligence or want of due
There was an exception
caution on the part of the plaintiffs.
to the charge and to the refusal of the court to charge certain
The plaintiffs had a verdict for
propositions as requested.

a

is

is

is

a

it

is

is

It

is

it

if

is

is

$1,035.38, which the Superior Court refused to set aside, and
after judgment the defendants appealed to this court.
The Claim of Appellants. — The appellants claimed: —
no rule that the banker must know the
1st.
That there
handwriting of his customer as to his signature, but the rule
"that the banker shall take care that he do not pay away
his customer's money without sufficient authority for that purforged order, he must bear the loss,
paid on
pose; and
immaterial whether the order was forged wholly or
and
genuthe banker's duty to see that the check
in part.
ine in all respects.' The attempt to establish the principle
required in examining the
that a different degree of scrutiny
drawn, from that
draft by the person on whom
body of
utterly
required in examining the signature of the drawer,

'Hallv. Fuller,
Price

v.

Neal,

&

5

Cress., 750; Chitty on Bills, 288,
Barn.
Taunt., 75.
also Smith v. Mercer,
6

see

3

^

ed. of 1839;

is

it

is

fallacious and ought to be discountenanced.
2d.
The second proposition laid down in the second
"that paying the draft, under
division of the judge's charge,
the circumstances, was not of itself evidence of any negligence or want of due caution on the part of the plaintiffs."
This assumes that which
the province of the jury to find.
The jury were to judge of circumstances, and of negligence
or no negligence.''

Burr., 1355.
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The court erred in refusing to charge

the jury, as
that the drawee of a draft is bound, before acceptpaying the same, to know its genuineness, and it is

is

is

it

a

is

it

if

it

it,

it

if

a

it

it

is

if

if

is,

ing or
negligence in him not to inform himself whether the draft is
genuine or not; and if he accepts or pays it (unless upon misan admission of its genuineness,
representation), that
which concludes him.'
Even
there was no negligence on the part of the
4th.
—
still,
plaintiff
there were none (and no fraud) on the part
of the defendants, there
no reason why one innocent party
should suffer rather than the other, and the law therefore
leaves the parties in the same condition in which
found
If, when the defendants presented the draft in questhem.^
tion for payment, they held
in good fath, and for
valuable
consideration; or
the party from whom they received
so
held
when he passed
to them, and
upon such presentation the plaintiff's bank paid the amount of
to them, without being induced to do so by any fraud, deceit, or untrue
representation of the defendants, this action could not be
maintained.
The only ground upon which the respondent claims
5th.
that the amount of the
right to recover in this case,
That action can only be
altered draft was paid by mistake.
maintained where
against conscience for the defendant to
no pretense that the appelHere there
retain the money.
lants can not conscientiously retain the money, for they have
paid out in good faith, and without fault, all that they claim
of respondents.'

The Claim of Respondents.— The respondents claimed:

Cases before cited, and Bank of Gloucester
Mass., 33.
^

17

S.

§

6

4

3

V.

2

John.,
Neal,
Burr., 1355; Markle v. Hatfield,
Kline,
v.
Bass
J.;
Kent,
C.
of
in
opinion
462, last paragraph
Maule & Selwyn (opinion of Dampier, J.,), p. 15; Smith v. MerBank v. Bank of
113; U.
Taunt., 75; Story on Bills,
cer,
Georgia, 10 Wheat., 333.

'Price

v. Salem Bank,

5

2

'See rule laid down by Ld. Mansfield in Price v. Neal, before
Taunt, 142; Moses v. Macfarlan,
cited; Brisbane v. Dacres,

Burr., 1012.
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That where money is paid under mistake of facts

1st.

is

it

is

it

it
is

is

it

^

it,

a

it,

it may be recovered back.'
2d.
The Bank of Commerce paid the money through
The forged alterations in the amount of
mistake of facts.
the draft being without their knowledge at the time they paid
The rule
they are entitled to recover back the sum paid.
requiring a banker to know the signature of his customer to
a check or draft, does not extend to the filling up of the body
of the instrument.'' So where party has procured payment
of forged or altered paper without indorsing his name on
yet he must pay back the money, although he may have paid
over to the party of whom he was the agent.
The party paying has a right to recover his money
3rd.
that of the indorser's name, as
as well where the forgery
an alteration of the amount for which the bill was
where
In this case the draft was assignable only by the indrawn.
It lacks
was drawn.
dorsement of Durand, in whose favor
that indorsement, and no title therefore ever passed either to
the Charleston Bank or to the Union Bank.*
an implied warranty in the transfer of
There
4th.
not forged — and the
every negotiable instrument that
actual indorsement of this draft by the Union Bank, was an
it

express averment, and a guaranty to the Bank of Commerce
It was an assurance of its
was not forged or altered.
that

5

9

3

S.

3

8

i

2

2

,

'Chit, on Cent Am. ed. of 1844, p. 626, and cases cited in
Smith's Lead.
notes; Chitty on Bills, Am. ed. of 1849, P- 425;
Cas., p. 237, Law Lib., vol. 28, new series, p. 269, and notes;
Wend., 355;
Hall, 252; Mowatt v. Wright,
Potter V. Everett,
Cowen, 195; Union
id. 412; Waite v. Leggett,
Burr V. Veeder,
Mass., 74; Garland v. Salem Bank,
Branch Bank,
Bank v. U.
id. 389; Lazell v. Miller, 15 id., 207.
^Chitty on Bills, ed. of 1849, p. 245, and cases cited; Jones
Taunt., 488; Bruce v. Bruce, id. 495; Merchants'
v. Ryde,
Bank of New York v. Exchange Bank of New Orleans, t6 Louis
'^

Rep., 457-

&

&

Comst.,

I

II.

i

i

i

i

P., 197; S. C. Ryan
Fuller V. Smith,
C.
Moody, 49;
Bills,
on
ed.
of
Chitty
1849, P- 245.
*Chitty on Bills, ed. of 1849, p. 260, and cases cited; Smith
V. Chester,
Term. Rep., 654; Dick et al. v. Leverich, 11 Louis.
Hill, 287; Talbot v.
Rep., 573; Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany,
Bank of Rochester,
id. 295; Coggill v. Am. Ex. Bank,
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signature of

the

Decision. — The payment of a bill of exchange by the
drawee is ordinarily an admission of the drawer's signature,

it

'Chitty on Bills,

ed. of 1849, p. 245;

Jones v. Ryde,

5

a

'
'

a

J.

is

it,

which he is not afterwards, in a controversy between himself
and the holder, at liberty to dispute; and therefore if the
drawer's signature is on a subsequent day discovered to be a
forgery, the drawee can not compel the holder to whom he
paid the bill, to restore the money, unless the holder be in
some way implicated in the fraud. ^ This rule is founded on
the supposed negligence of the drawee in failing by an examination of the signature, when the bill is presented, to detect
the forgery and refuse payment.
The drawee is supposed to
know the handwriting of the drawer, n\\o is usually his customer or correspondent.
A3 between him, therefore, and an
innocent holder, the payer, from this imputed negligence,
must bear the loss.
In Price v. Neal, the plaintiff had paid
to Neal, the holder, two bills of exchange, purporting to be
drawn on him by Sutton, whose name was forged.
On discovery of the forgery. Price brought his action against Neal,
to recover back the money as paid by mistake.
Ld. Mansfield in delivering the opinion of the court in favor of the defendant, said, "It was incumbent upon the plaintiff to be
satisfied that the bill drawn upon him was the drawer's hand,
but
was not imcumbent upon
before he accepted or paid
" Whatever neglect there
the defendant to inquire into it."
a misfortune which has happened
was, was on his side.
It
without the defendant's fault or neglect."
Pratt was of opinIn Wilkinson v. Lutwidge,'' Ld. C.
sufficient acknowledgment of the
ion that
acceptance was
drawer's handwriting on the part of the acceptor, who must
be supposed to know the hand of his own correspondent."
bill, whether general, or for honor, or
So the acceptance of

Taunt,

I

'

Trice

V.

Neal,

3

§§

7

&

3

Cress., 428; Herrick v.
488; Wilkinson v. Johnson,
Yerg., 310; Story
Whitney, 15 John., 240; Harris v. Bradley,
no, 235.
on Bills of Exch.,

Barn

Strange, 148.

Bur., 1354-
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supra protest, after sight of the bill, admits the genuineness of
the signature of the drawer; and consequently if the signature
of the drawer turns out to be a forgery, the acceptance will
nevertheless
be binding and entitle a bona fide holder for
value and without notice to recover thereon according to its

tenor.'
But it is plain that the reason on which the above rule is
founded does not apply to a case where the forgery is not in
counterfeiting the name of the drawer, but in altering the
body of the bill.
There is no ground for presuming the body
of the bill to be in the drawer s handzvriting, or in any liandIn the present case, that
ivriting known to the acceptor.
part of the bill is in the handwriting of one of the clerks in the
office of the Canal and Banking Company in New Orleans.
The signature was in the name and hannwriting of the cashier.
The signature is genuine.
The forgery was committed
No
by altering the date, number, amotmt and payee's name.
case goes the length of saying that the acceptor is presumed
to know the handwriting of the body of the bill, or that he is
better able than the indorsers to detect an alteration in it.
The presumption that the drawee is acquainted with the
drawer's signature, or able to ascertain whether it is genuine,
is reasonable.
In most cases it is in conformity with the fact.
But to require the drawee to know the handwriting of the
residue of the bill is unreasonable.
It would, in most cases,
be requiring an impossibility.
Such a rule would be not only
The drawee would unarbitrary and rigorous but unjust.
doubtedly be answerable for negligence in paying an altered
bill, if the alteration were manifest on its face.
Whether it
not,
was so or
in this case, was properly submitted to the
jury, who found that it was paid by mistake and without
knowledge of or reason to suspect the fraudulent alterations.
It would have been difficult to find otherwise upon the evidence, the bill having passed through the defendant's bank
and the Charleston bank without suspicion.
If the forgery
had been in the name of the drawer, it might not perhaps
have been incumbent on those banks to scrutinize the bill, because they might have relied on the drawee's better knowledge
'

Story on Bills,

§ 262.
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the hand; but the forgery being in the body of the bill,
the
plaintiffs were not more in fault than the defendants.

■of

The greater negligence in

on the party who received the

a case

of this kind is chargeable

bill from the perpetrator of the
respects the genuineness of the bill each

So far as
forgery.
indorsee receives it on the credit of the previous indorsers;
and it was the interest and the duty, in the
present case, of
the Bank of Charleston to satisfy itselt that the bill was
genuine, or that its immediate indorser was able to
respond in

bill should prove to be spurious. The party who
fraudulently passed the bill can not avoid his liability to recase the

fund on the pretence of delay in detecting the forgery, or in
giving notice of it; and if reasonable diligence is exercised in
giving notice after the forgery comes to light, it is all that any
of the parties can require.'
In Smith v. Mercer,^ in Cocks v. Masterman,^ and in
Price v. Neal,' the plaintiffs who paid the forged bills, being

chargeable with a knowledge of the signature of the drawer
(which was forged) were held to have paid it negligently and
without due caution and examination, and on that ground it
was that the defendants to whom they paid the money were
held not Hable without immediate notice of the forgery. But
in the present case no such negligence is imputable to the
plaintiffs, the plaintiffs being no more capable of detecting the
forged alteration by inspection of the bill, than either of the
other parties.
This action is not founded on the bill as an instrument
containing the contract on which the suit is brought.
The
acceptor can never have recourse on the bill against the indorsers.
But the plaintifis right of recovery rests on equitable
In the Canal Bank v. The Bank of Albany, the
grounds.
principle was recognized that money paid by one party to another through mutual mistake of facts in respect to which both
are equally bound to inquire, may be recovered back.
The
defendants here as in that case have obtained the money of
'

Canal Bank v. The Bank of Albany,

'6 Taunt., 76 (1814).

Barn. & Cres., 902 (1827).
*3 Burr., 1354 (1762).
^9

i Hill,

287, 292, 3.
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of a forged
title as genuine, the forgery being unknown to both parties.
The defendants ought not in conscience to retain the money,
because it does not belong to them; and for the further reason
that the defendants and the previous indorsers have, each, on
the same principle, their remedy over against the party to
whom they respectively paid the money, until the wrongdoer
is finally made to pay.
If that party should be irresponsible,
or if he can not be found, the loss ought to fall on the party,
who, without caution, took the bill from him.
In cases where no negligence is imputable to the drawee
in failing to detect the forgery, the want of notice within the
ordinary time to charge the previous parties to the bill is excused, provided notice of the forgery be given as soon as it is
the plaintiffs without right and on the exhibition

discovered.

Judgment affirmed.

SECTION

33.

THE DRAWEE, BY ACCEPTING A BILL, THEREBY ADMITS
OR WARRANTS THAT THE PAYEE HAS CAPACITY TO
INDORSE, BUT DOES NOT ADMIT HIS INDORSEMENT.*
MEAD

V.

YOUNG.'

In the King's Bench, Nov. i8th,
\_Reported

in 4 Term. Rep.,

1790.

28.

'\

*

a

is

it,

In an action by the indorsee against the acceptor of a bill
of exchange, drawn payable to "A. or order," it is competent to
the defendant to give evidence that the person, who indorsed to
the plaintiff, was not the real payee, though he be of the same
name, and though there be no addition to the name of the payee
If a bill of exchange, payable to A. or order, get
on the bill.
into the hands of another person of the same name as the payee,
and such person, knowing that he was not the real person in whose
favor it was drawn, indorse
he
guilty of
forgery.
is

cited in Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 692,
Benjamin's Chalmers, Bills, Notes and Checks, 90; Wood's
Byles on Bills and Notes, 148, 270; Chitty on Bills, 198, 156, 261,
391, 395, 641, 780, 784; Norton on Bills and Notes, 115, 243;
Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, 266; Randolph on Commercial
See also. Masters v. Miller,
Term Rep., 320;
Paper, 251, 252.
First Bank v. Burkham, 32 Mich., 328; Chambers v. Union Bank,
78 Pa. St., 205; McKleroy v. Southern Bank, 14 La. An., 458.
^This case

4

1345;
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was

an action brought by

indorsee of a bill of exchange for 90/. against the acThe bill was drawn at Dunkirk by Christian on the
ceptor.
defendant in London, payable "to Henry Davis, or order;''
and, having been put into the foreign mail inclosed in a letter
from Christian, it got into the hands of another Henry Davis
than the one in whose favor it was drawn.
The defendant
accepted the bill; and when Davis desired the plaintiff to discount
the latter made application to the defendant to know
whether or not
was his acceptance
and, on receiving an
answer in the affirmative, coupled with an assurance that
was
not knowing the H. Davis
good bill, he discounted
There was no ground to impute any
from whom he took it.
fraud to the plaintiff.
On the trial before Ld. Kenyon, after
the plaintiff had proved the defendant's handwriting, and the
indorsement by Davis, the defendant offered evidence to show
that the H. Davis, who indorsed to the plaintiff, was not the
real H. Davis in whose favor the bill was drawn: but Ld.
Kenyon being of opinion that such evidence was inadmissible,
rule having been obtained
the plaintiff recovered verdict.
to show cause why a new trial should not be granted on this
misdirection.
The Claim of the Plaintiff. —Ld. Erskine for the plainthere had been any particular description
tiff argued that,
of the payee on the bill, the plaintiff must have taken care
answered the whole
that the person from whom he received
of the description; but there was no description of, or addition to, the H. Davis; there was nothing on the bill to lead
either the acceptor or any third person to suspect that the H.
Davis, who was in possession of the bill, was not the real
And, so far from the plaintiff's having incurred any
payee.
charge of neglect, he seems to have taken more than ordinary
caution in making inquiries of the acceptor before he disno pretense to impute either fraud
There
counted the bill.
or neglect to the plaintiff; he stands in the situation of an
is

it

it

a

A

a

it,

it

.'

it

it,

the

a

innocent purchaser for
therefore falls within the
two innocent persons must
loss must be borne by him

This case
valuable consideration.
common rule, that, where one of
suffer by the fraud of another, the
who enabled the party to commit
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person is Christian, whO'
ought to have described the payee more particularly.
The Claim of Defendant. — In support of the rule it was
argued that, a party, purchasing a bill of exchange, is, like
the purchaser of any other species of property, bound to inNo person
quire into the title of him from whom he buys.
can derive title to this bill but he who claims under the real
H. Davis: and it is indifferent whether the person indorsing
the bill be or be not of the same name with the real payee;
in neither case can any property be transferred but by him
If he bear the same name, prima facie
who has the title.
indeed he may be presumed to be the same person, till the
contrary be shown: but here the question was, whether evidence should not have been received to prove the contrary i*
If such evidence be not admissible, it will follow that payment to a person of the same name with a legatee would discharge the executor, or a payment by a debtor to any person
who had the same name as his creditor: but that cannot be
This bill was drawn in order to satisfy a debt due
pretended.
from Christian to the real H. Davis; and yet payment of this
bill to the plaintiff can never be considered as a discharge of
that debt, without the indorsement of that H. Davis.
In all
cases where a bill is drawn payable to A. B. or order, it is

the

fraud; and in this case that

indispensably necessary to prove the handwriting of the payee,
which was not in fact done in this instance.
The necessity of
this proof is apparent from the form of the declaration:
which after alleging that the bill was drawn in favor of H.
Davis, avers that the said H. Davis afterwards indorsed to the
If the negligence of either of the parties be resorted
plaintiff.
to as a ground for the determination of this case, the plaintiff
seems to have been guilty of the greatest negligence in taking
a bill from a person whom he did not know, whereas the
transaction, as far as Christian was concerned, was carried on
in the ordinary course of business.
There is also another obto
the
jection
plaintiff's recovering, because he claims through
a forgery: For the H. Davis, who received the bill inclosed
in a letter from Christian, must have known that it was not
intended tor him; and the circumstance of his bearing the
same name with the payee would be no defence to him on a
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prosecution for forgery, since he put a false signature to an
instrument with intent to defraud.

Decision.— The question here is, Whether the name of
H. Davis, to whom the bill on the face of it was payable,

I

If

it

it,

it

it,

shall or shall not convey a title to this plaintiff who gave a
valuable consideration for
and who discounted
with the
name of H. Davis upon
and with an assurance from the
defendant that
was accepted by him.?
any fraud, or even
neglect, could be imputed to the plaintiff, that would vary the
case; but, circumstanced as these parties were,
think that,
the plaintiff cannot recover,

it

I

'

is

it

Burr., 452 (1758).

a

a

is

I

a

is

a

I

is

I

a

it

it

a

a

I

if

will put an insuperable clog
cannot distinguish this case on
principle from that of Miller v. Race,' where the innocent
holder of
note, which had been taken when the mail was
robbed, was held entitled to recover; that indeed was
note
payable to bearer, but still the same principle must govern
both cases.
In this case the fault originated with the drawer
of the bill, in not describing more particularly the person towhom he intended
should be paid.
The plaintiff was not
bound to send to Dunkirk to know whether the person, who
had possession of the bill, was or was not the real H. Davis.,
There may indeed be some inconvenience the other way; but
setting the inconvenience on the one side against that on the
other, in my apprehension
would throw too great
burden
on persons taking bills of exchange to require proof of an
indorsee that the person from whom he received the bill wasthe real payee.
Such proof has never yet been required of
an indorsee in such an action: and therefore
think that, as
there was no fraud, or want of due diligence on the part of
the plaintiff, he
entitled to recover; however,
give this,
opinion with some diffidence, as my brothers have intimated
that they are of
different opinion.
Ashhurst, J., said, "This
a case of considerable importthink that we ought to grant new trial, that the
ance; and
parties may have an opportunity of putting the question on
with
the record.
The present inclination of my opinion
bill of
In order to derive
the defendant.
legal title to
necessary to prove the hand-writing of the
exchange,
on this species of property.
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bill may come by mistake

into the hands of another person, though of the same name
with the payee, yet his indorsement will not confer a title.
Such an indorsement, if made with the knowledge that he is
not the person to whom the bill was made payable, is in my
opinion a forgery; and no title can be derived through the
This is distinguishable from
medium of a fraud or forgery.
the case of Miller v. Race; for there the note was payable to
In such cases the bearer, who purchases for a valubearer.
able consideration, and without notice of any fraud, is entitled
to receive the contents of the bill; and payment to him is a
But in this case the bill was drawn
discharge to the drawer.
payable to H. Davis, or order; and though the name of H.
Davis was indorsed on the bill, yet it was incumbent on the
plaintiff, who claims through the payee, to be satisfied that
that was the indorsement of the real payee."
Duller, J., said, "As the bill in this case is of great value,
the parties may put this question in a mode to be decided by
the dernier resort.
As at present advised, I entertain the
same opinion as my Brother Ashhurst.
If we were to inquire
whether any laches were to be imputed to the plaintiff or the
drawer, I rather think the plaintiff is more in fault than any
other person, in advancing his money to H. Davis, who was
But, without going into any such
a total stranger to him.
inquiry, I am of opinion that it is incumbent on a plaintiff,
who sues on a bill of exchange, to prove the indorsement of
the person to whom it is really payable.
The general form of
the declaration shows that it is so; for that is that, 'the said
A. B. to whom, or to whose order, the payment of the said
sum of money mentioned in the said bill was to be made,
afterwards, etc., indorsed the said bill, his own proper handwriting being thereto subscribed.'
Now here it is clear that
the indorsement was not made by the same H. Davis to whom
the bill was made payable; and no indorsement by any other
person will give any title whatever.
Then, is there any thing
in this case that estops the defendant from saying that the
person who indorsed to him (plaintiff) was not the real payee.?
JSIow the act of that person who indorsed, and who in so
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doing was guilty of a forgery, cannot prevent an innocent
person from showing the truth.
' '
Then it was argued that Christian was guilty of negligence, in not describing more particularly the payee; but I
know of no authority which requires that to be done.
This
bill was drawn in the common form, payable 'to H. Davis
or order;' and the drawer could not foresee that it would get
into the possession of any other H. Davis.
If any other
stranger had received this bill, and indorsed it over to the
plaintiff, it is not pretended that such indorsement would have
conveyed any title to the bill, and it cannot make any difference whether such stranger bear the same name with the real
payee or not; for no person can give title to a bill but he to

Independently of these reasons, I
whom it is made payable.
think that convenience requires that the determination should
I have no difficulty in saying
be in favor of the defendant.
this H. Davis, knowing that the bill was not intended for him,
was guilty of a forgery; for the circumstance of his bearing the
same name with the payee cannot vary this case, since he was
Then if the plaintiff cannot recover on
not the same person.
this bill, he will be induced to prosecute the forger; and that

it

if

it

it,

would be the case even if it had passed through several hands,
because each indorser Vv'ould trace it up to the person from
would come to him who
and at last
whom he received
the plaintiff succeed
had been guilty of the forgery: whereas
in this action, he will have no inducement to prosecute for the
forgery: the drawer, on whom the loss would in that case fall,
might have no means of discovering the person who committed the forgery, and thus he would probably escape punishAs far, therefore, as convenience can have any effect,
ment.
But at
weighs strongly with me to receive the evidence.
all events the plaintiff cannot recover, since he derives his

a

is

A

I

I

it

title under a forgery."
was competent
Grose, J., said, " am of opinion that
to the defendant to show in evidence that the person, who
indorsed to the plaintiff, was not the person named as the
form that opinion as well
payee in this bill of exchange; and
on the substance of the transaction as on the form of pleading
transfer of a chose
only
bill of exchange
in such cases.
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custom of merchants; it is an
authority to one person to pay to another the sum which is
due to the first, and it is generally directed to be paid to the
When the person, on whom it is drawn,
payee or his order.

in action

according to the

he only engages by the terms of his acceptance to
or to
pay the contents of the bill to the person named in
to
The general form of the declaration, which
his order.
is

it,

accepts,

be found in some of the old entries, also agrees with this doctrine, and points out what the law is.
not drawn in
observe indeed that this declaration
is

"I

form, for the words 'to whom or to whose order'
the
that the said H. Davis, that
are omitted; but still
mentioned in the former part of the
same H. Davis who
It clearly,
declaration as the payee, indorsed to the plaintiff.
therefore, appears that as no person can demand payment of
bill of exchange but the payee, or the person authorized by
him, the acceptor only undertakes to pay to them, and cannot
he pay the
be compelled to pay to any other person.
in his own
amount of the bill to any other person, he pays
wrong, and such payment does not discharge his debt to the
this decision will prove a clog on the circulation
drawer.
think
will be less detrimental to the
of bills of exchange,
public, than permitting persons to recover through the medium
And that this was
of a forgery.
forgery cannot be doubted,
we consider the definition of it; which
the false making
instruine)it,
indorsement, etc., with intent to defratid^
of any
makes
no
difference
It
whether the person making this false
indorsement was or was not of the same name with the
payee, since he added the signature of H. Davis, with a view
to defraud, and knowing that he was not the person for whom
the bill was intended.
agree also with my Brother Duller,
that this decision will be more convenient to the public;
because then the plaintiff will prosecute the person, who indorsed to him, for the forgery.
For these reasons
am of
that,
as this bill of exchange was only payable to the
opinion
was competent to the defendant, the
payee or his order,
Geo.

2

'Vid.

2

it
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acceptor, to inquire whether the person under whom
plaintiff claims, was or was not the payee.'"
Rule absolute.
'
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the

following cases for a further discussion of this general
proposition: Robarts v. Tucker, i6 Q. B. (Ex. Ch. ), 560; Lawrence V. Russell, 77 Pa. St., 460; Graves v. American Bank, 17
N. Y., 205; Welsh V. Bank, 73 N. Y., 424; Gale v. Miller, 54
N. Y., 536; Arnold v. Check Bank, i L. R. C. P., 578; National
Park Bank v. Ninth National Bank, 46 N. Y., 77; Braithwaite v.
Gardiner, 8 Q. B., 473; Marine National Bk. v. National City
Bk., 59 N. Y., 67; White v. Continental Bk., 64 N. Y., 316; Reddington v. Woods, 45 Cal. , 406; Henertematte v. Morrie, 28
Hurr., 77.
See the

CHAPTER VII.
Methods of Transferring Commercial Contracts.

SECTION

34.

General Methods of Transfer.— It may be said that there
are but two general methods of transferring commercial contracts ;^^r.y2', by the act of the parties; and, second, by operaUnder the first method might be mentioned three
tion of law.

others, which constitute the most general methods:
a.
b.
c.

By assignment;
By indorsehient; and
By delivery simply.

SECTION

35.

Assignment Defined. — An assignment in the sense we
have used it here means the act by which one person transfers
to another his right, interest and property in bills of exchange,

a

(if

is

By
promissory notes, bonds and other commercial contracts.
an assignment of a commercial contract, the assignee gets the
An assignment differs from
interest which the assignor hath.
an indorsement in this, that the assignee takes the rights of
a bona fide holder)
he
the assignor, whilethe indorsee
gets all the rights represented by the terms of the contract.
The assignee may not receive any rights whatever, depending
altogether upon the right of the assignor; while the indorsee
secures the rights represented by the terms of the contract
without reference to the rights of the indorser.
Negotiable
are
transferred
contracts
by indorsement.
At common law the transfer of
chose in action or right
forbidden,
to a thing not in possession was
as violating the
rules against champerty and maintenance, and because the
man could not sell a thing which he did not have.
Such an

S^C. 36.
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assignment or transfer was considered as passing to another a
mere right to recover in a suit at law, and as the
ancient law
abhorred litigation, it prevented the sale of possibilities or
rights in action, and refused to recognize the title of the as-

signee when he sought to recover in a suit at law.
266a.

SECTION

Coke. Lit.

,

36.

Common Law Rule Abrogated.— The

stringent rule,
of the common law courts, has long since been disregarded by
the courts of equity and now in that court, assignments of
choses in action, will be protected and enforced.
In courts of
equity the assignee is regarded as the true owner of the thing
assigned (the chose in action) and is entitled to use it for his
own purposes subject to equities, of course, if there are any.
Experience has taught that the grave apprehension of the
common law courts, that actions would be multiplied; that the
rules against champerty and maintenance would be violated
and that justice would be trodden under foot, if property in
action should be transferred, has never been realized and the
supposed difficulties are no longer entertained.
Experience has not only taught the courts that no evil
results from the assignment of things in action, negotiable
contracts, etc. , but upon the contrary the permission to transfer these contracts (property in action), as well as property in
possession has resulted in great public good and private convenience.
Thalheimer v. Brinckerhoff, 20 Johnson (N. Y.),
380; Bacon v. Bouham, 33 N. J., eq. , 614; Wright v. Wright,
I Ves. R. , 411.

SECTION

37.

Interest Received by an Assignee. — An assignment,

as

applied to the transfer of negotiable contracts or negotiable
paper, is the transfer of the interest or equities which the
holder hath therein; while an indorsement, as will be explained
later, is a transfer of the title in a negotiable contract by writ-
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No particular or precise form of
ing, on the back thereof.
words are necessary to constitute an indorsement or an assignDawson, i Vesey, 331.
Any words which show an intention to transfer the title
An assignment may be either by
or interest will be sufficient.
McWilliams v. Webb, 32 Iowa, 577;
parol or in writing.
Jordon v. Gillen, 44 U. S. St., 424; Noyes v. Brown, 33 Vt.,

Row

ment.

V.

431-

it

it

a

it,

The same
An indorsement must always be in writing.
act may be either an assignment or an indorsement depending
For instance, if
upon the nature of the contract transferred.
the particular contract is a negotiable one, then the writing of
or across
the name, merely, of the payee across the back of
the face will be an indorsement; while the same act, upon
non-negotiable contract, one not containing the indicia of negotiability, will amount to an assignment and will transfer the
holder's interest therein only, and not the right represented by
In all cases, however, whenever
the terms of the contract.
was the intenappears upon the contract transferred, that
tion of the parties to the agreement that the transaction was
to have been an assignment, the courts will give their act that
effect and protect the interest of the parties accordingly.
Pass v. McCrea, 36 Miss., 143.
Non-Negotiable Contracts Transferred by Assignment
Only. — The only method of transferring non-negotiable con-

is

,

it

is

it

a

if

is

tracts
by assignment; but negotiable contracts may be transferred by assignment or by indorsement
the parties so intend.
The transfer of
negotiable contract payable to the order of
the payee, without indorsement in the first instance, by the
original payee or holder, would be an assignment of that contract, and passes the equitable title only, and the person to
whom
thus transferred may be subjected to all the equities
that attached to
in the hands of the transferer.
Quigley
Bank, 80 Mo., 295; Paris v. Wells, 68
v. Mexico So.
Ga. 604.
The assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor and his
right to recover upon the contracts assigned,
subject to the
defenses which were available against the latter, even though
he took the contract upon consideration and in good faith.
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40 Mich., 55; Spinning v. Sullivan, 48
Mich., 8; Foreman v. Beckwith, 78 Ind., 575; Weber v. Orten, 91 Mo., 677; Calvin v. Sterrett, 41 Kan., 218.

Morris,

SECTION

38.

Assignment — Action by Whom— The Rule at Common Law — The Equity Rule.— At common law the transferee of these

is

is

a

is

,

(if

contracts, if he desired to sue upon them, was
obliged to bring the action in the name of the assignor.
In
equity, however, a different rule prevailed and he was there
permitted to sue in his own name.
By statute, now, in all
the states, the equity rule has been adopted so that the holder,
the real party in interest, may maintain the action, upon such
contracts, in his own name.
Grand Gulf Bank v. Wood, 12
S. & M., 482. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 9 Cow., 34.
The Requirements in Case of an Assignment. —
There are certain duties imposed upon the assignee which are
not imposed upon the indorsee or one who takes a negotiable
instrument by indorsement.
He is required to give notice, to
the debtor
he desires to protect himself) that he has become the holder of the particular contract.
This notice
should be given as soon as convenient in order that the assignee
may be protected against possible equities which may arise
after the transfer.
The notice will not of course, relieve him
—
from the offset,
equities and other defenses, — which might
have been raised against him at the time of the transfer, and
before the notice.
Wood v. Brush, 72 Cal. 224; Kinderly v.
Jervis, 22 Beav., 31; Barrow v. Porter, 44 Vt., 587; Vanbuskirk V. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 14 Conn., 141.
Upon the question of the necessity of giving notice to
chose in action there
the debtor of the assignment of
In Clodfelter v. Cox, Mcmuch conflict in the authorities.
an irresistible conflict of authorKinney, J., says, "There
The weight of American authority
ity upon this subject.
comseems to be that the assignment of a chose in action

is

plete in itself, and vests a perfect title in the assignee as against
third persons, without notice of assignment to the debtor.
the settled doctrine of the English
But the contrary of this
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well as some of the courts of this country at the present
The latter we consider as the more reasonabe and safe
day.
practical rule, and have accordingly held on more than one
occasion, that the assignment of a chose in action is not complete, so as to vest the title absolutely in the assignee, until
notice of assignment is given to the debtor; and this not only
And,
as regards the debtor, but likewise as to third persons.
as

therefore, as between subsequent purchasers or assignees of a
chose in action, he is entitled to preference who first gives
notice to the debtor, although his assignment be subsequent
to that of the other.
To perfect the assignment not merely
as against the debtor, but also as against creditors and subsei Sneed
quent bona fide purchasers notice must be given."
(33 Tenn.), 339; Pickerring v. Ilfracomb R. R. Co., 3 Law
Rep., C. P., 235; Thayer V. Daniels, 113 Mass., 131; Muir
V. Schenck, 3 Hill, 230.
Notice Must be Given by the Assignee or his Lawfully Authorized Agent. — The notice of assignment should be
given by the assignee or his agent. Dale v. Kimpton, 46 Vt. , 76.

SECTION

39.

Assignee Takes Subject to Equities. — No rule is better settled than that the assignee of a chose in action takes it

subject to all equities existing between the debtor and creditor.
It is not necessary that the equities should exist at the
It is sufficient if they
inception of the debt or contract.
exist prior to the assignment; for the reason that the rule is as
applicable to one case as to the other; which is tnat the
assignee has it in his power to protect himself against them
Chancelby inquiring of the debtor before the assignment.
' '
Kent,
in
v.
the
Murray
Sylburne, says
lor
assignee can alto
the
debtor
and
ascertain
what claims he may have
ways go
in
action, which he is about
the
bond
or
other
chose
against
2 Johnson's Ch., 441; York
to purchase from the obligee."
Dec, 607; Polk v. Gallant, 34 Am.
V. McNutt, 69 Am.

Dec,

410.
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What is Meant by "Equities Which may

be

Inter-

posed Against the Assignee."— What we mean by the phrase
"equities which maybe interposed against an assignee" are
all those defenses which existed between the original parties,
and which grew out of some defect inherent in the contract
itself, and which renders the contract invalid in whole or in
part between the original parties, such as fraud, illegality or
duress or where the consideration has failed or in case of payment or accord and satisfaction.
Against these equities an
assignee cannot be a bona fide holder.
Some of these defenses (equities) may and others may not be interposed
against a bona fide indorsee.
(See Post Chap, on Defenses).
We have said that these "equities" relate to defenses
existing between the "original parties."
Upon the question
whether the "equities" which exist between the "original
parties" are the only ones which can be interposed, or
whether all the equities which exist between the subsequent
parties may be interposed as well, there is much conflict of
Theodore W. Dwight in discussing this rule said,
authority.
"The rule is not simply that the assignee takes subject to the
equities between the original parties though that is sound law.
It goes farther than this, and declares that the purchaser of a
chose in action must always abide the case of the person from
whom he buys.
The "reason of the rule," he continues, "is
that the holder of a chose in action cannot alienate anything
It is a question of
but the beneficial interest he possesses.
power or capacity to transfer to another, and this capacity is
Trustees of Union
to be exactly measured by his own lights."
College V. Wheeler et. al., 6i N. Y., 88 at 105; Owen v.
Evans, 134 N. Y., 514; Schafer v. Reilly, 60 N. Y., 61; Ingraham V. Disborough, 47 N. Y., 421; Green v. Warnick, 64
N. Y. , 220; Davies v. Austen, i Veseyjr. , 247; Durton v.
Benson, i P. Wm., 497; Barney v. Grover, 28 Vt. , 391;
Jeffries v. Evans, 6 B. Mon., 119; Boardman v. Hayne, 29
la., 339; Hill V. Shields, 81 N. C, 250; Warner v. Whittaker, 6 Mich., 133; Tinmes v. Shannon, 19 Iowa, 296; Robeson v. Roberts, 20 Ind., 155; Summers v. Hutson, 48 Ind.,
230; Watt V. Clark, 9 Pa. St., 399; Hill v. Caillone, i Ves,
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Sr., 122; Norton V. Rose, 2 Wash. (Va. ), 233; Crosby v. Tanner, 40 Iowa, 136; Duke v. Clark, 58 Miss., 466; L. R., 5
Ch. App., 358; Sutherland V. Reeve, 151 111., 384; 38 N. E.
Rep., 130; Commercial Nat. Bank v. Burch, Receiver, and
Burch, Receiver V. Kalamazoo Paper Co. , 141 111., 519; The
Mullanphy Sav. Bank v. Schopp et. al. v. Magloughhn, 133
Pa. St., 520; Rice v.
111.,
33; Stephens v. Weldon,
151
Hearn, 109 N. C, 150. This doctrine is disputed, see post
section 41.

SECTION

41.

Equities may be Interposed Between Parties —
Latent Equities. — While it is no doubt the general rule that
■What

the assignee takes the contract burdened with all the equities
against it there is an imposing line of authorities, which hold

that the assignee takes the contract freed from all equities
except those which existed between the original parties in its
inception.
Chancellor Kent, however, in a dissenting opinion in the
case of Bebee v. Bank of New York, says "when it is said
that an assignee of a chose in action takes it subject to all
equity, it is meant only that the original debtor can make the
same defence against the assignee that he could against the
assignor; the rule has never received any other application.''
1 Johnson,
529 at 572 (or 574 star pages); Livingston v. Dean,
2 Johns Ch. , 479;
Murray v. Lylburn, 2 Johns Ch., 441; Ohio
Life Ins. Co. v. Ross; 2 Md. Ch., 25, 39; Sleeper v. Chapman, 121 Mass., 404; Bloomer v. Henderson, 8 Mich., 395;
Bush V. Lathrop, 22 N. Y., 535; Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Sees. 703-715; Bispham's Principles of Equity, 171.
The defenses or equities, which arise between the subsequent parties are contra-distinguished from those existing between the original parties only, as latent equities.

CHAPTER VIII.
Indorsement.*

SECTION

42.

AN INDORSEMENT

MUST BE IN WRITING AND UPON THE
COMMERCIAL CONTRACT INDORSED.
FRENCH

V.

TURNER, i

In the Supreme Court of Indiana, November
\^Reported in

zj

Indiana,

^g.

27th, i860.

]

The Form of Action. — The first count

states

in

sub-

stance, that on Nevember 6, 1852, one John Bodle executed
and delivered to Abel C. Pepper, a mortgage on certain land,

therein described, to secure the payment of $1, 100, evidenced
by ten promissory notes of that date, each for $110; one payable in a year from date, and one maturing each year thereThis case is cited in Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 689a,
690, 748a; Benjamin's Chalmers on Bills, Notes and Checks, 117,
on Commercial Paper, 247, 264, 305; Wood's
125; Tiedeman
Byles on Bills and Notes, 252; Norton on Bills and Notes, 108;
See also Ryan v. May,
Ames on Bills and Notes, (Vol. i) 228.
'

14

111.,

*

49;

Kuler

V.

Williams, 49 Ind., 504.

Indorsement — Defined. — An indorsement

is the writing of
of the holder upon a commercial contract with the
intent (i) either to transfer the title thereto, or (2) to strengthen
the security, or both, by which act he becomes conditionally
Daniel, in his valuable
liable for the payment of such contract.
work on Negotiable Instruments, says, "Indorsing an instrument,
in its literal sense, means writing one's name on the back thereof;
and in its technical sense, it means writing one's name thereon
with intent to incur the liability of a party who warrants the payment of the instrument, provided it is duly presented to the principal at maturity, not paid by him, and such fact is duly notified
Dan. on Negot. Inst, sec. 666; Higgins v.
to the indorser."
Bullock, 66 111., 37; Sigourney v. Clarke, 17 Conn., 519.
the

name
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after until they all become due, with interest payable annually.
That in September, 1854, Pepper assigned and transferred the
mortgage and notes, by indorsement on the mortgage, to the
That Turner, in January, 1858, for value
defendant. Turner.
received, transferred the mortgage and notes to the plaintiff,
The mortgage
by indorsement in writing on the mortgage.
The
and notes, together with the assignment, are set out.
The California Code says, "One who writes his name upon

a

negotiable instrument, otherwise than as a maker or acceptor, and
delivers it with his name thereon to any other person, is called an
indorser, and his act is called an indorsement."
Sec. 3108 of the
Civil Code.
The fact that a guaranty is written on the back of a note above
the signature of the payee, does not have the effect of preventing
the signature from operating as an indorsement.
Nat. Bank v.
Galland, 45 Pac. Rep., 35.
An indorsement in its technical sense applies only to negotiable contracts.
It is an independent contract from the contract upon which it is made and is equivalent to the drawing
of a new bill upon the maker, drawee or acceptor as the case
It is an independent contract in the sense that its
may be.
validity may be attacked independently from the original contract
and in the same manner and under the same circumstances that
At common law the indorser
any other contract may be attacked.
could not be sued in the same action with the original parties to
the contract.
This rule, however, is now changed so that the indorser and maker may be sued together.
An indorsement must be
An indorsement, or
supported also by a distinct consideration.
what would amount to an indorsement of a negotiable note, will
be but an assignment when applied to a non-negotiable
contract.
Merchants
Nat. Bank v. Gregg ( Mich. ), 64 N. W. Rep., 1052;
Steere v. Trobilock et al., 66 N. Rep., 342.
The Mode of Indorsement. — There is no required form
for an indorsement.
It is done by simply writing the indorser's
name upon the back of the contract.
It must be in writing and
upon the instrument itself or upon a paper attached thereto.
Folger V. Chase, 18 Pick., 63; French v. Turner, supra.
The following statements have been held to be indorsements
when written upon negotiable instruments:
hereby assign all
"
my right and title to Mr.
.
Sears v. Lautz, 47 la., 658;
assign the within note to Mrs.
." Sands v. Wood, i la., 263;
'T hereby transfer my right, title and interest of the within note
to S. A. Y."
Aniba v. Yeomans, 39 Mich., 171; "For value received, I hereby assign all interest in and to this note to Mr.
.""
Stevens v. Hannan, 86 Mich., 307; 48 N. W. Rep., 551; Markey
V. Carey, 108 Mich., 184; 66 N. W. Rep., 493; "For value re-

"I

"I
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assignment from Turner to the plaintiff, on the mortgage, is
as follows, viz. :
' '
For value received,
hereby assign the within mortgage and notes, therein described, to John
French.
'' January 2,
{Signed) Moses Turner."
1858.
It is averred that the note which became due on November 6, 1858, and the interest on the other not due, remain due

I

J.

ceived I hereby assign, transfer and set over to D. B. T. all my
right, title and interest and claim in the within note." Hall v.
Toby, no Pa. St., 318; Adams v. Blethen, 66 Me., 19; Hatch v.
Barrett, 34 Kan., 230; 8 Pac. Rep., 129; Davidson v. Powell,
114 N. C, S7S.
To Whom a Commercial Contract May be Indorsed. —
A bill or note may be indorsed by the holder or owner to any one.
And it does not matter whether the indorsee is laboring under any
disabilities, such as infancy, lunacy, or coverature, or not.
At
common law, however, if a bill or note was indorsed to a married
woman, it became the property of her husband.
Story on Notes,
But in case the wife should survive the husband then
sec. 126.
she may sue in her own name, provided the husband does not
reduce the note to possession and secure the payment of the same.
Negotiable contracts may also be indorsed or transferred to
If,
executors any administrators, trustees and agents, as such.
however, the indorsement is made to the personal representatives
The same
it will operate as an indorsement to them personally.
At common law the husband could
is true in the case of trustees.
Dan. on
not indorse a contract to his wife except as her agent.
Negot. Inst., sec. 686; Schmittler v. Simons, loi N. Y., 554;
Pinney V. Adm'rs, 8 Wend., 500; Parsons on B. & N., vol. i, p.
161; Cornthwaite v. First Nat. Bk., 57 Ind., 268.
If a commercial contract is indorsed to the agent of a private
corporation as such, it will be regarded /rma/acz^ as an indorseDugan v. U. S., 3 Wheaton, 172; Fleckment to the corporation.
Wheat.,
8
Bank,
ner v.
360.
The Indorsement Must be of the Entire Instrument. —
The indorsement must be an indorsement of the entire instruIf, however, a part has been paid it may be indorsed as to
ment.
Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 668; Hawkins v.
the residue.
Ld.
Ray., 360; Byles on Bills, 291. An indorsement
Cardy, i
which purports to transfer a part only of the amount payable, does
If a part of the
not operate as a negotiation of the instrument.
note has been paid then of course the action may be an indorseHughes v. Keddell, 2 Bay (S. Car. Rep.),
ment of the residue.
324.

Indorsement — When Necessary. — It is well settled that
commercial contracts payable "to order" cannot be negotiated in
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That, for the notes which matured before
unpaid.
November 6, 1858, he foreclosed the mortgage, and the mortgaged premises were sold for $600, being fifty dollars less than
That Bodle,
the amount of the judgment, interest and cost.
at the time of the execution of the notes and mortgage, had
no property subject to the execution except the mortgaged
premises, nor did he have at the time of the maturity of any
and

the first instance, except by the indorsement of the payee or
holder or his legal representative so as to pass to the holder both
If, however, the note payable to
the legal and equitable title.
order has been once indorsed in blank by the payee, it then becomes
payable to bearer and may be negotiated without indorsement, because it is then equivalent to a note payable to
■'bearer."

The Effect of the Transfer of

a

Bill or Note Payable

to Order Without Indorsement. — The transfer of a commercial contract payable to order without indorsement by the payee,
is a mere assignment of the contract and the transferee may be
subjected to all the equities existing under such contracts.
Lancaster v. Baltzell, 7 G. & J., 468; Smalley v. Wight, 44 Me., 442;
Dubuc V. Voss, 19 La., Andrew, 210.
In all other cases of commercial contracts than those payable
to order, and where the indorsement is special or in full, they may
be transferred without indorsement,
if, however, other negotiable
contracts than those payable to order are indorsed, the indorser
incurs the same liability.
While an indorser may limit his liabilthe
nature
of
his
ity by
indorsement, he cannot restrain the negotiability of a commercial contract by his indorsement.
Johnson
V.

Mitchell, 50 Tex., 212.

Indorsement, May be Explained by Parol Evidence. —
'When. — The rule of evidence which provides that parol evidence

is inadmissable to vary or contradict the terms of a written contract applies to commercial contracts in general, and to contracts
of indorsements where they are regular and unambiguous.
Therefore parol evidence will not be admitted for the purpose of varying
the contract of indorsement unless the same is irregular and ambiguous.
Martin v. Cole, 104 U. S., 30; Lewis v. Dunlap, 72 Mo., 174;
V.
Lee
Pile, 37 Ind., 137; Charles v. Dennis, 42 Wis., 56; Fassen
V. Hubbard, 55 N. Y., 465; Chaddock v. Vaness,
35 N. J. L., 517.
While this is the weight of authority in the United States, some of
the states have held to the contrary.
In Pennsylvania it was expressly held that parol evidence was admissable to control or vary
the effect of the contract implied by law from an indorsement in
blank, on the broad ground that the rule excluding such evidence
applied only to express agreements; holding that the contract of
indorsement is one implied by the law from the blank indorse-
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That he is still wholly and notoriously

insolvent, having no property subject to execution, and that an
action against him would be unavailing, wherefore, etc.
The second count alleges, that the defendant, professing
to be the holder of the ten promissory notes (described in the
first count), secured by the mortgage on, etc., for value received, sold the said ten promissory notes to the plaintiff, by
Ross v. Espy, 66 Pa. St., 481; 5 Am. R., 394; 2 Parsons
N., 519.
The ground of these decisions is that a blank indorsement not

ment.
B. &

filled out is not a written instrument and hence not entitled to its
immunities, and not subjected to its restraints.
And hence these
decisions hold, that a blank indorsement may be orally proved to
have been merely for the puspose of collection or as a renewal of
Harrison v. McKin, 18 Iowa, 485; Miner v.
a previous note.
D.,
12
Robinson,
Am.
694.
While it is the general rule that regular indorsements may not
be varied by parol evidence, there are three apparent exceptions:
(i) where there is a want or failure of consideration; (2) where
Daniel
the indorsee is a trustee; and (3) in the case of fraud.
St.,
618;
Wolcott,
Ohio
v.
Hudson
on Negot. Inst., Sec. 720;
39
Wis.,
Carter,
v.
Abrahams v. Mitchell, 112 Pa. St., 232; Smith
25
283; Kirkham v. Boston, 67 111., 599; Lewis v. Dunlap, 72 Mo.,
178.

the case of Dye v. Scott, Gilmore, C. J., m speaking of
the right to show by parol evidence a waiver of demand and notice
of non-payment, said, "As between the indorser and indorsee we
regard the blank indorsement as only prima facie evidence of a
contract which the law presumes to arise therefrom if there was a
contemporaneous agreement between the parties upon which the

In

indorsement was made, both reason and justice require that as between themselves, the actual and not the presumed contract should
oral testimony should be
be enforced; and, as between them,
35 Ohio St.,
admissable to prove the contemporaneous contract.
Inst., Sec.
194; Lewis V. Long, 102 N. C, 206; Dan. on Negot.
66
Ensign,
v.
Farwell
Bills,
584;
1093; Parsons on Notes and
Mich.,
675.
Mich., 600; Kulenkamp v. Groff, 71
A different rule, however, has been laid down in several jurisThere are decisions which hold that parol evidence showdictions.
the title is
ing that the indorsement was merely made to transfer
where
recourse,
without
indorsement
admissable, and amounts to an
in
circulabeen
not
put
has
the paper is held by the indorsee, and
Rodney v. Wilson, 67 Mo., 123; Light v. Kingsbury, 50
tion.
Mo., 331; Charles v. Denis, 42 Wis., 56; Kern v. Von Phul, 7
Minn., 74; Campbell v. Robbins, 29 Ind., 271; Davis v. Breron,
U. S., 423; Breneman v. Furness, 90 Pa. St., 186.
94
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indorsement on the mortgage (as in the first count); and that
before the said assignment, the defendant received full payment and satisfaction of the first of said series of promissory
notes, to-wit: the one payable on November 6, 1853, and all
interest thereon, from the said Bodle, which interest at the
time of the assignment amounted to $30, making, of principal
and interest on the note, at the time of the assignment, $140,
which the defendant refuses to pay.
The third count alleges, that "the defendant professing
to be the holder of the ten promissory notes and mortgage,
and that the payment of the notes was secured by the mortgage, induced the plaintiff to purchase the same for a valuable consideration, fully equal to the principal sum mentioned
in the notes and interest accrued thereon; and thereupon the
defendant, in pursuance of said sale, by an instrument in
writing indorsed on the said mortgage, assigned the notes and
That at the same time the demortgage to the plaintiff.

Indorsement — Presumption as to the Time Of. — Where

an indorsement appears upon a commercial contract, without date,
there is a presumption of law that it was indorsed on the day of
its date, or at least before maturity.
This presumption, however,
be
rebutted
by evidence showing when it was made in fact.
may
Smith V. Nevlin, 89 111., 193; White v. Weaver, 41
409; Mc-

III,

Dowell V. Goldsmith, 6 Md., 319; Rogers v. Wiley, 14 111., 65;
Sanger v. Gary, i Mete, 369.
And, if the defendant alleges that it was indorsed after it became due, the burden of proof is on him to show it.
Hutchins v.
Flintge, 2 Tex., 473; Jordon v. Downs, 9 Rob., 265.
Every indorsement is presumed to be bona fide, and the burden of proof to the contrary is on the party denying the good
faith of the transaction.
Woodworth v. Huntoon, 40 111., 131.
If the indorsee secures the contract before maturity and without notice, he holds such contract free of any equitable defenses
which may have existed against it in the hands of prior holders,
and the burden is upon the defendant to show that the indorsee
had notice of equities between the original parties to the note, or
of such circumstances as would lead to notice at the time of the
The indorsee, before maturity, takes the title of the
indorsing.
indorser. If he is a bona fide purchaser without notice he may even
take a better title than the indorser, in which case he might
be able to recover even though the indorser could not.
And inasmuch as an indorser takes the title of the indorser, he may be able
to recover even though he has knowledge of existing equities,
providing the indorser was able to recover against existing equities.
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fendant, by an instrument in writing, executed contemporaneously with the assignment, covenanted and agreed with the
And in
plaintiff that the notes were secured by mortgage.
consideration that the plaintiff would receive the notes without indorsement, the defendant then and there agreed by
parol, and undertook and promised the plaintiff, that if he
could not collect the same from Bodle, the defendant would
pay the plaintiff the sum of money mentioned in the notes.
The foreclosure of the mortgage; the insufficiency of the
mortgaged premises to pay the debt; the insolvency of Bodle,
and that the note due November 6, 1858, with the interest
thereon, remains due and unpaid, are averred, substantially,
as in the first count.
Decision. — The first count is evidently based upon the
supposition that the defendant is liable as an indorser of the
This, however, is not the case. In order to render
notes.
him thus liable, the indorsement of the notes must have been
"on
made "thereon" (i R. S., 1852, p. 378), or perhaps,
another paper annexed thereto (called in French, Allonge),

is

Vansant,
16

56

58.

J.

III,

&

is

is

is

it

I

it

a

I

is

it

it

a

is

it

it,

The reason for this rule is that when the contract once comes into
the hands of a bona fide holder without notice it is purged of all
and they may not be interposed again
equities existing against
The only limitation on this rule
against one having notice even.
reaches the hands of the original parties again, the
that when
Kost v. Benequities attach and may be interposed against them.
III,
141, where
Huntoon,
v.
40
der, 25 Mich., 515; Woodworth
infirmity
or
other
Walker, C. J., said, "A note tainted with fraud
passing into the hands of an innocent purchaser, not chargeable
valuable consideration (and before maturity),
with notice, for
he acquires
purged of the defenses, and any other person acquirfrom him succeeds to his rights in the same condition he
ing
A defense to the instrument in the hands of an origheld them.
not revived by the note
inal holder having been thus cut off
being again transferred." Judge Cooley, in discussing this quesam not
tion in the case of Kost v. Bender, supra, says, "But
by the
to
purchaser
aware that this rule has ever been applied
the
to
protecessential
perceive that
original payee, nor can
should be."
tion of the innocent indorsee that
as to the Place.— Every
Presumption
Indorsement—
made, at the place where
been
have
to
presumed
indorsement
but prima facie.
This presumption
dated.
the instrument
L.,
162; Maxwell v.
N.
Co. v. Vannest, 58
Brook, Oliphant
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which is sometimes necessary, when there are many successive indorsements to be made."'
The indorsement in question, made upon the mortgage,
refers to the notes as being therein described, and is not upon
Such an
the notes, or upon any paper attached to them.
assignment could not operate to transfer the legal title to
It would convey an equitable title, authorizing
the notes.
the assignee, under our code, to sue thereon in his own name,
but it does not place the assignor in the condition of a legal
By such an assignment, the assignor does not warindcrser.
rant the solvency of the maker of the
effectual for that purpose than a parol
an assignment made by the delivery of
is analogous to the transfer of a bill

notes.

It

is no more

assignment would be,
the notes.

The case

if

a

it,

payable to bearer, by
"If it is payable to the bearer, then it maybe
delivery.
But, although it may be thus
transferred by mere delivery.
transferred by mere delivery, there is nothing in the law which
prevents the payee of a bill, payable to himself or bearer,
In such
he chooses, by indorsement.
from transferring
case, he will incur the ordinary liability of an indorser,

it,

a

a

a

is

mere transfer by delivery, he
from which, in the case of
On the transfer of a bill, payable to the
ordinarily exempt.
bearer, by delivery only, without indorsement, the person
party to the bill; although
making the transfer to be deemed
limited responsibility to the perhe may in some cases incur
founded upon parson to whom he immediately transfers
ticular circumstances, as, for example, upon his express or
implied guaranty of its genuineness, and his title thereto.^

follows, that the first count

is

dorser thereof

it

The defendant not being liable upon the notes,

as

in-

bad, and the

Story on Bills,

200.

4

Pa.

i

See also Rex v. Bigg,
Strange, 18;
St., 99; Moxon v. Pulling,
Camp.,
Votrain,
v.
Jurist. (N. S.), 637; Badgley

204.

25.
§

III,
^

68

3

'Story on Bills,
Arnot V. Symonds,
50; Young V. Glover,

85 §

demurrer thereto was properly sustained.
The second count we also deem defective.
Admitting
that the defendant impliedly warranted that the note thus
transferred had not been paid to him, which would seem to be
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still he is not Hable on the contract of assignment.
The plaintiif could only sue to recover what he paid for the asthe case,

signment of the note, as for money paid
that had failed.
If property was given
then he could only sue for the property,
and delivered; and if the assignment was
the

upon a consideration
for the assignment,
as for property sold
for a prior debt, then

prior debt only could be sued for.'

Story on Prom. Notes,

''S

Ind.,

§§

'

is

is

it,

is,

Here, the consideration paid for the assignment, and to
be recovered, if any thing, is not set out.
Nothing more is
averred in this respect than that the assignment was made
"for value received." In what the value was received,
whether in money, and if so, how much, or property, or by
way of satisfaction of a precedent debt, does not appear.
There is, evidently, not enough stated to show what the plaintiff paid, and, therefore not enough to show what he was entitled to recover.
The instrument in writing therein mentioned, executed
contemporaneously with the assignment,
by which, as is
the
defendant
agreed that the notes were secured by
alleged,
is
out,
not set
and therefore the case stands as if
mortgage,
the allegations in that respect were stricken out.
The parol
as
is
made,
agreement
alleged, contemporaneously with the
written assignment, can not be admitted to vary or extend the
effect of the assignment as written.
The doctrine in this resis
stated
in
the
case
of
McClure v. Jeffrey,'' as follows:
pect
" The rule
that all oral negotiations or stipulations between
the parties, which preceded or accompanied the execution of
the instrument, are to be regarded as merged in
and the
latter
to be treated as the exclusive medium of ascertaining
the agreement to which the contractors bound themselves."
The demurrers, we think, were correctly sustained, and
the judgment must be affirmed.
affirmed, with costs.'
The judgment
117, 118 and notes.

79.

'

Upon the question, as to what constitutes an indorsement,
Bl.
following authorities will be found to throw some light;
Stranges R., 18, 19;
121;
Com., 468, 469; Story on Notes,
Peere William's R., 419; 11 Grattan's R., 830.
Rex v. Bigg,
3

i

§

2

the
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43.

AN INDORSEMENT CAN ONLY BE MADE BY THE PAYEE OR
SUBSEQUENT HOLDER. AN INDORSEMENT BY A
STRANGER TO THE BILL OR NOTE IS IRREGULAR OR

ANOMALOUS.
UNION BANK

V.

WILLIS.'

In the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, October,
\_Reported in 8

The Form
against

of a promissory

tenor:
^'

For value

Metcalf, 504. ]

of Action. — Assumpsit

the indorser

received,

1844.

by

note

the

indorsees

of the following

'' August 8th,
184.J.
Willis,
to pay to
[promise Tilley

him, or order, $350, in four rnonths from date.
T. D. Thompson.

"

" B. L. Mirick & Co.," and unOn the back was the name of
der that name was the name of the defendant, both indorsements being in blank.
At the trial before the chief justice, the plaintiff's cashier
testified that they discounted the note for Thompson, and that
when it was discounted, the names stood on the note as they
There was no evidence that the note was presented
now do.
to JMirick & Co. for payment; but there was evidence tending
show that notice of dishonor was given to them, as indorsers,
well as to the defendant.
The defendant contended that Mirick & Co. were to be
considered as joint, or joint and several, promisors, and that
the defendant was not responsible as indorser, without proof
But it was ruled that
of presentment to them for payment.
they were not to be so considered as promisors, as that preas

'

This case is cited in Daniel on Negotiable

Instruments, 455,
Cfialmers
on Bills, Notes
713a,
999a,
1757;
Benjamin's
S94> 7i3>
and Checks, 169, 221; Bigelow on Bills and Notes, 34, 104, 105;
Bigelow's Cases on Bills and Notes, 38; Norton on Bills and
Notes, 137; Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, 157, 212, 270, 313,
336-
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a

a

is

a

If

it

is,

sentment of the note to them, and demand of payment of
them, were necessary to charge the defendant.
A verdict was
returned for the plaintiffs, which is to be set aside, and a new
trial granted, if the ruling was incorrect.
Decision. — It is admitted that the note was not presented for payment to Mirick & Co. ; and the question
whether the omission to do
discharges the indorser.
new one, we
the subject now brought before us were
shough hesitate in giving countenance to such an irregularity,
as to hold that any person whose name
written on the back
We should
of
note should be chargeable as a promisor.
name written on the paper, which name was not
say, that

a

if

that of the payee, nor following his name on his having indorsed it, was either of no validity to bind such individual,
any, was
because the contract intended to be entered into,
incomplete or within the statute of frauds; or that he should
second indorser; leavbe treated, by third parties, simply as
ing the payee and himself to settle their respective liabilities,

it

according to their own agreement.
But the validity of such contracts has been so long established, and the course of decisions, on the whole, so uniform,
has been prethat we have now only to apply the law, as

it

it,

I

'

it,

a

it

is

is

viously settled, in order to decide the present suit.
The first case of this description, of which any mention
that of Sumner v. Parsons, tried before
made in the reports,
The facts were
this court in Lincoln county, July term, 1801.
to
paper and gave
these: "Parsons wrote his name on
intent, or of
John Brown, but there was no evidence of the
Brown made a
any connection in business between them.
note on the other side, payable to Jesse Sumner or order, on
and thirty days after
demand, with interest, and signed
Sumner then got a writing in
made a partial payment on it.
In consideration of
these words over the name of Parsons:
the subsisting connection between me and my son-in-law, John
Brown,
promise and engage to guaranty the payment of the
contents of the within note, on demand.' And he sued Parand the
sons, declaring on the promise, specially stating
note, but did not aver any demand on John Brown, or notice
In two trials in the supreme judicial court,
to Parsons.

2
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that Parsons was liable, and that Sumner had a
right to fill the indorsement so as to make Parsons a common
indorser of the note, with the rights and obligations of such,
or a guarantor, warrantor or surety, liable in the first instance,
and in all events, as a joint and several promisor would be."'
remarks, that
Mr. Dane, who cites it in his Abridgment,^
was

held

" this

far as any case had gone, and on
the review the court was not unanimous; and it has since been
questioned"; and we have no doubt with good reason; for the
holder of the paper, having himself set out the contract by the
words written over the name of the defendant, should have
been held by its terms, and the legal effect should have been
And in that view of
given to the material word "guaranty."
the contract, the promise of Parsons was only to pay after a
demand upon Brown for payment, and a refusal by him, and
But the court must
of which Parsons should have had notice.
have construed the writing as constituting him an original
And in
promisor, and so bound, absolutely, without notice.
our apprehension, the writing of the guaranty over the name
of Parsons ought not to have been as an act obligatory on
him; but he should have been treated, if held at all, as an indorser of the note, and, as such, subject to the liabilities, and
case was carried

as

entitled to the notice, of an indorser.^
The next case which came before the court was that of
By the report, it appears that John Ames
Josselyn v. Ames.*
was indebted on a note to the plaintiff, who demanded security, and John offered his brother Oliver as surety, Vv'ho was
accepted.
John then made a note to Oliver, not negotiable,
The plaintiff
and Oliver put his name on the back in blank.
received it and gave up his former note, and afterwards wrote
over the defendant's name the same words as in Sumner v.
Parsons, with this additional clause, "and in consideration of
receiving from Elisha Josselyn a note of the said John of the
'

Amer. Prec. Declarations,

^Vol.

C.J.

I,

113.

416, 417.

"See Beckwith
'3 Mass.,

274.

v.

Angell,

6

Conn., 325, opinion of Hosmer,
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The court held that the plaintiff could not

same amount."

recover in that action, but might cancel the words written,
and substitute, ' ' for value received, I undertake to pay the
money within mentioned to Elisha Josselyn," and upon such
an indorsement, might maintain an action upon the facts
reported.
In what light the court held the defendant, does not distinctly appear; but we presume as an original promisor, from
the manner in which the case of Sumner v. Parsons is spoken
of.
"The guarantor in that case," they say, "was not the
promisee, but a stranger, who warranted the payment to him.
He cannot himself warrant to a third person payment of a
note made payable to himself and not negotiable."
The next reported case is that of Hunt v. Adams,' which
was assumpsit on a note given by Chaplin to Bennet, under
which the defendant wrote,
' '

of

/ acknowledge

the demand

of the

myself holden as surety for the payment
above note.

Witness my hand.
Barnabas Adams."

This cause was much considered, and the court ruled that the
defendant, Adams, was to be charged as a promisor, and that
his holding himself as surety did not abridge or affect the
plaintiff's rights, but only was evidence, as between the promisor and himself, that he had signed for his accommodation.
Other cases between the same parties, on similar notes, afterwards arose, and were decided in the same manner.^
Immediately after, occurred the case of Carver v. Warren.'
That was on a note made by one Cobb to the plaintiff,
and on the back of which the defendant wrote his name; and
the plaintiff filled the indorsement, and declared upon it as his
The defendant demurred to the declaration, on the
promise.
ground that this was but a promise to pay the debt of anBut the court
other, and was void for want of consideration.
held that, by the pleadings, each promised to pay the same

'5 Mass.,
''

358.

6

Mass., 519.

^5

Mass., 545.
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defendant's promise did not import any
guaranty or collateral stipulation; and that if the defendant
had indorsed as guarantor, and the present indorsement was
filled up without his consent, or any authority from him, he
should have pleaded the general issue, and on the trial he
And so the
might have availed himself of this evidence.
and that the

sum,

plaintiff had judgment on the demurrer.
There the
The case of Hemmenway v. Stone, followed.
"
I promise to pay F. M. Stone or order," and was
note ran,
signed B. Chadwick; and below was signed by the defendant.
The court held that it was a joint and several note, like the
case of March v. Ward.^
The next case was White v. Rowland,' which was on a
note payable by one Taber to the plaintiff, and on the back
of it was written,

" For value

jointly and severally undertake
tvithin -mentioned, to the said William

received,

pay the money,
White.

to

we

I. Coggeshall,

Jr.

Jno. H. Howland."
The court held that this undertaking was within the principle
settled in Hunt v. Adams, and was the same as if the party
had signed his name on the face of it; and that
charged as a several original promisor.
The case of Moies v. Bird,* which succeeded,

he was well
is

substan-

A note was made to the plaintiff, and
tially like the present.
signed by Benjamin Bird, and the defendant signed his name
The court say, the defendin blank on the back of the note.
ant "leaves it to the holder of the note to write anything over
his name which might be considered not to be inconsistent
with the nature of the transaction.
The holder chooses to
consider him as a surety, binding himself originally with the
If he was a
principal; and we think he has a right so to do.
surety, then he may be sued as an original promisor."
'

Mass., 58.
'Peaks's Cas., 130; see also Bayley on Bills (2d Amer. ed.), 44.
' Mass.,
'

7

9

II

314.

Mass., 436.
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In the case of Baker

the promisor, he

He

note, meaning to make himself liable with
to be regarded as
joint promisor and
a

puts his name on

is a

a

it

&

^

it

it,

v. Briggs/ which was an action to
recover the amount of a promissory note made by one Ryan
to the plaintiff, the name of the defendant, Briggs, was written on the back of
and the court say that, according to several decisions,
was right to declare against him as promisor,
though he stood in the relation of surety to Ryan, who signed
the note on the face of it.
The case of Chaffee v. Jones was assumpsit on a note
signed by Israel A. Jones, as principal, and Eber
Jones and
E. Owen
Sens, as sureties, by which they jointly and severally promised to pay the president, etc., of the Housatonic
Bank, or their order; and the plaintiff put his name on the
back of the note in blank.
The plaintiff was called upon, after the neglect of the makers, and he paid
to the bank.
The court held that where one, not promisor, nor indorser,

is

a

it

it

it

a

it,

is

is

not liable as indorser, for the note
not negotiated, nor
title made to
through his indorsement; nor
as guarantor, there being no distinct consideration; but he
means to give security and validity to the note by his credit
and promise, and
immaterial, for this purpose, on what
part of the note he places his name.
So in Austin v. Boyd,*
where the defendant's name was, in like manner, on the note,
was held that the party, by thus putting his name on the
back, makes himself an original promisor.
He intends by
to give credit to the note.
The case of Samson v. Thornton* was assumpsit on
note made by Benjamin Russell to the plaintiff, and was indorsed by the defendant, Thornton; and the declaration
The court there ruled
charged him as an original promisor.
that the defendant, not being the payee of the note, must be
held to stand in the character of an original and joint promisor
surety.

and surety.

'8 Pick.,

Pick., 260.

"

^19

24

*3

130.

Pick.,

64.

Met., 275.
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Lincoln'

is of the same type.
There the court held that the defendant, not being payee, but
having put his name, in blank, on the note, must be considered as an original promisor and surety, if he put it on simul-

The case of Richardson

v.

taneously with the promisor, as an original contractor.^
The same questions have arisen in New York, in various
They will
cases, and have been decided in a similar manner.
be found cited in Story on Notes, §§ 59, 472-480, where the
subject is fully discussed, and the authorities examined.
To hold the party, however, as promisor, where the name
alone is written, it must appear that he made the promise at
the time when the note itself was made; otherwise, he may

have been an original undertaking on their part.
It was contended, in the argument, that Mirick

&

it,

it;

either not be chargeable at all, or be chargeable as surety or
'
But that the
guarantor, according to the facts proved.
promise was made at the same time with the note, is a fact
which is to be presumed when the note is in the hands of a
And
bona fide holder, and nothing is shown to the contrary.
in the present case, the note was offered to the plaintiffs for
discount, by the maker himself, with the names of Mirick &
therefore, to
showing
Co. and Willis on the back of
Co.

right to
merely sureties, and that the plaintiffs had
treat them as such, and therefore were not bound to demand
necessary step to enable
payment of them as makers, as
them to charge the indorser; the relation of promisor, surety
There is, unquestionably,
and guarantor being distinct.

a

a

a

were

■distinction

between these several undertakings;

and always so

But as to the subsisting relations between
principal and surety, they rarely affect the
contract between the creditor and surety.
man may be
equally a surety and an original promisor; as where the promise is,
A. B., as principal, and
C. D., as surety, promise
'5

I,

I,

A

a

in regard to a mere guarantor.

Met., 201.

4

6

§§

8

8

5

also Sumner v. Gay,

4

Pick., 311.
^Carvor v. Warren,
Mass., 545; Tenney v. Prince,
Pick.,
V.
Pick., 130; Oxford Bank v. Haynes,
385; Baker
Briggs,
Pick., 423; Story on Notes,
473, 474; Beckwith v. Angell,
Conn., 315.
^See
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1

&

I

is,

to pay; or where the party signs, and adds to his name the
word surety.
This does not make him less a promisor.
It
only defines the relation between him and his co-promisor;
and as promisor, the necessity of a presentment to him is not
dispensed with, if the intention of the holder of the note is to
charge the indorser.
It is not for the holder of the note to
choose in what character he will consider the party who has
put his name on the note; but he must treat him as sustaining
that legal relation which the facts establish.
If he put his
name on the note at the time it was made, like the case at
bar, he is a promisor; if after the making of the paper, he is
a surety or guarantor, according to the agreement upon which
he gives his signature.
The fixing of the relation of the party,
when he enters into the contract, is necessary for the protection of holders, and for guarding the rights of indorsers, whose
If it were held otherwise, I do not
liability is conditional.
well see how such contracts could be supported against the
objection of being void within the statute of frauds. And, as
it
consider these engagements rather as exceptions to the
statute, than in any other light, and as growing out of, or
rather engrafted upon, the law merchant applicable to regularly drawn bills of exchange and promissory notes.
Upon this view of the law, as drawn from the various
Co. to have been joint and
cases, we consider Mirick
several promisors with Thompson, and liable in like manner
with him.

&

is

if
it

it

&

The demand, in this case, was made on Thompson, the
Co. and
signer of the note, and notice was given to Mirick
contended,
by the plainnow
to Willis, as indorsers; and
Co. are joint and
should be held that Mirick
tiffs, that

a

If

several promisors with Thompson, and not indorsers, then the
demand on Thompson is, in law, a demand on them also; and
such demand being proved, that the indorser, on due notice,
will be bound.
The precise question here presented, we believe, has not
the joint and several
been decided in any reported case.
promisors are to be considered in the light of partners, then
notice to all, as partners
a notice to one must be esteemed
are but one person in legal contemplation; each partner.
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acting in such capacity, being not only capable of performing
what the whole can do, and of receiving that which belongs to^
It
all, but by such acts necessarily binding all the partners.
follows, therefore, as an incident to such joint relations, that
But in
all the partners are affected by the knowledge of one.
respect to mere joint and several promisors on a note, there is
not such absolute community of interest between them, nor
such necessary connection with each other, as to constitute

The relationship is confined to the present
specific liability of a joint and several promise, and which can

them

partners.

by the act of one, so that his conduct shall
one
As between themselves,
bind the other.

not be extended

necessarily
promisor may be a mere surety, and the other the debtor; one
surety may have received security for lending his name, the
Or, if there are three joint and several promisors,
other not.
two may be sureties, and the other the principal debtor,
although the fact may not appear on the note.
As the incidents, then, of a partnership do not attach to
such a limited joint liability, there being neither a community
of interests, nor joint participation of profit and loss, the lact
of knowledge on the part of the whole, from the actual
knowledge of one, does not follow as a presumption of law;
and a demand upon one is not, therefore, in law, a demand
upon the whole.
If. then, the bringing home of knowledge
to each, or proof of a demand upon each, is a fact necessary
to be proved, in order to bind third persons, then such knowledge or such demand on each, must be proved as any other
fact.

A case arose in Connecticut, upon

note payable to two
One
jointly, and by them indorsed in their individual names.
ground of defense was want of notice of non-payment; and
The
notice was proved to have been given to one only.
court held, after a careful consideration of the case, that a
notice to one laid no foundation for an action against both, as
This
each payee must indorse it, in order to transfer the title. '
case, we think, involves and settles a principle similar to the
one arising in the case at bar.
And the Supreme Court of
the state of New York strongly incline to a like view of the
'

Shepard v. Hawley,

i Conn., 367.

a
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law, in a case ' where it was not necessary to decide the point.
And Judge Story, who carefully considers the subject, in his
work on notes, is of the same opinion.''
To apply the law to the tacts as proved in the case before
us: Thompson and Mirick & Co. stand in the relation of joint
'S
^

Hill,

234.

Story on Notes, §§ 230, 255.

Indorsement by Joint Payees. — If

a commercial contract
payable to several persons, not partners, or in case it be
indorsed to several persons jointly, it can only be transferred, by
indorsement, by a joint indorsement of them all.
If, however, the
joint payees are partners, then it may be transferred by any one of
them.
One of the joint payees may be authorized by the others
to indorse for them.
Ryhiner v. Feickert, 92 111., 305; Story on
Notes,
sec.
Promissory
125; Dan. on Negot. Inst, sec. 701a.
While a joint payee or indorsee may not transfer the title,
legal or equitable, by his separate indorsement, he may, however,
transfer his interest in the same; Ryhiner v. Feickert, supra; Dan.
on Negot. Inst., supra; in which case the transferee would take an
When joint payees become
equitable title only in the instrument.
Lane
joint indorsers, the right of contribution exists among them.
V. Stacy, 8 Allen (Mass.), 41 (1864).
By Whom May the Indorsement be Made? — In case the
contract can be transferred by indorsement, the general rule is that
It may
it may always be indorsed by the legal or lawful holder.
mind.
of
unsound
also be indorsed by an infant or a person
A\'hen the indorsement is by an infant it will pass a good title to
the paper; but the infant of course does not render himself liable
thereon unless he desires so to be, or unless after reaching his
But the infant may indeed avoid
majority he ratifies the contract.
his indorsement and intercept the payment to the indorsee, or by
giving notice to the antecedent parties, of his avoidance, furnish
But
to them a valid defense against the claim of the indorsee.
to be deemed, in
the indorsement
until he does so avoid
good and valid transfer.
respect to such antecedent parties, as
Culver V. Leavy, 19 La. Ann., 202; Story on Bills and Notes, sec.
80;
Daniel on Negot. Inst., sec. 228; Tied, on Com. Paper,

sec. 49.

voidable

only and not void.

3

The indorsement by an infant
Wend., 479.
Goodsell v. Meyers,

is

a

is

it,

be made

has been said that, where he receives full consideration for
suspended until he
the transfer, his right to avoid his contract
then without
reaches his majority; and that he cannot disaffirm
There
returning or offering to return the consideration received.
v.
Medbury
rule.
the
being
this
about
however,
some doubt,
Inst.,
sec.
Hill, no; Dan. on Negot.
229.
Watrous,
7

is

it

is

It
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and several promisors.
Pa5'ment of the note was demanded
The defendant is an
of Thompson, but not of jNIirick & Co.

indorser, Hable only upon legal notice of a demand upon the
promisors and a refusal by them to pay the note; and we are

In case of the death of the holder, the right in these contracts passes to his personal representatives — administrators
or
The personal repexecutors — and then must be indorsed by them.
resentative cannot bind the estate which he represents by his
indorsement.
Curtis v. National Bank, 39 Ohio St., 579.
Where
there are several executors they must all indorse.
Brown v. Salisbury, r Glyn. i& Jam., 407; Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, 262.
At common law the husband by reducing the wife's chose in
action to possession became the lawful owner of them and must
therefore transfer them by indorsement.
Conner v. Martin, i
Strange, 516; Miller v. Delameter, 12 Wend., 433.
This rule has now been greatly modified in many of the states
by statute, so that she now owns and controls her own estate just
as though she were a, feme soule.
A spendthrift or a person under guardianship can not contract,
and therefore cannot pass title by an indorsement.
Lynch v.
Dodge, 130 Mass., 458.
In case of bankruptcy all the property of the bankrupt passes
to the assignee, and together with it the control, etc., and thereby
the original holder loses the right to indorse.
In such cases the
assignee may indorse these contracts.
Where these commercial contracts are made payable to a copartnerships, any one of the firm may indorse it; but such indorsement must be in behalf of the partnership.
Otherwise the member
of the firm who indorses would be personally bound.
If one of
the firm dies, then the survivor may indorse in his own name.
If
the paper is payable to a corporation it must be indorsed by some
agent of the corporation who has authority to bind the corporation by contract, and then the indorsement must show that it is
the act of the corporation, for otherwise the agent would be personally bound.
When a bill or note or other commercial contract
is payable to two or more persons jointly and who are not partners, they must all join in the indorsement in order that the whole
title may be passed. If one of them indorses alone, it passes his
equitable interest only. The indorsee in this case could not maintain an action on the paper.
When, however, the paper is payable to either of two or more persons, then any one may pass the
title by indorsement.
Culver v. Leavy, 19 La. Ann., 202; Ryhiner
V. Feickert, 92 111., 311.
Of course one of joint parties may be authorized to indorse
such contract.
He may also indorse to the others, in which case
the indorsement
will carry with it all his interest.
Russell v.
Swan, 16 Mass., 314.
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of opinion that he has a right to avail himself of this neglect
to make demand on Mirick & Co. to discharge himself from
his

liability

as

indorser.

Verdict set aside, and a new trial granted.

Irregular

or Anomalous

Indorsement — Defined. — An

irregular or anomalous indorsement is where a person who is not
the payee, but a third party, places his name on the back of a
commercial contract before the name of the payee or of the original party to the contract.
It is the indorsement by a stranger
before the delivery of a commercial contract.
Where the payee
of a commercial contract indorses it by placing his name on the
back of the instrument, a contract of indorsement is created; and
parol evidence is not admissible to change or vary the terms of his
Kingsland v. Koeppe, 137 111., 344: 28 N. E. R., 48;
contract.
Good V. Martin, 95 U. S., 95; Blakeslee v. Hewitt, 76 Wis., 341
(44 N. W. Rep., 1105); Cady V. Shepherd, 12 Wis., 639; People's
Bk. V. Jefferson, etc. Bk., 106 Ala., 624. The exact nature of the
liability of one who, not being the payee, — a stranger, — writes his
name across the back of a negotiable contract before delivery, is
In some states he
differently stated in the various jurisdictions.
maker;
in others an ina
joint
in
some
is held to be a guarantor;
dorser; in others as a co-surety; but in all of the states it is held
that parol evidence may be admitted for the purpose of showing
In
the intention of such signer at the making of such signature.
Indiana it is held that he is a co-security or joint maker if the
contract is non-negotiable while if it is a negotiable contract the
same act is held to be an indorsement and the party liable as an
Some of the states have settled the nature of his liaindorser.
In Connecticut, New Jersey, Indiana, Wisconbility by statute.
New York, Maine and in the courts of the
sin, Pennsylvania,
Spencer v.
United States his liability is that of an indorser.
Ind.,
Chad126
Bank,
553;
v.
AUerton, 60 Conn., 410; DePauw
Wis.,
12
dock V. Vaness, 35 N. J. L., 517; Cady v. Shepherd,
Barb.,
639; Smith v. Kessler, 44 Pa. St., 142; Lester v. Paine, 39
616; Brown v. Butler, 99 Mass., 179; Sturtevant v. Randall, 53
Me., 149; Good v. Martin, 95 U. S., 95. He is held to be a
Kingsland
grantor in Illinois, Kansas, California, and Nevada.
Kan.,
Hill,
48
558: Riggs
V. Koeppe, 137 111., 344; Fullerton v.
He is held to be a joint maker or cov. Waldo; 2 Cal., 485.
security in Tennessee, Missouri, Maryland and Vermont, MichiArkansas, Delaware, Mingan, Massachusetts, Maine, Colorado,
North Carolina, South
Island,
nesota, Missouri, Ohio, Rhode
Carolina, Texas, Maryland, New Hampshire, Vermont, Utah.
Bank of Jamaica v. Jefferson, 92 Tenn., 537; First Nat. Bk. v.
Mo., 291; Owings v. Baker, 54 Md., 82; Smith v.
Payne,
Long, 40 Mich., 555; Seymour v. Mickey, 15 Ohio St., 515.
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44.

PARTICULAR FORM IS REQUIRED FOR AN INDORSEMENT. IT IS SUFFICIENT IF IT IS MADE, EITHER
WITH AN INTENTION TO TRANSFER THE CONTRACT
UPON WHICH IT IS WRITTEN, OR TO STRENGTHEN
THE SECURITY AND TO TRANSFER THE CONTRACT.*
BROWN

V.

BUTCHER'S, ETC., BANK.i

In the Supreme Court, New York, May,
[Reported in 6

Hill,

443, 41

1844.

Am. Dec, 7SS-]

On error from the Superior Court of the city of New
York, where the Butchers and Drovers' Bank sued Brown as
the indorser of a bill of exchange, and recovered judgment.
The indorsement was made with a lead pencil, and in figures
thus,
2. 8. ," no name being written.
Evidence was given
strongly tending to show that the figures were in Brown's
hand-writing, and that he meant they should bind him as in-

"I.

'This

case is cited in

Daniel on Negotiable

Instruments,

74,

688a; Benjamin's Chalmers on Biils, Notes and Checks, 57; Norton on Bills and Notes, 58, 108, 382; Tiedeman on Commercial
Paper, 12, 265; Bigelow on Bills and Notes, 10, 25, 63; Bigelow's
Cases on Bills and Notes, 77.
See also 41 Am. Dec, 755, and
cases cited.

*Form of Indorsement. — No particular form

is required so
long
to be transIt is quite immaterial whether the indorsement be written
ferred.
on the back of the instrument or on the face.
Young v. Glover,
I
S.),
Aures
on
Cases
Bills
637;
and
Notes, 228; Gor3 Jurist (U.
man V. Ketchum, 33 Wis., 427; Chitty on Bills, 227; Haines v.
Dubois, 30 N. J. L., 259; Rex v. Bigg, i Strange, 18; Shaw v.
Sullivan, 106 Cal., 208; Quin v. Sterne, 26 Ga., 223; Arnot v.
Symonds, 85 Pa. St., 99; Marion Gravel Road Co. v. Kessinger,
66 Ind., 553; Herring v. WoodhuU,
29 111., 92; Yarborough v.
Bank of England, 16 East, 12; Gibson v. Powell, 6 How. (Miss.),
60; Moies V. Bird, 11 Mass., 436; Story on Promissory Notes, sec.
as

121

it is in writing and placed upon the contract

.

The indorsement is generally written upon the back of the
note and at the left-hand end thereof.
In the case of Haines v.
Dubois, supra, the payee
wrote his name under that of the
maker, and it was held to be a sufficient indorsement.
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dorser; though it also appeared that he could write.
The
court below charged the jury that, if they believed the figures
upon the bill were made by Brown, as a substitute for his
proper name, intending thereby to bind himself as indorser,
he was liable.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs below, on which judgment was rendered, and Brown thereupon
brought error.

An Allonge Defined. — The

indorsement may also be written
upon another paper if the same is attached to the contract, in which
It may sometimes happen that in
case it is called an " allonge."
numerous transfers from hand to hand, the back of the paper is
In such case the holder may tack on a
covered by endorsements.
piece of paper sufficient to bear his own and subsequent indorseThis addition is called an "allonge." Young v. Glover,
ments.
Ind., S9j Cusley v.
3 Jurist (U. S. ), 637; French v. Turner, 15
Roub, 16 Wis., 616; Folger v. Chase, 18 Pick (Mass.), 63; Helmer
V. Com. Bank, 44 N. W. Rep., 482.
The full name of the indorser should be written, and it is usual
so to do; but the initials will be sufficient, as well as any mark or
Merchants Bank
sign, instead of the name if made to represent it.
V. Spicer, 6 Wend., 443; Corgan v. Trew, 39 III, 31; Rogers v.
Colt, 6 Hill, 322; Brown v. Butchers and Drovers Bank, 6 Hill
322; Johnson's Cases on Bills and Notes, 114.
The indorsement may be made with pen or pencil, so long as
Geary v. Physic,
the intention of the parties can be ascertained.
Hill,
6
Bank,
C,
v.
Butchers
Brown
443; Closson
Barn.
&
234;
5
Dec,
Vt.,
V. Steans, 4
11; 41 Am.
755.
The following forms of expression have been held to constitute good indorsements when written across the instrument and
properly signed: —

8;" "Pay the contents to A;" " Pay A;" " Pay A or
order;" "Pay A or bearer;" "assign;" "sell and assign;" "Pay
to the order of A;" "A;" "Pay A only;" "Pay A for the use of

"I,

2,

B;" " I hereby assign this draft and all benefit of the money
secured thereby to B;" " I hereby assign all my right and title to
Brown v. Butchers Bank, 6 Hill, 443; Adthe within note to B."
ams V. Blethen,
V.
V.

66

Me., 19; Sears v. Lantz,

I Camp., 442; Sands v. Wood,

Horlock,
Judd, 24 Kan., 166.

"I

47
21

la., 658; Vincent

Iowa,

263; Shelby

hereby transfer my right and title to the within note to S.
A. Yeoman," was held to be a good transfer of the contract in
Michigan by assignment. Aniba v. Yeoman, 39 Mich., 171.
The full name of the indorser should be given, but the initials
The following have
No particular form is necessary.
will answer.
Just the name written
also been held to constitute an indorsement:
order,"
or "bearer;"
or
A.
"Pay
bill;
note
or
of
across the back
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Decision. — It has been expressly decided that an indorsement written in pencil is sufficient;' and also that it may be
In a recent case it was held that a mark
made by a mark.^
was a good signing within the statute of frauds; and the court
refused to allow an inquiry into the fact whether the party

could write, saying that would make no difference/
These cases fully sustain the ruling of the court below.
They show, I think, that a person may become bound by any
mark or designation he thinks proper to adopt, provided it be
used as a substitute for his name, and he intend to bind himself.*

Judgment affirmed.

SECTION

45.

AN INDORSEMENT IS NOT COMPLETE UNTIL A DELIVERY
OF THE CONTRACT UPON WHICH IT IS MADE.
BROMAGE ET AL.

:■.

LLOYD ET AL.s

In the Court of Exchequer, May,
\_Reported in

i Exchequer

Hep.,

The Form of Action. — Assumpsit.

1847.

J

2.^

The declaration

"assign;" "sell and assign;" any form of words, with the signaIt has been
ture, which will indicate the intention of the indorser.
held that the indorsement need not be on the back of the instruIt matters not where the sigRex V. Bigg, I Strange, 18.
ment.
nature appears, so long as it shows what the nature of the liability
is.
Quin V. Sterne, 26 Ga., 223; Arnotv. Symonds, 85 Pa. St., 99.

'Geary v. Physic,

Barn. & Cress., 234.
"George v. Surrey, i Mood. & Malk., 516.
'Baker v. Dening, 8 Adol. & Ellis, 94; and
Harrison, 8 Ves., 186; Addy v. Grix, id., 504.
5

see

Harrison v.

Coit, (ante. p. 322, 323).
^This case is cited in Daniel on Negotiable Contracts, 64, 267;
Norton on Bills and Notes, 72, 135; Tiedeman on Commercial
Paper, 34, 148; Benjamin's Chalmers on Bills, Notes and Checks,
59, 61; Wood's Byles on Bills and Notes, 115, 285; Ames on Bills
and Notes, 289.
See also, Clark v. Sigourney, 17 Conn., 511;
Ohio,
2
Clark V. Boyd,
56; Taylor v. Surget, 21 N. Y., ti6; Marston V. Allen, 8 Mees. & W., 494; Spencer v. Carstarphen, 15 Colo.,
445 (1890); 24 Pac. Rep., 882; Laird V. Davidson, I24lnd.,4i2;
Cooper V. Nock, 27 111., 301.
*See Rogers v.
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Stated, that the

Price, 442.

8

Marston v. Allen,

'5

'

M. & W.,

494.

a

is

a

it,

defendants, on, etc., made their promissory
note in writing, and thereby jointly and severally promised to
pay one H. Lloyd Harries (since
deceased) or order, ;£'300 on
demand, and then delivered the said note to the said H. Lloyd
Harries, who then indorsed the said promissory note, but without making any delivery thereof: and afterwards, to wit, on,
etc. , the said H. Lloyd Harries died, having first made his last
will and testament, in writing, duly executed and attested as
by law required, and thereby appointed his then wife, to wit,
one Jane Harries, executrix thereof, who, after the death of
the said H. Lloyd Harries, to wit, on, etc., duly proved the
said will and took upon herself the execution thereof, and became and was sole executrix thereof; and she, as such executrix, afterwards, to wit, on, etc. , for good and valid consideration to her, as such executrix as aforesaid, in that behalf, transferred the said note, so indorsed as aforesaid, to the
plaintiffs, to wit, by delivery thereof to them by her as such
executrix as aforesaid; of all which the defendants then had
notice, and then, in consideration of the premises, promised
to pay the amount of the same note to the plaintiffs, according to the tenor and effect thereof, and of the said indorsement and delivery.
General demurrer, and joinder.
The Claim of Defendant.— The plaintiffs have no title
to sue on the note.
An indorsement consists of two things,
namely, (i) the writing on the note of the name of the party
and (2) of
transferring
delivery for the purpose of completing such transfer.'
In the present case, the testator wrote his name on
the note, but did not deliver it; the executrix has delivered
the note without indorsing it.
The indorsement by the
testator was a mere inchoate act which could not be rendered complete by the subsequent delivery of the executrix.
In Rex V. Lambton,^ Wood, B., says, "It
clear that
special indorsement does not transfer the property in bills until
they are delivered over."
Suppose the testator has sealed a.

bond,

and died without

it,

BROMAGE ET AL. V. LLOYD
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delivering
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a delivery by his execu-

'^Hammondv.

If

4

&

3

Colls,

i

Bing., 460; E. C. L. R.,

C. B., 916.

6.

2

'12 Adolph. & E., 459.
^Childs V. Monins,
Bred.

&

if
it

9.

A

a

is

is

it

If

is

a

is

a

is

A

a

if

a

it

a

it

In Adams
the deed of the testator.
trix would not render
V. Jones,' Ld. Denman, C. J., says, "A bill may be indorsed
to
party in two ways, either by special indorsement, making
blank indorsement, and depayable to that party, or by
not
In the latter way, at all events,
livery to that party.
in the former, the bill must be delivered to the party as inAn
dorsee, in order to constitute an indorsement to him."
bill by an executor, with delivery, will not
indorsement of
fortiori delivery, without
bind the assets of the testator.^
indorsement, cannot do so.
The Claim of Plaintiff. — First, upon general demurrer,
there
sufficient allegation of the transfer of the note.
The declaration alleges that the executrix, for good and valid
consideration to her as executrix, transferred the note so indorsed as the plaintiffs, to wit, by delivery thereof to them by
her, as such executrix as aforesaid.
That allegation
tantaThe promise
mount to
legal indorsement by the executrix.
to pay according to the tenor and
alleged in the declaration
effect of the said indorsement.
legal transfer can only
be made by the party writing his name upon and delivering
the note, then upon general demurrer, such must be taken to
be the meaning of the word "transferred."
The true construction of the declaration in this: that the executrix transferred the note "being so indorsed as aforesaid;" that is, indorsed by another person.
The videlicet does not control the
operation of the word "transfer," or render material the
mode in which
"transalleged to have been made.^
fer" may mean either an indorsement or assignment; which
latter word
used in the statute
Anne, c.
the
defendant had pleaded by denying the transfer modo et forma,
and that issue had been found against him, he could not after
verdict have taken advantage of any ambiguity in the declaration.
Secondly, even
be taken on the face of the declaration that there was a mere writing of his name by the testator,
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and a delivery by the executrix, such transfer would pass the
property in the note, and entitle the plaintiffs to sue upon it.

Where the testator has delivered

note without indorsement,
an indorsement by his executor is equally valid as if made by
himself.'
That case only decides, that where a party delivers
a note for a valuable consideration, without indorsement, he
creates an equitable, not a legal title, and the holder, having
an equitable right, is entitled to call on the executor of the
If a note is
party who delivered it to give a formal transfer.
transferred without indorsement before bankruptcy, the holder
There
may call on the bankrupt or his assignees to indorse it.^
are many instances in which an executor may adopt and
A cognizance by a defendant,
ratify the acts of his testator.
as bailiff of an executor, for rent due to the testator, is supposed by proof of a distress by him in the name of the testator, and by his direction, but after his death; such distress,
though made before probate, having been afterwards adopted
and ratified by the executor." In that case Ld. Denman,
C. J., said, " The law knows no interval between the testator's
An
death and the vesting of the right in his representative."
a

executor is not in the situation of a mere agent, but his acts
are identified with those of his testator.
Decision. — This is an action on a promissory note, upon
which a party has written his name, and after his death his
executrix delivers the note to the plaintiffs without indorsing
it; so that there is a writing of his name by the deceased, and
Those acts will not constitute an
a delivery by his executrix.
indorsement of the note; the person to whom it is so delivered
has no right to sue upon it.
The promissory note, was made payable to the testator
''or order;" that means order in writing. The testator has
written his name upon the note, but has given no order; the
'Watkins v. Maule, 2 Jac. & W., 237.
'Smith V. Pickering, Peake, N. P. C, 50; Arden v. Watkins,
East., 317.
''Whitehead v. Taylor, 10 Adol. & E., 210.
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The two
executrix has given an order, but not in writing.
acts being bad, do not constitute one good act.
The word "transfer" means indorsement and delivery.
Judgment for the defendant.*

SECTION

46.

AN INDORSER CONTRACTS TO PAY THE BILL OR NOTE
INDORSED ACCORDING TO ITS TENOR, IF, UPON PRESENTMENT TO AND DEMAND UPON (AND PROTEST
WHEN NECESSARY), THE PARTIES WHO ARE PRIMARILY LIABLE, PAYMENT IS REFUSED, HE IS DULY NOTIFIED OF SUCH REFUSAL.
HOTEL CO.

V.

BAILEY.i

In the Supreme Court of Vermont, Mar.,
\Reported in 64 Vermont,

i^i;

24

At I.

1892.

Rep.,

ij6.]

The Form of Action. — Special assumpsit for

the annual

interest due on five promissory notes indorsed by the defend-

*An acceptance or indorsement of a bill or note is not complete without actual or constructive delivery; Cox v. Troy, 5 B. &
Aid., 474; Brind v. Hampshire, t M. & W. 65; Marston v. Allen,
8 Id., 494; Belcher v. Campbell,
8 Q. B., i.
And as between the
original parties and subsequent holders with notice, evidence that
the delivery was merely for safe keeping, will, it seems, sustain a
traverse of the indorsement, Marston v. Allen, supra; although
not as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser, Hayes v. Caulfield,
5 Q- B., 81.
'This case is cited in illustrative cases on Bills and Notes,
See also Allin v. Williams, 97 Cal., 403; 32 Pac, 441; First
109.
Nat. Bank v. Crabtree, 86 Iowa, 731; 52 N. W., 559; Bowman v.
Hiller, 130 Mass., 153; Kenworthy v. Sawyer, 125 Mass., 28; Sjnker
61 Ind., 276; First Nat. Bank v. National M arine
V. Fletcher,
Bank, 20 Minn., 63 (Gil., 49).
The indorser impliedly warrants
that the paper is a valid obligation in every particular, that all the
parties to said note were competent to contract; that he has a perfect title to the paper; that the maker will pay it if properly presented (Copp V. McDugall, 9 Mass., i; Erwin v. Downs,
15 N.
Y., S7S; Prescott Bank v. Caverly, 7 Gray, 217); that the note is
not usurious (Hazard v. Bank, 72 Ind., 130; Stewart v. Bramhall,
74 N. Y., 85.)
To charge an indorser there must be a demand and notice.
1 Par., Bills and Notes, 3S3-3S6, 442,
443; Sto. Pr. Notes, s 135;
2 Aik., 264; Whitney v. Dean, 22 Vt.,
561.
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for the defendant.

The plaintiff excepts.
Decision. — It appears by the statement of facts that Geo.
Doolittle and Mrs. E. J. Doolittle promised to pay the defendant, William P. Bailey, or order, five thousand dollars, as
their five promissory notes should respectively become due,
and the interest thereon annually.
The notes are dated April
I, 1886, are for $i,ooo each, and payable i6, 17, 18, 19 and
20 years from their date.
The plaintiff, as the indorsee of the notes, seeks to recover of the defendant, as indorser, the first three years' interest upon them without demand of the makers and notice
to the defendant of the makers' default of payment.
The defendant's counsel contended, — ist, that the indorser cannot in any event be compelled to pay the interest as it
annually falls due, that his conditional liability does not become absolute until the notes respectively mature, and then
only after demand and notice.
2d.
That if the interest is collectable of the indorser as
it annually accrues it is after the usual measures have been
taken to make him chargeable.
The general rule of law relative to the respective liabilities of the maker and indorser of a promissory note is well deThe promise of the maker is absolute to pay the note
The promise of the inupon presentment at its maturity.
dorser is conditional that if, when duly presented, it is not
paid by the maker, he, the indorser, will, upon due notice
given him of the dishonor, pay the same to the indorsee or
fined.

other holder.

seems clear that the indorser is not liable for the annual payment of the interest without performance of these
If he were thus liable his relation
conditions by the holder.

It

to the note would be like that of a surety or a joint maker,
and his promise, instead of being conditional, would be absoThis is contrary to the
lute as to the payment of the interest.
general statement of the law that his liability is conditional.
The relation of principal does not exist between him and the
Their contracts are
They are not co-principals.
maker.

HOTEL
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law.'
separate and they must be sued separately, at common
The maker has received the money of the payee and in

consideration thereof promises (absolutely) to repay it according to the terms of the note, and if he fails to pay, his conThe contract
tract is broken and he is liable for the breach.
of the indorser is a new one, made upon a new consideration
His undertaking is in
moving from the indorsee to himself.
the nature of a guaranty that the maker will pay the principal

His liability
and interest according to the terms of the note.
is fixed upon the maker's default upon demand, and notice to
him of such default.

This new contract cannot be construed

interest without default of or
The promise cannot be absolute as
demand upon the maker.
to the payment of interest when it is clearly conditional as to
as an absolute

one to pay

the

the payment of the principal.

Interest Payable Annually. — When due. — It

is held

it

it

it

is

it

it

it,

that though the annual interest (interest payable annually)
upon a promissory note may be collected of the maker as it
falls due, it is not separated from the principal so that the recovery of it is barred by the statute of limitations until the recovery of the principal is thus barred.^ The holder of a note
with interest payable annually loses no rights against the parwhether makers or indorsers, by neglecting to deties to
mand interest, and he has the election to do so, or wait and
with the principal, for
regarded as an incident
collect
But it is so far an independent debt that
of the principal.^
as
anhe may maintain an action against the makers for
nually accrues, or allow it to accumulate and remain as a
pari of the debt until tlie note matures.*' In the latter course
the makers would be chargeable with interest upon each year's
was due until final payment.* It was
interest from the time
said, by the court in Talliaferro's
Ex'rs. v. King's Admr,"

I

*

*

,

^

'

Randolph Com. Paper, s. 739.
Grafton Bank v. Doe et al., 19 Vt. 463.
'National Bank of North America v. Kirby,
Catlin V. Lyman, 16 Vt., 44.
Aik., 410; Austin v. Imus, 23 Vt., 286.

'9

Dana, 331,

(35

Am. Dec, 140.)

108 Mass.,

497.
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The interest, by the terms of the covenant, is made payable
at the end of each year, and is as much then demandable as
a specific sum equal to the amount
of interest had been
promised; and, in default of payment, as much entitles the
plaintiff to demand interest upon the amount so due and unThe fact that the amount so promised to be paid is
paid.
described as interest accruing upon a larger sum, which is
made payable at a future day, cannot the less entitle the
plaintiff to demand interest upon the amount, in default of
payment, as a just remuneration in damages for the detention
or non-payment."
It is true that at the maturity of the notes the defendant
would be liable, as indorser, for both principal and interest,
upon due demand and notice, although these measures had
not been taken to make him chargeable as the interest fell
due each year.
Notice of the maker's default of payment of
interest need not be given annually to the indorser in order to
charge him with liability for interest when the note matures.
This is so stated by the court in National Bank of North
America v. Kirby, supra.
In Howe v. Bradley,' it is held
that when a note is made payable at some future period, with
interest annually till its maturity and no demand is made for
the annual interest as it becomes due, or if made, no notice
thereof is given the indorser, if duly notified of the demand
and non-payment when the note falls due, is liable for the
whole amount due, both principal and interest; that the obligation imposed by the law upon the holder is only to demand
payment and give the required notice when the bill or note
becomes payable.
It is not held in this country that interest
is subject to protest and notice, according to the law merchant, in order to charge indorsers with it when the note matures.
The usual consequence of omission to notify the
indorser of the maker's default, namely, the release of the
indorser, would not follow the omission to give him annual
A note is not dishonored by a failnotice of such default.
ure of the m.aker to pay interest.''
' '

if

'19 Me., 31.

First National Bank v. County Commissioners,

^

77

(100 Am. Dec,

T96, note).

14

Minn.,
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The defendant's counsel argues that it would be incon-

is

is

if

it

it

it

is

it,

is

.''

sistent to hold the indorser liable for interest, which is a mere
increment of the principal, until his liability is established to
pay the sum out of which the interest springs; that there may
be defences to the note at its maturity which will release the
maker and consequently the indorser, or that the indorser
On
may then be released by neglect of demand and notice.
first impression it might seem inconsistent that the maker
should be compelled to pay interest before his liability has
It is
been fixed to pay the principal, but that is his contract.
also argued that the fact that the interest, when uncollected,
is an incident of the debt so that as it annually falls due, demand and notice are not necessary in order to charge either
the maker or the indorser with liability to pay it when the
note matures, is ground for holding that the indorser is not
liable for interest until he is made liable for the principal.
The Indorser's Contract. — The question is whether the
indorser, by the act of indorsement, promises to pay anything
on the note till its maturity, at which time he clearly may be
The note bears
made liable for both principal and interest.
upon its face an absolute promise by the maker to pay the
due and the interest thereon
principal when it becomes
His promise is two-fold.
It is as absolute to pay
annually.
the interest at the end of each year as to pay the principal at
Now what is the nature of the
the end of the time specified.
His
contract which the indorser makes with the indorsee
not in writing, like that of the maker, but his name
contract
evidence that he has received value for
upon the note
and also of an undertaking on his part that
shall be paid
and delivers
to
according to its tenor. When he indorses
the indorsee he directs the payment to be made to the latter,
and in effect represents that the maker has promised to pay
certain sums of money according to the terms of the note,
that is, the principal at maturity and the interest annually;
that
the maker fails to pay on demand, he, the indorser,
will pay on due notice.
His conditional promise
concurrent with the absolute promise of the maker.
His liability to
pay interest and principal, as each respectively falls due,
arises from his contract.
It his contract that he will make
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payment

whenever the maker is in default and he, the in■dorser, is duly notified thereof.
It is true that interest is an incident, an increment of the
principal, and that the holder may wait for it until his note
matures and then collect it with the principal.
He may,
however, by the contract, collect it as it falls due, of the
maker, and upon the latter's default, of the indorser.
Presentment, Demand and Notice Necessary to Charge
an Indorser with the Payment of Installments of Principal.
— The courts of England have never recognized the American
doctrine that interest is a mere incident, an outgrowth of the
principal, and in many cases follows and is recoverable as
such without an express contract.
Until 37 Hen., 8, c. 9, it
was unlawful to demand interest even upon a contract to pay
it.
Since the case of DeHavilland v. Bowerbank,' interest
has been allowed in England upon express contracts therefor,
and not otherwise.
Where there is such a contract interest
stands like the principal in respect to the rights and liabilities
of an indorser.^
In Jennings v. Napanee Brush Co.,'* in a
learned opinion by McDougall, J., it was held that where
there was an express contract to pay interest annually or
semi-annually , it was not different from a contract to pay an
installment of the principal itself, and that notice to the indorser of the maker's default was necessary to charge the
indorser with it. In that case the indorser was released from
payment of the first two half-yearly installments of interest
for want of demand and notice.
While we adhere to the doctrine laid down in Grafton
Bank v. Doe, et. al., supra, that interest is in general an incident of the debt, it is consistent to hold that where the indorser is himself a party to the original contract to pay interest annually, as in the case at bar, by his indorsement he
guarantees the performance of that contract. Any other holding would make the indorser liable for only a part of the
maker's contract.
'

I Camp.,

50.

''Sedg. on Dam., 383;

Dec,

189,

Selleck v. French,

i Conn.,

note.)

''Reported in Canada Law Jour., Vol.

20,

No.

19.

32, (6 Am.

2

88
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The case of Codman v. The Vt. and Can. Railroad Co.,'
The trustees and manahas been brought to our attention.
gers of the Vermont Central Railroad Co. and the Vt. and
Can. Railroad Co., issued notes to the amount of $1,000,000
in sums of $1,000 each, payable to the defendant company, in
twenty years from their date, with interest semi-annually on
presentation of the interest coupons made payable to bearer
On each note was this indorseand attached to the notes.
ment, signed by the treasurer of the defendant, under its seal:
" For value received, the Vermont and Canada Railroad Company hereby guarantee the payment of the within note, principal and interest, according to its tenor, and order the conThe coupons were
tents thereof to be paid to the bearer."
not indorsed.
The notes were put on the market and the
plaintiff purchased fifty of them, and subsequently, after due
demand, notice and protest, brought this suit to recover the
amount of two coupons on each of his notes, the notes themselves not having matured.
Without passing upon the question whether the guaranty was negotiable and available to the
plaintiff, as a remote holder, Wheeler, J., among other questions that arose in the case, decided that the indorsement was
a contract of indorsement running to the bearer,
and that
demand, notice and protest fixed the liability of the indorser
to pay the coupons, and gave judgment for plaintiff for the
amount of the coupons.
Statute of Limitations — Annual Interest. — The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held that
the statute of limitations begins to run upon interest coupons
payable annually or semi-annually, from the time they respectively mature, although they remain attached to the bonds
which represent the principal debt.*
Where the indorser is
the payee of the note there would seem to be no difference in
his liability in respect to interest whether the maker's promise
to pay it is contained in the body of the note or in interest
coupons not indorsed, the notes to which they are attached
being indorsed, and the coupons being mentioned in the notes;,
but it is unnecessary to decide that question here.
'16 Blatch., 165.
"Amy V. Dubuque, 98 U. S., 470.
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Upon the facts found by the county court this action can-

it

a

it

I

is

is

if

it

is,

not be maintained for the reason that the plaintiff never fixed
the defendant's Uability to pay the three years' accrued interest.
It does not even appear that the makers refused payment of it or that they were requested to pay it before this
suit was brought; therefore nothing is due from the defendant
to the plaintiff.
Judgment affirmed.
Ross, Ch. J., dissents.
Ross, Ch. J.
I concur in the disposal made of this
case; and in most of the grounds and reasoning of the opinion.
But I do not see my way clear to concur in holding,
that an indorser upon a promissory note, payable on time,
with the interest annually, can be made chargeable for the
payment of the interest, before he can be, and
charged with
the payment of the principal.
By placing his name on the
back of the note as an indorser, without making any limitation upon his indorsement, he guarantees its payment, upon
condition that the indorsee, when the time named in the note
to the maker and
for its payment arrives, shall present
the maker fails to make payment,
demand its payment, and,
When this
shall seasonably notify him of such failure.
done, the indorser promises to pay whatever of principal and
This condition attaches
interest,
then due upon the note.
think
attaches to
primarily to the principal of the note.
It
becomes
part of the principal.
the interest only as
seems to me to be illogical, and pressing the indorser's conditional undertaking beyond its proper scope and office, to hold
that he can have his liability fixed to pay for the use, or legal

is

is

is

rental of the principal, before his hability to pay the principal
Interest
fixed.
legal damage, fixed usually by statute, for
As soon as the money
the detention and use of money.
due and payable, the law implies damage for its detention and
It may also arise from the contract, for the detention
use.
it

it
is

payable by the terms of
principal before
may
When stipulated to be paid annually,
the contract.
be collected from the maker of the note at the end of each
and use of the

HOTEL CO.

290

V.

BAILEY.

[CHAP.

8,

is it,

It is an incident, and outyear, because such is his contract.'
whether
The promise to pay
growth from the principal.

a

is

is

I

is

it,

It

is

It

it

If

is

if

is

it

is

is

is

attached
It
a dependent promise.
implied or expressed,
When
to and arises from the promise to pay the principal.
stipulated to be paid annually, and before the
the interest
payable, the maker when sued for the annual inprincipal
dependent upon his
terest, because his promise to pay
promise to pay the interest, may set up any defence to the
the
suit for recovering the annual interest, which he could
suit were for the recovery of the principal, such as fraud in
the inception of the note; or want or failure of consideration,
conditional,
or duress, or that his liability for the principal
he
the terms of which have not been complied with.
will estop the holder from recovering the
defeats the action,
principal when due, and vice versa.
The opinion recognizes this intimate, attached and dependent relation of the promise to pay the interest annually to the
promise to pay the principal, from which the interest springs.
recognizes that the statute of limitations does not begin to
run on such promise to pay interest annually until the principal falls due, in accordance with Grafton Bank v. Doe et al.^
This must be because, until severed by enforced collection or
but an incident, and dependent of the
payment, interest
also recognizes this relation in holding that
principal.
the indorsee may allow the interest to accumulate, and may
fix the indorser's liability to pay
proper demand, deby
fault and notice in regard to the principal when that falls due.
That
because liability for the principal carries its dependenconcur in the holdings.
cies.
They are supported by the
decisions cited in the opinion.
But they rest, and, in my
judgment, can rest only on the basis that the promise to pay
the interest annually, both for its consideration and enforcement
dependent upon the promise to pay the principal.
The opinion also holds that the liability incurred by the inconditional, that that condition attaches to the
dorsement

'19 Vt., 463.

a

is

'Ross, Ch. J., has not kept in mind that the contract of an
in the nature of
indorser
guaranty that the maker will do
what
he
to
do.
exactly
promised
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and that the liabiHty of the indorser must be
fixed by demand, default and notice, in regard to the interest
payable from the maker yearly, as well as in regard to the
It then seems to conclude, that, because the inprincipal.
note,

dorsee can lawfully demand and collect of the maker, whose
promise to pay the principal is absolute, upon his dependent,
but yet absolute promise to pay the interest annually, he can

demand, default and notice, collect such annual
interest of the indorser whose promise and liability to pay the
principal is conditional, and cannot as- yet be made absolute,
and whose promise to pay the annual interest, it has already
held is dependent upon his promise to pay the principal, and
therefore, in my judgment, takes the condition attached to
his liability to pay the principal.
It is at this point that I fail
to follow the reasoning of my associates.
Here they assume
— as I think — and proceed upon the basis, that, the indorser's
implied promise to pay the annual interest, is not dependent,
but independent, like what it would be, if it were an installment of the principal.
The holdings in the opinion, that the
indorser's liability for the accrued annual interest may be made
absolute by a proper demand, default and notice in regard to
the principal when it falls due, and that it may also be made
absolute by a proper demand, default and notice yearly, result m holding that the maker's promise to pay the interest
annually which he indorses, is both dependent upon, and inI do not
dependent of, his promise to pay the principal.
character,
but
think that it has this double and inconsistent
If it be independent, must not demand and
only the former.
default be made, and notice given yearly, or the indorser beAnd if demand and default be made, and
come discharged.?
notice given annually, must not the statute of limitation begin
I think so. The result of
to run from date of such demand.?
giving this double character to the promise to pay interest anby proper

If
think, to some difficult legal problems.
the note is to mature at the end of twenty years, and the
payee holds it and allows the interest to accumulate for ten
the indorsee must
sells
years, and then having indorsed
wait for the accumulated interest until the note falls due, because the maker's promise and the indorser's liability in regard
it,

I

it,

nually will lead,
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to that interest is dependent upon tiie indorser's liability for
the maker's promise to pay the principal, which is still conditional, and for that reason the indorser's liability to pay the
accumulated interest is conditional, and will remain so until
it is made absolute for the principal; but when the eleventh
year's annual interest falls due, the indorsee may at once, by
due demand, default and notice, fix the indorser's liability to
pay that year's interest, and may enforce its payment by suit,
while the indorser's liability for the payment of the principal
from which the year's interest springs, cannot for years be
After the indorser's liabilmade absolute and may never be.
ity for the payment of the year's interest has thus become
fixed by suit, on what legal principles governing res judicata,
could the indorser defend, in a suit brought, without further
demand, default and notice, at the maturity of the note, for
the enforcement of the payment of the principal

and the ten

years accumulated interest.''

The only decision relied upon for the holding of my asso-

I

not regard that in point.
The relation
The guarantee was written instead of implied.
of the indorser to the obligation was exceptional, it having
The interest was
been given by its receivers and managers.
expressed in separate coupons, which, for some purposes, are
The statute of limitations
treated as independent obligations.
In this respect
runs on them generally from their maturity.'
they are unlike the promise in the note to pay the interest
I do not
annually, as held in Grafton Bank v. Doe, et. al.^
think that the indorsee has the election to fix the indorser's
liability for, and recover of him annually such yearly interest,
or to wait and fix it by proper demand, default and notice in
I think his liability can only become
regard to the principal.
absolute for the payment of the incident or outgrowth of the
debt, when it becomes absolute tor the payment of the prinThe
cipal from which that incident or outgrowth springs.
opinion on this branch of the case is made to rest upon the
ground that the indorser's undertaking, on due demand and
notice, is to make good to the indorsee any failure of the
ciates is from 6 Blatchford.

'Amy V. Dubuque,
^19 Vt., 463.

98

do

U. S., 470 (25 L. C. P. Co., 228.

)
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maker to perform the contract, and, in that the maker has
promised to pay the interest at the end of each year, the indorser has Hkewise so undertaken upon proper demand and
notice.
But his implied contract being conditional in regard
to the payment of the principal I think is conditional also to
any incident or outgrowth of the principal, so long as it is
conditional in regard to the payment of the principal, and

The Amount for which Indorsers are Liable. — (a). They
are Liable for a Deficiency on Notes Secured by a Mortgage. — An
indorser of a promissory note, secured by a mortgage given by the
maker, is liable for any deficiency resulting after a sale of the
mortgaged premises under a judgment of foreclosure against the
mortgagor, providing the requirements of presentment, demand,
Allin v. Williams, 97
and notice of dishonor were complied with.
Cal., 403; 32 Pac. Rep., 441
They are Liable for Attorney's Fees. — An indorser, by
{U).
his contract of indorsement, promises, among other things, that
he will discharge the note according to its tenor, upon due preTherefore an indorser
sentment, demand, and notice of dishonor.
for
"reasonable attorof a bill or note which contains a stipulation
ney fees" "or collection fees" in case of suit, is as much liable
for these amounts as he is for the principal of the bill or note.
Benn v. Kutzschan, 24 Oregon, 28; 32 Pac. Rep., 763.
— There is no ConThey are not Liable to. Each Other
(c).
—
the
payment of the contract
tribution.
Each indorser guarantees
(unless otherwise stipulated in the indorsement) to every subseEach subsequent holder may
quent holder of the instrument.
recover the full amount due upon the contract from any one of the
No prior indorser can insist or compel a subseprior indorsers.
quent indorser to contribute to the payment of the contract, unless
There is no contribution between indorsers
otherwise stipulated.
Young v.
as a general rule in the absence of a special agreement.
Ball, 9 Watts. (Pa.), 139 (1839); Core v. Wilson, 40 Ind., 206;
Shaw v. Knox, 98 Mass., 214; Bishop v. Hayward, 4 Term., 470
(1791); Penny V. Innes, i C. M. & R.. 4395 Easterly v. Barber,
66 N. Y., 443; Barrey v. Ranson, 12 N. Y., 462; Phillips v. Preston, 5 Howard, 278; Givens v. Merchants' Bank, 85 III, 443;
Hale

V.

Danforth, 46 Wis., 555.

If, however, a subsequent indorsee holds collateral security
from the maker and a prior indorser is called upon to pay the contract, he (prior indorser) may compel an appropriation of the colIn such case a
lateral security to the payment of the instrument.
trust is created in favor of the prior indorsers as well as the holder,
Price v.
to have the fund applied in the payment of the note.
Trusdell, 28 N. J. E. R., 200.
The indorsement may be joint, in which case, of course, conis
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absolutely bound to pay the interest at
the end of each year, when he becomes bound absolutely to
When so bound for the payment of the
pay the principal.
principal, then this obligation to pay the interest at the end
of each year attaches, in respect both to the interest then
accrued and the interest which may thereafter accrue.
I
would modify the opinion in the particular indicated.
that he only becomes

tribution may be enforced.
Lane v. Stacey, 8 Allen (Mass.), 41.
are
Liable
the Full Amount due tlpon the Bill
They
for
(d).
or Note. — It may be stated generally that an indorser is liable for
the full amount of the contract, including interest, protest fees and
all costs of collection,
i Daniel on Neg. Inst., sees. 766-768;
Merritt v. Benton, 10 Wend., 116; Simpson v. Griffin, 9 Johns.,
131; National Bk., etc. v. Green, 33 la., 140; Durant v. Bunta, 3
Dutch (N. J.), 623, 635; 2 Parsons on N. & B., 428; March v.
Barnet, 114, Cal., 375.
Where Indorsee has Paid Less than Amount of Bill or
(e).
Note — For what Sum is the Indorser Liable? — There is much conflict in the authorities upon the question of how much may an
indorsee recover of an indorser when the former has paid less than
the full amount for the bill or note,
i Daniel on Neg. Inst., sees.
766-768; National Bank, etc. v. Green, 33 la., 140.
If the transaction was in good faith, we think the weight of authority permits
the indorsee to recover the full amount of the contract.
National
Bk., etc. V. Green, supra; 2 Parsons, N. & B., 428; Bissell v.
Dickerson, 64 Conn., 61; Cromwell v. County of Sac,
96 U. S.,
51, 60; R. R. Co. V. Schutte, 103 U. S., 118.

The Consideration of the Indorser's Contract.— It

is a

well recognized rule of law that every binding contract must be
supported by a consideration, and the contract of indorsement is
no exception to this rule. But in the case of commercial contracts
the consideration
is presumed; this presumption, however, as between the original parties may be rebutted.
Dan. on Negot. Inst,

sees. 174, 679.
What is a sufficient consideration to support contracts in general is sufficient to support contracts of indorsements.
Swift v.

Tyson, 16 Pet., i; Pond v. Waterloo, 50 Iowa, 695; Bradsley v.
Delp, 88 Pa. St., 420; Collier v. Mahan, 21 Ind., no.
The rule is well settled that in order to charge an indorser,
presentment and demand for payment, of the maker
(or the facts
which excuse such presentment and demand), and notice of dishonor, must be proven by the plaintiff.
Ankeny v. Henry, i
Idaho, 229; Ballingalls v. Gloster, 3 East., 481; Story on Bills,
224, 255; Wood's Byles, 255.
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THE NEGOTIABILITY OF A COMMERCIAL CONTRACT CANNOT BE RESTRAINED, AFTER AN INDORSEMENT IN
BLANK BY THE PAYEE, BY AN INDORSEMENT IN FULL
OR SPECIAL.*
SMITH

V.

CLARKE.i

In the Court of King's Bench,
[Reported in

i Espinasse,

181 ; Peake, 22^.

The Form of Action.— Assumpsit
as acceptor of a

1794.
]

against the defendant

bill of exchange.

The bill was drawn in favor of Lisle & Co. and they had
indorsed it to Surtees, Burden & Co. , who had indorsed it to
one Jackson: the first indorsement was general (in blank), but

'This case is cited in Benjamin's Chalmers on Bills, Notes
and Checks, 128; Story on Bills of Exchange, 207; Chitty on Bills,
228, 230; Wood's Byles on Bills and Notes, 251; Norton on Bills
and Notes, 113, 117, 197; Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 696.
See also Walker v. McDonald, 2 Exch., 527; Johnson v. Mitchell,
50

Tex., 212.
* Where a bill is by the payee indorsed in blank,

a subsequent
indorsee shall not by any special indorsement restrain its general
negotiability, so far as to make it necessary to prove the handwriting of such special indorsee, where the action is by a subseWhere a bill or note is made payable to
quent bona fide holder.
the "order" of the payee and indorsed in "blank" by him, it is
then the same as if it had been made payable to "bearer" originally. But even though the instrument is made payable to "bearer"
a particular subsequent indorser may, by a special or restrictive
indorsement, limit his liability, because each indorsement is a new
contract and the parties to it are liable only according to its terms.
Curtis V. Sprague, 51 Cal., 239; Humphreyville v. Culver, 73 III,
485; Bank of, etc. v. Sherer, 108, Cal., 513; Beal v. Glen. Elect.
Co., 38 N. Y., 527.

Indorsement— Kinds or Varieties

of — Enumerated. —

Contracts of indorsement have assumed numerous forms, and the
primary liability of an indorser depends upon the form or kind of
The indorsement maybe (i) in blank, (2) in full
his indorsement.
or special, (3) implied or conditional, (4) restrictive, (5) absolute,
(6) without recourse, (7) for accommodation, (8) irregular or
anomalous.
Blank Indorsement — Defined. — Where the payee or holder
of a commercial contract writes his name across the back of such
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Burden & Co. was a
J. Jackson, or order.'
Jackson was the receiver-general of one of the northern
counties, and kept an account with Muir, Atkinson & Co.

the indorsement to Jackson by Surtees,
" Pay the contents to
special one, viz.,

instrument without any additions or explanations it is called an
indorsement in blank, and the contract thereafter is the same as
one payable to bearer; it may be transferred by delivery, and its
Palmer v. Nassau
possession vi prima facie evidence of ownership.
III,
Bank, 78 111., 380; Morris v. Preston, 93
215; Belden v. Hann,
61 Iowa, 41.
It has been held that the holder can fill up the blank indorsement and make it an indorsement in full, making it payable to himHe may change it into any
self, to his own or to another's order.
not
inconsistent with the character of indorsement in
contract
blank, but he may not enlarge the liability of the indorser in blank
The indorsement
by writing over it a waiver of any of his rights.
in blank may be either before or after the complete execution and
Central Bank v. Davis, 19
delivery of a commercial contract.
Pick., 376; Hance v. Miller, 21 111., 636; Scott v. Calpin, 139
Mass., 529, where it was held that the indorsee might write over
the blank indorsement " I guarantee payment of the within note."
Belden v. Hann, supra.
Contra.
Indorsement in Full or Special — Defined. — An indorsement in full, which is sometimes called a special indorsement, is
where the indorser directs that the contract shall be paid to some
"particular person or his order." To illustrate: " Pay to B or
order," (signed) A; "Pay to B," (signed) A.
It has been held
that there is no distinction between the indorsements "Pay to B
or order," and " Pay to B "; and the phrase "or order" makes
no change in the special indorsement.
In case of a special indorsement of a commercial contract, to enable any subsequent
party to recover thereon he must be able to make his title through
the special indorsee.
Therefore it must appear that the contract
has been re-indorsed by the special indorsee, or that he (special
indorsee ) has received satisfaction.
The mere possession of a
commercial contract which has been indorsed in full and which
has not been indorsed by the special indorsee is not sufficient evidence of the holder's right of action thereon.
The special indorsee in his transfer of the contract may use any of the regular
forms of indorsement he desires; and if he uses a blank indorsement, the contract thereby becomes transferable by mere delivery.
Mitchell V. Fuller, 15 Pa. St., 268; Johnson v. Mitchell, 50 Tex.,
212; Reamer V. Bell, 79 Pa. St., 292; Morris v. Preston,
93 111.,
215.

In case there are several indorsements in blank, the holder
may strike out any one or change them to some other form of indorsement, so long as he does not affect his own title or increase
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This bill had been sent among others to Muir, Atkinson Co.,
desiring them to get it discounted anywhere, provided it did
not come to the Bank of England; but there was no evidence
of any indorsement by Jackson on it.
He may not, however, strike out a special indorsement and insert his own name, for the reason that he
thereby destroys his own title.
Johnson v. Mitchell, 50 Tex., 212,
where Gould, J., said, "The rule is well settled that if a bill be
once indorsed in blank, although afterwards indorsed in full, it will
still, as against the drawer, the payee, the acceptor, the blank inthe

liability of indorsers.

dorser, and all indorsers before him, be payable to bearer, though
as against the special indorser himself, title must be made through
his indorsee."
The holder of a contract which has been indorsed in blank
may change it to one in full and make the contract thereby payable to some particular person.
Johnson v. Mitchell, 50 Tex.,
212;

Hance v. Miller,

Conditional

21 111.,

636.

Indorsement — Defined. — An

indorser

may

condition upon his liability in the contract of in.impose
and
he would not be liable thereon if such condition is
dorsement
And if the party who is primarily liable
broken or unfulfilled.
upon the principal contract pays the amount to such conditional
indorsee before the performance of the condition, this fact will
not preclude a recovery for the full amount by the conditional indorser in an action against him. The party who is primarily liable
some

upon a commercial contract is bound to take notice of conditions
Dan. on Negot.
imposed or annexed to indorsements thereon.
Taunt,
Inst., Sec. 697; Robertson V. Kensington, 4
30.
These conditions may be either precedent or subsequent. To
illustrate: An indorsement "Pay to A if he arrives at twenty-one
due," is an inyears of age," or "if he is living when it becomes
maker of such
the
if
dorsement upon a condition precedent; and
contract should pay to such indorsee before the happening of such
condition, he might again be called upon to pay the contract to
This is true whether the condition be
the conditional indorser.
An
example of an indorsement upon a
precedent or subsequent.
condition subsequent would be, "Pay to A unless before payment
I give you notice to the contrary." Robertson v. Kensington,
268.
supra; Story on Bills, Sec. 217; Chitty on Bills, ch. 6, p.
indorser
may
Restrictive Indorsement— Defined.— An
but
indorser,
an
as
liability
his
not only impose conditions upon
in
instrument,
the
of
he may restrict the further negotiability
To
illustrate:
which case the indorsement is called restrictive.
"Pay to A only " (signed) B; or "Pay to A for the use of B "; or
"Pay to A for my use"; or "for collection"; or "for collection
and immediate returns"; or "credit my account"; are examples
An examination of the various reof restrictive indorsements.
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Atkinson & Co. discounted it with the plaintiffs,
who were their bankers.
Muir & Atkinson became bankrupts, and soon after Jackson also became a bankrupt; and this defense was in fact by
Muir,

strictive indorsements will show that they may be divided into two
classes: (i) where they are indorsed for the use of the indorser,
or to an agent; and ( 2 ) where they are indorsed for the use and
In the first of these
benefit of some third person, or to a trustee.
cases, or in a restrictive indorsement to an agent, the indorser still
retains the title to the contract; while in the second the title passes
In either case,
from the indorser to the trustee upon condition.
however, the restrictive indorsee has no authority to indorse the
contract to another — he is only authorized to collect the amount
due upon said contract and apply it according to the terms of the
indorsement.
The terms, annexed to a restrictive indorsement, are
notice to all subsequent holders of the nature thereof.
Neither
does the indorser incur any liability to the indorsee in a restrictive
indorsement.
Nat. Butchers' Bk. v. Hubbell, 117 N. Y., 384;
Manf. Nat. Bk. v. Contanentile, 148 Mass., 553; First Nat. Bk.
v. First Nat. Bk., 76 Ind., 561; Briggs v. Central Nat. Bk., 80 N.
Y., 182; ^tna Ins. Co. v. Alton City Bk., 25 111., 243; Dan. on
Negot. Inst., Sec. 698; Johnson v. Donnell, 90 N. Y., i; White
V. Miner's Nat. Bk., 102 U. S., 658; Hook v. Pratt, 78 N. Y.,
371; Leavitt v. Putman, 3 Coms., 499; People's Bank v. Jefferson
Co., etc., Bk., 106 Ala., 624 (17 So. Rep., 728); Freeman's Nat.
Bk. V. National Tube Works, 151 Mass., 413; 24 N. E. Rep.,
779; 21 Ans. St. Rep., 461; Bank v. Weiss, 67 Texas, 331; Blakeslee v. Hewitt, 76 Wis., 341; 44 N. W. Rep., 1105.
An indorsement for "collection" is not a contract of indorsement, but the
creation of a power, the indorsee being a mere agent or trustee to
receive the money for the use of another.
Freeman v. Exchange
Bk., 87 Ga., 4S; i Daniel on Neg. Inst., Sec. 698.
See Hook v.
Pratt, 78 N. Y., 371, for a full discussion of the nature of a
strictive indorsement; Edie v. East India Co., 2 Burr., 1221; Sigourney v. Lloyd, 8 B. & C, 622; Fennings v. Brown, 9 Mees &
W., 496; Brook, Oliphant & Co. v. Vannest, 58 N. J. L., 162;
Commercial Bk. v. Armstrong, 148 U. S., 50; Butcher's, etc. Bk.
v. Hubbell, 117 N. Y., 384; Power v. Finnic, 4 Call (Va.),
411.
An Absolute Indorsement — Defined. — An absolute or
unconditional indorsement is one by which the indorser makes
himself liable, binds himself to pay the contract in case the maker
or the party who is primarily liable thereon does not, subject to
the condition,
however, of presentment, demand, protest
(when
necessary) and notice.

Indorsement Without Recourse — Defined. — There is
still another method by which an indorser may limit his liability
in the contract

of indorsement.

It

is by an indorsement

"sans
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on the

ground that the indorsement to Jackson
that it restrained the farther negotiability of
the bill and defeated the plaintiff's right to recover, unless
Jackson's indorsement was proved.
being special,

recours," or "without recourse," or by adding the words "at the
owner's own risk," or by using any term or phrase which indicates
that he does not intend to incur liability as an indorser.
Such an

indorsement has the effect of transferring the title of the instrument to the indorsee without rendering the indorsee personally
responsible on the contract.
An indorser without recourse assumes
the same liability that a transferer does without indorsement, of a
commercial contract payable to bearer, being released from all
liabity for the dishonor of the bill based upon the incapacity or
refusal of the maker to pay.
He is not, however, released from all liability. He impliably
warrants:
1.
That the original parties had capacity to execute and
deliver such a contract;
2.
That they did execute and deliver the particular contract;
That there is no illegality or defense existing between
3.
the original parties which can be interposed to defeat the payment
of a contract;
That he has a good title to the instrument.
4.
In short, an indorser without recourse warrants that the contract is a valid, subsisting contract; but does not warrant that the
original makers will pay, or that they are solvent.
Dumont v.
Williamson, 18 Ohio St., 515; Chitty on Bills, 247; Watson v.
Chesire, 18 Iowa, 202; Bourdon v. Collar, 26 Mich., 410; Rieman
V. Fisher, 4 Am. Law Reg., 433; Allen v. Pegran, 16 Iowa, 163;
Challiss V. McCrum, 22 Kan., 157; Drenian v. Bung, 124 111., 175.
Accommodation Indorsement.— Defined. — An accommodation maker or indorser of a commercial contract is one who has
signed or executed and delivered a commercial contract without
consideration and for the purpose of giving his name to some other
As to third persons, the liability of
person as a means of credit.
an accommodation party to a commercial contract, whether maker,
drawer, acceptor or indorser, is the same as that of corresponding
parties receiving valuable consideration; but between the accommodation party and the accommodated party there is no such liability, and one who draws, makes, accepts or indorses a commercial contract for the accommodation of another is not liable to
him in any capacity.
Miller v. Larned, 103 111., 562.
As to third parties who take the contract before maturity, an
accommodation party is liable according to the terms of his contract, whether it be that of maker, drawer, acceptor or indorser;
and it makes no difference whether the holder or third person took
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The Claim of the Plaintiff.—For

plaintiff it was
contended, that the first indorsement being general, that the
bill thereby acquired a general negotiabihty; nor could it by
any subsequent indorsement be restrained; and that how
the

the note with knowledge that the parties were accommodating parties, or not, providing that they are otherwise bona fide holders.
I Parsons on Notes and Bills, 183, 226; Nat. Bk. v. Grant, 71
Me., 374; Winters v. Home Ins. Co., 30 Iowa, 172; Miller v. Larned, supra; Seyfert v. Edison, 45 N. J. L., 393; Norfolk Nat. Bk.

N. C, 173.
It has been held also that an accommodation party is liable
according to the terms of his contract to a holder or indorsee, in
good faith, as collateral security for an antecedent debt or in payment of a pre-existing or concurrent debt of such holder or indorMiller v. Larned, supra; Pitts v. Fogelsing, 37 Ohio St., 676;
see.
Altoona Bk. v. Dunn, 151 Pa. St., 228.
There may be successive accommodation indorsers upon the
same contract, and in which case they will be liable to each other
Accommodation
according to the priority of their indorsement.
in
the
absence
of
an
are
not
co-sureties
agreement to that
indorsers
A subseeffect, therefore, contribution does not lie between them.
quent accommodation indorser who pays the note may recover the
full amount of a prior indorser and not merely a contribution as in
case of co-sureties.
Moody v. Findley, 43 Ala., 167; DePauw v.
Bank, 126 Ind., 553; Esterly v. Barber, 66 N. Y., 433; Shaw v.
Knox, 98 Mass., 214; McGurk v. Huggett, 56 Mich., 187; Kelly
v. Burroughs, 102 N. Y., 93.
Some of the courts have held, however, in the case of accommodation indorsers, that they are considered as co-sureties where
there is no special agreement to the contrary, and that subsequent
indorsers cannot recover more than a contributive share against a
Douglas v. Waddle, i Ohio, 413; 13 Am. D.,
previous indorser.
630; Barnett v. Young, 29 Ohio St., 11; Pitkin v. Flanagan, 23

V.

Griffin,

107

Vt., 160.

It

has been held that an accommodation party to a commercial contract is not liable thereon if it has been fraudulently diverted from the purpose for which it was intended to a person who
has knowledge of such diversion, even if he pays value for it and
Grocer's Bk. v. Penfield, 69 N. Y.,
acquires it before maturity.
R.,
Am.
502; 25
231; Daggett v. Whiting, 35 Conn., 366; Fetters
Bk.,
V. Muncie Nat.
34 Ind., 251; 7 Am. R., 225.
Diversion cannot be shown, however, ^gKWi.'s.X'a.bona fide holder
for value without notice.
Clark v. Thayer, T05 Mass., 2t6; Frank
V. Quast, 86 Conn., 649; Jackson v. First Nat. Bk., 42 N.
J. L.,
V.
Ind.,
Meeker
112
Shanks,
177;
207.
The rule that equities may be interposed against the purchaser
after maturity applies to an accommodation contract; and some of
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many names soever appeared on the back of the bill, or however many special indorsements such as the present, that the
bona fide holder might strike out the names of all the interthe courts have held that the paper as an accommodation paper of
itself constitutes an equity under such circumstances.
This, however, is contrary to the weight of authority.
An accommodation
indorser is liable under the same conditions and to the same extent
as a

regular indorser.

Agents, Corporations and Partners Cannot Execute and
Deliver Accommodation Commercial Contracts Without
Express Authority. — There is some question whether an agent,

corporation, or a partner may execute and deliver an accommodation commercial contract without express authority.
It has
been held that a general power given to an agent to make or indorse commercial contracts will not warrant the agent in executing and delivering or indorsing contracts for accommodation.
German Nat. Bk., v. Studley, i Mo. App., 260; Gulick v. Grover,
33 N. J. L., 463; 97 Am. D., 728.
A corporation has only such powers, as a general rule, as are
expressly given it or necessarily implied from the nature and charIt has been held that the indorsement of
acter of its business.
commercial contracts for accommodation by a corporation is not
If, therea necessary incident to the business of a corporation.
fore, a corporation is not expressly authorized to execute and deliver a commercial contract for accommodation and it does so, the
corporation is not liable thereon. Nat. Bk. v. Wells, 79 N. Y.,
498; Smead v. Indianapolis, etc., 11 Ind., 105.
As a general rule one partner cannot without express or implied authority bind the firm in the execution and delivery of an
Sweetzer v. French, 2 Gushing, 309;
accommodation contract.
Madison v. Alden, 129 U. S., 372;
D.,
of
Ft.
Am.
Bank
666;
48
a

Heffron v. Hanford, 40 Mich., 305.
And in case a partner does execute

and deliver an accommodation commercial contract, the burden is on the holder to show
that such partner was expressly authorized to bind the firm. Sweetzer V. French, supra; Nat. Security Bk. v. McDonald, 127 Mass.,
82; see a general discussion of the rights and liabilities of accommodation parties, 31 Am. St. R., 742, 757.
General Effect of an Indorsement.— The indorser by
placing his name upon the instrument enters into a contract with
the indorsee, which is a complete contract independent of the contract of any other party to the paper, and requires all the essenHe thereby engages that the comtial elements of a contract.
mercial contract upon which his endorsement is placed will be
paid when due according to the tenor therof, upon due presentment and demand by the parties to that contract; and if not, then
The contract
by himself on receiving due notice of their failure.
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mediate indorsers, and prove only the first indorsement in
order to entitle him to recover.
The Claim of the Defendant. — The counsel for the
defense insisted, that its negotiability could at any time be
restrained; and cited Ancher v. Bank of England' as deciding
the point; but they further pressed, as a general question, the
propriety of admitting special indorsements, for the purpose
of greater security in the remitting of bills of exchange by
of an indorser of a commercial contract is the same as that of a
The
drawer of a bill of exchange or other commercial contract.
purpose of an indorsement is usually two-fold: (i) to transfer the
The
title to the instrument; (2) or to strengthen the security.
he
makes,
warranties
which
of
the
indorser,
outside
of
a
liability
The first
must always depend upon the kind of indorsement.
indorser is responsible to every holder and subsequent indorser
who has been compelled to pay the amount of the note, upon due
McKnight v. Wheeler, 6 Hill,
presentment, demand and notice.
Minn.,
Butler,
v.
Maine
Trust
Co.
45,
506; Ankeny v. Henry,
492;
I Idaho, 229; Rhodes v. Jenkins, 184, Col., 449; Aymarv. Sheldon, 12 Wend., 438.
If the commercial contract is overdue, the indorsement is
equivalent to drawing a new contract payable at sight, upon which
the indorser is liable upon proof of a demand upon the maker
within a reasonable time, and immediate notice of the default.
Colt. v. Barnard, 18 Pick., 260; 29 Am. D., 584; Leavitt v. Putman, 3 N. Y., 494; 53 Am. D., 322.
Some of the courts have held that an indorsement upon an
over-due commercial contract is an original and unconditional engagement to pay the same, without presentment, demand and
notice.
Brown v. Davies, 3 T. R., 80; Jordan v. Hurst, 12 Pa.
St., 269.
The mere indorsement of the name of the payee or holder on
a negotiable contract is ineffectual to pass the title thereto without
If the
The term "indorsement" implies a delivery.
delivery.
"bearer,"
it may be transferred by delivery
contract is payable to
without indorsement.
This is true also when it is payable to " order, " after being indorsed in blank.
Spencer v. Carstarthen, 15
Col., 445; 24 Pac. R., 882; Loyd v, Howard, 152 B., 995; Marston V. Allen, 8 Mees & W., 454; Ross v. Smith, 19 Tex., 171;
Smalley v. Wight, 44 Me., 442.
The promise of the indorser is conditional and his liability
depends upon due presentment, demand, protest (when necessary)
and notice.
Mt. Mansfield Hotel Co. v. Bailey, 64 Vt., 151; 24
24

Atl. R., 136.
'

Doug., 615.
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post; to which the restriction contended for would greatly
contribute.
The counsel for the plaintiff admitted that the payee
might restrain the negotiability of a bill by a special indorsement; but contended that it was confined to him, and did not
■extend to any subsequent indorser; and that uhe case cited of
Ancher v. Bank of England established that point as to the
payee only.

Decision.— Ld.

Kenyon ruled with the plaintiffs.
He
said that the doctrine contended for by the defendant's counsel was not supported by any case; that it would clog the circulation of bills of exchange if by indorsements of this sort,
where there might be several, the holder was obliged to prove
the handwriting of the several indorsers; that a bill being
payable generally to a payee or his order, when he to whose
order only it was payable, by a blank indorsement, sent it
into the world, that he meant it should have a general circulation.
That any person to whose hands it came bona fide, by
proving the handwriting of the payee, entitled him to sue,'
that as this gave him a legal title, he might strike out the
names of all the intermediate indorsers, whether the indorsements to them were special or not."
The plaintiff had a verdict.

'Vide Moor

Manning, Com., 311; Acheson v. Fountain,
I Stra., 557; Morris v. Foreman, i Dal., 193.
^Chaters v. Bell at al., post, vol. 4, p. 210.
After a special
v.

indorsement by the payee, a subsequent indorser may again make
the bill negotiable from him.
Holmes v. Hooper, Bay, 158.

Had this action been brought by any indorsee subsequent to
the special indorsee against this special indorser, then it would
have been necessary for him to prove the handwriting of the special indorsee.
But as to any party prior to the special indorser,
the maker, drawer, acceptor, payee and all prior indorsers, it is
sufficient for him to prove the indorsement of the person to whose
"order" the contract was made payable.
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A SPECIAL INDORSER IS LIABLE ONLY TO SUBSEQUENT
INDORSEES WHO MAKE THEIR TITLE THROUGH HIS

SPECIAL INDORSEE. SUBSEQUENT INDORSEES MAY
STRIKE OUT THE SPECIAL INDORSEMENT AND RECOVER AGAINST PRIOR INDORSERS.*
MITCHELL

u.

FULLER.i

In the Supreme Court of Pa., Dec,

1850.

[Reported in 15 Pa. St., 268.]

The Form of Action. — This was

suit brought by Martha Ann Fuller, executrix, etc., of Horace Fuller, deceased,
against Matthew Pope Mitchell and Benjamin N. Wynkoop,
upon the following drafts: —

"

S79P-OI.

" Sixty days
after

''New York, April jotA, 184.6.
date, pay to the order of ourselves,

seven hundred and ninety-nine
ceived, which place to account
' '

a

To Messrs. Mitchell

&■

dollars and

of

one cent,

Sands, Fuller & Co.''

Wynkoop.

(Accepted by) Mitchell & Wynkoop.
"
(Indorsed) Sands, Fuller & Co.
' '

' '

value re-

"

* According to the elementary authorities, a bill or note payable to order and indorsed in blank, so long as the indorsement
Chit. Bills
continues blank, "is in effect payable to bearer."
Kent,
Bills.
Comm.
side
227;
Story,
Ec),
89;
ed.),
p.
3
(9th
(nth
Bills,
Notes,
2
Pars.
Notes
and
note
Edw.
Bills
and
w;
60;
p.
19,
§
131, 269; I Daniel Neg. Inst., § 693; Greneaux v. Wheeler, 6Tex.,
522; Weathered v. Smith, 9 Tex., 625; Whithed v. McAdams, 18
Tex., 553; Ross V. Smith, 19 Tex., 172.
Ld. Mansfield said, in Peacock v. Rhodes:
see no difference between a note indorsed in blank and one payable to bearer;"
"A note indorand Chancellor Kent said in Conroy v. Warren:
sed in blank and one payable to bearer are of the same nature.
They both go by delivery, and possession passes property in both
2 Doug.,
cases."
So " a note payable to
636; 3 Johns Cas., 263.
the maker's order becomes, in legal effect, when indorsed in blank,

"I

'

This case is cited in Norton on Bills and Notes, 113, 117;
Illustrative Cases on Bills and Notes, 130. See also Burnap v.
Cook, 32 111., 168 contra.
Johnson v. Mitchell, 50 Tex., 212;
Smith v. Clarke, 1 Esp., 180.
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''New York, April 30th, 184.6.
Ninety days after date, pay to the order of ourselves,
seven hundred and forty-four dollars and seventy-seven cents,
value received, which place to account
of
$744-77 ■
' '

' '

To Messrs.

Mitchell &

Sands, Fuller & Co.''

Wynkoop.

(Accepted by) Mitchell
"
(Indorsed) Sands, Fuller &■ Co.
' '

' '

To which

the following

&■

Wynkoop.

"

affidavit of defence was filed: —

That the bills upon which said suit is brought, are both
specially indorsed to J. B. Trevor, Esq., cashier, or order.
And that the writing filed in the above case, as a copy of
the said bills, is not a true copy thereof, as will appear on the
production of the said bills, and as defendant is informed and
believes,

and expects

to prove.

The original drafts were

forth in the
paper-book of plaintiff in error, but with the following additional indorsement:
" Pay to
B. Trevor, Esq., cash, or order,

J.

(in red ink)

as

the

copies

set

Hammond & Co."

note payable to bearer."
Byles Bills, p. 68, c. 7; Brown v. DeWinton, 6 Man. G. & S., 336.
The rule is well settled that "if a bill be once indorsed in
blank, though afterwards indorsed in full, it was still, against the
drawer, the payee, the acceptor, the blank indorser, and all indorsers before him, be payable to bearer, though as against the
special indorser himself title must be made through his indorsee."
Byles Bills (sth ed. ), 109, cited by Pollock in 2 Exch. infra.;
Chit. Bills, 228, 230a; 3 Kent, Coram., side p. go; Story, Prom.
Notes, § 139; 2 Pars. Notes and Bills, 19, 26; Walker v. McDonald, 2 Exch., S31, citing Smith v. Clarke, i Peake, 295, and i
Esp., 180; Mitchell v. Fuller, 15 Pa. St., 270; Huie v. Bailey, 16
La., 213; Little v. O'Brien, 9 Mass., 423; Dugan v. U. S., 3
Wheat., 172; Edw. Bills and Notes, 275, citing Dollfus v. Frosch,
I Denio, 367; Savannah Nat. Bank v. JHaskins, loi Mass., 370.
It may be objected that the safe transmission, by mail, or
otherwise, of notes and bills payable to bearer requires a different
rule.
The answer is — First, that such a consideration will not justify a departure by the courts from established principles and precedents; second, that what is known as a "restrictive "indorsement
Chit. Bills, 232; Story
stops the currency of negotiable paper.
Prom. Notes, § 142 et. seq. ; 2 Pars. Notes and Bills, 21; i Daniel Neg. Inst, § 698.
a
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& Co. was erased before the

notes were placed in the hands of counsel.
The case was then one of an indorsement in blank by the
payees, and a special indorsement by a subsequent holder to

or order.
There was no indorsement by Trevor.
"November 24, 1849, on motion, and upon inspection of
the originals of the copies filed, judgment is granted by the
court for plaintiff, for want of a sufficient affidavit of defence."

J, B. Trevor, Esq.,

cashier,

The Claim of Defendant. — The defendant made the fol-

lowing claims:
The court entered judgment for the plaintiff below,
1.
notwithstanding an affidavit of defence had been filed.
The court entered judgment against the defendants,
2.
although the affidavit of defence filed set forth a full defence.

The Claim of Plaintiff.— The plaintiff claimed that

the

affidavit of defence alleges that the bills are specially indorsed
to J. B. Trevor, Esq., cashier, or order, and, in case of special indorsement, to enable any one but the special indorsee
to recover on the bill, it must appear either that it is reindorsed by the special indorsee, or that he has received satisfaction.'
That there would be no use in a special indorsement if any holder could maintain the action without showing
title in himself.^ Such an indorsement cannot be stricken out
The only exception to the rule is where the
by the plaintiff.^

Where such an
plaintiff is the drawer or a prior indorser.
one comes again into possession of the bill, such possession is
prima facie evidence of ownership.*
Decision. — In the case of a special indorsement of

a

bill

or promissory note to enable any one but the
special indorsee to recover on the bill, it must appear either
that it is reindorsed or re-assigned by the special indorsee, or
that he has received satisfaction. The mere possession of the
note or bill of exchange by the indorser who had indorsed it
of exchange

'2 Dal., 144; I Yeates, 94;
'

Cranch, 159.
Peter's C. C. Rep., 171.
*3 Wheat., 183.
7

'i

12 Ser.

& R., 43.
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a
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it

a

it

a
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to another, is not sufficient evidence of his right of action
against his indorser, without a re-assignment or receipt from
the last indorsee.'
But this rule obtains only when the note
is specially indorsed by the payee, or made payable specially
by the maker, for when the note or bill is indorsed in blank,
the rule is otherwise.
A blank indorsement makes the bill
transferable by mere delivery.
When the first indorsement is
in blank, the bill or note as against the payee, drawer, or acceptor, is afterwards assignable by mere delivery, notwithstanding it may have subsequent indorsements in full; because
a subsequent holder by delivery may declare and recover, as
the indorsee of the payee, and strike out all the subsequent
indorsements, whether special or not.^
In Smith v. Clarke,^ a bill was indorsed in blank by the
payee, and after some other indorsements, indorsed to Jackson or order; Jackson never indorsed the bill, but a recovery
was had by a subsequent holder who had stricken out all the
indorsements but the first.
Ld. Kenyon gives the reason for
the decision.
He said the doctrine contended for by the defendant's counsel was not supported by any case, and that it
would clog the circulation of bills of exchange,
by indorsement of this sort, where there might be several, the holder
was obliged to prove the hand-writing of the several indorsers;
that a bill being payable generally to
payee or his order,
when he, to whose order only
was payable, by
blank indorsement, sent
into the world, that he meant
should
circulation,
have
and any person into whose hands
general
came, bona fide, by proving the hand- writing of the payee,
title, he might
entitled himself to sue; that as this gave him
indorsers,
strike out the names of all the intermediate
whether
the indorsements to them were special or not.
Thus the distinction
clearly taken; this case falls within the latter class.
Since Smith v. Clarke, the law has been

'This

7

i

&

on Bills, 175-6, 5th edition.
C. Peake's Rep., 225.
Esp. Rep., 180;

*i

S.

'■'Chitty

i

2

is

Dal., 144;
ruled in Gorgerat v. McCarty,
Yeates,
R., 43;
Cranch, 159; and in
94; Zeigler v. Geary, 12 Ser.
Peter's C. C. Rep., 174; Reamer v. Bell, 79
Craig V. Brown,
Pa. St., 292; Lawrence v. Fussell, 77 Pa. St., 460.
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considered settled, and it would be dangerous now to disturb
I know of no case where it has been even questioned.
it.
The latter class seems to be the rule, the former for special
It has always been the policy of
reasons, is the exception.
the courts, accommodating themselves to the wishes of the
mercantile world, to promote the free, unconstrained circulation of commercial paper; and hence it is they have adopted
the rule that the holder may maintain suit in his own name,

The presumption,
by striking out the special indorsements.
and it is a fair one, is that he is a boita fide holder for value,
The rule, however, is reor a trustee or agent for collection.
laxed in favor of the maker of a note, who may make it payable in full, by inserting the name in whose favor it is made,
as drawee of a bill of exchange or payee of a note, who may

indorse it specially for purposes of transmission and for safety,
Beyond this, the courts have
and so far to clog its circulation.
When the note
wisely decided, they are not at liberty to go.
is once indorsed in blank, subsequent holders cannot control
These principles are fully sustained by the
its circulation.
authorities.
After an indorsement in blank by the payee or subsequent
indorser, it is competent for the holder of the bill or note to
make himself the immediate indorsee, and to claim by the
blank indorsement.'
And where a person fairly and without fraud becomes
possessed of a negotiable note, indorsed in blank, it has been
held that he may maintain an action thereon, although it has
not been legally transferred to him.^
An Indorsement in Blank may be Changed to a Spe— So, where a promissory note, payable to
Indorsement.
cial
order, is indorsed in blank, the holder has a right to fill it up
with any name he pleases, and the person whose name is inserted will be deemed the legal owner; and if in fact the indorsement in blank was intended as a transfer for the benefit
of another person, yet he would be considered as a trustee,

'Taylor

v. Binney,

7

Mass., 481;

Mullen v. French,

9

Watts,

15

Mass.,

96.
H^ittle V.
534-

O'Brien,

9

Mass., 423;

Bowman

v.

Wood,
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suing for the benefit of the person having the legal interest.'
This view of the case, so fully sustained by authority, is
an answer to the other exception. The holder having stricken
out the indorsements, the record contains a true copy of the
note on which suit is brought.
Judgment affirmed.

ii

'Lovell V. Evertson,
Johns. R., 52; 11 Ser. & R., 179,
Sterling v. Marietta Co.; Curtis v. Sprague, 51 Cal., 239; Middleton v. Griffith, 57 N. J. L., 442; Barney v. Steiner Bros., 108
Ala.,

III.

CHAPTER IX.
of Indorsers.*

\A^arranties or Admission

SECTION

49.

AN INDORSER WARRANTS OR ADMITS THAT THE BILL
OR NOTE IS JUST SUCH A CONTRACT AS IT APPEARS
TO BE; THAT IT IS IN EVERY WAY A VALID, SUBSISTING, GENUINE CONTRACT.
EX. PARTE CLARKE. 1
In the High Court of Chancery, March,
\_Reported in 3

1791.

Brown's Chancery Cases, 2j8.'\

The Form of Action. — Petition to be admitted
itor, in respect
the petitioner.

a

cred-

to certain bills indorsed by the bankrupt to
The bills were made to fictitious payees.
But

'This case is cited in Chalmers' Bills, Notes and Checks, 222;
Chitty on Bills and Notes, 158, 705. See also Heylyn v. Adamson, 2 Burr., 669; McGregor v. Rhodes, 25 L. J. Q. B., 318; Selser V. Brock, 3 Ohio St., 302; Canal Bank v. Bank, i Hill., 287;
Turner V. Keller; 66 N. Y., 66; Watson v. Chesire, 18 la., 202.
*

Warranties

or Admissions

of Indorser. — Every in-

dorser of whatever kind, as well as every transferer without
indorsement (where the title can be transferred without indorsecertain warranties or admissions, which he is
ment), makes
from
A regular indorser in full or in blank
denying.
estopped
warrants:
1.
That the contract is in every way genuine;
2.
That the prior parties thereto are competent;
That he has a lawful title to the instrument;
3.
That he has a right to transfer the title to the same;
4.
That the contract is in every way just such a contract as
5.
it purports to be and that the parties are liable thereon according
to the terms of their apparent contract; and
6.
That the parties who are primarily liable thereon are
to
able
pay and will pay at maturity upon presentment and
demand.
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it was said, that that circumstance was of no consequence
against the indorser.
Decision. — It is clear that, as against the indorser, it
does not signify what the bill is.
The indorsee may come

son,

5

3

7

a

a

it

if,

The foregoing warranties or admissions are made by every
indorser without recourse, as well as by those who transfer commercial contracts without indorsement, except the last (6th).
Therefore,
in the case of an indorsement without recourse, or
transfer by delivery simply,
should turn out that the original
contract was
forgery, or that the original parties thereto were
not liable by reason of incapacity for any reason, or that they had
been discharged lawfully, or that the contract was invalid by
reason of the statute or the common law or public policy, such
indorser or transferer would be liable thereon by reason of
breach of his warranty or admission.
Story on bills, no, 235;
Col.,
v.
18
Willis
v.
French, 84 Me., 593; 30
Rhodes
Jenkins,
49;
R.,
Y.,
416; Frank v. Lanier, 91 N.
Am. St.
112; Harris v. BradYerg (Tenn.), 310; Erwin v. Downs, 15 N. Y., 575; Bowley,
man V. Hiller, 130 Mass., 153; Fish v. First Nat. Bk., 42 Mich.,
203; Merriden Bk. v. Gallaudet, 120 N. Y., 298; Selser v. Brock,
Ohio St., 302; Dumont v. Williamson, 18 Ohio St., 515; 98 Am.
D., 186; TurnbuU v. Bowyer, 40 N. Y., 456; Cover v. Meyers, 75
Md., 406; Redington v. Woods, 45 Cal., 406; Aldrich v. Jack-

In

R. I., 218.

the transfer of commercial contracts on account of their
Dugeneral purpose the maxim of caveat emptor does not apply.
V. Williamson, supra.
An indorser admits all prior indorsements to have been duly

mont

is

It said the indorser warrants the title and genuineness,
made.
of the paper he transfers, and that when sued he cannot deny the
existence, legality, or validity of the contract which his indorsement put in circulation, for the purpose of defeating his own
Edwards on Bills and Notes, 289, 291; Fish v. First
liability.
Mich., 203.
Parties dealing in such paper are not
strictly right.
the signatures of the several indorsers.
with
familiar
expected to be
This

42

is

Nat. Bank,

If

is

a

4

it

it

it

is

genuine, they are not resatisfied that the last indorsement
quired to look beyond in the absence of such facts as would impute to them bad faith in case they did not. A person has no
negotiable, and offer
right to indorse paper, thereby making
of business, unless
course
usual
in
the
offered
to be
or permit
satisfied that the signatures previously appearing thereon are genuMills V. Barney, 22 Cal., 240; Merriden v. Gallaudet, 120
ine.
Ohio St., 628.
N. Y., 298;
bill or note has nothing to do with the preof
holder
The
indorsements,
and whether genuine or not his immediate
ceding
The last indorsement is, in fact, a.
liable to him.
indorser
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against the indorser, though the bill is a mere nullity in other
It is the indorser's business to see what he can
respects.
guaranty of the preceding indorsements, and admits the handwriting of drawer and prior indorser, although the bill be forged.
Chitty on Bills, 197-8; 3 Kent Com., 60; 2 Salk., 127.
Forged Indorsement — Effect of. — If an indorsement is
forged by one lawfully in possession of a commercial contract
which cannot be transferred without indorsement, and he transfers
it, so indorsed, to an innocent purchaser for value, the latter does
Roach v. Woodall, 91 Tenn., 206;
not acquire any title thereto.
Foltier v. Schroeder, 19 La. Ann., 17; Roberts v. Tucker, 16
Q. B., 560.
The holder of a commercial contract payable to bearer or
indorsed in blank may recover upon the same, providing he took
it innocently, in the due course of trade, for a valuable consideration and before maturity, even though the transferer had stolen or
If, however, it becomes necessary for the finder
found the same.
or the thief, in order to transfer the contract, to forge the indorsement of the original parties, then the indorsee takes no title whatever against the original parties.
Story on Promissory Notes,
381-383; Roach V. Woodall, supra; Miller v. Race.
The original parties, however, to the contract maybe estopped
in certain cases from setting up that the indorsement was a forgery.
Benjamin's Chalmers B. & N., 92.

Effect of Indorsement After Maturity. — Liability of

the Indorser. — When

a negotiable
contract is indorsed after
and
demand
must
be made within a reasonmaturity, presentment
notice,
able time, and
in case acceptance or payment is refused,
must be given to the indorser in order to charge him.
The indorser
cannot be held liable without presentment, demand and notice,
unless these conditions are excused or waived.
Indorsitig a commercial contract after maturity is equivalent to making a new contract payable on de7nand.
Dan. on Negot. Inst., 611, Beer v.
Clifton, 98 Cal., 323; Goodwin v. Davenport, 47 Me., 112; Graul
V. Strutzel, 53 Iowa, 712; Bassenhorst v. Wilby, 45 Ohio St., 336.
There is no precise time where a note payable on demand is
deemed to be dishonored.
As a general rule it is due within a
reasonable time after its date, and what is a reasonable time is a
Goodwin v. Davenport, supra; Field v. Nickerquestion of fact.
son, 13 Mass., 131; Leavitt v. Putman, 53 Am. D., 322.
In Vermont the indorsee must prove demand and notice within
sixty days of the indorsement to him in order to charge his indorser.
Verder V. Verder, 63 Vt., 38.
In Michigan, a commercial contract payable on demand is
payable at once and without demand, so that the statute of limitations begins to run from its delivery.
Palmer v. Palmer, 36
Mich., 487; In re. King's Estate, 94 Mich., 411, 425; Fenno v.
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make of the bill, but he, by his indorsement, is certainly
liable to the indorsee.'

ii8;

McMullen v. Rafferty, 89 N. Y., 456.
commercial contract has matured does not
Bassenhorst v. Wilby, 45 Ohio St., 333 j
destroy its negotiability.
R.,
N.
E.
Putman, 3 N. Y., 494.
Leavitt
v.
75;
13
Gay,

146

Mass.,

The fact that

a

So it has since been determined, that in action against indorser, it is not necessary to prove any indorsement on the bill
Critchlow v. Parry, 1 Campb.,
prior to that of the defendant.
182.
It had long before been decided, that in an action against
the indorser, the handwriting of the drawer need not be proved.
Lambert v. Pack, i Salk., 127; Lambert v. Oakes, S. C, i Ld.
Rayra., 443.
The present was one of the numerous cases which arose in the
bankruptcies of Livesay & Co. and Gibson & Co., a succinct account of which will be found in the note to the case of Bennett v.
Farnell, 2 Campb., 130, 180.
'

CHAPTER X.
Warrants

or

Admissions of an
Recourse."

SECTION

Indorser

" Without

50.

WARRANTS, OR
ADMITS: (i) THAT HE IS A LAWFUL HOLDER OF THE
CONTRACT; (2) THAT HE HAS A JUST AND LAWFUL
TITLE TO THE SAME; (3) THAT THE CONTRACT IS IN
EVERY WAY A VALID, SUBSISTING OBLIGATION; (4)
THAT HE HAS A RIGHT TO TRANSFER IT.

AN INDORSER "WITHOUT

DUMONT

-u.

RECOURSE"

WILLIAMSON.!

In the Supreme Court of Ohio, Dec,

1869.

[Reported in 18 Ohio St., 515; 5 Am. Law Reg. {N. S. ), 330; g8
Am. Dec, i86.'\

The original

action in this case was brought by the
plaintiff in error, who states in his petition "that Henry
Essman, on the 12th of May, i860, at Cincinnati, made his
promissory note in writing of that date, and thereby promised
to pay to the order of William Wolff five hundred dollars, for
value received, in four months after the date thereof, and
which said promissory note purports to be indorsed on the back
thereof by Wm. Wolff, which said note afterward came to the
'

Chalmers Bills, Notes and
Tiedeman
on
Commercial Paper, 260; Daniel
Checks, 129, 222;
on Negotiable Instruments, 670; Norton on Bills and Notes, 119,
See also Watson v.
167; Wood's Byles on Bills and Notes, 256.
Chesire, 18 Iowa, 202; 87 Am. D., 382; Goupy v. Harden, 7 Taunton, 159, 163; 2 Marsh, 454; Gurney v. Wormsley, 28 Eng. L. &
Eq., 256; 4 Ell. & Bl., 132; Gompertz v. Bartlett, 24 Eng. L. &
Eq., 156; Baxter v. Duren, 29 Me., 434; Terry v. Bissel, 26
Conn., 23.
Judge Redfield's review of the decision of the court
below in this case, vol. 5, p. 356, April mumber 5 of American
Law Register; Wheeler v. Miller, et al., 2 Handy, 149; Ellis and
Morton v. O. L. Ins. & Tr. Co., 4 Ohio St., 628.

This case is cited in Benjamin's
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hands of the defendant, who afterward then and there indorsed and deUvered the same to the plaintiff, but without recourse on him.
The plaintiff avers that the defendant did
thereby warrant that the indorsement on the back thereof was
the signature of William Wolff, and was made by him, whereas
in truth and in fact said signature on the back of said note was
not made by said William Wolff, but was and is a forgery,
and by reason thereof said note was wholly worthless, and of
no value, the said Henry Essman, the maker thereof, being
wholly insolvent."
The petition proceeds to allege due demand and notice of
non-payment at maturity, and asks judgment for the amount
with interest.
A copy of the note is attached to the petition, which,
with the indorsement thereon, corresponds with the state-

of the note,

ments of the petition.

To this petition the defendant demurred, and the case
from special term for the opinion of
the judges in general term upon the questions of law arising
By the judgment of the court in general
on the demurrer.
term the demurrer was sustained, and the plaintiff not desiring to amend his petition, it was thereupon dismissed, and
judgment rendered against plaintiff for costs.
The plaintiff here asks a reversal of this judgment on the
ground of error in the Superior Court in sustaining the demurwas thereupon reserved

rer to his petition.
There is no statement in the petition of the circumstances under which the note in this case was transferred to the
plaintiff, or the consideration paid therefor, but it is to be
presumed that it was so transferred for a valuable considerIf the fact be otherwise, this is a matter of defense,
ation.
to be set up by answer.
There is no averment of fraud, or that the defendant had
knowledge at the time of the transfer, of any defect in the
The question therefore arises,
note, which he concealed.
whether upon the sale and transfer of a promissory note by
indorsement, " without recourse," the vendor impliedly warrants that the signatures of the prior parties whose names appear thereon are genuine.

DUMONT
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Whilst the words "without recourse," accompanying an

indorsement, clearly indicate that the party making the transfer does not intend to assume the position of an unconditional
indorser, or to incur any liability if the note is not paid at
maturity, upon due demand, or even if all the parties to the
can
paper should prove to be wholly insolvent, we think they
At least they
not be construed as importing more than this.
do not divest such indorser of his character as a vendor of the
note, nor exempt him from the liabilities arising from a sale
and transfer by delivery, where the note is capable of being
In such case, then, is there no implied
thus transferred.
warranty on the part of the vendor that the note is not forged.?

That it is in fact what it purports on its face to

be.'

On this question the language of the text-books, in this
country at least, is nearly, if not quite, uniform.
a Transferrer, Simply, of a Commer—
cial Contract. Justice Story, in his Commentary on Promis-

The Contract of

'§

a

is

;"]

sory Notes,' speaking of the liabilities of a party who transfers a
note by delivery only, says: "/« the first place he warrants
by implication, unless otherwise agreed, that he is a lawful
holder, and has a just and valid title to the instrument, and
a right to transfer it by delivery ; for this is implied as an
In the next place, he warrants, in
obligation of good faith.
like manner, that the instrument is genuine, and not forged
To this the editor of the fourth edition of the
or fictitious."
work, published in 1856, adds in brackets: ["that it is of the
kind and description it purports on its face to be; unless
where the note is sold, as other goods and effects, by delivery
merely, without indorsement, in which case it has been decided that the law respecting the sale of goods is applicable,
referring in the notes
and that there is no implied warranty
to the cases of Baxter v. Duren,^ Ellis v. Wild,' and other
authorities, also to conflicting decisions.
This new matter
shown
was added to the text after Justice Story's death, as
stateby the brackets, and was evidently intended only as
The excepment of the authorities bearing on the question.
118.

R., 434.
'6 Mass. R., 321.

''29 Maine
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tion stated to the general rule as laid down by Judge
Story
can not, therefore, claim the sanction of his name.
The law is similarly stated in Parson on Notes and Bills,'
where it is said to be " well settled that the vendor without
indorsement [the transferrer] warrants that the paper is

of

kind and description

that it purports to be. " In a note
on page 38, the case of Baxter v. Duren, supra, is referred
to, where it was held that one who sells and transfers a promissory note by delivery is not liable on an implied warranty of
the

its genuineness,

if he

sold the same as property, and not in
debt previously existing or then created, and if

payment of a
he did not know of the forgery.
But it was said in that case
that if the note was transferred by delivery merely, in payment of a debt due, or for goods then purchased, or by way
of discount for money then loaned, there would in such case be
an implied warranty of the genuineness of the paper. " But,"
adds the learned author, ' ' this distinction does not seem to
be well founded."
And again, at page 589 of the same volume, the principle is broadly stated " that any
transferrer of a
note or bill transferable by delivery, warrants that it is no

If

it turns out that the name of one of the parties
is forged, and the bill becomes valueless, the vendor, though
no party to the bill, becomes liable to the vendee as upon a failure of consideration."
He then proceeds to state, without
further comment, the distinction which was taken in the case
of Baxter v. Duren, supra, and of which has previously disapproved.
So, in Edwards on Bills and Promissory Notes, page 291,
it is said: "The party assuming to transfer a negotiable
instrument thereby asserts it to be genuine, and is bound ta
make his assertion good."
And on page 289: " Though the
indorser transfers the note upon condition that it is to be collected at the risk of the indorsee, he is nevertheless responsible if the note proves to be a forgery.^
In England, it seems to be well settled, by the latest
decisions on the subject, that the vendor of a bill of exchange
forgery.

'Vol.

2, pages 37, 39.

^Shaver v. Ehle,

16

Johns. R., 201, and

20

N. Y. R., 226.
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Thus, in Gompertz v.
responsible for its genuineness.
Bartlett, decided in 1853, it was held by the Court of Queen's
Bench that the vendor of a bill of exchange impliedly warrants that it is of the kind and description that it purports on
And in Gurney and others v. Womersthe face of it to be.'
ley/ decided in 1854 by the same court, it was held that the
vendor of a bill of exchange, though no party to the bill, is
responsible for its genuineness ; and if it turns out that the
name of one of the parties is forged, and the bill becomes
valueless, he is liable to the vendee, as upon a failure of conBoth these cases were decided on the same prinsideration.
ciple which is applied in sales of personal property generally,
that the vendor impliedly warrants that the article sold is of
the kind and description which it imports and is understood

is

by the parties to be.

it was held that
one who sells a promissory note, by delivery, upon which the
names of indorsers have been forged, is not liable upon an
implied promise to refund the money received therefor, if he
sold the same as property, and not in payment of a precedent
debt, and did not know of the forgery.
The same doctrine was held in the case of Ellis v. Wild,^
where the same distinction was made between the sale of the
note and its transfer in payment of a debt.
But the doctrine
is no longer maintained in that commonwealth.*
In the last
of these cases, Ellis v. Wild and Baxter v. Duren are both
considered, and, for what seems to us good reasons, disapproved; and it is held that there is no valid reason for the
distinction taken in those cases.
In Aldrich v. Jackson," the doctrine is expressly stated

In the case of Baxter

v. Duren,^ supra,

'24 Eng. Iv. and E. Rep., 156; 23 L. J. Ex., 65; see also
Challis V. McCrum, 22 Kan., 157; Bell v. Dagg, 60 N. Y., 528;
Bell V. Cafferty, 21 Ind., 411.
^24L. J., Q. B., 46.
''29
*

Me., 434.

Mass., 321.
'^
Cabot Bank v. Morton, 4 Gray, 156; Lobdell v. Baker,
Met., 193; Merriam v. Wolcott, 3 Allen, 258.
6

"5

R. I., 218.

i
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bill or note, by the very act of sale,

impliedly warrants the genuineness of the signatures of the
previous parties to it."
The same doctrine is held in Terry v. Bissel,' and in

Thrall

v. Newell.^

And the principle upon which these decisions rest has its
foundation,
'

26

^

19

as we

think, in reason and justice.

Conn., 23.
Vt., 202.

An unqualified indorsement is the assumption of a conditional
The indorser becomes a new drawer, and is liable on the
liability.

"Without recourse,"

away with this
It leave the indorsement simply as a trans<:onditional liability.
fer of title, and the indorser liable only as vendor; yet it leaves
him a vendor, and divests him of none of the liabilities of a venIt makes the transaction the equivalent of a delivery of
■dor.
paper payable to bearer, and transferable by delivery.
(Hannum
•default of the drawee.

V.

does

Richardson, 48 Vt., 508.)

The Warranties of Tranferrer. — Independent

of any
in the
there
is
what
indorsement,
warranty
of
implied
matter
?
Two
note
things
of
a
promissory
transfer by delivery simply
is
an
implied warare clear under the authorities: ist, that there
ranty of the genuineness of the signatures; and 2nd, that there is
It is unnecessary to
no warranty of the solvency of the parties.
these proposiauthorities
upon
of
the
a
few
refer
more than
to
notes;
in
cases
and
Jones v.
tions: Byles on Bills, pp. 123, 125,
BL, 132;
&
El.
Ryde, S Taunt., 488; Gurney v. Womersley, 4
Bissell,
v.
■Gompertz v. Bartlett, 24 Eng. Law & Eq., 156; Terry
26 Conn., 23; Merriam v. Wolcott, 3 Allen, 259; Aldrich v. Jackson, S R. I., 218; Lobdell v. Baker, 3 Mete, 469; i Addison on
Cont, p. 152; Ellis V. Wild, 6 Mass., 321; Eagle Bank v. Smith,
Conn., 71; Shaver V. Ehle, 16 Johns., 201; Dumont v. WilliamS
son, 18 Ohio St., 515; 2 Parsons on Notes and Bills, ch. 2, § 2.
A reference to some of the leading cases will throw light upon
this question.

v. Newell, 19 Vt, 203, it appeared that one of the
The vendor made a written assignmakers of a note was insane.
ment, in which was a description of the note, and the court construed this as an express warranty that the instrument was the legal
obligation of the apparent makers, and one of them being incapable of contracting, gave judgment against the vendor on account
While the judgof this breach for the amount received by him.

In Thrall

ment of the court is rested upon the fact of an express warranty,
the judge who writes the opinion expresses his individual conviction that the same result would follow on a mere transfer without
any express warranty, and quotes approvingly an extract from
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'promissory note, it is
not the material substance of the paper and ink for which the
consideration is understood by the parties to be paid, but it is
the chose in action of which the note purports to be the evidence, that is the real subject of negotiation and transfer.
But if the note is forged, if no such chose in action exists, if
the vendor neither owns nor parts with anything of the kind.

In the sale what purports to be

a

Rand's edition of Long on Sales, that "there is an implied warranty in every sale that the thing sold is that for which it is sold."
In Lobdell v. Baker, 3 Mete, 469, it appeared that the owner
of a note procured the indorsement of a minor, and then put the
He was held liable to a subsequent holder.
paper in circulation.
Ch. J. Shaw, delivering the opinion of the court, said:
•'Whoever takes a negotiable security is understood to ascertain for himself the ability of the contracting parties, but he has a
right to believe, without inquiring, that he has the legal obligation
of the contracting parties appearing on the bill or note.
Unexplained, the purchaser of such a note has a right to believe, upon
the faith of the security itself, that it is indorsed by one capable
of binding himself by the contract which an indorsement by law

imports."
In Hannum v. Richardson, 48 Vt., 508, a note was given for
liquor sold in violation of law, and was by statute void.
Defendant knowing its invalidity, transferred it by an indorsement with-

out recourse, and was held liable to his vendee.
In Delaware Bank v. Jarvis, 20 N. Y., 226, a usurious note
was sold, and the vendor was adjudged liable, not merely for the
money received by him, but also the costs paid by his vendee in a
suit against the makers of the note.
In the opinion, Mr. Justice
Comstock uses this language:
"The authorities state the doctrine in general terms that the
vendor of a chose in action, in the absence of express stipulation,
impliedly warrants its legal soundness and validity. In peculiar
circumstances and relations, the law may not impute to him an enBut if there are exceptions, they certainly
gagement of this sort.
do not exist where the invalidity of the debt or security sold arises
out of the vendor's own dealing with or relation to it. In this case,
the defendant held a promissory note which was void, because he
had himself taken it in violation of the statutes of usury.
When
he sold the note to the plaintiffs and received the cash therefor, by
that very act he affirmed in judgment of law that the instrument
was unattained so far at least as he had been connected with its

origin."

In Young v. Cole, 3 Bingham (N. C), 724, certain bonds were
sold as Guatemala bonds, which turned out afterward to be lacking the requisite seal, and the vendor, though ignorant of the de-
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it is difficult to see any just ground upon which he can be
allowed to retain the purchase money.
He has undertaken to
sell what he did not own, and that which in fact has no exist-

The maxim of caveat emptor is inapplicable to such

ence.

a

case.

The present case, however, is much stronger.

It

is not

by delivery merely, but by indorsement, qualiis true, so as to exclude the liabilities consequent

a case of sale

fied,

it

it,

feet and innocent of wrong, was compelled to refund the money.
The thing in fact sold was not the thing supposed and intended to
be sold.
In Gompertz v. Bartlett, 24 Eng. Law and Eq., 156, the plaintiff discounted for the defendant an unstamped bill, purporting on
its face to have been a foreign bill, drawn at Sierra Leone and acIf
cepted in London, but which was in fact drawn in London.
actually a foreign bill, it required no stamp, and was valid; but
being an inland bill, it required a stamp to make it a valid bill in a
court of law.
The acceptance was genuine, and the acceptor had
But the acceptor becoming bankpreviously paid similar bills.
rupt, the commissioner refused to allow it against his estate because not stamped.
Thereupon the plaintiff, who had sold the
bill, and had been compelled to take it up, brought his action to
and the action was sustained.
recover the price he had paid for
Ld. Campbell, before whom the case had been tried, and who then
held adversely to the plaintiff, said:
then thought that the rule caveat emptor applied; but after
think the action
hearing the argument and the authorities cited,
maintainable, and upon this ground: that the article sold did not
If had been
was sold.
answer the description under which
foreign bill, and there had been any secret defect, the risk would
must be taken that the
have been that of the purchaser; but here
On the
purported to be.
bill was sold as and for that which
Leone,
and
face of the bill
purporting to be drawn at Sierra
was sold as answering the description of that which on its face
really was
That amounted to warranty that
purported to be.
of that description."
was
In Ticonic Bank v. Smiley, 27 Me., 225, an overdue note
"
holden;
not
yet
transferred with this indorsement, "Indorser
was decided that the indorser was liable to his vendee for any payment made on the note before the transfer, or any set-off existing
of which the note gave no indication and the vendor no
against

it

it

a

it

it

it it

it

it

a

it

it

is

I

"I

information.

Iowa, 329,

is

was

is

is

v. Reno, 38

it

an
held that there
in
the
implied warranty that there has been no material alteration
" We have no doubt
court
The
says:
its
execution.
since
paper
no
an implied warranty of the transferrer that there
that there

In Snyder
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Still, the defendant is a
thereon under the commercial law.
party to the note, he has sold and transferred it as such, and
On this queshe is bound to make his representation good.
tion we know of no conflict in the authorities.
The judgment of the court below must then be reversed,
the demurrer to the plaintiff's petition overruled, and a procedendo awarded.
defect in the instrument, as well as that the signature of the maker
See also, Blethen v. Lovering, 58 Me., 437; Ogden v.
is genuine."
Blydenburgh, i Hilton, 182; Fake v. Smith, 2 Abb. (N. Y.), App.,
76; 2 Parsons on Notes and Bills, eh. 2, § 2, and cases in notes;
Terry v. Bissell, 26 Conn., 23; i Daniel on Neg. Instruments,
§ 670.

The Contract of an Indorser " Without Recourse." —
it

is

it

a

is

9

a

it

is

3

a

if

if

if

a

if

is

a

is

it,

"When the indorsement is without recourse, the indorser specially
declines to assume any responsibility as a party to the bill or note;
but by the very act of transferring
what
he engages that
purports to be — the valid obligation of those whose names are
He
like
drawer who draws without recourse but who
upon it.
never less liable
he draws upon
fictitious party, or one withAnd, therefore, the holder may recover against the inout funds.
dorser without recourse, (i)
any of the prior signatures were not
the note was invalid between the original pargenuine; or, (2)
ties, because of the want, or illegality of, the consideration;
or,
was
prior
any
the
indorser
was
or,
party
incompetent;
(3)
(4)
without title."
For further discussion of this rule see Watson v.
Chesire, 18 Iowa, 202; Hailey v. Falconer, 32 Ala., 536; Rice v.
Stearns,
Mass., 225; Ticonic Bank v. Smiley, 27 Me., 225.
If an indorsement
intended to be "without recourse" that
fact should be indicated; for
well settled rule of law that an
unqualified indorsement, in full or in blank, cannot be varied by
parol as against
subsequent bona fide holder.
Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 699, 719; Dale v. Gear, 38 Conn., 15;
Am.
Dec, 353; Hill V. Shields, 8i N. C, 250; 31 Am. Rep., 499;
Martin v. Cole, 104 U. S., 30; Charles v. Denis, 42 Wis., 56; 24
Am. Rep., 383; Lee v. Pile, 37 Ind., 107, no; Rodney v. Wilson,
67

Mo.,

123.

An Indorsement "\A^ithout Recourse" Does not Impair the Negotiable Quality of Commercial Contracts. —

An indorsement

3

&Eq.,

156.

a

it

"without recourse" does not impair the negotiable quality of commercial contracts.
Neither does
subput
sequent purchaser upon inquiry concerning defenses which might
be set up by prior parties.
Borden v. Clark, 26 Mich., 410; Rice
V. Stearns,
Mass., 225; Stevenson v. O'Neal, 71 111., 314; Bisbing V. Graham, 14 Pa. St., 14; Gompertz v. Bartlett, 24Eng. L.

CHAPTER XI.
Warranties or Admissions of a Transferrer of a Commercial Contract Without Indorsement.
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THE TRANSFERRER OF A COMMERCIAL CONTRACT, PAYABLE TO BEARER, WITHOUT INDORSEMENT, IMPLIEDLY WARRANTS OR ADMITS: (i) THAT HE IS A
LAWFUL HOLDER OF THE CONTRACT; (2) THAT HE
HAS A JUST AND LEGAL TITLE TO THE SAME; (3) THAT
THE CONTRACT IS IN EVERY WAY A VALID, SUBSISTING OBLIGATION; (4) THAT HE HAS A RIGHT TO TRANSFER IT; (5) THAT IT IS THE KIND AND DESCRIPTION
OF A CONTRACT THAT IT PURPORTS TO BE.
GOMPERTZ

V.

BARTLETT.'

In the Court of Queen's Bench, Nov.

14,

1853.

[Reported in 24 English Law and Equity, 1^6; 2j Law

(N.

S. ), Q.

B., 65;

18

fur.,

266;

2

Ellis

&- Blackburn,

J.

Rep^

849.]

The Form of Action.— Action for

money payable by the
and for money received by the de-

defendant to the plaintiff,
fendant for the use of the plaintiff.
Plea of the general issue.
On the trial, before Ld. Campbell, C. J., at the sittings
in London after Trinity term last, it appeared that the plaintiff and the defendant had for the previous six or eight months
considerable dealings together in respect of the discounting of
bills of exchange; and in January last the defendant produced
to the plaintiff, for the purpose of being discounted, an unstamped bill, purporting on the face of it to have been a foreign bill drawn at Sierra Leone, and accepted in London, but

'This

case is cited in Wood's Byles on Bills and Notes, 268,
Chalmers Bills, Notes and Checks, 227. See also
Benjamin's
568;
O'Dell,
v.
Webb
49 N. Y., 583; Bell v. Dagg, 60 N. Y., 528; Murray V. Judah, 6 Cowen, 483; Brown v. McNamara, 20 N. Y., 287.
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was more

bill of exchange

a

it

is

it,

a

8

a

it,

The dewhich it appeared was, in fact, drawn in London.
fendant then stated to the plaintiff that he believed the bill to
be perfectly good, and that it would be paid at maturity; that
he would not put his own name upon it, but that the plaintiff
might take the bill and make inquiries about it and that if he
approved of it he, the defendant, would pay a liberal discount
The plaintiff took
upon its being taken without his name.
the bill, and upon inquiry was informed that the parties to it
were respectable, and he thereupon paid the defendant the
amount of the bill, less 85/. discount.
The plaintiff afterwards indorsed the bill to a person named Rogers, for the full
amount, less 5/. per cent, discount.
The bill was afterwards
dishonored, the acceptor becoming bankrupt, the plaintiff was
compelled to repay the amount he had received from Rogers.
Bills of the same kind had before been paid by the acceptor,
and an endeavor was made to prove under the bankruptcy of
the acceptor for the amount of the bill, but the commissioner
refused to allow
as the bill was not stamped.
Upon these
facts, the learned judge was of opinion that the action could
not be maintained, and the plaintiff was non-suited, leave
being reserved to move to set aside the non-suit, and to enter
verdict for the plaintiff for 15/.
The Claim of the Plaintiff.— The plaintiff contended
that the bill was
perfect bill of exchange, though unstamped.
The acceptor was in the habit of paying bills such as these.
The mere fact that his bankruptcy prevented him paying
cannot entitle the plaintiff to recover back the money he paid
for it.
There has been no failure of consideration.
There
no implied warranty that the bill was drawn at
any particular place, or that
did not require stamp, or that
a

it

a

was of

East, 314.

'Co. Lit., 102,
•V.

Lopus, Cro.

Jac,

a.
4,

Bree v. Holbech, Dougl., 630; Chandelor
and Taylor v. Bullen,
Exch. Rep., 779.
5

2

'

it

it

it

than
purported to be on its
merchantable character. In Parkinson
V. Lee,'
was held that there was no warranty that hops sold
by sample were of a merchantable quality, and there was no
more warranty of the bill in this case.
The principle of
caveat emptor clearly applies.'
Here the plaintiff had the bill
face, or that
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He took it away, and made such inquiries
inspect.
about it as he pleased.
He had every power of ascertaining
the truth.

to

it

is

it

if
it

a

is,

[Wightman, J., put this question:
"How can you distinguish this from the case of a forged bill.?
There is an implied warranty that the instrument is genuine, though there is
none that the parties are solvent."
Byles on Bills, 266. J
It has never been held as a part of a definition of a bill
of exchange that it should be drawn upon a proper stamp.
This bill is a genuine bill and might have been enforced
abroad.
If a horse sold without a warranty die, the day after
the purchase, of a latent defect existing before the sale, the
loss falls on the purchaser.
Jones v. Ryde' is distinguishable,
for a forged bill is no bill at all.
Chapman v. Speller' is
much in point to show that the plaintiff cannot recover this
money back; this is like the case of Baglehole v. Walters,"
and Pickering v. Dowson.*
There was no representation
whatever made at the sale of the bill, which distinguishes this
case from Bridge v. Wain.^
At most, it was but a sale of
what purported to be a foreign bill.
Wilson v. Vysar. *
The remedy here, if at all, was by a special action, and
the plaintiff cannot sue for the whole price, upon the ground
of failure of consideration.
Kempson v. Saunders' may be
relied on by the other side, but that case rests upon the
ground that the shares sold were not saleable at all.
The Claim of the Defendant. — The question
whether
valid security
not
a vendor of that which purports to be
liable
turns out upon some latent defect to be invalid.
Here the
The authorities that have been cited do not apply.
purbill of exchange sold was not of the description which
It does not confer the rights and
ported to be when sold.
The sale and purchase
purported to give.
powers which

'3

'5

Taunt., 488.
'14 Q. B. Rep., 621.
Camp.,

154.

*4 Taunt., 779.
^i

Stark, 504.

20

5.

'4

% Taunt., 288.
Bing.,
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bill of exchange of value and capable of being enIn Young v. Cole/ where bonds were sold as Guate-

mala bonds, and it turned out that they had not been sealed
at the time required to render the estate liable, it was held
that they could not be considered as Guatemala bonds, and
that the vendor was bound to refund the purchase money.
So, here, in point of law, this cannot be considered as a bill
It purported to be a foreign bill, and apparently
of exchange.
did not require a stamp, and the defendant impliedly represented it to be a foreign bill.
In Addison on Contracts,

°

the law is correctly stated to

that if a man goes into the money market with a bill or
note and gets it discounted, and it is not the bill or note of
the money received
the parties whose names appear upon
cannot lawfully be retained, and that dein exchange for
it

it,

be,

is

I

is

I

a

if

it

it

a

I

I

is

it

a

it

clining to indorse the bill does not rid the party negotiating
from the liability which attaches to him for putting off an incertain description which turns out not to be
strument as of
not
The case of Jones v. Ryde"
such as
represented.
distinguishable from the present, and the decisions on the
cases of forged signatures apply strongly to this case.
Decision. — Ld. Campbell, C. J., said, "At the trial
was struck
entertained an opinion adverse to the plaintiff.
mere sale,
with the consideration that this was the case of
and that the vendor had title in the thing sold, and knew
was diffiAnd
nothing of any secret defect when he sold.
cult to say that the bill was of no value at the time of the
sale, because at that time there was no strong reason for supthe acceptor had not
would have been paid
posing that
been insolvent, and even now payment might perhaps be enthen thought that the rule of
forced in
foreign country.
caveat emptor applied; but after hearing the argument and
maintainable, and
think the action
the authorities cited,

this gronnd, that the article sold did not ansiver the
was sold.
had been
foreign
description nnder which
bill and there had been any secret defect, the risk would have

■'5

'sBing., (N. C),
'Vol. I, p. 152.
Taunt., 488.

724.

a

it

If

it

upon
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been that of the purchaser; but here it must be taken that the

bill was sold

and for that which it purported to be.
On
the face of the bill it purported to be drawn at Sierra Leone,
and it was sold as answering the description of that which on
its face it purported to be.
That amounted to a warranty
that it really was of that description.
It is" not a foreign bill,
but was drawn in London, and payment of it could not be enforced here.
This is not the case of a sale of goods answering the description of the goods sold, and a secret defect in
the goods; but it is the case of a thing which is not what it
professed to be when sold, and upon this ground I think the
money must be taken to have been paid upon a mistake of
fact, the bill not answering the description of that sold.
The passage quoted from Addison on Contracts very
clearly, I think, lays down the law on this subject, and both
Jones V. Ryde' and Young v. Cole'' are authorities in support
as

'S Taunt., 488.
^3 Bing.
(N. C), 724^A^arranties or Admissions of a Transferrer. — While the
transferrer cannot be held liable to a subsequent transferree either
upon the instrument or the consideration, he may be liable upon
his warranties or admissions.
The transferrer, while he does not
warrant the solvency of the prior parties, he does warrant:
1. That the contract, in every respect, is a genuine one;
2. That he has a good title to the same;
3. That the parties to the instrument were competent to contract;
4. That the contract is not forged or fictitious;
Merriam
5. That the contract is just what it purports to be.
v.
V. Wolcott, 3 Allen, 258 (1861); Gurney
Womersley, 4 El. &
Bl., 123; Shaver v. Eale, 16 John., 201; Bell v. Dagg, 60 N. Y.,
528; Wilder v. Cowles, 100 Mass., 487; Swanzey v. Parker, 50
Pa. St., 441; Lobdell v. Baker, 3 Metcalf, 469 (1842); Bayard v.
Shunk, I W. & S. (Pa.), 92; Erwin v. Down, 15 N. Y., 575;
Tiedeman on Com. Paper, 244; Thrall v. Baker, 4 Metcalf, 193.
Some cases hold, however, that where a commercial contract
is transferred or exchanged without indorsement, that no such
Batzer v. Ruren, 29 Me.,
warranties or admissions are implied.
Ellis
v. Wild, 6 Mass., 321.
Md.,
12
Rieman,
v.
497;
434; Fisher
warrants that he has.
also
transferrer
It has been held that the
of
any defenses or facts,
no knowledge at the time of the transfer
The suppreswhich will defeat the enforcement of the contract.
Wood's Byles on B.
sion of the truth is a fraud and he is liable.
& N., 269; Camidge v. Allenby, 6 B. & C, 373 (1827); 60 E. C.
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In principle the case is the same

II,

if the vendor had professed to sell a bar of gold, which turned out to be
I am, therefore, of opinmere dross colored and disguised.
ion, that the law implies to a promise on the part of the vendor
of the action.

L. R.; Fenn v. Harrison,
vis,

20

N.

Y.,

228

as

T. R., 759 (1790); Delaware Bk. v. Jer(1859); Bridge v. Batchelder, 9 Allen, 394
3

if

a

3

111.,

450.

is

it

a

is

a

is

it

is

a

is

it

it

it,

a

it it

it

it,

(1864).
The rule as to what defenses may be interposed against the
holder of negotiable contracts applies to a transferree.
Equities
him
if
be
he
is
not
a
bona
holder.
interposed
against
may
fide
Transfer by Delivery Simply. — When a commercial contract is payable to bearer it may be transferred so that the holder
or transferree would take both the equitable and legal title, by deThis is true of a commercial
livery simply without indorsement.
contract payable to order, also, after it has been once indorsed in
blank, for the reason that a note payable to order and indorsed in
blank is equivalent to a commercial contract payable to bearer.
Lamb v. Matthews, 41 Vt., 42 (1868); Holcomb v. Beach, 112
Mass., 450; Curtis v. Sprague, 51 Cal., 239 (1876); O'Keefe v.
First Nat. Bk., 49 Kan., 347; Russ v. Smith, 19 Tex., 171; 70
Am. Dec, 327.
The transferrer by a mere delivery of a commercial contract,
payable to bearer without indorsement, incurs no liability on the
instrument to the transferree; that is, he is not liable upon the
consideration for the transfer.
He is only liable upon his warranties or admissions.
The transferree can never look to the
transferrer for payment, if the contract is a valid subsisting one.
Wood's Byles on B. & N., 265; Benjamin's Chalmers on B. & N.,
226; Roberts v. Haskill, 20 111., 59, where Canton, C. J., says,
"By receiving and passing the note while under a blank indorsement, and without putting his name to
he (transferrer) assumed
no responsibility in relation to it.
The moment he parted with
he became as much
as
he had never held it.
stranger to
Had the party to whom he passed
wished him to assume any
he should have required his indorseresponsibility in relation to
ment upon it.
without such indorsement he waived
By taking
any such guaranty and agreed to take
upon the sole reponsibility of the names already on the note."
In case the contract
payable to
particular person or to his
order, and
transferred without indorsement,
the transferree
takes but an equitable title and has the rights of an assignee only.
In Illinois, however,
held that where
negotiable contract
payable to
particular person or bearer
cannot be transferred by mere delivery, so as to vest the legal title in the transferree; so that the word "bearer" in such
note
surplusage in
that state.
Hilborn v. Artus,
Scam., 344; Roosa v. Crist, 17
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that the action is well

is the case of a mere sale, and where

is a sale of goods without a warranty the vendor is not

Indorsement

of

a

Non-Negotiable

Instrument.— An

indorsement upon a non-negotiable contract does no more than to
transfer the equitable interest therein with the right to recover the
money due thereon.
It amounts to a mere assignment of the contract.
It is not an unusual way of transferring non-negotiable
contracts for the holder to write his name across the back thereof,
but such act imports no legal liability on the part of the indorser
to pay the amount of the claim in case of failure by the debtor.
To hold otherwise would be giving to the apparent indorsement
the same character and effect of an indorsement and to subject
the maker of it to the liability of an indorser of a commercial
contract.
Story v. Lamb, 62 Mich., 525.
Indorsement — Statute of Limitations. — At cornmon law
when a cause of action once accrues, an action might be brought
upon it at any time subsequently.
The action was never barred
reason
of
a
mere lapse of time; and it was not untill after the
by
middle of the thirteenth century when by statute the time within
which an action must be brought was limited.
These statutes at
first limited the time within which an action pertaining to real
property should be brought.
Early in the seventeenth century
similar statutes wer.e enacted applying to actions concerning personal property.
Now all the states have statutes limiting the time
within which actions may be brought.
The statutes of limitation
do not destroy the debt, they simply bar the remedy.
In order
for the defendant to secure the advantage of these statutes he must
In some jurisdictions, however, under
specially plead them.
proper circumstances the advantages under the statutes of limitations may be taken by demurrer.
The statutory period within which an action must be brought
To illustrate:
commences to run from the time an action accrues.
a commercial contract is nominally due upon the first day of the
month, but if grace is allowed it is not legally due until the fourth
day of the month, and no action can be brought upon the fourth,
for the reason that the maker has the entire day in which to pay
the same; therefor.e no action can be brought until the fifth, at
which time the statute of limitations begins to run.
If the contract is payable on demand, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until a demand is made, but it does
run from that time, for the reason that an action accrues immediIf the contract is payable a certain time after demand, then
ately.
of course that period must elapse before the statutes begin to run.
In some jurisdictions, however, where the commercial contract is
payable on demand it is payable at once and without demand;
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bound to see that the thing he sells possesses either the qualBut a vendee
ity or value supposed at the time of the sale.
is entitled to have a thing of the kind and description which
Here, in
the thing professes to be at the time of the sale.
and in such juristictions the statutes run from its delivery, for the
reason that an action may be brought at once without a demand.
Palmer v. Palmer, 36 Mich., 487; in re. King's estate, 94 Mich.,
411, 425; 54 N. W. R., 178; Hitchings v. Edmands, 113 Mass.,
338; Fenno v. Gay, 146 Mass., 118; 15 N. D. R., 87; McMullen
V. Rafferty, 89 N. Y., 456; Jones v. Nicholl, 82 Cal., 32; Massie
V. Byrd, 87 Ala., 681; and this is true whether the note be payable
with or without interest.
Wenman v. The Mohawk Co., 13
Wend., 267; Wheeler v. Warner, 47 N. Y., 519; 7 Am. R., 478.
If the contract is payable at sight it becomes due at sight,
and the statute of limitations runs from that date.
If the contract
becomes due upon the happening of some event, the statute of
limitations begins to run from such event.
If the contract is indorsed or transferred after maturity, the indorsement is equivalent
to the drawing of a new contract payable on demand, and an
action may be brought immediately thereon.
If there is a breach
in any of the warranties made by an indorser, an action may be
brought against him immediately, even before the maturity of the
principal contract.
Blethen v. Lovering, 58 Me., 437 (1870);
.Turnbull v. Bowyer, 40 N. Y., 456 (1869); Graham v. Robertson,
79 Ga., 72.
If an action is barred by reason of the statute of limitations,
no action can be maintained upon the collateral security given for
the payment of the debt.
When the action on the principal contract is barred an action on the security is also barred.
Schmucker
V. Sibert, 18 Kan., 104; Grattan v. Wiggins, 23 Cal., 16; Wood
v. Goodfellow,
Pollock v. Maison, 41 111., 516;
43 Cal., 185;
v.
Elliott, 62 111., 532; Day v. Baldwin, 34 la., 380.
Medley
Indorsement After Payment — Effect of. — Maturity of a
commercial contract does not destroy its negotiability;
but whoever takes it after maturity, as a general rule, takes it with notice
of existing equities.
Therefore, if the holder of a negotiable contract should negotiate the same after maturity and after payment,
he could not thereby render the makers liable thereon.
He would
be liable only upon the warranties of an indorser.

Payment

Before

Maturity — Liability of Maker. — A

different condition would arise where the maker should pay a commercial contract before maturity and permit the payee to negotiate
it thereafter before maturity.
In such a case, if a contract should
come into the hand of a bona fide holder, he
(maker) might be
called upon to pay the contract a second time.
Morley v. Culverwell, 7 Mess. & W., 174.
Payment before maturity by the maker of a commercial con-
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the absence of all fraud, both parties thought they were dealing about a foreign bill, which on the face of it this bill pur-

ported to be, and it turns out not to be a bill of that kind and
description, and therefore [because it is unstamped it is] of no
tract to the holder thereof, if not followed by a surrender of the
same, will not protect him.
Wheeler v. Guild, 20 Pick., 545; Miller V. Race, i Burr., 452; Kingman v. Pierce, 17 Mass., 247;
Bleaden v. Charles, 7 Bing., 246.
Indorsement — Mistake in. — A mistake in the indorsement
will not necessarily render it void.
If the name of the special
indorsee is misspelled, he may indorse it by spelling his name
Leonard v. Wilson, 2 C. & M., 589; Wood's Byles on
properly.
B. & N., 152.

Indorser's Right to

Fill

Up

a

Blank Indorsement. —

The holder of a commercial contract indorsed in blank can
convert it into an indorsement in full in his own favor by superHe may also change the blank
scribing the necessary words.
indorsement into one in full in the same way, making it payable

In case there are several blank indorsements, the
holder may fill up any one of them, making it an indorsement in
He may, in
full, or he may make his title through all of them.
short, so long as he does not increase the liability of any of the
parties t5 the instrument, change any or all blank indorsements to
He may fill up a
indorsements in full to himself or strangers.
with any contract conblank indorsement, by a superscription,
Bank of Utica v.
sistent with the character of that indorsement.
Smith, 18 Johns., 230; Mitchell v. Culver, 7 Cowan, 336; Cope v.
Daniel, 9 Dana (Ky.), 415 (1840); Cole v. Cushing, 8 Pick.,
48; Vincent v. Horlock, i Camp., 442.
The Holder's Right to Strike Out an Indorsement. —
The holder of a commercial contract upon which there are indorsements may strike out any or all of such indorsements which are
If the contract is payable to bearer and
not necessary to his title.
there are several indorsements in blank, the holder may strike out
all of them.
By striking out an indorsement, if intentional, the
Middleton v. Grifindorser is thereby released from all liability.
Mendelhall v.
R.,
L.,
Am.
St.
617,
619;
N.
fith, 57
442; 51
J.
v. MarsBrett
16
Brown,
111., 454;
Banks, 16 Ind., 284; Parks v.
ton, 4S Me., 410.
These indorsements may be struck out at any time either
Middleton v. Griffith, supra; Porter v.
before or during the trial.
Cushings, 19 111., 572.
The holder must not, however, strike out the indorsement
If the indorsements are in
through which he makes his title.
blank and the instrument payable to bearer, as was said above, he
may strike out all; if, however, it is payable to a particular person
or order and is indorsed by him and several others in blank, he
to a stranger.
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value; and common justice requires that the vendee should
not be bound, and that the purchase money should be recovered back.

Wightman, J. — I am of the same opinion, on the ground
that the thing sold does not answer the description of that
may not strike out the indorsement of the original payee without
changing the transfer by indorsement to an assignment, for the
reason that he would not be able to make his title through the

original payee or his order.

Transfer of Negotiable Contracts by Operation of Law.

— While

commercial contracts may be transferred by assignment,
by indorsement and by delivery, they may also be transferred by
A transfer of a commercial contract by operaoperation of law.
tion of law will occur in the following cases:
I. In the case of bankruptcy or assignment for the benefit of
creditors, where all the property of the bankrupt or of the assignor
passes to the assignee without an express assignment or indorsement;
1.
In the case of the death of a payee or holder, his right
and title passes to his personal representatives;
In the case of the death of one of the joint payees, the
3.
title vests at once in the survivors;
Where a note is transferred to a married woman, the title
4.
at once vests in the husband, unless otherwise provided for in the
Norton on Bills and
statutes under the married woman's acts.
Notes (2d ed. ), 191.
The Indorsement Must Not be Partial. — The law will
not permit the parties to split their cause of action, therefore the
holder of a commercial contract will not be permitted to indorse
for a part of the amount; but in case a part of the amount has
been paid, an indorsement may be made of the balance, which of
At common law a transfer of
course is not a violation of the rule.
a part Only of a commercial contract could not be recognized, and
no action at law could be maintained on such a title by any of the
Hawkins v. Cardy, i Ld. Raym., 360; Heilbut v. Nevil,
parties.
P., 358; Conover v. Earle, 26 Iowa, 169: Goldman v.
R.
L.
C.
4
Tex.,
Blum, 58
636; Lindsay v. Price, t^T) Tex., 2S2.
But now by statute in many of the states the indorsee or
assignee of a part of a demand may sue by making the indorser or
Lapping v. Duffy,
assignor a party, either plaintiff or defendant.
Ind.,
Ind.,
Gorves
v.
Ruby, 24
571;
418; Fordyce v. Nelson,
47
91

Ind., 448.
In the case of

a partial assignment, the indorsee will have a
Flint
lien upon the instrument to the extent of the indorsement.
V.

Flint,

6

Allen,

or transfer of

a

36.

an Indorsement be Made? — The indorsement
commercial contract may be made any time after

When May
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vendor professed to sell.
On its face the bill
purports to be a foreign bill of exchange not requiring a
It turns out, however, that so far from answering
stamp.
the description of that for which it was sold, it was not a
the

its execution and delivery, either before or after maturity.
MaturLeavitt
ity does not destroy the negotiability of these contracts.
V. Putman, 3 N. Y., 494; Scott v. First Nat. Bk., 71 Ind., 448.
But when a person takes a commercial contract after maturity,
or with notice of its having been dishonored, he takes it subject to
all the equities which might have been interposed against the party
from whom he receives it.
Robinson v. Lyman, 10 Conn., 30;
2
Gaine,
If, however, he takes it from
v.
Lansing
Johns., 300.
one having a title freed from equities, then he gets the title of his
indorser and may recover.
Kost v. Bender, 25 Mich., 515. And
this is true even though he had knowledge of the equities.

The Law of ^Vhat Place Governs the Indorsement. —

Commercial contracts, like common law contracts, in the absence
of stipulations to the contrary, are governed according to the lex
loci; and in case of indorsement, there is a presumption that it was
This presumpmade at the place where the contract was made.
tion, however, may be rebutted by positive proof to the contrary.
Unless otherwise stipulated, a contract of indorsement is controlled
There is some conflict of
by the law of the place where made.
authority in the case where a contract is executed and delivered in
one place to be performed in another, as to the laws of which place
It was held in the case of Staples v. Nott, upon a promcontrols.
issory note bearing date at Washington, D. C, and payable at a
bank in Watertown, N. Y., that the plaintiffs was entitled to recover as upon a contract made under the government of the laws
128 N. Y., 403; 28 N. E. Rep., 515;
of the District of Columbia.
Bank v. Low, 81 N. Y., 566; Sheldon v. Haxtoa, 91 N. Y., 124.
In the case of Alister v. Smith, it was held that the laws, of
the state where a negotiable contract is made, will fix the rate of
interest that it is to draw.
17 III, 328.
Some of the courts have made a distinction between a case
where the note was given for an original indebtedness or as a reStaples v. Nott, supra; 65 Am. D., 651; Dunewal note simply.
gan V. Lewis, 79 Tex., 246; 23 Am. St. R., 332; New England Co. v.
McLaughlin, 87 Ga., i; Hanover Nat. Bk. v. Johnson, 90 Ala.,
549-

" It

While Beck, C. J., in the case of Bigelow v. Burnham, says:

is a well settled rule that the law of the place where a contract
or a note by its terms is to be performed determines the question
v. Stryker, 47 Iowa, 477;
of its validity."
83 Iowa, 120; Burrows
Story on Conflict of Laws, §§242, 280, 281; Andrews v. Ponds,
of Aurora v. West, 22 Ind., 88; 85 Am. D.,
13 Peters, 65; City
413; Mason v. Dousay, 35 111., 424; 85 Am. D., 368.
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inland still requiring
bill in any court of law. I
that
if
an
article sold and delivered without a warranty
agree,
answers the description of that which at the time of sale it
a stamp,

but an

and therefore not a valid

The parties may, however, where a contract is executed in one
place to be performed in another, stipulate as to the laws of which
place shall control, and in that case their agreement will be carried out.
New England Co. v. McLaughlin, supra.
It is a well recognized rule of law that a commercial contract
must conform to the place where made as to the formality of its
execution and the consideration necessary to its validity; the lex
ioci gov e.Tns also in its interpretation, nature and effect. Evans v.
Anderson, 78 III, 558; King v. Sarria, 69 N. Y., 24; The Freeman's Bk. v. Ruckman, 16 Gratt. (Va.), 126.
It is often difficult to determine whether a matter relates to
the rights of the parties or to the remedy, and whether it is governed by the lex loci or the lex fori.
Lerou.x v. Brown, 12 C. B.,
801; 74 E. C. L. R., 801; The Freeman's Bank v. Ruckman,
16
Gratt.,

126.

The Laws of W^hat Place Govern Negotiable Contracts. — In the case of Kilgore v. Dempsey, it was held, where

the maker of a commercial contract resided in Ohio, where the law, at
the time, allowed the parties to contract for any rate of interest not
exceeding ten per cent., and the payee resided in Pennsylvania,
where six per cent, was a legal rate of interest, that on a loan of
money made in Ohio the parties had a right to stipulate in the note
for interest at ten per cent, per annum and to make the note pay-

able in Pennsylvania, without thereby rendering a contract usurious.
Ohio St., 413; Chapman v. Robertson, 6 Paige, 627;
25
Peck V. Mayo, 14 Vt, 33, where Redfield, J., in delivering the
opinion in an action upon a contract executed and delivered at
Montreal, Canada, and payable in New York, said,
a contract
be entered into in one place to be performed at another, and the
rates of interest differ in the two countries, the parties may stipulate for the rate of interest of either country, and thus, by their
own express contract, determine with reference to the law of which
country that incident of the contract shall be recited." Harvey v.
Archbold, i Ryan & Moody, 184; E. C. L. R., 412; Dessau v.
Humphreys, 20 Martin, i; Andrews v. Pond, 13 Peters, 65; Ekins
V. The East India Co., i P. Wms.,
395.
If, however, the contract is entered into in one country to be
performed in another having established a lower rate of interest
than the former, and the contract stipulates interest generally, it
has always been held that the rate of interest recoverable was that
of the place of performance only.
Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burrow,
loi 7; Fanning V. Cousequa, 17 Johns., 511; Scofield v. Day, 20

"If

Johns.,

102.
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professed to be, and the vendor professed to sell, the rule of
taveat emptor applies.
Young v. Cole ' and Jones v. Ryde ^
are both authorities in support of the action; and Jones v.
Ryde is more especially an authority in point.

Rule absolute.
'3 Bing. (N.
^S

Taunt,

C),

488;

724; 4 Scott,
157.

i Marsh.,

495.

CHAPTER XII.
Protest.

SECTION

52.

THE "CERTIFICATE OF PROTEST" SHOULD SHOW: (i) A
COPY OF THE INSTRUMENT OR SHOULD SET IT OUT
ACCORDING TO ITS LEGAL EFFECT; (2) THAT PRESENTMENT AND DEMAND WERE MADE; (3) THE TIME
AND PLACE OF PRESENTMENT AND DEMAND: (4) THE

PARTIES BY AND TO WHOM PRESENTMENT AND DEMAND WERE MADE; (5) THE ANSWER, IF ANY, GIVEN
TO THE DEMAND; OR THAT NO ANSWER WAS GIVEN;
OR THAT THE PARTY COULD NOT BE FOUND; OR THE
FACTS WHICH EXCUSE PRESENTMENT AND DEMAND;
HAD BEEN GIVEN; (7)
(6) THAT NOTICE OF DISHONOR
THE SIGNATURE AND SEAL OF THE NOTARY.
MUSSON

V.

LAKE.i

In the Supreme Court of the U.

S-,

Dec,

1845.

[Reported in 4 Howard, 262.']

The Form of the Action. — Lake was sued as indorser
the following bill of exchange: —
" Vicksburg, ijtli December, 18j6.

of
' '

ijj

Exchange for $6,
/^\.
'•
Twelve months after

this first of exchange

first

{second

of

day

of February, i8jy, 0/

the same tenor and date tin-

paid'), pay to the order of R. H. &

J.

H. Crump six thou-

'This case cited in Story on Bills of Exchange, 325; Wood's
Byles on Bills and Notes, 575; Benjamin's Chalmers on Bills,
Notes and Checks, 165; Bigelow on Bills and Notes, 87, 107;
Bigelow's Cases on Bills and Notes, 100; Daniel on Negotiable
Instruments, 654, 896, 898, 953, 970, 983; Norton on Bills and
Notes, 127, 160, 322, 349; Tiedeman on Commercial Contracts,
326, 318, 334, 346, 507, 508; Randolph on Commercial Paper,,
29.

37>

47-
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sand, one hundred and thirty-three dollars,
and charge the same to account of

"

Steele,

To Kirkman,

"Indorsed:

Rosser & Co.,

Jenkins & Co."

New Orleans."
R. H. &

A.

value received,

J.

H. Crump,

Lake."
Kirkman, Rosser & Co. , New Orleaus, 3d February,
—
18j8,
protested for non-payment .
A. Mazureau, Not. Pub."
It being admitted, that Vicksburg, where said bill bore
date, was in the State of Mississippi, and New Orleans, the
place of payment, was in the State of Louisiana, the plaintiffs then offered to read in evidence to the jury, the protest
of said bill of exchange; which protest, thus offered to be
read, is in the words and figures following, to-wit: —
W.

' '

United States oe America, State of Louisiana.
By this public instrument, protest, be it known, that on
the third day of February, in the year one thousand eight
hundred and thirty-eight, at the request of the Union Bank
of Louisiana,

original draft, whereof a true
written, I, Adolphe Mazureau, a
city and parish of New Orleans,
duly commissioned and sworn,
demanded payment of said draft, at the counting-house of
the acceptors thereof, and was answered by Mr. Kirkman
that the same could not be paid.
Whereupon I, the said notary, at the request aforesaid,
holder

of the
copy is on the reverse hereof
notary public in and for the
State of Louisiana aforesaid,

did protest, and by these presents do publicly and solemnly
protest, as well against the drawer or maker of the said draft,
as against all others whom it doth or may concern, for all
exchange, re-exchange, damages, costs, charges, and interests,
suffered or to be suffered for want of payment of the said

draft.

Thus done and protested, in the presence of John Cragg
and Henry Frain, witnesses.
In testimony whereof, I grant these presents under my
signature, and the impress of my seal of office, at the city of
New Orleans, on the day and year first herein written.
A. Mazureau, Notary Public.
[L. S.J
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But the defendant objected to said protest, and the copy
of the bill on the reverse side thereof written being read in
evidence to the jury, on the ground that it was not stated in
said protest that the notary presented said bill of exchange
to the acceptors, or cither of them ; or had it in his possession when he demanded payment of the same.
And that for this alleged defect, which it was insisted
could not be supplied by other proof, the said protest was
invalid and void upon its face, and could not be received as
evidence of a legal presentment of the bill for payment, or of
And, thereupon, on the question
the dishonor of the bill.
whether the said protest could be read to the jury, as evidence
of a legal presentment of the bill for payment, or of the dishonor of said bill, the judges were opposed in opinion.
Which is ordered to be certified to the Supreme Court of the
United States for their decision.

J. McKiNLEY.
J. Gholson.

[l.
[l.

s.
s.

]

j

The Claim of the Plaintiff. — On the trial of this cause,
and after the original bill of exchange, upon which the suit
was brought, had been read to the jury, the plaintiff
in evidence the protest thereof.

offered

The counsel of the parties to this suit do not differ at all
duty of a notary, when making a personal demand
of the payment of negotiable paper prior to the protest
lie concur in opinion, that he must have the note
thereof.
or bill with him, and should present it for payment, etc.,
and the only difference zvliicli arises is, as to the species of
evidence which is indispensable to prove the fact of presentMust the term itself be used in the protest, and will
ment.
no form of words therein supply its place } This is the position assumed for the defendant; and, this being controverted,
the issue is made which is now to be disposed of.
A number of authorities have been cited by the learned
counsel for the defendant, which, though certainly applicable
to the duties to be performed by a notary ante protest, are
believed not to decide the question raised here; nor, if they
did, can it be conceded that they would be conclusive, upon
a matter specially pertaining to Louisiana's jurisprudence.
as to the

SEC.
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The stress of the argument in the learned counsel's

brief

is that in all cases the fact of presentment must appear, in
verbo, upon the face of the protest, and this is assuredly not
so.
For example: if a note or bill should be payable at a

a

a

is

is

is

it

if

a

it,

particular place, and the notary takes it thither at maturity,
and there should be no one there to whom to present
or of
whom to demand payment, the law dispenses the party with
making either, and the notary, of course, from certifying
either, for nullus cogitur ad vana.
So in the case of
lost
note; a valid protest could could be made thereof without its
an adequate indemnity was tendered to protect
production,
the party from all future liability, or to reimburse him for any
payments he should be constrained to make.
In these and
analogous cases,
could hardly be insisted, either that the
law required the notary to certify to a presentment which was
never made, and the failure whereof the law excuses; or, that
the protest would be invalid without it.
One of the most
of
important
the cases cited adversely
strong authority to
establish this.
It the case of Freeman et al. v. Boynton.'
The court there, after affirming the necessity of having the
note or bill present when the demand
made, says: —
"This rule may admit of exceptions, — as where the
tender of sufficient
security may be lost; in which case
valid,
without producing
indemnity would make the demand
the security.
And where, from the usual course of business,
of which the parties are conversant, the security may be
lodged in some bank, whose officers shall demand payment,
and give notice to the indorser, according to the custom of
such banks, — the security not being presented at the time of
the demand, but the parties being presumed to know where it
Here, again, presentments are dispensed
may be found."
with, in cases where protests are authorized; and surely these
protests must dispense with averments which would not be
true.

The forms of protest vary in different countries.
They vary in the same state.
vary in different states.

They

They

7

'

must necessarily adapt themselves to the true circumstances
attendant upon the dishonor of bills and notes.
Mass.

R.,

483.
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The acts of public officers are favored to the extent that
they are presumed to know their duty, and to do their duty,
A notary has no right "to
unless the contrary appears.
demand payment," in the absence of the security which
its presentment;
or without
attests the party's liability,
and of course he is presumed to know that he cannot do it.
Where, then, notaries "demand payment," they have a right
to the presumption that the demand followed the presentation.

A contrary doctrine casts the] presumption against the officer,

and arraigns him, by implication, for a breach of duty; and
Hence,
that, too, in the absence of an interest or a motive.
therefore, a "demand of payment," in the absence of other

far from implying an actual presentment, would imply
It is beheved that no principle, nor
that there was none.
usage, nor even precedent, gives the sanction of its authority
to accusatory implications like these.
If the protest had averred, that "payment was duly demanded," surely that would have implied that the demand
was made upon presentment; and if so, it is to be implied
that the demand alleged in this protest was otherwise than
If a protest states the substance of what is reduly made.
No form of words
quired to be done, it is all that is needed.
words,

is sacramental;

protests have been holden good, though they
stated that the demand was made "at the maturity" of the
bill or note; or "at the time they were due," in lieu of the
usual mode of stating the precise day, month, and year when
So, notaries must make their demand
the demand was made.
within certain hours of the days when the bills or notes maDemands made in unseasonable hours would be of no
ture.
Nevertheless, protests but rarely enter into such deavail.
tails, but the thing itself — the presentation — is as much required to be made within the prescribed hours, as it is reWhy, then, is more specialty of
quired to be made at all.
statement needed about the exact performance of one duty
than the other.?
Why, if the demand of payment implies that
it was made in due time, may it not imply that it was made
after due presentation.'
But the protest ad hoc was made in Louisiana. If good
there, it must be good elsewhere.
Commercial usages, how-

S'^C.
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ancient, however prevalent, and however reasonable,
cannot confront her statutes and annul them, nor reverse
her
courts' judgments which settle their meaning.
Most disastrous would be the results were it otherwise; for
notarial
offices in the large cities have their printed forms of
protests,
which they use in all cases in like conjunctures, and which
ever

have been in use for years, and are in daily use; and in
heavy
business offices (Hke that of Mazureau's), there are sometimes

if,

from twenty to a hundred protests made in a single day, in
behalf of the banks; and hence there are vast and incalculable
interests dependent upon the validity of these protests, and it
would be an intolerable grievance to dealers in commercial

while these protests bound indorsers in Louisiana,
they released them elsewhere.
rapid synopsis of the statute and decisions of the Supreme Court of Louisiana will settle the law of protests specially applicable to the case at bar.
The act of the Louisiana General Assembly, of March
13th, 1827, section
provides: — "That all notaries, or persons acting as such, are authorized in their protests of bills of
exchange, promissory notes, or orders for the payment of
money, to make mention (not of the presentment,
but) of
the demand made upon the drawer, acceptor, or person, on
whom such order or bill of exchange
drawn or given; and
of the manner and circumstances (net of such presentment,
but) of such demand; and whenever they shall have so
done,
certified copy of such protest, etc., shall be evidence
of all the matters therein stated."
In the case of the Louisiana Ins. Co. v. Shaumburg,
was decided that
notary's certificate of demand of payment
and protest may be contradicted by other evidence.
If
might, evidence might be marshalled to rebut that contradiction, and even supply, by parol, omissions excepted to; and
this were so, the objection to the protest at bar should not
have been to its admissibility, but to its effect, etc.
And this
would accord with the deci.sion of Allain v. Whittaker, et al.,^
which declares that
the uniform practice in this state has
'
'

if

it

it

a

'

a

is

i,

A

paper,

^5

'2 Mar., N. S., 511.
N. S., 513-

21
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been to receive the protests of notaries as evidence of the
demand on the maker of a note or acceptor of a bill of ex-

change."

Kemper's Heirs,' the court says, —
"The note was made payable at the office of discount and deposit of the Bank of the United States, in the city of New
Orleans, and the protest states, that (not the presentation,
etc. , but) the demand was made there of the proper officer.
When a note is payable at a particular place, a personal demand on the drawer or maker cannot be made, and it is not
It suffices to have been made of any peralways required.

In the case of Gale

v.

sons there."

Goff,* the court gave a striking
instance of its liberality of interpretation when construing the
It decided that, where certain notes,
language of protests.
payable at the Branch of the United States Bank at Natchez,
are protested by a notary residing in Natchez, who states in
his protest that he demanded payment at the United States
Bank, it will be considered as meaning the Branch at Natchez,

In the case of Thatcher

v.

and not the principal Bank of Philadelphia; thus supplying,
'
by intendment, the important words, "Bank at Natchez,
which the notary had omitted in his protest.

The learned counsel has cited the case of Warren

v.

Bris-

coe;' but it is believed to be clearly distinguishable from the
There the note was "payable at the Planter's
case at bar.
Bank of Mississippi at Natchez," and the protest stated that
"he went to the Planter's Bank, Natchez, and was informed
by the teller, there were no funds in the bank for the payment
Not only is no
of said note; wherefore he protested," etc.
presentment stated, but there are no words from which it is
to be implied, for no demand is stated to have been made;
and though it be inferable that there was some note of the
party which the bank had no funds to take up, yet non constat

that it was the note in question, unless the same had been exBut this case was fully reviewed in the
hibited to the teller.
next case to be cited, which it is respectfully suggested is decisive of the validity of the protest in question.
'
^

'

lo Louisiana,
13
12

Louisiana,

208.
363.

Louisiana, 472.
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Beard.'

The protest passed upon was from the identical notarial office

which made the one in the case at bar.
It is couched in the
"
—
hke language, thus:
I demanded payment of said draft at
the counting-house of the acceptors thereof, and was answered
by Mr. Burnett, one of said firm, that the same could not be

It is to every extent the very case at bar; it decides
paid."
emphatically, that, under the laws of Louisiana, the word
presentment is unnecessary in notarial protests; and the word
demand implies the presentment, and is all-sufficient.
The Claim of the Defendant.— This is an action brought

by the plaintiff against the defendant, as indorser of a foreign
bill of exchange.
The question raised in the Circuit Court,
and upon which the judges divided in opinion, was whether
the protest offered in evidence showed upon its face ' ' that a
"
presentment to the drawees of a bill, and a demand of payment, had been made.
The protest does not state that the

bill was

' '

"

presented to the drawees and payment demanded,
but sim.ply that the notary de->nanded payment of the bill,
tvithout alleging that he presented it, or that he had it with
him and exhibited it at the time he made the demand.
We
maintain that, by the settled principles of the commercial law,
the protest of a foreign bill must show, that at the time the
notary demanded payment he had the bill with him., ready to
deliver in case it should be paid; this is generally done by
It does not
stating that he presented or exhibited the bill.
necessarily follow, from a mere statement that he demanded
payment of the bill, that he had the bill with him, and presented it or exhibited it to the drawees or acceptor, because
he could demand payment of the bill without actually having
it with him.
To present a bill for payment is to exhibit orshow the bill itself to the drawer or acceptor; to demand payment of a bill is to request its payment; and this request may-

A presentment
bill be present or not.
ex vi termini imports that the bill itself was shown to the acA mere demand of payment does not necessarily imceptor.
port that the bill was shown and exhibited to the acceptor at
be made whether the

the time the demand was made.
'16 Louisiana, 308.
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to constitute a legal demand of payment of
a bill or note, that it should be presented to the acceptor at
the time the demand is made, or, in other words, that the
person who makes the demand should have the bill with him.

It

is essential,

Robinson,' the court of the King's Bench decided that the holder of a bill of exchange cannot insist on
In Hansard

v.

payment without producing and offering to deliver up the bill.
The same principle is asserted in Freeman v. Boynton,^ and
other authorities."
The contract of an indorser is conditional; he promises
that the bill shall be paid if it is duly presented for payment,
or if not paid upon presentment, and notice of its non-payThese constitute
ment be given to him, that he will pay it.
conditions precedent to a right of recovery against him.* And
being conditions precedent, the proof must be clear and exIn the last case, the Supreme Court of
plicit to charge him.''
New York say: — "The question is not what inference the
jury might draw from the evidence, but what testimony does
We have seen that this is a
the law require in such case.
The law
condition precedent, and strict proof is required.
has allowed the indorser this protection; nothing short of clear
The reason and
proof of notice shall subject him to liability.
justice of requiring proof against a surety will not be doubted.
It is imposing no hardship on the party," etc. In that case,
the proof was, that notice was left at the office of the defendIn the one case the notice would
ant, or at the post-office.
have been sufficient, in the other it would not; and as the
proof did not affirmatively and clearly show that it was left at
the office of the defendant, it was held insufficient.
So here,
was
if the bill
present, and shown to the acceptor when the
made,
was
it was sufficient to charge the indorser;
demand
it were not present, and ready to be delivered up when payment of it was demanded, it was not sufficient ; and as the

if

'

Barn. & Cressw., 90; 14 Eng. Com. Law Rep., 20.
7 Mass. Rep., 483.
'Vide Chitty on Bills, edit, of 1836, 385, et seq.; 12 Louisiana,
7

'^

473-

Chitty on Bills, edit, of 1836, 385.
^
20 Johns., 381.

*
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it

it

is,

evidence (that
the protest) does not show
was presented
or exhibited when the demand was made,
necessarily follows
that the proof was insufficient to charge the indorser; because,
before shown, the statement in the protest, that he demanded payment of the bill, does not of itself import ex vi
termini that he had the bill with him when such demand was
as

made.

The refusal to pay in this case, when payment was

demanded,

may have been predicted upon the fact, that the
notary did not have the bill.
Every fact stated by the notary
in this protest may be true, and yet no dishonor of the bill
have occurred on which to charge the indorser.
The protest
is

must show every act to have been done that
necessary to
charge the indorser, and can leave nothing to inference or in-

tendment.

a

a

is

it

a

is

it

a

is

is

it

it

'
'

is

is

is

if

is

is

If

every fact stated in this protest might be true,
and the bill itself never have been exhibited or shown for payment, the proof
insufficient.
In suits against indorsers of foreign bills of exchange, the'
only legal evidence to prove the presentment of the bill and
demand of payment
the protest.
In regard to the drawer,
he had no funds in the hands of the drawee no protest
necessary, and an explicit promise to pay by an indorser may
waive the necessity of a protest; but without such express
waiver, a protest
the only evidence of presentment and demand known to the law.
"Whenever," says the law,'
notice of non-payment of a foreign bill
necessary, a protest must also be made, which, though on first view
might
be considered mere matter of form, is, by the custom of merchants, indispensably necessary, and cannot be supplied by
witnesses or the oath of the party, or in any other way; and
foreign bill of exsaid
part of the constitution of
the solemn declaration of
notary, who
change, because
due
public officer recognized in all parts of Europe that
presentment and dishonor has taken place, and all countries
give credence to his certificate of the facts stated."^
To make the protest evidence of presentment and dishonor,
must then show on its face the solemn declaration
12

Pick., 484;

Har. & Johns., 54, 61;

4

'^lo Mass. R., ij
Wash. C. C. R., 468.

1836, 489, et seq.
4

'Chitty on Bills, edit, of
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presentment of the bill and its
dishonor has taken place, and to constitute such due presentment and dishonor, it has been shown that a presentation or
exhibition of the bill itself to the acceptor, and a demand of
And to establish a legal presentment,
payment, is necessary.
the bill must accompany the demand.
The evidence must
affirmatively show that fact, and as the protest in case of a
must
foreign bill is the only evidence admissible to prove
show that the bill accompanied the demand, by stating that
was presented, etc. or other equivalent words.
This
ex—
"When the drawee,
pressly stated by Mr. Chitty.' He says,
etc., refuses to pay the bill, the holder should cause
to be
For this purpose, he should carry the bill to
protested.
to present
notary, who
again to the drawee and demand
the drawee again refuses to pay, the nopayment," etc.
minute, etc.
tary
The next step
thereupon to make
to
draw up the protest, which
formal declaration, on production of the bill itself, etc., "that
has been presented for
payment and payment refused," etc.
In countries governed by the commercial law, the form
of the protest shows that the bill itself must be stated to
have been presented in the protest, as well as the demand of
The form runs thus: "On this day, the ist, etc.,
payment.
at the request of A. B., bearer of the original bill of exchange,
B, C,
whereof a true copy
on the other side written,
it

is

is

I,

is

it

a

is

a

is

If

it

is

a

it

,

it

it,

of the notary, that a due

necessary to prove

it,

etc.

The demand

form.^

the time payment
to prove it; and

if

it

it

is

it

If

is

notary, etc., did exhibit the said bill," etc.,
of payment and refusal
then stated, vede
be necessary to exhibit the bill at
demanded,
would seem necessary
of

is

the

a

a

it

protest, which
the instrument of proof, must not only show
demand of payment,
but
presentation of the bill itself at the time the demand
And in conformity with these principles, the Suwas made.
preme Court of Louisiana held, in the case of Warren v.
Briscoe,'' the protest must show that the bill itself was prebe

sented, etc.

'Chitty on Bills, edit, of

1836, 492.

^Chitty on Bills, edit. 1836, 497.
"12 Louisiana Rep., 475.
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This case, it is true, has in effect been overruled by the
case ot Nott's Executor v. Beard,' although the court endeavored to reconcile the two cases.
The last case, it is submitted, is irreconcilable with the principle and the adjudicated
cases hereinbefore cited.
It substitutes inference or presumption for fact, and decides the point mainly on the ground that
the notary is a public officer, and must be presumed to have
done his duty.
It introduces a new rule, unknown to the

it,

commercial law, and substitutes inference of a fact, the existence of which the law required should be shown by express
proof; and, moreover, it assumes to raise the presumption
from the statement of a fact (to wit, demand), which by no
means necessarily imports that the bill was presented when
such demand was made.
The case is, as we will endeavor to
show, inconsistent not only with the previous case in the same
court in 12 Louisiana, but with principle.
The court (p. 312) admit the law to be, that the person
making the demand must have the bill with him; but, say
I hey,
"It does not follow as a consequence, because both
words are not used in the protest, that he had not the bill
with him." By "both words," we understand the court to
mean the words "presentment" and "demand," as used in
the previous part of the sentence, in which they say, — "The
person making the 'presentment' or 'demand' must have the
bill with him." With all due deference to the opinion of that
court, for whom we entertain the highest respect, the question
was not whether it followed as a consequence, because both
words were not used, that the notary had not the bill with
him, but whether it followed as a consequence, from the statement of the one used, to wit, "demand," that he had the bill
with him.
The law required the plaintiff to prove that he
presented the bill and demanded its payment, which was refused.
It does not follow, that, because he demanded payment of a bill, therefore he had the bill itself with him and
He may have had it when he demanded paypresented it.
ment, or he may have demanded payment of the bill without
but the law will not perIt is probable he had
having it.
mit the liability of an indorser to be established by the substi'16 Louisiana R., 308.
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The statement, therefore, that
tution of probability for proof.
not proof that he presented or
he demanded payment of
be essential that the bill should be preexhibited it.
follows
sented or shown, and payment thereof demanded,
that both the presentment of the bill for payment and the demand of payment should be stated.
Chitty (page 492) says
and demand payment, and
the notary should present
paywhich
formal declarment
refused he should protest
From this,
etc.
ation that he presented
appears the
protest must state the presentment, that is, the exhibition of
the bill to the acceptor, and the demand of payment.
Aware of the difficulty of sustaining their opinion,
the
same rule of evidence applied to the statements of the notary
that would apply to the same statements on oath by a private
individual, they say he
a public officer, and
not to be
presumed that he would do so unless an act as to go to the
house of the acceptor and demand payment
he had not the
bill with him, and that the law will presume the notary had
The principle, that the law presumes public
done his duty.
officers to do their duty,
respectfully submitted, was mistrue, in
It
applied by the court.
proceeding against an
officer for dereliction of duty, the presumption
that he has
done his duty, and the contrary must be proved, though
involve a negative.
But
this principle applies to
collateral
proceeding hke this,
proves too much, and the long train of
recorded decisions, requiring
protest to be produced on the
trial, will at once be struck from the commercial code.
the
law presumes he will do his duty, why require the protest to
be produced, proof that the bill was left with him to protest
would be sufficient, because, as
was his duty to protest
will be presumed he did so.
So, when
made his duty to
give notice when he protests
bill, as
the case in some
states, no notice need ever be proved; all that
necessary,
upon the principle assumed by the court,
in such case to
prove the protest, and then, as
was the notary's duty to give
the

notice,

will be presumed

he gave

if
it

it

it

it

be
Nay,
proved that the bill was put in his hands to protest,
will be
presumed he did his duty, and therefore
will be presumed
he did protest it.
But the question might be here asked,

it.
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notary when a foreign bill is placed in
It is not merely to present and demand
If he
payment, but to set forth these facts in his protest.
omits to do so, the protest on its face shows he has not done
his duty, and of course the presumption falls to the ground.
The principle might be carried out to cure any defective statement as to the time notices were given; if omitted to be stated
when notice was given, as the notary's duty was to give notice,
at furthest, the day after the protest, it could be presumed he
did so, although his protest does not show the time when he
gave the notice.
The court endeavor to distinguish the case from the one
in 12 Louisiana, 472.
They say, in the last named case, the
notary certified that he went to the Planters' Bank, and was
informed by the teller there were no funds in the bank to pay
the note, etc.
He does not say, says the court, that "he
■
What
presented the note or made a demand of payment."
was the use to do so, if their opinion in 16 Louisiana is cora

his hands for protest.'

According to that opinion, as he was presumed to do
his duty, and as it was his duty to present the note and demand payment, this would be presumed; nay, as they say in
that case, that it is not to be presumed the notary would do
so unless an act as to go to the house of the acceptor without
the bill; so, in this case, they might with equal justice have
said it would not be presumed he would go to the bank to demand payment, and yet make no demand when he got there.
Why was it not presumed he did his duty in that case, as well
as in the last.'
Simply because in that case the court decided,
very correctly, that the facts which constitute a legal presentment, etc. , must appear on the face of the protest, and canrect.'

not be presumed.
Upon the whole, it is believed, both on principle and authority, that the case in 16 Louisiana cannot be sustained,
and that the protest in this case is not legal evidence of presentment, to charge the defendant.
Decision. — The plaintiffs brought an action of assumpsit,
in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi, against the defendant, as indorser of a bill
of exchange, drawn at Vicksburg, in said state, by Steele,
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Jenkins & Co., for $6,133, payable twelve months after the
first day of February, 1837, to R. H. & J. H. Crump; and ad-

Rosser & Co., at New Orleans, and by
them afterwards accepted, and indorsed by the payees and the
defendant.
On the trial of the cause, the plaintiffs offered to read as
evidence to the jury a protest of the bill of exchange, to the
reading of which the defendant objected; because it did not
appear in the protest, that the notary had presented the bill
to the acceptors, or either of them, when he demanded payment thereof.
And upon the question, whether the protest
ought to be read to the jury as evidence of a presentment of
the bill to the acceptors for payment, or as evidence of the
dishonor of the bill, the judges were opposed in opinion.
Which division of opinion they ordered to be certified to this
court; and upon that certificate the question is now before us
for determination.
The indorser of a bill of exchange, whether payable after
date or after sight, undertakes that the drawee will pay
the holder present
to him at maturity and demand payment;
and
he refuse to pay
to be proand the holder cause
tested, and due notice to be given to the indorser, then he
promises to pay it.
All these conditions enter into and make
part of the contract between these parties to
foreign bill of
exchange; and the law imposes the performance of them upon
the holder, as conditions precedent to the liability of the indorser of the bill.
presentment to and demand of payment
must be made of the acceptor personally, at his place of business or his dwelling.'
Bankruptcy, insolvency, or even the
death of the acceptor will not excuse the neglect to make due
presentment; and in the latter case
should be made to the
personal representatives of the deceased.^
Why Must a Presentment be Made. — The reasons why
presentments should be made to the drawee are:
Story on Bills,

§

'

if

it

it

A

a

if

it,

it

it,

dressed to Kirkman,

325.

8

5

2

^

Chitty on Bills, 7th London ed., 246, 247; Story on Bills,
Taunt. R., 30; 12 Wend. R., 439;
360;
Douglass, 515; WarFurbor,
V.
East, 245; Esdaile v. Sowerby, 11 East,
rington
117; 14 East, 500.
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That he may judge of the genuineness of the bill;
That he may judge of the right of the holder to re-

ceive the contents; and

That he may obtain immediate possession of the
3rd.
bill upon paying the amount.
The acceptor has a right to see that the person demand-

it

if

it

is

is

a

is

is

it

is

if

a

is

it

a

a

it,

it

it

is

it,

ing payment has a right to receive
before he
bound to
answer whether he will pay
or not; for, notwithstanding his
acceptance,
may have passed into other hands before its
And he, as well as the drawee, has a right to the
maturity.
possession of the bill, upon paying
to be used as
voucher
in the settlement of accounts with the drawer.'
Mr. Justice Story has given the form of
protest now in
use in England, in his treatise on bills of exchange, by which
will be seen that the words " did exhibit said bill " are used,
and
blank
left to be filled up with " the presentment, and
to whom made, and the reason,
assigned, for non-payment."^
This, with the authorities already referred to, shows
that the protest should set forth the presentment of the bill,
the demand of payment, and the answer of the drawee or acThe holder of the bill
the proper person to make
ceptor.
the presentment of
for payment or acceptance.'
But the
law makes the notary his agent for the purpose of presenting
the bill, and doing whatever the holder
bound to do to fix
the liability of the indorser.
Every thing, therefore, that he
does in the performance of his duty must appear distinctly in
his protest.
He
the officer of
foreign government; the
ex parte; and the evidence contained in the proproceeding
test
credited in all foreign courts.* The evidence contained
in the protest must, therefore, stand or fall upon its own
merits.
It rests upon the same footing with parol evidence;
and
fails to make full proof of due diligence on the part
of the plaintiff,
must be rejected.

4

7

2

2

•

§

^

§

7

&

Barn.
'Story on Bills,
361; Hansard v. Robinson,
Cressw., 90.
Story on Bills, 302, note.
'Story on Bills,
360.
T. R., 713;
Chitty on Bills, 215; Rogers v. Stephens,
East,
Ld. Raym., 993; Orr v. Maginnis,
Brough V. Parkings,
v.
Chesmer
Camp.,
Noyes,
359;
129.
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But the counsel for the plaintiffs insists, that the statute
of Louisiana, and the interpretation given to it by the Supreme
Court of that state in the case of Nott's Executor v. Beard,'
have so changed the law merchant, as to render unnecessary
After a carethe presentment of a foreign bill for payment.
ful examination of the opinion of the court in that case, we
are unable to perceive any intention manifested to depart
from the settled usages of the law merchant; but, on the contrary, they attempt by argument and authority to bring the
The question before that court was the
case within that law.
The protest was objected
identical question now before us.
to because it did not show that the bill had been presented by
To this objection,
the notary to the acceptors for payment.
that court said it might perhaps have been more specific if in
the protest it had been stated that the bill was presented, and
And they admit the law is well
payment thereof demanded.
settled, that, before the holder of an accepted bill can call on
the drawer for payment, he must make a presentment for, or
Here,
demand of, payment, and give notice of the refusal.
that a presentment
for payment and a demand of payment are convertabie terms,
and that the proof of either would be sufficient.
To support this proposition, they refer to Chitty on Bills,
And as
and Bayley on Bills, and the annotations on them.
further proof and illustration, and to show that doiiand of
payment should be preferred to prcseiitiiicnt for payment,
they refer to the statute of Louisiana, passed in 1S27, in
and that the
which they say the word dcnia)id is used in
not; and they refer to the statute, also,
word prcsciitiiiciit
to show that notaries were vested with certain powers by
which gave authority to their acts, and that they being public
officers, the presumption of law
that they do their duty;
and therefore,
the protest were defective, and liable to the
this presumption of law would
objection urged against
cover all such defects.
This
substituting presumption for
proof, in violation of all the rules of evidence.
With all due respect for that distinguished tribunal, we
asserting

is

it,

if

is,

it,

is

it,

then, is a definite proposition,

'

are constrained to dissent
16

Louisiana, 308.

from the general

proposition

they
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have laid down on the subject

of demand and presentment,
and from all their reasoning in support of it.
Due diligence
is a question of law; and we think we have shown, by abundant authority, that the holder of an accepted bill, to fix the
liability of the drawer or indorser, must present it to the acIt may be well here to
ceptor and demand payment thereof.
repeat what Ld. Tenterden, C. J., said on this subject, in
delivering the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, in the
He said, —
case of Hansard v. Robinson, before referred to.
' '
The general rule of the English law does not allow a suit by
The custom of merchants,
the. assignee of a chose in action.
considered as part of the law, furnishes in this case an excepWhat, then, is the custom in this
tion to the general rule.
It is, that the holder of the bill shall present the inrespect.?
strument, at its maturity, to the acceptor, demand payment
of its amount, and, upon receipt of the money, deliver up the
The acceptor paying the bill has a right to the possesbill.
sion of the instrument for his own security, and as his voucher,
If,
and discharge pro tanto, in his account with the drawer.
upon an offer of payment, the holder should refuse to deliver
up the bill, can it be doubted that the acceptor might retract
This extract, we think, furhis offer, or retain his money.?"
answer to all that has been said by the Supreme
Court of Louisiana to prove that it is not necessary to present
the bill to the acceptor for payment; and to the presumption
of law relied on to cure the defects in the protest.
But to show, that, by the statute of Louisiana, the presentment of a bill to the acceptor for payment is not dispensed
with, and that the presentment is, by a fair construction of
the act, as much within its true intent and meaning as the deThe principal
mand, we proceed to examine its provisions.
object of the legislature in passing this statute seems to have
been, to give authority to notaries to give notices, in all cases
of protested bills and promissory notes; and to make their
And, therefore, all that
certificates evidence of such notices.
is said on the subject of the demand and the manner of makwas not inand the other circumstances attending
ing
tended as a new enactment on these subjects, but as inducethe
ment to the powers conferred on the notary, which was
it,

it,

nishes a full
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principal object of the statute, as will appear, we think, by
That part of it which relates to this subject is in
reading it.
these words: "That all notaries, and persons acting as such,
are authorized, in their protests of bills of exchange, promissory notes, and orders for the payment of money, to make
mention of the demand made upon the drawee, acceptor, or
person on whom such order or bill of exchange is drawn or
given, and of the manner and circumstances of such demand;
and by certificate, added to such protest, to state the manlier
in which any notices of protest to drawers, indorsers, or other
persons interested were served or forwarded; and whenever
they shall have so done, a certified copy of such protest
of all the notices therein
and certificate shall be evidence
stated."

It

seems to have been taken for granted by the legisla-

to which the notary was required to add

cate of the manner in which

he had

given notices,

a

stance of

it,

ture, that the notaries knew how to make out a protest, and
therefore they did not prescribe the form, but gave the sub-

certifi-

and when

a

certified copy of the protest
done, according to the statute,
not of the demand and
and certificate should be evidence,

it,

is

is

a

.'

a

it

it,

manner and circumstances of the demand, but of the notice
This shows that the intention of the legislature, in
only.
passing this part of the statute, was merely to authorize the
notaries to give notices, and to make the copy of the protest,
and the certificate added to
evidence of notice in the courts
But independent of this view of the subject,
of Louisiana.
we think the language employed in this statute includes the
presentment of the bill for payment, and for all other purdoes the demand of payment.
In giving
poses, as fully as
construction to the act, the phrase, "and of the manner and
circumstances of such demand," cannot be rejected, but must
receive
fair interpretation.
When taken in connection with
other parts of the statute, what do these words mean
The
manner of making
demand of payment, we have seen,
by presenting the bill to the drawee or acceptor; and so imthis part of the proceeding, that the omission to
portant
present the bill to the acceptor will justify his refusal to pay
The legislature cannot
although payment be demanded.
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presumed to have intended to make so important a change
in the law merchant as that ascribed to them by the counsel
for the plaintiffs, without at the same time providing some
other mode of obtaining the acceptance and payment of bills
be

and of holding drawers and indorsers to their
liabilities.
It is but reasonable, therefore, to give the phrase
before referred to such construction, if practicable, as will
leave the law merchant as it stood before the passage of the
statute, and carry into effect the main intention of the legislaThis, we think, may fairly be done without doing any
ture.
violence to the intention or the language of the statute.
The manner of the demand must, therefore, mean the
presentment of the bill for either acceptance or payment; and
the circumstances of the demand, we think, means the place
where the presentment and demand is made, and the person
to whom or of whom it is made, and the answer made by
such person.
It is very clear, that bills payable at sight, and
after sight, are within the meaning of the statute; because it
provides for a demand of payment of the acceptor of a bill.
Now how can there be an acceptance of a bill, without a presentment for acceptance .? Until the bill becomes due, payThis shows, that
ment cannot be demanded of the drawee.
without the word presentment and the word demand also, the
plain meaning of the statute could not be carried into effect.
of exchange,

fixed period after its date, need not be
presented for acceptance; it is sufficient to present it and demand payment when it arrives at maturity ; but a bill pay-

A bill, payable at

a

able at sight, or after sight, can never become due until after it
How is the
has been presented for acceptance or payment.
holder or the notary to obtain the acceptance of such a bill,

under the decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana.? Will
That would
it be sufficient to demand payment of the bill.?
be a nugatory act, because it is not due, then it must be admitted, that, by fair and necessary construction, the word
of the
presentment is within the plain meaning and intention
statute, and that the bill may be presented for acceptance or
the decisfor payment, and therefore neither the statute nor

ion of the Supreme Court of Louisiana has changed the law
merchant in any of these respects.
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The Laws of What Place Control the Liability of
is,

Parties to Negotiable Contracts. — There

however,

an-

a

is

it,

if

if

it

it

is

other question, entirely independent of the statute and the
decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which may be
decisive of the case before this court; and that question is,
Whether the contract between the holder and indorser of the
to be governed by the laws of Louisiana,
bill in controversy
where the bill was payable, or by the laws of Mississippi,
The place where the conwas drawn and indorsed.
where
tract is to be performed is to govern the liabilities of the
The acceptors
person who has undertaken to perforin it.
resided at New Orleans; they became parties to the bill by
So far, therefore, as their liabilities were
there.
accepting
concerned, they were governed by the laws of Louisiana.
But the drawers and indorsers resided in Mississippi; the bill
any,
was drawn and indorsed there; and their liabilities,
The undertaking of the defendant was, as
accrued there.
before stated, that the drawers should pay the bill; and that
the holder, after using due diligence, failed to obtain paywith interest and damages.
ment from them, he would pay
This part of the contract was, by the agreement of the parties, to be performed in Mississippi, where the suit was brought,
The construction of the contract, and
now depending.
and
the diligence necessary to be used by the plaintiffs to entitle
them to
recovery, must, therefore, be governed by the laws
of the latter state.'
Whatever, therefore, may have been the intention of the
legislature in passing the statute, and of the Supreme Court of
Louisiana in the decision of the case referred to, neither can
affect, in the slightest degree, the case before us.
In Mississippi the custom of merchants has been adopted as part of the
common law: and by that law and their statute law, this case
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§

Peters, 123;
Kent's Comm., 459;
'Story on Bills,
366;
R.,
R.,
12
Wend.
4;
76;
439; Story on Bills,
13 Mass.
Johns.
R., 119; 12 Johns. R., 142;
East, 124;
Mass., R., 81;
Cowen, 154;
Cowen, 107;
Cranch, 298.
See also Daniel on
Negotiable Paper, Sec. 1265; 28 N. E. Rep., 515; 81 N. Y., 571;
57 N. W. Rep., 865; 91 Ind., 440; 22 la., 194; 46 N. H., 300;
25 Ohio St., 413; 55 Minn., 259; 47 la., 477; Story on the Conflict of Laws, Sees. 242, 280, 281; 39 Ohio St., 63.
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We think,

therefore, the protest offered
by the plaintiff, as evidence to the jury, ought not to have
been received as evidence of presentment of the bill to the acceptors for payment, nor as evidence of the dishonor of the
bill; which is ordered to be certified to the Circuit Court accordingly.
Mr. Justice McLean said, " I think the protest was evidence.

The notary made demand of payment, at the matur-

is,

ity of the bill, and we know that he had possession of the bill,
from the fact of the protest being made on the same day.
Now as the notary could not make a legal demand in the absence of the bill, the fair, if not the necessary, inference
that he had possession of the bill when he demanded payment."

Mr. Justice Woodbury said, "

it

it

it

a

a

is

'

is

I

a

it

if

I

a

I

regret being compelled to
portion of the opinion of the majority of the
court which has just been pronounced.
This should be content to do without explanation,
the grounds for
did not
do not question that
appear to be misunderstood.
note
should be present usually when payment
demanded;
and
that a written protest
the proper evidence to show a presentment or demand in the case of
foreign bill of exchange.^
But, in my view,
protest like this was competent evidence
to be submitted to the jury, in order that they might infer
from
that the note was presented when the demand was.
made.
That was the point presented by the division of opinion between the judges in the court below.
One held
wascompetent evidence from which to make such an inference,
and the other,
was not; and we are merely to decide which,
dissent from

a

The question of due presentment and demand

is

was right.
mixed:

Metcalf, 495.

V.

Boynton,

Mass. R., 483;

is

all thean analogy of the
possible for the

17

Mass. R., 449;

*i Peters,

2

583.

i

J.

^

?,

Howard, 71.
Wheat., 333; Burke V. McKay,
Paine's C. C. R., 156.
Barker,
'United States v.

j

Freeman

7

'

it

facts are first conceded or agreed.' This
rule about notice.* In all cases where

is

one of law and fact, and not one of mere law, unless
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hypothesis to infer a proper presentment from the protest offered, it is safer that the writing should
not be withdrawn from them, but go in, and the court instruct
the jury on the whole evidence what the law was on such facts
'
Chancellor Kent thinks it very
as they might be satisfied of.
difficult, in these mixed questions of law and fact about comIn this case
mercial paper, to do justice by any other course.
the jury might or might not be satisfied of the fact of the bill
being present when the demand was made. But why not let
It is manifest that no evil or danger
them pass on that fact.'
would result from leaving the matter to them, under due instructions from the court, provided there be no legal obstacle

jury on any reasonable

to such a course.
It is conceded,

on both sides, that the protest is compe-

tent evidence, and contains enough from which the jury could
That is the most material part
infer a demand of payment.
It is not only so described in some eleof the notary's duty.
treatises,
but the duty of having the note present, or
mentary
of calling with it at the hours of business alone, are not described separately; but are involved or implied in the general
Thus Dane, in his Abridgment,
duty of making a demand.

Bills of Exchange,^ says, — " In making

protest, three things
and drawing up the
are to be done,
"
The material part is the making of the demand."
protest."
So the word demand is at times used as synonymous with the
■^oxA presentment by Bailey,*
But the protest in this case states not only a demand, but
that payment of the bill was refused, and he had it in possession, so as to make a copy " of the original draft," on the
back of the protest, or, to use his own words, " whereof a true
copy is on the reverse hereof written," and also " demanded
a

— the noting," demanding,

'

3

Comm.,

107.

-Art.

II,

''The

"noting"

§

I.

is simply the making of a memorandum of
what the notary did so that he may subsequently have the facts
This should be done on
upon which the certificate may be made.
The certificate
the day the demand and presentment are made.
be
made
at
time.
Dennistown
v. Stewart, 17
of protest may
any
How., 606.

*i6 Louisiana Rep.,

311.
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"that

the same

Under these expressions, it could hardly be deemed unfair, or any stretch of probabihty, to infer that the bill was
present at the demand, and the more especially as the notary
knew it was his duty to have it present, and does not state
that any objection was made, or refusal to pay, on account of
its absence, as he should have stated, if such was the truth.

My views do not differ from those of a majority of this court
concerning the importance of having the principles as to commercial law, and especially commercial instruments, uniform,
and as little fluctuating as possible; and hence as to them I
would make no innovation here.
But our difference is rather
on a question of evidence.
Thus, had the testimony offered
been submitted to the jury, and they had inferred from it a
due presentment of the note, it would not change any com-

mercial

principle as to the necessity of presentment, but
merely establish the fact of presentment here on evidence
deemed by the jury to render that fact probable.
And if
juries should be disposed to find such a fact on slight testimony, it would do no injury to commercial paper, or commercial principles, or substantial justice between parties, but
merely indicate an increased liberality as to forms, where substance has been regarded; that is, where the vital point in the
transaction is beyond controversy, namely, that payment has
Such a course would
clearly been demanded and not made.
accord, also, in spirit, with what was laid down by this court
in 1 Peters, 583, that rules as to commercial paper ought to
be formed and construed so as to be reasonable and founded
in general convenience and with a view to clog as little as possible, consistently with the safety of parties, the circulation of
paper of this description.
There is nothing in the nature of protests and presentments which on principle requires any increased strictness in
the proof of them, but, on the contrary, much to justify every
Any holder would be
reasonable presumption in their favor.
anxious to get his money at once of the drawee, and not neglect to have the note with him so as to give it up on paySo would he wish to be paid and
ment and prevent delay.
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entirely from making protest, rather than resort to
that and notice, and suffer the delay of recovering it of a
drawer or indorser.
Both of these considerations strengthen the inference that
he and his agent would present the note, or have it with them,
when demanding payment, and render it reasonable, after
excused

slight proof of presentment, to leave it to the opposite party
to rebut that inference, so natural, by stronger proof that the
note was not present, if the facts would warrant such proof.
Another consideration against requiring great or greater
rigidity in the evidence of a presentment and form of protest
is the fact, that a protest is of less materiality than notice.
As an illustration, that the notice is deemed more material than the protest, "omitting to allege in the declaration a
protest of a bill is only form, not to be taken advantage of on
demurrer.'"
But, omitting to state a demand or notice

a general

is bad after

verdict.^

Dane, in his Abridgment,' says, — "Notice is very materYet notice may be
Protests are mere matter of form."
ial.
very loose, and it answers in all cases, if it disclose merely the
fact of demand, and a reliance on the person notified for payment.''

"The

should inform the party to whom
it is addressed, either in express terms or by necessary implication, or, at all events, by reasonable intendment, what the
has become due, that
that
has been duly
bill or note
presented to the drawer or maker, and that payment has been
it

however,

it

is,

notice,

refused."^

it

it

has again and again been held, that the notice
But
will
need not state a presentment in express terms, and that

'i

3

§

Dane's Abr., Bills of Exchange, eh. 20, art. 11,
9; Lill.
R.,
Solomons
v.
202;
Staveley, Doug., 684, in
Johns.
note to Rushton v. Aspinall.

Ent., 55;

&

6;

4

2

3

i

§

'Doug., 684.
^Vol. I, p. 395, ch. 20, art. 10,
i.
Miliary.
Pick., 401;
*Shed V. Brett,
Bank of United States,
II Wheat., 431; Gilbert v. Dennis, Mete, 495; Johns. Ch. R.,
Wash. C. C. Rep., 464.
337; 12 Mass. R.,
loth Amer. edit.), 469.
^Chitty on Bills (9th Lond.

52. J
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be implied

from stating a demand and non-payment, and a
looking to the indorser.'
So, "Your note has been returned
dishonored," is enough from which to intend all.''
It may be a letter, — merely to that effect, — and need not
be a copy of the protest.^
And it has been adjudged, that the
notice need not state, in express terms, that the note was
present, or if present was exhibited, if it only contained matter from which, by reasonable intendment, this can be inferred.*

It not being

necessary, then, to inform the indorser of
presentment of the note itself, in so many words, there
seems to be no use in having the fact stated at length in the
protest, if enough appear to render the fact probable.
It would be difficult to find a reason, in the absence of
positive law, why the form of the protest should not be dealt
by as liberally as that of notice; and
like the other,
disclose
demand, allow the jury to infer from that, as in the
case of notice, that the note was present.
Indeed,
protest
not required to be in writing at all except in case of foreign
bills, drawn on persons abroad.*
The Purpose of a Protest.— ^«^ then it doubtless originated 171 a rule merely allowing it to be done to save the
expense and trouble of bringing a witness from, abroad to
prove the fact, rather than making
imperative.
Instead of a written protest being better evidence than a
witness of the presentment and demand in case of inland bills
or promissory notes, or even foreign bills drawn on persons
here,
inferior evidence to witnesses for proving presentis

it

it

is

a

a

it

if,

the

2

5

2

6

&

I

3

4

Kent's Comm., 108; 10 Mass. R., i; Mason,
33;
Cas.,
107.
Johns.
Ellis, 499;
Adolph.
^See various other illustrations,
DowL, 771;
Macs. & Welsh., 109.
Chit. R., 364;

'9 Peters,

336;

8

4

&3

&

g

2

334;
520, 870;

2

Chit. (2d Eng.

R.,

4

I

"

ist Amer. edit.), 363, 364, 498, 499;
Starkie, 232; Goodwin v. Harley,
Adolph.
Mass. R., 386.
Ellis,
Eq. R., 48. See
Peters, 254;
Peters, 33.
*Chitty on Bills (last edit.), 469;
Camp.

Peters, 179;

i

173;

2

Cranch,

205.

2

3

6

8

2

*

D. & E., 713;
Chitty on Bills, 643; Rogers v. Stevens,
Wheat,
Wheat.,
Wend.,
Ev.,
333;
572;
232;
Starkey on
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except

by

that there is danger in allowing
an informal written protest to go to the jury as evidence to
But there
be weighed in proving that the note was present.
can be no more in that than allowing an informal notice to go
The jury must be satisfied, in both cases, and
to the jury.
should so be instructed, that all has been done which the law
If there be any defense in either case, that
in both requires.
all proper has not been done, it can probably be shown by
Why should it
counter evidence in one as well as the other.
to suppose

not be.' and why is not that an ample security against being
improperly charged.? For the protest is not a written contract
between the parties, or a sealed instrument not open to be
contradicted by parol evidence.
But it is a mere certificate
of a notary, a subordinate officer, admitted for convenience
as prima facie evidence of certain facts, and allowed to that
extent in order to save the expense of witnesses and delays,
but ought to be always open to be impaired or disproved by
the other party in interest, who has never been heard before
him, and of course cannot reasonably be concluded forever
The notary is not required to swear to them,
by his acts.
when they are admissible as evidence, as he would be to a
deposition, because of his official obligations and standing.
But the character and construction that properly belong to
his certificate as evidence seem to be like those of a deposition; and if it states, in so many words, that the note was
presented, or states what justifies such an inference, there
appears to be no good reason why the contrary may not be
proved, if such was the fact, and the indorser be thus protected against statements or inferences not well founded. And
the absurdity of the contrary course is still more apparent as
to protests, when one made by any respectable merchant, and
attested by two witnesses, in the absence of a notary, has the
same validity as his.''

'i

Chitty on Bills, 405;

3

Pick., 415;

R-) 375; 4 Wash. C. C. Rep., 148;
U. S., Rep., 71; 8 Wheat, 146.
^Chitty on Bills, 303;

4

Wheat., 572; 5 Johns.
Camp. R., 129; 2 Howard's
6

Story on Bills, §276.
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Webb,' counter testimony was held to

v.

be

admissible against the minutes of a notary offered to prove
demand and notice.
So it is admissible to show that the notary mistook the
place, and did not demand the bill at the place of business
of the

drawee.^

In Vandewall

Tyrrell,'* counter evidence was offered,
and avoided the protest, because the clerk of the
notary, and
not the notary himself, as stated in the protest, made the
v.

demand.^

This point thus being established on both principle and

all the danger or difficulty as to the merits of the
case, by admitting a protest like this, is obviated.
But it is
further urged against
that presentment
averred in the
declaration, and therefore must be proved.
This we admit.
And so
notice averred in the declaration and notice of
presentment, and so that
must be proved." All we urge
here
to let them be proved by similar general statements,
from which the similar inferences may be drawn in one case
as the other, that the note was present at the time of the demand, unless the contrary
shown, — as
true.
may be,
Again,
said that the forms of protest generally state,
that the bill was present or exhibited.
This
true.'
But we are aware of no case deciding that this fact must
be stated, in so many words, in the protest itself, though we
admit that the jury must be satisfied that the fact existed.
Minutes in the book of a messenger deceased have been held
to be proof to be submitted to
jury as evidence of due demand and notice.* Yet there does not appear to have been
presentment stated, eo nomine, or that there was any but
if

it

v.

Shamburg,

Martin's R. (N.

S.

'Mood. & Malk 87.
*See Chitty on Bills, 495, note.
^Chitty on Bills, 643-647.
«i Chit., 633; Doug., 654, 680.
Chitty, 395, 396 (ist Amer. edit.); Story on Bills of Ex-

change,

§

I

'

,

513.

Company

),

'8 Wheat., 336.

'■'Insurance

2

a

a

is

is

it

is

is

it

a

is

is

it,

precedent,

276, note.

'Welsh

V.

Barrett,

15

Mass. R., 380.
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And it
inferential evidence that he had the note with him.'
is not a Httle remarkable, that the only statute in England/
which prescribes the form of a protest, and which is in relation to inland bills of five pounds and upwards, in order to
recover damages and interest, the form does not state in so
many words that the bill was present or was exhibited, but
merely "at the usual place of abode of the said A. have deIn such cases, precisely
manded payment of the bill," etc*
that, and that alone, must be done which is contended for
here, namely, leave it to the jury to infer the presence of the
bill from its payment being demanded, and any other facts
Look at another analstated, unless the contrary is shown.
It is necessary that the exhibit of the note and the deogy.
But, as in
mand be made in the legal hours of business.*
respect to the presence of the note, no case holds that this
And it is not
must appear by so many words in the protest.
stated, in the common forms, that the demand was made in
''
the usual hours of business.
On the contrary, the jury are
allowed or instructed that they may infer, from the statement
of the demand and non-payment, that they were made within
And if it was not, the other party would
the proper hours.
doubtless be allowed to disprove it by counter evidence.
How can such a case, then, be distinguished in principle
from this.? — except that there is much less in the usual form
of protest from which to infer that the bill was presented in
legal hours, than there is in this protest from which to infer
that the bill was present when the demand was made.
I am
the more inclined, also, to the opinion, that this protest is
competent evidence, because, under a special law in Louisiana, passed March 13th, 1827, such protests have been adTheir law uses the word " deraand " when
judged sufficient.
describing what the protest shall contain, and such a protest
'See, also. North Bank v. Abbott,
^9 and 10 Will., 3.

Pick., 469.

Bills, 465 (9th ed. ).
*Chitty on Bills, 349, 354; Reuben v. Bennet, 2 Taunt., 388;
Camp,, 537; Parker v. Gordon, 7 East, 385; i Maul. & Selw., 20.
"i Chitty on Bills, 396.
^'Chitty on

2

13
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is there allowed to go to the

jury as evidence from which to
infer that the note was present.'
The bill now in dispute was on its face payable in Louisiana; and hence the principles of commercial law require that
the protest be made at the time and in the manner prescribed
by that state. ^
But whether the statute of Louisiana prescribing what
protest shall be sufficient ought to be considered as affecting
anything beyond the evidence of protest in its own courts, is
not very clear on principle.^
Hence, in forming an opinion, I have placed it mainly on
general considerations, though in the construction of a Louisiana statute, which clearly affected the contract, and not the
evidence; and where the judgment of its court clearly rested
on the statute alone, about which some doubt exists, it ought
unquestionably to control us in respect to contracts made or
to be fulfilled there, even, if a departure from the general
principles of commercial law.
I wish, also, to avert some serious consequences that I apprehend may result from the decision of the majority of the court in several of the states of the
Union.
Bills of exchange drawn in one state on persons in another must be considered, under the previous decisions of this
court, as foreign bills.* Demand of payment, then, cannot
be proved in suits upon them out of the state where presented,
unless by a written protest, according to the cases before
■cited.

Whenever the protest, then, in such case, does not state
in detail a presentment or presence of the bill, though stating
a demand, refusal, and no objection, the protest must, as in
this decision, be ruled out as incompetent evidence; and the
same decision virtually implies, that no other evidence except
the written protest is admissible to show that fact, or indeed
'Nott's Executor v. Beard, 16 Louisiana R., 308.
Story on Bills of Exchange, § 176; i Chitty on Bills, 193,
506; Story's Conflict of Laws, § 369.
'See cases. Story on Bills, § 172.
*TownsIey V. Sumrall, 2 Peters, 179, 586, 688; Lonsdale v.
Brown, 4 Wash. C. C. R., 87, 153; i Hill, 44; 12 Pick., 283; 15
■Wend., 527; 5 Johns., 375; Dickins v. Beal, 10 Peters, 579.
^
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any fact which may be omitted by accident or otherwise in the
written protest, and that no inference can be admitted to be

drawn from the protest as to presentment, when only a deThese
mand, refusal, and no objection are stated, as here.
consequences, with others before named, I would avoid, by
making the protest competent evidence, and when it showed a
demand, refusal, and no objection explicitly, as here, would
leave it to the jury, from that and the other circumstances, to
say whether they were or were not satisfied that the note was
present.

In this way it is easy to reconcile full action of the jury
on the facts with that of the court on the law, and this, too,
without any innovation or change in the rule as to commercial paper, or any violation of adjudged cases, but rather in
conformity to them and to several strong analogies.
This court have in other cases gone still farther, and held
it proper even to expand or enlarge the rules of evidence in
certain exigencies.
In Nicholls v. Webb,' the principle laid
down by Ld. Ellenborough, in Pritt v. Fairclough,' as to the
rules of evidence, was adopted, namely, " That they must exAnd in the Bank
pand according to the exigencies of society."
of Columbia v. Lawrence,' speaking of a rule as to diligence,
'8 Wheat., 332.
'3 Camp. R., 305.

'i

Peters, 583.

Protest Defined. — Protest may

be defined to be a solemn
declaration, written, by a notary public, under a fair copy of the
bill, stating that the payment or acceptance has been demanded
and refused, the reason, if any, given, and that the bill is, therefore, protested.
Dennistown v. Stewart, 21 Curtis, 722; 17 Howard, 606; Cayuga, etc. Bk., v. Hunt, 2 Hill (N. Y. ), 635.
In What Cases Necessary. — Under the lex mercatoria, it
was necessary to protest foreign bills of exchange only; but now
by custom of merchants and bankers in many jurisdictions every
commercial contract is protested.
In Texas, protest and notice is
rendered unnecessary by statute if suit is brought against the acceptor or maker before the first term of the court to which srit can
be brought after the right of action shall accrue, or at the second
such term after, if good cause for the delay can be shown.
Protest may also be waived by the parties to the contract, in which
Daniel on Neg. Inst.,
case, of course, it will not be necessary.
Sees. 926, 928; Wood's Byles on Bills and Notes, 260.
When to be Made. — Presentment and demand should be

SEC.
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says,

— " For

367

the sake of general convenience

it has been found necessary

to enlarge this rule."
But all I ask here is to go as far as the existing rule of

made on the day that the contract legally matures, unless they are
excused or unless delay is justified.
Notice of dishonor, or of protest, may be given as soon as the
If the parties reside in the same place
instrument is dishonored.
it must be given before the close of the next day; if payable at a
place of business, then before the close of business hours; if payable generally, then before the usual hours of rest of the next day.
If, however, the parties reside at different places and notice must
be sent by mail, then it must be deposited in the post-office in time
for the first out-going mail, unless that it is at an unusually early
Lawson v. Farmer's Bank, i Ohio St., 206; Illustrative
hour.
If where the parties reside at different places
Cases, 203, and note.
than by mail, then it must be sent at
sent
otherwise
and notice is

time which will insure its receipt at the same time it would have
Smith v. Poillon, 23
been received if sent through the mails.
Hun., 632; Howard v. Ives, i Hill, 263.
If the requirements of presentment, demand, and notice of
dishonor have been complied with properly, the certificate may be
made at any time before an action is brought.
Where Made. — Protest must be made according to the law
of the place of dishonor, or the place where the bill is made payChitty on Bills, 456; Geralupolo v. Wieler, 10 C. B., 690;
able.
Mitchell V. Baring, 10 C. B., 4; 4 C. & P., 35; Carter v. Union
Bank, 7 Hum., 548.
By ^A^hGm Made. — Protest should be made by a notary pubIt may, however, be made by any respectable resident of the
lic.
In the latter case
place where the bill is dishonored or is payable.
two witnesses.
attested
be
by
should
the presentment and demand
County
Onondaga
Sec.
934a,
Daniel on Negotiable Instruments,
Notes,
and
394;
Bills
Bank v. Bates, 3 Hill, 53; Wood's Byles on
Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, 322; Chitty on Bills, 303; Story
The clerk or deputy of a notary cannot protest unon Bills, 276.
Chitty on Bills, 495, and note.
less authorized by statute.
What the Certificate Must Show. — The certificate of proa

test must set forth:
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

A copy of

the contract or a

fair description of it;

The fact of presentment for acceptance or payment;
The time and place of presentment and demand;
The fact of dishonor with the reason therefor;
The fact of protest;
That notice of dishonor had been sent or given, together

with the time of such notice;
The signature of the notary;
7.
Dennistown
The seal of the notary.
8.
tis, 722; 17 Howard, 606; Clough v. Holden,

v.
115

21 CurMo., 336; Tiede-

Stewart,
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seem to justify, and let reasonable inferences and
presumptions be made by the jury from all that is stated in
evidence

man on Com. Paper, Sec. 317; Daniel on Nag. Inst., 600; Sulsbacher V. Bank, 86 Tenn., 201; Cox v. Bank, 100 U. S., 716;
Wood River Bk., v. First Nat. Bk., 36 Neb., 744.
The Form of the Certificate of Protest. — The following is
a

common form of the certificate of protest:

—

)
State of Michigan,
County of Washtenaw, j ss
Be it Known, That on the first day of September, in the year
of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, at the
request of John Doe, I, Joseph H. Vance, a Notary Public, duly
commissioned and sworn, residing in the city of Ann Arbor, County
and State aforesaid, did present the original promissory (or bill of
exchange) which is hereto attached, Richard Roe or fat the place of
business of Richard Roe, naming it], and demanded payment (or

acceptance) thereof, which was refused.
Whereupon, I, the said Notary, at the request aforesaid, did
Protest, and by these presents do solemnly protest, as well against
the Drawers, Makers and Endorsers of the said promissory note
(or bill of exchange) as against all others whom it doth or may
concern for exchange, re-exchange, and all costs, charges, damages and interest already incurred and to be incurred by reason of
the non-payment (or non-acceptance) of the said promissory note
(or bill of exchange.)
And I, the said Notary, do hereby certify, that, on the same
day and year aforesaid, due notice that said promissory note (or
bill of exchange) had thus been presented for payment (or acceptance) and that payment (or acceptance) thereof had been thus
^demanded and refused, and that the holders of the said promissory
note (or bill of exchange) did and would look to the drawers, makers and endorsers thereof for payment of the same, were put into
the Post Office at Ann Arbor, Michigan, with the full legal postage
paid thereon, and directed as follows, after diligent inquiry being
made for the residence and place of business of the drawers and
indorsers:
Notice for John Smith, directed 1015 Main Street, Detroit,

Michigan.
Notice for Henry Jones, directed 150 Washington Street, Chicago, Illinois.
Each of the above named places being the reputed place of

residence or business of the person to whom the notice was directed.
In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto subscribed my name and
affixed my seal of office.

L.

S.

JOSEPH H. VANCE,
and
for
Public
in
Washtenaw Co., Michigan.
Notary
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the protest, and thus decide whether the note

was not prob-

ably present when the demand was made.

The Form of the Notice of Protest.
usual form of the

"notice of protest": —
Ann Arbor, Mich.,

—The following is the

Sept.
note for one

ist, 1898.

thousand dolTake Notice, that the promissory
lars, made by Richard Roe, dated July 29th, 1898, payable one
month after date at Ann Arbor, Michigan, and endorsed by you,
has this day been presented to the said Richard Roe and demand
made for payment thereof, which has been refused; said promissory
note has been duly protested for non-payment and the holders now
look to you for payment of the same.

Yours, &c.,

JOSEPH H. VANCE,

Notary Public in and for Washtenaw County, Michigan.

Protest Dispensed With — When. — Protest may

be excused or delayed whenever or under circumstances which would
It will be excused,
excuse or dispense with notice of dishonor.
control
of the holder
the
when prevented by circumstances beyond
For inand not attributable to his negligence or misconduct.
stance, when the party to whom presentment is to be made is quarBut when the excuse or cause for delay has
antined or dead.

been removed, then the protest must be made with reasonable diliDaniel on Negotiable Instruments, 730; Hull v. Meyers,
gence.
90 Ga., 674; Legg v. Thorpe, 12 East, i7r.
Protest for Better Security. — In case the drawee or acceptor becomes bankrupt or makes an assignment for the benefit of
creditors before the maturity of the bill, then the holder may
cause

the

bill

whose liability

to be protested
is conditional.

for better security against those
Daniel on Neg. Inst, Sec. 530.

CHAPTER XIII.
Presentment and Demand.

SECTION

53.

IN AN ACTION BY AN INDORSEE VERSUS AN INDORSER,
THE FORMER MUST SHOW PRESENTMENT AND DEMAND, OR DUE DILIGENCE TO GET THE MONEY, AT
THE MATURITY, FROM THE PERSON WHO IS PRIMARILY LIABLE UPON THE CONTRACT.
HEYLVN .. ADAMSON.i
In the Court of King's Bench, Nov. 20th,
[Reported in

2

Burrows

,

The Form of the Action. — This

66g.

1758.

J

was an action on the

And the first count in the declaration
bill of exchange, drawn by Robert Carrick
and directed to William Dods, dated the 13th day of March,
1756; whereby the said Robert Carrick required the said William Dods to pay to the defendant or his order 100/. at 40
days after date, value received, as advised by the said Robert
Carrick: which said bill was indorsed by the said defendant to
the said plaintiffs, and was accepted by the said Dods, but not
case, upon promises.
was upon an inland

paid by him.
Upon the trial of this cause, before Ld. Mansfield, at the
sittings after the last Hilary term at Guildhall, it was proved
on the part of the plaintiffs, that the said Robert Carrick
made the bill; and that the defendant indorsed it to tlie plaintiffs ; and that the said William Dods accepted it, but afterwards refused payment; and that the plaintiffs thereupon, on
the day it became payable, carried it to be protested for the

'This case is cited in Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 669a;
Norton on Bills and Notes, 155, 325, 326; Story on Bills of Exchange, 204, 381; Chitty on Bills, 520, 653, 241, 304, 339, 354,
368, 497, 521;

Tiedeman on Commercial

Paper, 259.
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and soon
afterwards brought their action
non-payment;
thereon, against the defendant; but it did not appear, on the
trial, that the drawer of the bill had any notice of such nonpayment; or that any demand of the m.oney was ever made on
him before the commencement of the suit.

It was thereupon objected by the defendant's counsel,

"That

the action would not lie against the defendant (the indorser) until a demand of payment had been made upon the
"
and as no such demand was proved to have been
drawer:
made on the drawer, the plaintiffs

ought therefore to be non-

suited.

Ld. Mansfield directed

verdict to be given upon the said
first count, for the plaintiffs, for lOo/. damages and 40 shillings
costs; subject to the opinion of the court, "Whether, upon
this case, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover."
The only question was. Whether, in an action brought
upon an inland bill of exchange, by the indorsee against an
indorser, this objection, "that no evidence was given at the
trial, of notice [that the bill had been dishonored] to the
drawer of the bill, or even of making any inquiry after him,"
a

was a ground of non-suit.''

The Claim of the Plaintiff. — The plaintiff

distinction between inland bills of exchange, and notes of hand
In the latter, the drawer is to be the
[promissory notes].
payer: in the former, the drawee (the acceptor of the bill) is
to pay it.
So that upon a note of hand, the drawer [the
maker] of the note is the first person to be resorted to, for
made

a

payment: but upon an inland bill of exchange, the acceptor of
the bill, not the drawer, is the first person to be resorted to,
for payment; (though the drawer shall indeed stand as a colTherefore cases upon
lateral security for his so doing).
promissory notes are not applicable to cases on inland bills of
The bill holder can't come upon the drawer of the
exchange.
bill, till the person upon whom it is drawn shall either refuse

bill of exchange:

is

of

new

they all undertake "that
shall pay it."

there are several indorsers,
the drawee (the acceptor of the bill)
and

if

a

a

it,

or refuse payment after he has once accepted it.
in the nature
bill of exchange
Every indorsement of

to accept
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stranger to the drawer of a bill of exchange: he is only concerned with the acceptor.
A bill of exchange may happen not to be dated from any
certain place; or it may be dated from a place where the
drawer does not reside; as where a traveler, calling at an inn,
takes up money there, and gives a bill which is afterwards indorsed by his landlord.
And it would be vastly inconvenient to all the parties, if
it should be holden necessary for the indorsee to find out or
even search for the drawer of an inland bill of exchange, to
give him notice "that the acceptor has refused payment."
For, the security may be lost, in the interim, whilst such
search is making; the indorser may break, before the indorsee
But the indorser may know
may be able to find the drawer.
where to find him, or how to apply to him.
Six Chief Justices have been of different opinions on this
point: three of them, of one opinion: three, of another.
The 9 & lo W., 3 c. , 17, was the first act that gives protests for non-payment of inland bills of exchange: and the 3
& 4 Ann. c. , 9, § 4, 5, extends the protest, to the case of nonThe words of both these acts are remarkable,
acceptance.
viz.: "That the protest shall be notified to the party from
whom the bill was received; who shall repay the same with
"
interest and charges.
The inconvenience may be the same (as to this matter)
upon an inland bill, as upon a foreign bill. Yet upon a foreign
bill, it certainly is not necessary.
These opinions seem to relate only to notes of hand; but

The indorsee is

a

upon a bill of exchange, the indorsers are all only promisors
and undertakers for the payer (the acceptor) of the bill; and
are not obliged to look after the original drawer.
And fact
and experience

in business are agreeable

to this position.

The Claim of the Defendant.— The defendant insisted
that upon an action brought by the indorsee against an indorser of an inland bill of exchange, the plaintiff ought, at the
trial, to prove notice to and demand of payment from the
drawer of the bill.
The indorser is only a conditional undertaker for the
drawer of the bill, who is the first contractor: he stands as a
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surety only, and cannot be called upon; unless the drawer
makes default.
It is like the case of principal and accessory;
where the accessory cannot be tried before the principal: so
here the indorser cannot be liable till the original
has failed in performing his contract.

contractor

And great inconveniences might follow, if this was otherwise.

There are several authorities which fully prove that it is
necessary.' Upon an action against the indorser of a promissory note, at Guildhall, C. B. Ld. Ch., J. Eyre's opinion

was accordingly, ' ' That the plaintiff must prove diligence to
get the money of the drawer; the indorser only warranting

his default.

"

And for want of such proof, he directed the
jury to find for the defendant.
Collins v. Butler, at Guildhall,
on

per Lee, Ch.

J.

It was ruled accordingly; who cited

a case

determined on great debate.

Due dihgence must be shown to
have been used in inquiring after the drawer of the bill of exchange, before the money can be recovered against the indorser.
And there is no difference between a note of hand, and a
bill of exchange; other than that the drawer of the note is the
express promisor, and (as it were) both drawer and drawee;
whereas on a bill of exchange, he is only an implied promisor.
Indeed on a foreign bill of exchange this notice and demand is
not necessary; because the foreign drawer is not amenable to
justice here.
As to the words of the statutes they do not exclude thenecessity of giving notice to the drawer; though they add an
additional caution, ' ' of giving notice to the person from whom-,
the bill was received."
The Reply of the Plaintiff. — Mr, Serjeant's case, wherein;
mention is made of the six Chief Justices differing in opinion,
seems to be taken from the 3d volume of the Abridgement of
the Law.^
'Cases in B. R. Temp. W., 3, 244, Lambert v. Oakes, at
Guildhall; and i Ld. Raym., 443; Lambert v. Oakes, S. C, is
i Salk., 126 pi. 6 Anon, accordingly.
directly in point,
Syderbottom V. Smith, i Strange, 649, M. 12 G. i, 2 Strange, 1087.
New Abridgement, vol. 3, title, Merchant and Merchandise, p. 608, note b. (which is undoubtedly the same case cited by
the Sergeant).
^See

23
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agree that the drawer of a bill of
exchange is only a conditional undertaker for the drawee; and
so also is the indorser of a bill of exchange a conditional unBut it does not follow, that the
dertaker for the drawee.

The plaintiff said,

' '

I

indorser of a bill of exchange is only a conditional undertaker
for the drawer.
The case of Lambert v. Oakes was upon a note of hand
(according to Ld. Raymond); and Ld. Ch. J. Holt's opinion
upon a bill of exchange, was upon a case not before him.
In the case of Hamerton v. Mackrell, Ld. Hardwicke'

held it not necessary.

The drawee's place of abode is always known upon

a

bill

it,

of exchange, but not the drawer's.
The court gave no opinion at the time of this argument;
in order to settle the point with precision
but postponed
and certainty.

from its not being settled,

who

is

have arisen

That the confusion seemed to
'
'

Ld. Mansfield observed,

the original

is

a

a

a

debtor."
Mr. justice Denison said, The case of Hamerton v. Mackwrit of error; and the judgment was affirmed,
rell, was upon
promise,
upon the allegation contained in the declaration, of
which
writ
of
indorsee,
error), they con(upon
made by the
sidered as an express promise; but Ld. Hardwicke did not
now the present
give his own opinion at all, upon what
question.

Decision. — Ld. Mansfield said,

hands,

to pay.

When the drawee

has accepted,

he

is

is

A

is

it

He could not persuade
himself that there had really been such a variety of opinions
upon this question, at nisi prius, as had been mentioned at
But however that may be,
must now be deterthe bar.
transaction,
mined upon the nature of the
general convenience, and the authority of deliberate resolutions in court.
bill of exchange
an order, or command, to the drawee
who has, or
supposed to have, effects of the drawer in his
the

original debtor; and due diligence must be used in applying
'The Serjeant had been misinformed:

for Ld. Hardwicke (as

appears by my note of that case) did not give or even intimate his
own opinion upon that point.
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to him.

The drawer is only liable in default
of payment by
him, due diligence having been used; and
the
therefore
acceptor is not called upon within a reasonable time
after the
bill is payable, and happens to break, the drawer is not
liable at all.
Every man therefore who takes a bill of exchange, must
know where to call upon the drawee; and undertakes to demand the money of him.
The Liability of Drawer and Indorser, Compared. —
When that bill of exchange is indorsed, by the person to
whom it was made payable; as between the indorser and indorsee, it is a new bill of exchange; and the indorser stands in

if

place of the drawer ; the. indorsee undertakes to demand
the money of the drawee.
If he neglects, and the drawee
becomes insolvent, the loss falls upon himself.
If the indorsee is diligent, and the drawee refuses payment, his immediate remedy is against the indorser; and it was very properly
observed, that the act of 9, 10 W., 3, requires notice of the
protest to be given "to the person from whom the bill was
received." He may have another remedy against the first
drawer, as assignee to, and standing in the place of the inXhe

dorser.

The indorsee does not trust to the credit of the original
drawer; he does not know whether such a person exists, or
where he lives, or whether his name may have been forged.
The indorser is his drawer; and the person to whom he originally trusted, in case the drawee should not pay the money.
There is no difference in this respect between foreign and inland bills of exchange, except as to the degree of inconvenience: all the arguments from law, and the nature of a transaction, are exactly the same in both cases.
As to foreign bills of exchange, the question was solemnly
determined by this court, upon very satisfactory grounds, in
'
That was ' ' An action upon
the case of Bromley v. Frazier.
the case upon a foreign bill of exchange, by the indorsee
against the indorser;" and on general demurrer it was objected,
" that they had not shown a demand upon the drawer, in
'

I Strange, 441, Tr.

7

G.

i B. R.
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And
default only it is that the indorser warrants."
because "this was a point unsettled, and on which there are
contradictory opinions in Salkeld, 131 and 133, the court took
And on second argument, they detime to consider of it.
hvered their opinions. That the declaration was well enough:
for, the design of the law of merchants in distinguishing these
from all other contracts, by making them assignable, was for
the convenience of commerce, that they might pass from hand
to hand in the way of trade, in the same manner as if they
Now to require a demand upon the drawer, will
were specie.
be laying such a clog upon these bills, as will deter every body
The drawer lives abroad, perhaps in the
from taking them.
Indies, where the indorsee has no correspondent to whom he
can send the bill for a demand; or if he could, yet the delay
would be so great that nobody would meddle with them.
Suppose it was a case of several indorsements, must the last
indorsee travel round the world, before he can fix his action
upon the man from whom he received the bills
In common experience, everybody knows that the more
bill has, the greater credit
indorsements
bears: whereas
those demands are all necessary to be made,
must naturally
diminish the value, by how much the more difficult
renders
the calling in the money.
And as to the notion that has prevailed, that the indorser warrants only in default of the
drawer, there
no color for it; for every indorser
in the nature of a new drawer; and at nisi prius, the indorsee
never
to
the
hand
of
drawer,
the
first
prove
put
where the action
an
indorser.
The
against
requiring
protest or non-acceptance,
not because a protest amounts to a demand: for
no more than
giving notice to the drawer to get his effects
out of the hands of the drawee, who, (by the other's drawing)
supposed to have sufficient wherewith to satisfy the bill.
Upon the whole, they declared themselves to be of opinion
" That in the case of a foreign bill of exchange,
demand
the
drawer
not
upon
necessary to make
charge upon the
indorser; but the indorsee has his liberty to resort to either for
the money: consequently the plaintiff (they said) must have
judgment."

if

a

is

a

is

a

is

it

is

;f

a

is

is

is

is

it

it

a

it

.''
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Every inconvenience here suggested

holds to a great deevery other argument holds equally, in the case of
inland bills of exchange.
We are therefore all of opinion, ' ' That to entitle the indorsee of an inland bill of exchange to bring an action against
the indorser, upon failure of payment of the drawee, it is not
necessary to make any demand of, or inquiry after, the first
"
drawer.
Promissory Notes and Bills of Exchange, Campared.—
The law is exactly the same, and fully settled upon the
analogy of .promissory notes to bills of exchange; which is
very clear when the point of resemblance is once fixed.
While a promissory note continues in its original shape
of a promise from one man to pay to another, it bears no
similitude to a bill of exchange.
When it is indorsed, the resemblance begins: for then it is an order by the indorser,
upon the maker of the note (his debtor, by the note) to pay
to the indorsee.
This is the very definition of a bill of exgree, and

change.

The indorser is the drawer; the maker of the note is the

J.

'2 Strange, 1087,

11

G.,

2.

,

,

a

is

a

if

is

is,

acceptor; and the indorsee is the person to whom it is made
The indorser only undertakes, in case the maker
payable.
of the note does not pay.
The Duty of an Indorsee. — The indorsee is bound to
apply to the maker of the note; he takes it upon that condition; and therefore must, in all cases, know who he
and
where he lives; and
after the note becomes payable, he
guilty of a neglect, and the maker becomes insolvent, he loses
the money and cannot come upon the indorser at all.
Therefore, before (ke indorsee of a promissory note
brings an action against the indorser, he must show demand,
or due diligence to get the money from the maker of the note;
made payjust as the person to whom the bill of exchange
demand, or due diligence to get the money
able must show
from the acceptor, before he brings an action against the
This was determined by the whole Court of Conjdrawer.
mon Pleas, upon great consideration, in Pasch. 4G. 2; as
Lee in the case of Collins v. Butler.'
cited by my Ld. Ch.

HEYLYN

378

V. ADAMSON.

[CHAP.

I3,

that the rule is exactly the same upon promissory
notes, as it is upon bills of exchange; and the confusion has,
in part, arisen from the maker of a promissory note being
called the drawer; whereas, by comparison to bills of exchange, the indorser is the drawer.
All the authorities, and particularly Ld. Hardwicke, in
the case of Hamerton v. Mackrell, M., lo G., 2 (according to
my brother Denison's statement of what his Lordship said),
notes and inland bills of exchange ]\isi -a^on
^Vi\. promissory
the same footing:' and the statute expressly refers to inland
bills of exchange/
But the same law must be applied to the same reason; to
the substantial resemblance between promissory notes and bills
of exchange; and not to the same sound, which is equally used
to describe the makers of both.
My Ld. Ch. J. Holt is quoted as being of opinion, "That
in actions upon bills of exchange, it is necessary to prove a
For proof of this, the principal
demand upon the drawer."
case referred to, is that of Lambert v. Oakes, reported in
So

three books.'

In

Ld. Raym.,

it appears manifestly, that the
" R. signed a note
question arose upon a promissory note.
under his hand, payable to Oakes, or his order; Oakes indorsed it to Lambert; upon which, Lambert brought the
He
Per Holt, Ch. J.
action for the money against Oakes.
ought to prove that he had demanded or done his endeavor to
demand this money of R. before he can sue Oakes upon the
The same law, if the bill was drawn upon any
indorsement.
other person, payable to Oakes or order;" that is, "A demand must be made of the person upon whom the bill is
And other parts of the case manifestly show this to
drawn."
For, my Ld. Ch. J. Holt is reported
have been the meaning.
to have said, "The indorsement will subject the indorser to
an action; because it makes a new contract, in case the per'

I

443,

My own note of that case is exactly agreeable, viz.: "Prom-

issory notes seem to me to be
inland bills of exchange."
^V, 3, 4
''t

Ann., c.

Ld. Raymond,

put upon

9.

i

Salk. and

12

Mod.

the

same

footing

as
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"If

son upon whom it is drawn does not pay it."
the
Again,'
indorsee does not demand the money payable by the bill, of
the person upon whom it is drawn, in convenient time, and

afterwards he fails, the indorser is not liable.
In Salkeld,^ the case is confounded: it is stated to be a
bill of exchange, and ' ' that the demand must be made upon
the drawer, or him upon whom it was drawn."
My Ld. Ch.
J. Holt had said that a demand must be made of the maker
of a promissory note, (calling him the drawer); and in the
case of a bill of exchange, of him upon whom the bill is
drawn.
The report jumbles both together, as applied only to
a bill of exchange; misled, I dare say, by the equivocal sound
of the term drawer, and by the Chief Justice's reasoning in the
case of a promissory note, from the law upon bills of exchange.''

In

1

as upon
'

In

2th Modern, 244, the case is mistaken, too; and stated
a

bill of exchange, and

as

a

determination

' '

that

p. 444-

Salk.,

(there called Lambert v. Pack), p. 9.
'The report in i Salk., 126, p. 6, is much more strong and
explicit; but it is short, anonymous, and a mere loose scrap, by the
same reporter; who was manifestly unclear about the case (being
S. C. with p. 9) .
■•'1

127

Presentment

for

Acceptance — ^A^hen

Necessary. —

Presentment for acceptance is necessary as a general rule:
1.
Where the bill is payable after sight or where it is necesto
fix
the maturity of the contract;
sary
2.
Where it is made necessary by the terms of the contract.
Presentment for acceptance need not be made, when the conBull v.
tract is payable on demand, at sight or at a time named.
Bank, 115 U. S., 373; Allen v. Suydam, 20 Wend., 321; Philpott
V. Bryant, C. &P., 244.
Presentment for Acceptance — How Made. — Presentment for acceptance should be made:
1.
By or on behalf of the holder (foreign bills by a notary);
2.
At the place named, if there be one, or at the place of
business or residence of the drawee;
Within a reasonable time after execution .and delivery
3.
and within business or reasonable hours;
To the drawee or some person authorized to act for him.
4.
If the bill is drawn upon or addressed to two or more persons (not partners), then it must be presented to each, unless one
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drawer of the bill of exchange;" and yet the report itself shows demonstrably, that
what was said by my Ld. Ch. J. Holt was applied to the
For
maker of a promissory note (calling him the drawer).
—
^"So if the bill was drawn on
the report makes him argue
there must be a demand upon the

is authorized to accept or refuse acceptance for all, and then it is
sufficient to present to him alone.
If the bill is drawn upon a partnership, then presentment to
any member of the firm will be sufficient.
If the drawee is dead, then presentment may be made to his

personal representatives.

If the drawee has been pronounced a bankrupt or has made
an assignment for the benefit of creditors, presentment for acceptGates v. Beecher,
ance may be made to him or to his assignee.
60 N. Y., 578; Parker v. Gordon, 8 R. I., 646; Smith v. Bank of
New South Wales, L. R. 4 P. C, 194, 205-208; Cheek v. Roper,
5

Esp.,

175.

Presentment

for Acceptance — Excused, When. — Pre-

sentment for acceptance is excused, generally:
1.
Where the drawee is dead;
2.
When he has absconded;
Where he is a fictitious person;
3.
Where he has no capacity to contract;
4.
Where
the presentment is irregular, but acceptance is re5.
fused upon some other ground; and
6.
Where after reasonable diligence it cannot be made.
Aymar v. Beers, 7 Cow., 705; Daniel on Negotiable Instruments,
Sec. 478; U. S. V. Parker, i Paine, C. C, 156.
Presentment for Acceptance May be Delayed — 'When.
— Presentment for acceptance may be delayed where after due
diligence it has been prevented at the proper time and place by
reason of war, sickness, inevitable accident, or other circumstances beyond the control of the holder.
Aymar v. Beers, 7 Cow.,
But in these cases
705; U. S. V. Parker, i Paine, C. C, 156.
presentment must be made within a reasonable time after the
cause for delay is removed.

Rights of Holder When
May Sue Immediately. — When

Acceptance

is Refused —

a bill has been properly prefor acceptance, and dishonored, the holder may sue the
drawer and prior indorsers immediately upon giving notice of such
dishonor, without waiting to present the bill for payment.
Daniel
on Negotiable Instruments, Sees. 449, 450; Whitehead v. Walker,
L. J. Ex., 168; Lucas v. Ladew, 28 Mo., 342; Pilkinton v.
Woods, 10 Ind., 432.
EflFect of Acceptance. — Before acceptance the drawee is
under no liability whatever unless he has contracted to accept.
But by acceptance he becomes liable upon the contract to pay it

sented

II
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any Other person, payable to Oakes or order;" which shows
that the case in judgment was not a bill drawn upon another
person, but payable only to Oakes, by R. himself.
It seems to me as if Ld. Ch. J. Holt, in that case, had
considered the drawee of a bill of exchange in the same light
as the maker of a promissory note: but loose and hasty notes,
misled by identity of sound, have misapplied what was said of
according to its terms.

liability after acceptance
sory note.

Daniel on Nego. Inst., Sec. 451.
His
is the same as the maker of a promis-

Presentment for Payment— When Necessary. — It may

be stated as a general rule that presentment for payment to the
drawee is a prerequisite condition to the liability of the following

(i)

of drawers; (2) of indorsers; (3) of acceptors for
parties:
honor. Lambert v. Oakes, i Ld. Ray., 443; Heylyn v. Adamson,
2 Burrows,
669; Harry v. Perrit, i Salk., 134; Darrach v. Savage, I Shaw, 15s; Red Oak Bank v. Orvis, 40 la., 332; Long v.
Stephenson, 72 N. Car., 569; Borough v. Perkins, I Salk., 131;
Meise v. Newman, 76 Hun., 341; Ranson v. Mack, 2 Hill, 587;
Griffin v. GofE, 12 Johnson, 423. And if there is a failure to
make presentment for payment properly, these parties are relieved
Presentment
from all liability unless the presentment is excused.
for payment is unnecessary in order to render the maker liable.
His liability is absolute from the execution and delivery of the
■contract.

Presentment

of Checks — Necessity

Of. — Demand

of
payment (unless excused) must be made upon a check in order to
render the drawer or indorser liable; but he cannot complain, unless by reason of the failure upon the part of the holder he has
Syracuse, etc. Ry. Co. v.
been injured and then only pro tanto.
C,
Collins, I Abb., N.
47; Murray v. Judah, 6 Cow., 484;
Greenwich, etc. Co. v. Oregon Improvement Co., 76 Hun., 194.
Presentment for Payment — How Made. — The presentment for payment must be made:
1.
By or on behalf of the holder (if a foreign bill, by a
notary);
2.
At the place named if there be one, or at the place of
business or residence of the drawee or maker;
On the day the contract legally matures;
3.
At a reasonable hour on that day;
4.
To the person who is primarily liable on the contract or
5.
to some one who is authorized to act for him; and
6.
By exhibiting the bill to the person from whom payment
is demanded.
Ocean Bank v. Williams, 102 Mass., 141; Lefty v.

Mills, 4 T. R., 170; Sussex Bank v. Baldwin, 2 Harrison (N. J.),
A custom allow487; Bank of Utica v. Smith, 18 Johnson, 230.
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the drawer of a promissory note, to the drawer of a

I3,

bill of ex-

it,

that two reports
change; and to such a degree misapplied
out of the three have stated the question as arising upon a bill
which
manifestly otherwise.
But be this conjecture as
may, we are all of opinion,
" That in actions upon inland bills of exchange, by an indordemand of,
see against an indorser, the plaintiff must prove
or due diligence to get the money from the drawee (or accepa

it

is

of exchange;

4

a

ing presentment by
notary's clerk or deputy has been held sufficient.
McClane V. Fitch,
B. Mon. (Ky.), 599; Miltenberger v.
Mo.,
Bank v. Varnum, 49 N. Y.,
Commercial
421;
Spalding, ■>,:,
269.

Where There are Several Drawees — Not Partners. — If
there are several drawees or makers not partners, then presentment
Brit v. Lawson, 15
for payment must be made to each of them.
Hun., 123; Arnold v. Dresser,
Allen (Mass.), 435; Blake v.
Hill, 232; Benedict v.
McMillen, 33 la., 150; Willis v. Green,
Schmieg, 13 Wash., 476; 52 Am. St. Rep., 61; Shutts v. Fingar,
100 N. Y., 539; 53 Am. Rep., 231; 24 Am. Rep., 161.
Where there are Several Drawees who are Partners. —
(1^)
If the drawees or makers are partners, presentment for payment
may be made to any one of them, even though there has been a
dissolution of the firm.
Gates v. Beecher, 60 N. Y., 518; Brown
V. Turner, 15 Ala., 832; Mt. Pleasant
Bank v. McLaren, 26 la.,
Cranch C. C, 541; Fourth Bank v.
306; Greatrake v. Brown,
Heuschen, 52 Mo,, 207.
The demand will also be sufficient
made on an agent of one of the firm.
Brown v. Turner, supra.
Where
the
Drawee
or
Maker
Dead. — If the drawee or
(c)
dead, and no place of payment
named, presentment
maker
for payment should be made to his personal representatives.
Mav.
Bank
of
gruder
Curtis, 299;
Peters, 87; Groth
Georgetown,
V. Gyger, 31 Pa. St., 271.
If there are no personal representatives, then presentment at the late residence of the drawee or
maker.
Some states permit
delay until they are appointed.
Bank of Washington v. Reynolds,
Cranch C. C, 289; Laudry
V. Stansbury, 10 La., 484.
Presentment for Payment — When Excused. — Presentment for payment to the drawee or maker
not necessary to
drawer or indorser:
charge
1.
Where the latter has no right to expect or believe that the
contract will be honored;
2.
Where the contract was made for his accommodation;
Where after reasonable diligence
cannot be made;
3.
Where
the
drawee
or
maker
fictitious
person; and
4.
Where
expressly waived by the parties.
Coyle v.
Smith,
E. D. Smith, 400; Beale v. Parish, 20 N. Y., 407; Little

I
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tor); but need not prove any demand of the drawer; and that
in actions upon promissory notes, by an indorsee against the
indorser, the plaintiff must prove a demand of, or due negligence to get the money from the maker of the note."
Accordingly, the rule v^^as, That the postea be delivered
to the plaintiff.
Phoenix Bank,
Cady v. Bradshavj,

V.

2

Hill,
116 N.

425;

Y.,

Brush

v.

Barrett,

82

N.

Y.,

400;

188; Daniel on Neg. Instruments,

Sec. 1576.

Presentment for Payment — May be Delayed When. —

Presentment for payment may be delayed:
1.
Where the holder is too ill to make the presentment himself or to appoint some one to do it for him;
2.
Where the contract is lost;
Where the mail miscarries;
3.
Where by reason of war or pestilence presentment can4.
not be made promptly;
Where the death of the holder occurs before maturity
5.
and before the appointment of a personal representative; and
6.
Generally whenever the delay is caused by circumstances
beyond the control of the holder and not imputable to his negligence.

But in all of these cases presentment must be made with reaWilsonable diligence after the causes of delay cease to operate.
i R. I., 401;
son V. Senier, 14 Wis., 380; Aborn v. Bosworth,
Smith V. Mullett, 2 Camp., 208; Bray v. Hadwen, 5 M. & S., 68;
Tunno v. Lague, 2 Johnson Cas., i; Woods v. Wilder, 43 N. Y.,
164; Morgan v. Bank of Louisville, 4 Bush. (Ky. ), 82; White v.
Stoddard, 11 Gray, 258.

Presentment

for Payment — Effect. — When

a commercial contract has been properly presented for payment and dishonored, and notice of that fact given to the parties who are
secondarily liable (drawers and indorsers), an immediate right of
action accrues to the holder against them.

CHAPTER XIV.
Defenses to Commercial Contracts.*

SECTION

54.

A MATERIAL ALTERATION IN THE TERMS OF A COMMERCIAL CONTRACT IS A REAL DEFENSE AND MAY BE

INTERPOSED AGAINST EVERY HOLDER.
MASTER

v.

MILLER.i

In the Court of King's Bench, July,
[^Reported in 4 Term Rep.,

320;

2

1791.

H. Bla., 141.]

The Form of the Action. — The first count in this declaration was in the usual form, by the indorsees of a bill of exchange against the acceptor; it stated that Peel & Co. on the
20th of March, 1788, drew a bill for 974/. I0.y. on the defendant, payable three months after date to Wilkinson &
Cooke, who indorsed to the plaintiffs.
The second count
stated the bill to have been drawn on the 26th of March.
There were also four other counts; for money paid, laid out
and expended; money lent and advanced; money had and reThe defendant pleaded
ceived; and on an account stated.
the general issue; on the trial of which a special verdict was
found.

it,

*An alteration of the date of a bill of exchange, after acceptance, whereby the payment would be accelerated, avoids the instrument; and no action can be afterwards brought upon
even
by an innocent holder for a valuable consideration.

8,

6,

Notes, 434.

7,

is

'This case
cited in Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 23,
148, 1373, 1373a, 1376, 1379, 1410; Wood's Byles on Bills and
Notes, 33, 476, 483; Chitty on Bills, 182, 317,
148, 159,
305, 560, 780; Story on Bills of Exchange, 17; Benjamin's Chalmers on Bills, Notes and Checks, 254, 256; Norton on Bills and
Notes, 234, 236; Randolph on Commercial Paper, 99, 288; Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, 194, 302, 394; Ames on Bills and
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It

Stated, that Peel & Co. on the 26th of March, 1788,
drew their bill on the defendant, payable three months after
date to

Wilkinson & Cooke, for 974/. los.

of exchange,

"Which

made by the said Peel & Co. as the

said bill

same hath

been altered, accepted, and written upon, as hereafter mentioned, is now produced, and read in evidence to the said
jurors, and is now expressed in the words and figures following, to wit:
'

June

2^rd,

PJ4I. los.
'Manchester,

March

20,

iy88.

Three months after date pay to the order of Messrs.
Wilkinson & Cooke g'j4.l. los. received, as advised.
'
Peel, Yates & Co.
'
To Mr. Cha. Miller.
'

'

2jrd June,

1788.'"

That Peel & Co. dehvered the said bill to Wilkinson &
Cooke, which the defendant afterwards, and before the alteration of the bill hereinafter mentioned, accepted.
That Wilkinson & Cooke afterwards indorsed the said bill to the plaintiffs, for a valuable consideration before that time given and
That the
paid by them to Wilkinson & Cooke for the same.
said bill of exchange at the time of making thereof, and at the
time of the acceptance, and when it came to the hands of
Wilkinson & Cooke as aforesaid, bore date on the 26th day of
March, 1788, the day of making the same.
And that after it
so came to and whilst it remained in the hands of Wilkinson
& Cooke, the said date of the said bill, without the authority
or privity of the defendant, was altered by some person or
persons to the jurors aforesaid unknown from the 26th day of
That the
March, 1788, to the 20th day of March, 1788.
words "June 23rd," at the top of the bill, were there inserted
to mark that it would become due and payable on the 23rd of
June next after the date; and that the alteration hereinbefore
mentioned, and the blot upon the date of the bill of exchange,
now produced and read in evidence, were on the bill of exchange, when it was carried to and came into the hands and
possession

of the plaintiffs.

That the bill of exchange was on

the 23rd of June and also on the 28th of June, 1788, presented to the defendant for payment; on each of which days
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The verdict also stated that
respectively he refused to pay.
the bill so produced to the jury and read in evidence was the
same bill, upon which the plaintiffs declared, etc.
The Claim of Plaintiff. — For the plaintiffs it was contended, that they were entitled, notwithstanding the alteration
in the bill of exchange, to recover according to the truth of
the case, which is set forth in the second count of the declaration, namely, upon a bill dated the 26th of March; which the
special verdict finds was in point of fact accepted by the deMore especially as it is clear that the plaintiffs are
fendant.
holders for a valuable consideration, and had no concern whatever in the fraud that was meditated, supposing any such apThe only ground of objection which can be suggested
peared.
is upon the rule of law relative to deeds, by which they are
absolutely avoided, if altered even by a stranger in any material part; and upon a supposed analogy between those
But upon investigating
instruments and bills of exchange.
the grounds on which the rule stands as applied to deeds, it
will be found altogether inapplicable to bills: and, if that be
shown, the objection founded on the supposed analogy between them must fall with it.

The general rule respecting deeds is laid down in Pigot's
case,' where most of the authorities are collected; from thence
it appears that if a deed be altered in a material point even by
a stranger without the privity of the obligee, it is thereby

avoided; and if the alteration be made by the obligee, or with
his privity, even in an immaterial part, it will also avoid the
Now that is confined merely to the case of deeds, and
deed.
does not in the terms or principle of it apply to any other inThere are
struments not executed with the same solemnity.
many forms requisite to the validity of a deed, which were
originally of great importance to mark the solemnity and
notoriety of the transaction, and on that account the grantees
always were, and still are, entitled to many privileges over the
It was therefore reasonable
holders of other instruments.
enough that the party, in whose possession it was lodged,
should on account of its superior authenticity be bound to
preserve it entire with the strictest attention, and at the peril
'

1 1

Co.
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of losing the benefit of it in the case of any material alteration
even by a stranger.
And that he is the better enabled to do
from the nature of the instrument itself, which not being of a
negotiable nature is not likely to meet with any mutilationunless through the fraud or negligence of the owner; whereas
bills of exchange are negotiable instruments, and are perpetually liable to accidents in the course of changing hands, from
the inadvertance of those by whom they are negotiated, without any possibility of their being discovered by innocent in,
dorsees, who are ignorant of the form in which they were
And the present is a strong inoriginally drawn or accepted.
stance of that; for the plaintiffs cannot be said to be guilty of
negligence in not inquiring how the blot came on the bill,
which mere accident might have occasioned.
That the same reasons, upon which the decisions of the
courts upon deeds have been grounded, will not support such
judgments upon bills, will best appear by referring to the authorities themselves.
When a deed is pleaded, there must be
'
it be
a profert in curiam, unless as in Reed v. Brookman
lost or destroyed by accident, which must however be stated
that anciently the
in the pleadings.
The reason of which
deed was actually brought into court for the purpose of insaid in lo Co., 92 b., the judges found
as
spection; and
that
had been rased or interlined in any material part, they
Now as that was the reason why
to be void.
adjudged
was
deed was required to be pleaded with a profert, and as
never necessary to make a profert of a bill of exchange in

is

Term. Rep., 151.
Bro. Abr. Faits, pi.
13 Vin. Abr. tit. Faits, 37, 38;

''

3

'

it

it

a

it

furnishes a strong argument that the reason appleading,
So deeds, in which were
plied solely to the case of deeds.
erasures, were held void, because they appeared on the face
Nor could the supposition of fraud
of them to be suspicious.'
have been the ground on which that rule was founded with
deed which had
respect to deeds; for in Moor, 35, p. 116,
been erased was held void although the party himself who
had made the erasure; which was permitting a party
made
impossible to conBut
to avail himself of his own fraud.

ring to 44 Ed.,

3, 42.

11,

refer-
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tend that the rule can be carried to the same extent as to bills;
nor is it denied but that if the blot here had been made by the

acceptor himself, he would still have been bound.
In Keilw., 162 it is said that if A. be bound to B. in 20/.
and B. erase out 10/. all the bond is void, although it is for
the advantage of the obligor, and even where an alteration in
a deed was made with the consent of both the parties, still it

wasjield to avoid it.'
Fraud could not be the principle on which those cases
were determined; whereas it is the only principle on which the
rule contended for can be held to extend to bills of exchange,
but which is rebutted in the present case by the facts found in

According to the same strictness, where
the special verdict.
a mere mistake was corrected in a deed, and not known by
whom, it was held to avoid it.^ And it does not abate the
force of the argument, that the law is relaxed in these respects
even as to deeds, for the question still remains, whether at
any time bills of exchange were construed with the same rigor
as deeds.

The principle upon which all these cases relative

to deeds was founded was, that nothing could work any alteration in a deed, except another deed of equal authenticity.
And as the party, who had possession of the deed, was bound
to keep it securely, it might well be presumed that any material alteration even by a stranger was with his connivance,
or at least through his. culpable neglect.
In many of the cases upon the alteration of deeds, the

29,

pi.

EL,

120.

^

6.

5.

letter U, pi.

Rol. Abr.,
II Co., 27.

*Cro.

is

29,

2

^

'2 Rol. Abr.,

it

is,

form of the issue has weighed with the court; as in i Rol.
Rep., 40, [which is also cited in Pigot's case,^] and Michael
against Scockwith,' in both of which cases the alteration was
after plea pleaded; and on that ground the court held that it
was still to be considered as the deed of the party on non est
Now the form of the issue in actions upon deeds
factum.
and those upon bills is very different; in the one case, the
whether
the deed of the party, which
issue simply
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goes to the

time of the plea pleaded, as appears from the
case before cited, and from 5 Co., 119 b; but here the issue
is whether the defendant promised at the time of the
acceptance to pay the contents.
The form of the issue is upon his

promise, arising by implication of law from the act of acceptance, which is found as a fact by the special verdict agreeable
to the bill declared on in the second count.
And in no instance, where an agreement is proved merely as evidence of a
promise, is the party precluded from showing the truth of the
case.
Not only therefore the forms of pleading are different
in the two cases, but the decisions which have been made
upon deeds, from whence the rule contended for as to erasures and alterations is extracted, are altogether inapplicable
to bills.
The reasons for such rigorous strictness in the one
case do not exist in the other.
On the contrary all the cases
upon bills have proceeded upon the most liberal and equitable
principles with respect to innocent holders for a valuable consideration.
The case of Minet v. Gibson' goes much further
than the present: for there this court, and afterwards the
House of Lords, held that it was competent to inquire into
circumstances extraneous to the bill, in order to arrive at the
truth of the transaction between the parties; although such
circumstances operated to establish a different contract from^
that which appeared upon the face of the bill itself. Wherea.s.
the evidence given in this case, and the facts found by the
special verdict, are in order to show what the bill really was;,
which it is competent for these parties to do against whom nofraud can be imputed, if any exist.
If the blot had fallen on
the paper by mere accident, it cannot be pretended that it
would have avoided the bill; and non constat upon this findEven if felony were committed
ing that it did not so happen.
by a third person, through whose hands the bill passed, although that party could not recover upon it himself, yet his
crime shall not affect an innocent party, to whom the bill is.
indorsed or delivered for a valuable consideration.
In Miller v. Race,^ where a bank note had been stolen,,
and afterwards passed bona fide to the plaintiff, it was held:
'3 Term.
^i
24

R.,

Burr., 452.

481;

in B. R., and

i H. Bl.,

569 in Dom.

Proc.
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that he might recover in trover against the person who had
And the same point was held
stopped it for the real owner.
in Peacock v. Rhodes/ where the bill was payable to order.
Again in Price v. Neale/ it was held that an acceptor, who
had paid a forged bill to an innocent indorsee, could not reNow if it be no answer to
cover back the money from him.
an action upon a bill against the acceptor to show that it was
a forgery in its original making by a third person's having
feigned the handwriting of the drawer, still less ought any
subsequent attempt at forgery, even if that had been found

But it
which is not, to weigh against an innocent holder.
would have been impossible to have recovered in any of these
cases if the deed had been forged in any respect even by
strangers to it; which shows that these several instruments
And so little have
cannot be governed by the same rules.
the forms of bills of exchange and notes been observed, when
put in opposition to the truth of the transaction, that in Russell V. Langstaffe' the court held, in order to get at the justice
of the case, that a person, who had indorsed his name on
blank checks which he had entrusted to another, was liable to
an indorsee for the sums for which the notes were afterwards
drawn; and yet the form of pleading supposes the note to
have been a perfect instrument, and drawn, before the indorsement.

But the case which is most immediately in point to the
present is that of Price v. Shute;* there a bill was drawn payable the 1st of January; the person upon whom it was drawn
accepted it to be paid the ist of March; the holder, upon the
bill's being brought back to him, perceiving this enlarged acceptance, struck out the ist of March and put in the ist of
January; and then sent the bill to be paid, which the acceptor
Whereupon the payee struck out the ist of January
refused.
and put in the ist of March again.
And in an action brought
on this bill the question was, whether these alterations did
'Dougl., 633.
^3 Burr., 1354.
'Dougl., 514.
*E., 33 Car.,

2,

in B.

R.;

2

Moll,

c.

10,

s. 28.
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not destroy it .? And it was ruled they did not.
This case
therefore has settled the doubt; and never having been impeached, but on the contrary recognized as far as general
opinion goes, by having been inserted in every subsequent
treatise upon the subject, it seems to have been acted on ever
since.
And it would be highly mischievous if the law were
otherwise; for however negligent the owner of a deed may be
supposed to be, who lets it out of his possession, the holder
of a bill of exchange is by the ordinary course of such transactions obliged to trust it even in the hands of those whose
interest it is to avail themselves of this sort of objection.
For it is most usual for the bill to be left for acceptance, and
afterwards for payment, in the hands of the acceptor, who
may be tempted to put such a blot on the date as may not be
observed at the time, through the confidence of the parties.
But even if the alteration should be considered as having destroyed the bill, why may not evidence be given of its contents
upon the same principle as governed the case of Read v.
Brookman,' where it was held that pleading that a deed is
lost by time and accident supersedes the necessity of a profert.
But at any rate the plaintiffs are entitled to recover on the
general counts for money paid, and money had and received,
on the authority of Tatlock v. Harris;^ for though it is expressly stated that so much money was received by the
defendant, yet that is a necessary inference from the fact of
acceptance which is found.
The Claim of the Defendant. — For the defendant it was
contended, that the broad principle of law was, that any alteration of a written instrument in a material part thereof
avoided such instrument; and that the rule was not merely
confined to deeds, though it happened that the illustration of
it was to be found among the old cases upon deeds only, because formerly most written undertakings and obligations were
This principle of law was founded in sound
in that form.
sense; it was calculated to prevent fraud, and deter men from
tampering with written securities: and it would be directly re'3 Term. R., 151.
2

3

Term. R., 174.
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pugnant to the policy of such a law to permit the holder of a
bill to attempt a fraud of this kind with impunity; which would
be the case, if after being detected in the attempt, he were not
If any differto be in a worse situation than he was before.
ence were to be made between bills of exchange and deeds, it
should rather be to enforce the rule with greater strictness as
to the former; tor it would be strange that, because they were
open to fraud from the circumstance of passing through many
hands, the law should relax and open a wider door to it than
in the case of deeds, where fraud was not so likely to be practiced.
The principle laid down in Pigot's case' is not dis-

But the first answer attempted
puted, as applied to deeds.
to be given is, that the rule as to deeds is stii generis, and
does not extend to other instruments of an inferior nature, because it arises from the solemn sanction attending the execuAs to this it is sufficient to
tion of instruments under seal.
say that no such reason is suggested in any of the books: but
the rule stands upon the broad ground of policy, which applies
at least as strongly to

bills as to deeds, for the reason above

given.

'

a

is

is,

it,

Then it is said that there is a material distinction between
the several issues in the two cases.
But the difference is
more in words than in sense; the substance of the issue in
both cases is, whether in point of law the party be liable to
answer upon the instrument declared on; and therefore any
matter which either avoids it ab initio, or goes in discharge of
may be shown as much in the one case as in the other.
Upon non est factum the question is, whether in law the deed
produced in evidence be the deed of the party; so on non
whether the bill given in evidence
assumpsit the question
be in point of law the bill accepted by the defendant; because
the promise only arises by implication of law upon proof of
the acceptance of the identical bill accepted, and given in evidence.
Now neither of the counts in the declaration was
For in the first count the bill was
proved by the facts found.
dated the 20th of March; but as there
no evidence of the
defendant's having accepted such
bill, of course the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover on that count.
Neither can

II

Co.,

27.
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they recover on the second, because though it is found that he
accepted a bill dated the 26th of March, as there stated, yet
inasmuch as the bill stated to have been produced in evidence
to the jury is dated the 20th, of course the evidence did not
support the count.
With respect to the cases cited of bills of exchange having been always construed by the most liberal principles, and
particularly in the case of Minet v. Gibson, the same answer
may be given to all of them, which is, that so far from the
original contracts having been attempted to be altered, all
those actions were brought in order to enforce the observance
of them in their genuine meaning against the party, who, in
the latter case particularly, endeavored by a trick to evade the
Whereas here the contract has been substantially
contract.
altered by the parties who endeavor to enforce it; or at least
by those whom they represent, and from whom they derive
title.
Then the case in Molloy of Price v. Shute is chiefly relied
on by the plaintiffs, to which several answers may be given.
First, the authenticity of it may be questioned; for it is not to
be found in any reports, although there are several contem-

In the next place, the
poraneous reporters of that period.
bill, as originally drawn, was not altered upon the face of it;
and therefore, as against all other persons at least than the
But principally it does
acceptor, it might still be enforced.
not appear but that the action was brought against the drawer,
who, as the acceptor had not accepted it according to the
tenor of the bill, was clearly liable; as the payee was not
bound to abide by the enlarged acceptance, but might conThen if this bill be void for
sider it as no acceptance at all.
this fraud, no evidence could be given to prove its contents, as
in the case of a deed lost; because in that there is no fraud.
But even if any other evidence might have been given, it is
And as to
sufficient to say that in this case there was none.
the common counts, if the general principle of law contended
for applies to bills of exchange, it will prevent the plaintiffs
from recovering in any other shape. Besides which, it is not
stated that the defendant has received any consideration,
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was
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cided.

In reply it was urged, that the issue was not whether the
defendant had accepted this bill in the state in which it was
shown to the jury; but whether he had promised to pay in
consequence of having accepted a bill dated the 26th March,
drawn by, etc., and those facts being found, the promise
It is said that the policy of the law will
necessarily arises.
extend the same rule to the avoidance of bills of exchange,
which have been altered,

as to deeds; because

there is even

greater reason to guard against fraudulent alterations in the
To which it may be answered,
former than in the latter case.
that the foundation of the rule fails in this case; for no fraud
is found, and none can be presumed: and it is admitted, that
if the blot had been made by accident, it would not have
avoided the bill; and nothing is stated to show that it was not
Besides, the policy of the law is equally
done by accident.
urgent in favor of the plaintiffs, it being equally politic to
compel a performance of honest engagements.
Here the defendant is only required to do that which in
And if he be not
fact and in law he has promised to do.
liable on this contract, he will be protected in withholding
payment of that money which he has received, and which by
the nature of his engagement he undertook to repay.
No answer has been given to the case cited from Molloy:
for though the case is not reported in any other book, it bears
every mark of authenticity, by noting the names of the parties,
the court in which it was determined, and the time of the
decision; and it has been adopted by subsequent writers on the
same subject.
Again, the alteration there was fully as important as this, for it equally tended to accelerate the day of
payment; and, lastly, it is not denied but that the action
mighty have been maintained on the bill against any other
person than the acceptor; which is an admission that the
policy of the law does not attach so as to avoid such instruments
upon any alteration, for otherwise it would have
avoided the bill against all parties.
'

3

Term R.,

174.
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Decision. — The question is not whether or not another

is

it

a

it
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it,

if

action may not be framed to give the plaintiffs some remedy,
but whether this action can be sustained by these parties on
this instrument.
For the instrument is the only means by
which they can derive a right of action.
The right of action,
which subsisted in favor of Wilkinson & Cooke, could not be
transferred to the plaintiffs in any other mode than this, inasmuch as a chose in action is not assignable at law.
No case,
it is true, has been cited on one side or the other, except that
in Molloy, of which I shall take notice hereafter, that decides
the question before us in the identical case of a bill of exBut cases and principles have been cited at the bar,
change.
which, in point of law as well as policy, ought to be applied
That the alteration in this instrument would
to this case.
have avoided
had been a deed, no person can doubt.
have had that effect in a
And why in point of policy would
deed.'
Because no man shall be permitted to take the chance
fraud, without running any risk of losing by
of committing
At the time when the cases
the event, when
detected.
cited, of deeds, were determined, forgery was only a misdemeanor: now the punishment of the law might well have been
considered as too little, unless the deed also were avoided;
and therefore the penalty for committing such an offense was
compounded of those two circumstances, the punif5hment for
the

misdemeanor,

and

the

avoidance

of

the

deed.

And

it

is

it,

&

is

it

I

though the punishment has been since increased, the principle
lay out of my consideration all the
still remains the same.
cases where the alteration was made by accident: for here
stated that this alteration was made while the bill was in
Cooke, who were then entitled to
possession of Wilkinson
and from whom the plaintiffs derive title:
the amount of
immaand
was for their advantage (whether more or less
to accelerate the day of payment, which in this
terial

The cases cited,

of the utmost importance.
which were all of deeds, were decisions

is

here)

commercial country

which applied to and embraced the simplicity of all the transactions at that time; for at that time almost all written enTherefore those decisions,
gagements were by deed only.
which were indeed confined to deeds, applied to the then state
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of affairs: but they establish this principle, that all written instruments, which were altered or erased, should be thereby
Then let us see whether the policy of the law,
avoided.
and some later cases, do not extend this doctrine farther than
It is of the greatest importance that
to the case of deeds.
these instruments, which are circulated throughout Europe,
should be kept with the utmost purity, and that the sanctions

to preserve them from fraud should not be lessened.
It was doubted so lately as in the reign of George the
First, in Ward's case,' whether forgery could be committed in
any instrument less than a deed, or other instrument of the
like authentic nature; and it might equally have been decided
there that, as none of the preceding determinations extended
to that case, the policy of the law should not be extended to
it.
But it was there held that the principle extended to other
instruments as well as to deeds; and that the law went as far

It is on the same reasoning that I have formed
policy.
The case cited from Molloy
my opinion in the present case.
indeed at first made a different impression on my mind: but
on looking over it with great attention, I think it is not apNo alteration was there made on the
plicable to this case.
bill itself; but the party, to whom it was directed, accepted it
as payable at a different time, and afterwards the payee struck
as the

'2 Str., 747;

2

Ld. Raym., 1461.

if
it

I

is

it
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out the enlarged acceptance; and, on the acceptor refusing to
pay, it is said that an action was maintained on the bill. But
it does not say against whom the action was brought; and it
could not have been brought against the acceptor, whose acceptance was struck out by the party himself who brought the
" that the alteraction.
Taking that case in the words of
does not affect this case: not
ations did not destroy the bill,"
an iota of the bill itself was altered; but on the person, to
whom the bill was directed, refusing to accept the bill as
was originally drawn, the holder resorted to the drawer. Then
was contended that no fraud was intended in this case; at
think that,
had been done
found: but
least, that none
by accident, that should have been found, to excuse the party,
as in one of the cases, where the seal of the deed was torn off
With respect to the argument drawn from the
by an infant.
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form of the plea, it goes the length of saying, that a defendant is liable, on non assumpsit, if at any time he has made a
promise, notwithstanding a subsequent payment: but the question is, whether or not the defendant promised in the form
stated in the declaration; and the substance of that plea
not bound by law to pay.
that according to that form he
On the whole, therefore,
am of opinion that this falsification
of the instrument has avoided it; and that, whatever other
remedy the plaintiffs may have, they cannot recover on this
bill of exchange.
The only question in this case is, whether there appears
on the face of this special verdict,
right of action in the

bill
on
The first count
counts.
of exchange dated the 20th of March; but, taere being no
clearly an end of that
proof of any bill of that date, there
on
bill dated the 26th of March; but
count.
The second
the defendant objects to the plaintiff's recovering on this
was
count also, because, the bill having been altered while
Cooke,
not the same bill as
in the hands of Wilkinson
the true and only questhat which was accepted; and that
that the plaintiff's right of
tion in the cause.
My idea
action, as stated in this count, cannot be maintained at common law, but
supported only on the custom of merchants,
which permits these particular choses in action to be transThe plaintiffs, as indorsferred from one person to another.
ees, in order to recover on this bill, must prove the acceptance by the defendant, the indorsement from Wilkinson
Cooke to them, and that this was the bill which was presented
The
Now has all this been proved
when
became due.
bill was drawn on the 26th of March, payable at three months
date; the defendant's engagement by his acceptance was, that
became due, according to that date;
should be paid when
consider as
but afterwards the date was altered; the date
very material part of the bill, and by the alteration the time
accelerated several days; according to that
of payment
a

is

on any of the

is

a

is

I

it

it

1

it

&

is

is

is

it

&

it

a

is

is

plaintiffs

a

it

alteration, the payment was demanded on the 23d of June,
bill drawn
as
which shows that the plaintiffs considered
the 20th of March; then the bill which was produced in evidence to the jury was not the same bill which was drawn by
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Peel & Co. and accepted by the defendant; and here the
Piggott's is the
cases which were cited at the bar apply.
leading case; from that I collect, that when a deed is erased,
whereby it becomes void, the obligor may plead non est factum, and give the matter in evidence, because at the time of
plea pleaded it was not his deed; and, secondly, that when a
deed is altered in a material point by himself, or even by a
Novv^ the effect of
stranger, the deed thereby becomes void.
deed
that
material alteration in
that determination
Such
the law reno longer to be the same deed.
causes
said that that law does not extend to
specting deeds: but
does or not must
the case of a bill of exchange: whether
founded.
depend on the principle on which this law
The policy of the law has been already stated, namely,
that
man shall not take the chance of committing a fraud,
and, when that fraud
detected, recover on the instrument
as
was originally made.
In such
case the law intervenes,
and says, that the deed thus altered no longer continues the
same deed, and that no person can maintain an action upon
it.
In reading that and the other cases cited, observe that

The General Classes

of Defenses. — The

commercial contracts have been divided
— (i) real and (2) personal.

defenses

to

into two general classes:

A Real Defense — Defined. — The

a

it

it

it

first or real defense may
be defined to be one which attaches to the contract and virtually
so that
cannot be enforced against any of the parties
destroys
to
nor in favor of any holder.
Among the real defenses may be
named:
1.

Incapacity

insanity;

of the parties,

such

as

infancy,

coverature,

it

Illegality of the contract, as where
contravenes (i) the
or (2) the common law, or (3) public policy — such as usury,
gaming or where notes or bills are given for the purchase of intoxicating liquors in jurisdictions where their sale
prohibited;
Where by the acts of the parties the contract has either
been cancelled, or altered in a material way; and
Want of delivery.
4.
A Personal Defense — Defined. — A personal defense may
be defined to be
defense which attaches not to the contract itself,
but to the agreement or conduct of the parties in regard to the instrument and which renders
inequitable for the holder to enforce
as between the immediate parties.
It
called
personal defense because
available as
defense only between the parties2.

a

is

it

a

is

it

it

a

3.

is

statute,

SEC.

54.

j

MASTER

V.

MILLER.

399.

it

is

is

it
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I

:

a

I

a

is

it

is

it

is

it

a
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it is nowhere said that the deed is void merely because it is
the case of a deed, but because it is not the same deed.
A
deed is nothing more than an instrument or agreement under
seal: and the principle of those cases
that any alteration
in
material part of any instrument or agreement avoids
because
thereby ceases to be the same instrument.
And
this principle
founded on great good sense, because
tends
to prevent the party, in whose favor
made, from attempting to make any alteration in it.
This principle too appears
to me as applicable to one kind of instruments as to another.
It has been contended that there
difference between
an alteration of bills of exchange and deeds; but
think that
the reason of the rule affects the former more strongly, and
the alteration of them should be more penal than in the latter
case.
bill of exchange were drawn for no/., and
Supposing
after acceptance the sum was altered to i,ooo/.
not pretended that the acceptor shall be liable to pay the 1,000/.and
say that he cannot be compelled to pay the 100/. acnot the
cording to his acceptance of the bill, because
same bill.
So
the name of the payee had been altered,

is

a

5

&

s

it

a

is

is

is

{e)

and privies to the immediate contract.
Parties are known as
Immediate parties are the parties to the
immediate and mediate.
contract, as the maker and payee; the indorser and his indorsee.
Mediate parties are parties between whom there are other parties,
as maker and indorsee; first indorser and second indorsee.
Among the personal defenses may be named; — (a) payment;
(h) release; {c) accord and satisfaction;
{d) failure of consideraor
tion;
duress;
fraud; (/)
(^) illegality, (whereby the statute,
but
common law or public policy, the act
pronounced illegal,
not void).
Material Alteration — Defined. — A material alteration in a
one which changes the legal relation of the
commercial contract
It
or
their
parties
obligations, or the legal effect of such contract.
" an alteration which causes the contract to speak language
originally spoke."
different in legal effect from that which
Houton, 45 Mich.,
v.
Van
Ind.,
Osborne
v.
May,
293;
76
Johnston
444; Burlingame v. Brewster, 79 111., 515; Rowley v. Jewett, 56
la., 492; Bank v. Douglass, 31 Conn., 170, i8r; Gardner v.
Mo. app., 186; Horn v.
Bl., 83; Lunt v. Silver,
Walsh,
El.
Newton City Bk., 32 Kan., 518; Gettysburg Bk. v. Chisolm, 169
Pa. St., 564, 569; Wait v. Pomeroy, 20 Mich., 425; Sulivan v.
not
mistake
Rudisill, 63 la., 158. An alteration to correct
Thrall,
v.
Mo.,
Derby
60
Foreman,
v.
449;
material; Evans
44.
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And the alteration
would not have continued the same bill.
in every respect prevents the instrunient's continuing the same,
It was said that
as well when applied to a bill as to a deed.
Piggott's case only shows to what time the issue relates: but it
goes further, and shows, that if the instrument be altered at
It is true the
any time before plea pleaded, it becomes void.
court will inquire to what time the issue relates in both cases.
Then to what does the issue relate here.? The plaintiffs in
this case undertook to prove everything that would support
the assumpsit in law, otherwise the assumpsit did not arise.
It was incumbent on them to prove that, before the action
was brought, this identical bill, which was produced in evidence to the jury, was accepted by the defendant, presented,
and refused: but if the bill, which was accepted by the defendant, were altered before it was presented for payment,
then that identical bill, which was accepted by the defendant,
was not presented for payment; the defendant's refusal was a
refusal to pay another instrument; and therefore the plaintiffs
failed in proving a necessary averment in their declaration.
If the bill had been presented and refused payment, and
it had been altered after the action was brought, then it might
Vt., 413;

contra, Newman v. King, 54 Ohio St., 273. Whether
the alteration is material is a question of law.
Material Alteration — Effect of. — "We understand the law
to be well settled that a material alteration of a promissory note by
any of the parties thereto discharges from liability thereon all other
parties not consenting to or authorizing such alteration; and this
without regard to whether the alteration is apparently or presumCourts
ably to the benefit or detriment of the parties objecting.
cannot undertake to say that a party would have made the contract
as altered, and thus make it for him, merely because its terms are
more favorable to him than those embodied in the original instrument, any more than a like conclusion could be justified where the
alteration imports additional liability.
In the one case no less
than in the other the altered paper is not the contract which the
party has made; and in neither case can the courts declare it to be
his contract, or enforce it as such.
The law proceeds on the idea
that the identity of the contract has been destroyed; that the contract made is not the contract before the court; that the party did
not make the contract which is before the court; and, so adjudging, it cannot go further, and hold him bound by
on speculations, however probable and plausible, that he would or ought to
have entered into the altered agreement because
involved less
it

it,

see

SEC.

MASTER
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have been like the case mentioned

40I

at the

It

bar.

was con-

a

it

it

if,

tended at the bar, that the inquiry before a jury in an action
Hke the present should be, whether or not the defendant
promised to pay the bill at the time of his acceptance: but
granting that he did so promise, that alone will not make him
liable unless that same bill were afterwards presented to him.
I will not repeat the observations which have already been
made by my Lord on the case in Molloy: but the note of that
case is a very short one; and the principle of it is not set forth
in any other book, nor indeed do the facts of it sufficiently
I doubt also whether it was a determination of this
appear.
it
court:
only appears that ther-e was a point made at nisi
But it has
prius, but not that it was afterwards argued here.
been said that a decision in favor of the plaintiffs will be the
most convenient one for the commercial world: but that is
after an alteration of this kind,
much to be doubted; for
be competent to the court to inquire into the original date of
will also be competent to inquire into the
the instrument,
original sum and the original payee, after they have been
door
altered, which would create much confusion, and open
to fraud.

liability than the original and only paper executed by him. There
Montgomery
are some expressions in the books to the contrary."
Masters v.
Cases,
Ala.,
Illustrative
154;
Crossthwait,
V.
553;
90
Miller, supra.
Material Alteration by a Stranger — Effect of. — Upon the
S.

a

4

is

&

a

a

a

a

is

is

ever material or not when made
question whether an alteration
and England.
rule in the U.
different
there
stranger,
by
In England material alteration by stranger destroys the title of
W., 778; 13 M. &W.,
the holder.
Davidson v. Cooper, 11 M.
treated as
While in the United States such an alteration
343.
Drum v. Drum, 133 Mass., 566; Colson v.
spoliation simply.
Arnot, 57 N. Y., 253; Neff v. Horner, 63 Pa. St., 237; Piersol v.
Ohio St., 529; BigeGrimes, 30 Ind., 129; Fullerton v. Sturges,
low v. Stilphen, 35 Vt., 521.

Material

Alterations— Illustrations of — The following

contracts have been held to be material:
joint and several contract;
Changing
of payment;
time
date
or
Changing the
Changing the place of payment;
Changing the rate of interest;
did not draw interest;
Adding interest when
new payee;
Substituting

3.
4.
6.

5.

a

it

2.

joint to

a

1.

a

changes in commercial
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Great and mischievous neglects have already crept into
these transactions; and I conceive, that keeping a strict hand
over the holders of bills of exchange, to prevent any attempts
to alter them, may be attended with good effects, and cannot
be productive of any bad consequences, because the party who
has a value for the bill may have recourse to the person who
On these grounds, thereimmediately received it from him.
fore, I am of opmion that the plaintiffs cannot recover on the
second count.
Neither do I think that they can recover on
the general counts, because it is not stated as a fact in the
verdict that the defendant received the money, the value of
the bill.
Judgment for the defendant.'

'This judgment
Chamber.
7.
8.
10
1 1

12

5

was afterwards
Term Rep., 367.

affirmed in the Exchequer-

Adding a seal;
Adding a subscribing witness;
Adding or removing a signature;
Adding words of negotiability when it was not negotiable;
Adding a special consideration after "value received";
Adding a place of payment when none is named;

Changing a material memorandum;
Changing the medium of payment.
14
Daniel on Neg. Inst.,
sees. 1373-1404 and cases cited; Cape Ann Nat. Bk. v. Burns,
129
Mass., 596; Angle v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 92 U. S., 330.
Immaterial Alterations — Illustrations. — The following
changes or alterations in commercial contracts have been held to
be immaterial:
1.
Changing a bill payable to "A" or bearer to "A" or
order or bearer;
2.
Changing an indorsement in blank into a special indorsement;
Adding the legal rate of interest where the note reads
3.
-"with interest" simply.
13

CHAPTER XV.
Defenses. — Alteration. — Negligence.

SECTION

55.

WHENEVER THE MAKER OF A COMMERCIAL CONTRACT,
BY HIS OWN CARELESSNESS OR NEGLIGENCE, EXECUTES AND DELIVERS IT SO THAT MATERIAL ALTERATIONS MAY BE MADE, IN A WAY WHICH DOES
NOT EXCITE THE SUSPICION OF CAREFUL AND PRUDENT BUSINESS MEN, HE WILL BE HELD LIABLE
THEREON TO ANY BONA FIDE HOLDER. NEGLIGENCE,
HOWEVER, IS A QUESTION OF FACT.
BROWN

REED.i

V.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Oct.,
{Reported in

1875.

/p Pa. St., J/o.]

The Form of Action. — This was an action of assumpsit
brought January 31st, 1873, by W. W. Reed against T. H.
Brown, upon the following note:
' '

"Six

North East,

April jrd,

I

iSyz.

J.

B.
promise to pay to
months after date
Smith or order two hundred and fifty dollars
for value received, with legal interest, without defalT. H. Brown."
cation or stay of execution.
Indorsed "_/. B. Smith, without recourse."
case is cited in Benjamin's Chalmers, on Bills, Notes
and Checks, 257; Bigelow on Bills and Notes, 187, 195; Wood's
Byles on Bills and Notes, 481, 589; Tiedeman on Commercial
Paper, 397; Ames on Bills and Notes, 598; Daniel on Negotiable
See
Instruments, 1405, 1409; Norton on Bills and Notes, 239.
Grote,
Bing.,
v.
253;
4
leading cases upon this question: Young
12. Moore, 484; Phelan v. Moss, 17 P. F. Smith (Pa.), 59; Johnson Harvester Co. v. McLean, 57 Wis., 258; 46 Am. Rep., 39;
Garrard v. Lewis, 47 L. T. Rep. (N. S. ), 408; Lowden v. Na-

'This

tional Bank, 38 Kan., 533.
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The plaintiff gave the note in evidence, and testified that
had bought it from the payee for $220, which he paid in
He testified further that he had received the note bona
cash.
he

it,

fide, and rested.
The defendant then offered to prove:
"That the paper he signed has been altered since so
signed, without his knowledge or consent, and that it was obtained from him by fraud of the payee; also, to show what
took place between Smith, the payee, and himself at the time
the note was made; also, to show that the paper in suit is but
the part of an agreement entered into between himself and
one J. B. Smith, purporting to constitute the defendant an
agent to sell 'Hay and Harvest Grinders' in North East and
Harbor Creek townships, in the county of Erie, and that the
paper making him such agent, has since it was signed by him,
been cut in two without his knowledge or consent, so as to
make the part in evidence read as a promissory note for $250,
and that a large part of the original instrument was cut off,
and that the paper in suit is not the whole of the paper signed
by defendant, nor in the shape in which he signed
but when
him
was
as follows, to wit:
signed by
North East, April 2d, 1872.
Six months after datel promiseto pay J- B. Smith or bearer fifty dollars when
sdl by
order TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY DOLLARS worthof Hay and Harvest Grinders,
for value received, with legal interest, without appeal, and also without
defalcation or stay of execution.
T. H.Brown, Agentfor Hay & Harvett Grinders."

The plaintiff objected to the offer, because, admitting
all to be true,

it

I

■'

a

a

is

it

it

did not constitute a defence to the note in
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, before maturity,
and
was not alleged that the plaintiff
not such
purchaser; nor that there was any guilty knowledge on part of
the plaintiff in this case before purchase of the paper.
[The paper was divided by cutting through between where
the asterisks are placed.]
The offer was rejected and
bill of exceptions sealed for
the defendant.
The court charged: —

SEC.

55.
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is no evidence

impeaciiing tliis paper as a note
in the hands of the plaintiff and your verdict therefore must
be for the plaintiff for the amount of note and interest."
The verdict was for the plaintiff for $280.54.
The defendant took a writ of error, and assigned the rejection of his offer of evidence and the charge of the court, for
error.
The Claim of the Plaintiff in Error (Defendant below).
— The defendant contended that a note once issued and then
altered is void altogether.'
Cutting the contract into two
pieces rendered the whole contract, and hence the part held
by the plaintiff, absolutely void as against maker.''
The Claim of the Defendant in Error (Plaintiff be—
low.
The defendant in error, cited the following cases in
support of the decision of the court below and closed: Phelan V. Moss," and Garrard v. Haddan.*
Decision.— The learned counsel for the plaintiff in error
has appealed to us to reconsider and overrule Phelan v. Moss. ^
We mean, however, to adhere to those cases, as founded both
on reason and authority, and as settling a principle of the
utmost importance in the law of negotiable securities.
That
the maker of a bill, note or check issiies^
principle is that,
it in such a condition that it may easily be altered without
detection, he is liable tc a bona fide holder who takes it in
the usual course of business, before maturity.
The maker

if

'Masters v. Miller, 4 Term Rep., 320, 346; Fay v. Smith, i
Allen, 477; Wade v. Wittington, Id., 561; Coch v Coxwell, ' C,
M. & R., 291; Smith's Lead. Cas., 934.
Parsons Notes and Bills, 580-2; Chitty on Bills, 182;
Wheelock v. Freeman, 13 Pick., 165; Wade v. Wittington, i
Allen, 561; Fay v. Smith, Id., 477; Bruce v. Barber, 3 Barb.,
374; Deny v. Reed, 40 Id., 16; Nazro v. Fuller, 24 Wend., 37;
Warring v. Early, 2 El. & B., 763; Stephens v. Graham, 7 S. &
R., 505; Jardine v. Payne, i B. & Ad., 671; Benedict v. Cowden,
49 N. Y., 396; Story on Notes, Sec. 408; Byles on Bills, Sees..
^2

254. 256"17 P. F. Smith

(Pa.),

59.

^Id., 82; Zimmerman v. Rote,

25

P. F. Smith

(Pa.),

188.

P. F. Smith (Pa.), 59; and Garrard v. Haddan, Id., 82;
since followed in Zimmerman v. Rote, 25 P. F. Smith (Pa.), 188.
"

25

17

4o6
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reaought surely not to be discharged from his obligation by
son or on account of his own negligence in executing and
issuing a note that invited tampering with. These cases did
not decide that the maker would be bound to a bona fide
holder on a note fraudulently altered, however skillful that
alteration might be provided that he had himself used ordinHe would no more be responsible
ary care and precaution.
upon such an altered instrument than he would upon a skillful forgery of his handwriting. The principle to which I have
adverted is well expressed in the opinion of the court in Zim-

"It is the duty of the maker of the
merman v. Rote.'
to guard not only himself but the public against frauds
alterations by refusing to sign negotiable paper made in
a form as to admit of fraudulent practices upon them,
ease and without ready detection."

note
and
such

with

But would the facts offered to be given in evidence and
rejected by the court below, have brought this case within
In Phelan v.
We think not.
the line of their decisions.?
Moss and in Zimmerman v. Rote, the party signed a perfect
promissory note, on the margin or underneath which was
written a condition which as between the parties was a part
But it could
of the contract and destroyed its negotiability.
easily be separated, leaving the note perfect, and no one
would have any reason to suspect that it had ever existed. In
Garrard v. Haddan the note was executed with a blank, by
which the amount might be increased, without any score to
In all these cases the deguard against such an alteration.
fendants put their names to what were on their face promisIn the case before us on the defendsory negotiable notes.
ant's offer, he did not sign a promissory note, but a contract
by which he was to become an agent for the sale of a washIt was indeed so cunningly framed that it
ing machine.
might be cut in two parts, one of which with the maker's
Whether
name would then be a perfect negotiable note.
there was negligence in the maker was clearly a question of
The line of demarcation between the two
fact for the jury.
parts might have been so clear and distinct and given the instrument so unusual an appearance as ought to have arrested
'25 P. F. Smith (Pa.), 191.

SEC.
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the attention of any prudent man.

But it may have been
in the maker, the
neghgence

it

a

it,

otherwise.
If there was no
good faith and absence of negUgence on the part of the
holder cannot avail him.
The alteration was a forgery, and
there was nothing to estop the maker from alleging and provThe ink of a writing may be extracted by a chemical
ing it.
process, so that it is impossible for any but an expert to detect
but surely in such
case
cannot be pretended that
the holder can rely upon his good faith and diligence.
We
think then that the evidence offered by the defendant below
should have been received.
Judgment reversed and venire facia de novo awarded.
his negligence, should execute

a

Alterations — Negligence

of Maker. — If

the maker,

commercial contract

as

by

follows:

"Ann Arbor, Mich., Aug. 25, i8g8.
50.00.
Two months after date without grace promise to pay to

"

I

"$

Fifty
of John Doe
at the Ann Arbor Savings Bank, for value received, with eight per cent annual interest after due.
the order

Dollars

And

a

Richard Roe."

subsequent holder

should write

"10"

in the margin before

"
"S° and "Ten hundred and" before "fifty" in the body of the

is

8

a

way which would not excite the suspicion of careful
men, he would be liable to any bona fide holder for the sum of Ten
Garrard v. Haddan, 67 Pa. St., 82;
hundred and fifty dollars.
Johnson Harvester Co. v. McLean, 57 Wis., 258; Yocum v.
Cal., 109.
Smith, 63 111., 321; Vischer V. Webster,
denied in some jurisdictions. GreenThis doctrine however
In this case the
field Savings Bank v. Stowell, 123 Mass., 203.
and the
in
the
margin,
figure "4" was inserted before "67"
in
the
body of
phrase "four hundred and" before "sixty seven"
In this case however the "alteration" was made by
the contract.
the principal party to the contract which no doubt had much to
See also Holmes v. Trumper, 22 Mich.,
do with the opinion.
etc. Bank v. Ekey, 51 Mo., 273; Cape Ann
427; Washington,
Nat. Bk. v. Burns, 129 Mass., 596; Angle v. Northwestern Ins.
Co., 92 U. S., 330; McGrath v. Clark, 56 N. Y., 34; Noll v.
See also Scofield v. Ford, 56 la., 37°;
Smith, 64 Ind., S"Tenn.,
271; Seibel v. Vaughn, 69 III., 257.
Stephens v. Davis, 85
note in

CHAPTER XVI
Defenses— Fraud.

SECTION

56.

FRAUD MAY BE EITHER A REAL OR A PERSONAL DEFENSE.
IT MAY ALWAYS BE INTERPOSED BETWEEN IMMEDIATE PARTIES, AND IF IT CAUSED THE PARTIES TO ENTER INTO THE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS UNDER A
MISAPPREHENSION OF THE REAL NATURE OF THE
CONTRACT, WITH THE EXERCISE OE DUE DILIGENCE,
THEN IT IS A REAL DEFENSE AND MAY BE INTERPOSED
AGAINST ANY HOLDER.
FOSTER
In the Court of

V.

MACKINNON.

Common

1

Pleas, July,

1869.

\^Reported i?i 4 Common Pleas, 704.]

The Form of Action. — Action

by indorsee against indorser on a bill of exchange for 3000/. drawn on the 6th of November, 1867, by one Cooper upon and accepted by one Callow, payable six months after date, and indorsed successively

by Cooper, the defendant, J. P. Parker, T. A. Pooley & Co.,
and A. G. Pooley, to the plaintiff, who became the holder for
value (having taken it in part payment of a debt due to him
from A. G. Pooley) before it became due, and without notice
of any fraud.
The pleas traversed the several indorsements, and alleged
that the defendant's indorsement was obtained from him by
fraud.

'This

case is cited in Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 850;
Benjamin's Chalmers, on Bills, Notes and Checks, 58, 220; Norton on Bills and Notes, 253; Wood's Byles, on Bills and Notes,
487, 589; Randolph on Commercial Paper, 284; Bigelow on Bills
and Notes, 37, 176, 180; Ames on Bills and Notes, 540.

SEC.

FOSTER

56.]

V. MACKINNON.

409

The cause was tried before Bovill, C. J., at the last
The defendant, who was a genspring assizes at Guildford.

a

a

it

a

a

it

it,

tleman far advanced in years, swore that the indorsement was
not in his hand-writing, and that he had never accepted nor
indorsed a bill of exchange; but there was evidence that the
signature was his; and Callow, who was called as a witness
for the plaintiff, stated that he saw the defendant write the
indorsement under the following circumstances:
Callow had
been secretary to a company engaged in the formation of a
railway at Sandgate, in Kent, in which the defendant (who
had property in the neighborhood) was interested, and the defendant had some time previously, at Callow's request, signed
a guarantee for 3000/., in order to enable the company to obCallow took
tain an advance of money from their bankers.
the bill in question (which was drawn and indorsed by Cooper)
telling
to the defendant, and asked him to put his name on
him that
was
guarantee; whereupon the defendant, in the
belief that he was signing
guarantee similar to that which he
had before given (and out of which no liability had resulted to
him), put his signature on the back of the bill immediately
Callow only showed the defendant the
after that of Cooper.
was, however, in the ordinary shape of
back of the paper:
stamp, the impress of which
bill of exchange, and bore

The Lord Chief Justice told the jury that,

if

was visible through the paper.
the indorse-

a

it

it

a

if

it

a

it

it

if,

being his
was obtained upon a fraudulent representation
signature,
without
was
that
guarantee, and the defendant signed
was
bill, and under the belief that
was
knowing that
the defendant was not guilty of any negliguarantee, and
gence in so signing the paper, he was entitled to the verdict.
ment was not the signature of the defendant, or

a

verdict for the defendant.
The jury returned
The Claim of Defendant. — Two questions arise here: —
1.
Whether there was any negligence on the part of the
defendant in signing the document as he did; and
Whether, assuming Callow's evidence to be true, the
2.
defendant can be responsible upon an indorsement so fraudulently obtained.

FOSTER
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In considering the first of these questions, regard must
What would
be had to the age and condition of the party.
be neghgence in a merchant or a banker would not necessarily
be negligence on the part of a gentleman of great age and im-

Negligence must in all cases be a
paired physical powers.
It is essenrelative term.' Then, as to the second question.
A man cannot
tial to every contract that there be volition.
be said to contract when he signs a paper upon a representation and under a belief that he is signing something different
from that which it turns out to be; to make a valid and bindThis arises
ing contract, the mind must go with the act.
Upon the facts proved,
upon the traverse of the indorsement.
the defendant cannot be said to have indorsed the bill at all.
Where a man puts his name as acceptor or indorser on a
blank stamp, he becomes responsible, if the bill is afterwards
filled up and gets into the hands of a bona fide holder for
value, to the full amount which the stamp will cover, ^ but in
such case he intends to become a party to the bill.
All the
eases in which one who has been defrauded has been held
liable upon the bill or note are explainable on the ground of
Young v. Grote,' may be sustained on that ground.*
agency."
But the fact of agency must be first established.* In Ingham
v. Primrose,' the defendant had once made a complete bill,
and the ground of the decision was that he had negligently
omitted to cancel or destroy it effectually.
The Claim of Plaintiff.— The fact that the defendant's
indorsement on the bill was obtained by a fraudulent repre'LyDch
22

V.

Nurdin, i Q. B.,

29

(E. C. L. R., vol. 41).

^Russell V. Langstaffe, Montague v. Perkins,
L. J. C. P., 187; Byles on Bills, 9th ed., 181.

"Byles on Bills, 9th ed., 131.
*4 Bing., 253 (E. C. L. R., vol. 13),

2

Doug., 514;

Mo., 484.
B., in Robarts
V. Tucker, 16 Q. B., 560
(E. C. L. R., vol. 71); of Williams, J.,
in Ex parte Swan, 7 C. B. N. S. , 445 (E. C. L. R., vol. 97); and
of Blackburn, J., in Gum v. Tyrie, 4 B. cSz: S., 680,
713 (E. C. L.,
12

*See the observations upon that case of Parke,

vol. 116).

'Awde v. Dixon,

6

Ex., 869; Kingsford v. Merry,

in error,- i H. & N., 503.
' C. B. N.
S., 82 (E. C. L. R., vol.
7

97 ), 28

11

Ex., 577,

L. J. C. R, 294.
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sentation that he was signing something else, is no answer to
the claim of a bona fide holder for value, without notice of the
fraud.
No doubt, as a general rule, fraud vitiates all contracts.
But a bill of exchange is not in the ordinary sense

of

the

word a contract at all.

The law-merchant imposes

it

a

a

a

^

is

it

it,

certain obligations on parties who put their names on bills of
exchange, — obligations altogether apart from the ordinary
obligations arising out of other contracts.
Bills of exchange
now form an important part of the currency of the country.
No matter how a bill or note may be tainted with fraud, or
even if it had been obtained by duress or by felony, that is no
answer to an action at the suit of a bona fide \io\AQxiox\-s\M&:^
Parsonson Bills, ed. 1865, pp. 109-115, citing amongst other
cases, Putnam v. Sullivan,^ where Parsons, C. J., says: "The
counsel for the defendants agree that generally an endorsement obtained by fraud shall hold the indorsers according to
the terms of it; but they make a distinction between the cases
where the indorser through fraudulent pretences has been induced to indorse the note he is called on to pay, and where he
never intended to indorse a note of that description, but a
different note and for a different purpose.
Perhaps there may
be cases in which the distinction ought to prevail; as, where a
blind man had a note falsely and fraudulently read to him,
and he indorsed
to be the note read to him.
supposing
But we are satisfied that an indorser cannot avail himself of
this distinction but in cases where he
not chargeable with
any laches or neglect or misplaced confidence in others."
In Rex V. Hales, the prisoner had got from
member of
blank frank, which he subseparliament named Gibson
quently, by writing over the signature and altering the word
"free" into "for" and adding "myself and partners" turned
into
promissory note for 2,600/.; and, though the most
eminent counsel of the day were retained to defend him,

656.
^4

Massachusetts Rep., 45.

'17 How. St.

Tr.,

161.

6

8

i

'Bayley on Bills, 472, 473, 534; Chitty on Bills, loth ed., 50,
Camp.,
53, 178; Byles on Bills, 8th ed., 57; Duncan v. Scott,
Ex.,
M. & W., 494; Harvey v. Towers,
100; Marston v. Allen,
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did not occur to any of them that the then necessary allegation in the indictment of the intent to defraud Gibson failed
in proof, which it would have done if the argument urged here
is well founded, viz., that Gibson was not liable on the note,
So, in Rex v. Revett,
and therefore could not be defrauded.
Byles on Bills,' A. by false representations induced B. to sign
his name to a blank stamped paper, which A. afterwards
A.
secretly filled up as a promissory note for lOo/. upon it.
was indicted for defrauding C. ; and it was held that C. had
his remedy against B. on the note, and that the fraud therefore not being upon C. but upon B., the indictment was not
sustained by the evidence.
Wherever there is consideration,
fraud may be disregarded.
If a stolen bill gets into circulation, the acceptor is liable at the suit of a bona fide holder for
value. ^ This was not a case of forgery: it was a mere fraudulent procurement of the defendant's signature to a genuine
and a complete bill.
Thoroughgood's Case,^ is peculiar, and
not very intelligible; and in the case cited from Keilway, 76b,
the deed was fraudulently read by the grantee himself.
Decision. — Nance v. Lary,* also cited in Parsons on Bills,
In that case,
114, seems to be very much to the purpose.
the defendant and one Langford being about to execute a bond
in blank, the latter produced a sheet of paper, upon which the
defendant signed his name; whereupon Langford suggested
that the signature was so far from the bottom of the paper
that there might not be room for the bond to be written above
and produced another sheet for the defendant to sign so as
to leave sufficient room for the intended bond.
Langford,
with apparent carelessness, slipped the first sheet aside, and
signed the other with the defendant, who carried
to the
clerk of the court to be filled up, leaving the former with
Langford, under the impression that
had been or would be
destroyed.
Subsequently, Langford caused the note upon
'8th ed.,

124.

'5

Alabama Rep., 370.

is

6

J.

7

C. B. N. S,, 82, 85 (E. C. L. R.,
''Ingham v. Primrose,
vol. 97), 28 L.
C. P., 294.
Awde v. Dixon,
Ex., 869,
like
V.
12
ElHott,
B.
N.
S.,
C.
C.
L.
Stagg
R., vol. 104).
373 (E.
'2 Co. Rep., 9b.
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which the present suit was brought to be written over the
blank signature of the defendant retained by him, and negotiated it to the plaintiff.
Collier, C. J., said:
"The making
of the note by Langford was not a mere fraud upon the defendant; it was something more.
It was quite as much a forgery as if he had found the blank, or purloined it from the de-

If a recovery were allowed upon such a
possession.
state of facts, then every one who indulges in the idle habit
fendant's

of writing his name for mere pastime, or leaves sufficient space

between a letter and his subscription, might be made a bankrupt by having promises to pay money written over his signature.
Such a decision would be alarming to the community,
has no warrant in law, and cannot receive our sanction."
In that case the defendant never intended to sign the instrument at all.
Byles, J., in his judgment in Swan v. North
British Australasian Company,' in the Exchequer Chamber
" The object of the law merchant as to bills and notes
says:
made or become payable to bearer is, to secure their circulation as money; therefore honest acquisition confers title.
To
this despotic but necessary principle, the ordinary rules of the
common law are made to bend.
The misapplication of a
genuine signature written across a slip of stamped paper
(which transaction, being a forgery, would in ordinary cases
convey no title), may give us a good title to any sum fraudulently inscribed, within the limits of the stamp, and in
America, where there are no stamp-laws, to any sum whatever.
Negligence in the maker of an instrument payable to
bearer makes no difference in his liability to an honest holder
for value: the instrument may be lost by the maker without
his negligence, or stolen from him, still he must pay."
If that be right, it can only be with reference to the case
of a complete instrument; it can hardly be applicable to a case
where a man's signature has been obtained by a fraudulent
representation to a document which he never intended to
sign.
Then, the verdict was clearly against the weight of eviCan it be said that it
dence upon the question of negligence,
was any other than gross negligence on the part of the de'2 H. &

C,

184.
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fendant to put his name upon the back of a document such as
If any
that described, without even looking at the face of it.
one is to suffer from his misplaced confidence in Callow, it
surely must be the defendant himself.
"This was an action by the plaintiff as
Byles, J., said:
indorsee of a bill of exchange for 3000/., against the defendant, as indorser.

The defendant by one of his pleas traversed

the indorsement, and by another alleged that the defendant's
The plaintiff
indorsement was obtained from him by fraud.
was a holder for value before

maturity, and without notice of

any fraud.

whether the indorsement was the defendant's signature at all; but, according
to the evidence of one Callow, the acceptor of the bill, who
was called as a witness for the plaintiff, he, Callow, produced
the bill to the defendant, a gentleman advanced in life, for
him to put his signature on the back, after that of one
Cooper, who was payee of the bill and first indorser. Callow not saying that it was a bill, and telling the defendant
that the instrument was a guarantee.
The defendant did not
There was contradictory

see the face

bill at all.

as to

But the bill was of the usual

stamp, the impress of which stamp was
at the back of the bill.
The defendant signed his

shape, and

visible

of the

evidence

bore

a

name after Cooper's, he the defendant (as the witness stated)
believing the document to be a guarantee only.

The Lord Chief Justice told the jury that, if the indorse-

signature, or
being his signature,
was obtained upon a fraudulent representation that
was
without knowguarantee, and the defendant signed
bill, and under the belief that
was
was
ing that
guarantee, and
the defendant was not guilty of any negligence
in so signing the paper, the defendant was entitled to the
The jury found for the defendant.
verdict.
new trial was obtained, first, on the ground of misdirection in the latter part of the summing-up, and secondly,
on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence.
As to the first branch of the rule,
seems to us that the
The
question arises on the traverse of the indorsement.
case presented by the defendant
that he never made the

it

a

it

is,

it

A

if

a

it

a

it

it

if,

ment was not the defendant's

56. J

SEC.

FOSTER

V. MACKINNON.

415

contract declared on; that he never saw the face of the bill;
that the purport of the contract was fraudulently misdescribed
to him; that, when he signed one thing, he was told and believed that he was signing another and an entirely different
thing; and that his mind never went with his act.

It seems plain, on principle and on authority, that, if

a

blind man, or a man who cannot read, or who for some reason (not implying negligence) forbears to read, has a written
contract falsely read over to him, the reader misreading to
such a degree that the written contract is of a nature altogether different from the contract pretended to be read from
the paper which the blind or illiterate man afterwards signs;
then, at least if there be no negligence, the signature so obtained is of no force.
And it is invalid not merely on the
ground of fraud, where fraud exists, but on the ground that
the mind of the signer did not accompany the signature; in
other words, that he never intended to sign, and therefore in
contemplation of law never did sign, the contract to which
his name is appended.
The authorities appear to us to support this view of the
law.
In Thoroughgood's ' it was held that, if an illiterate
man have a deed falsely read over to him, and he then seals
and delivers the parchment, that parchment is nevertheless
not his deed.
In a note to Thoroughgood's Case, in Eraser's
edition of Coke's Reports, it is suggested that the doctrine is
not confined to the condition of an illiterate grantor; and a
case in Keilway's Reports^ is cited in support of this observation.
On reference to that case, it appears that one of the
judges did there observe that it made no difference whether
the grantor was lettered or unlettered.
That, however, was a
case where the grantee himself was the defrauding party.
But the position that, if a grantor or covenantor be deceived
or misled as to the actual contents of the deed, the deed does
not bind him, is supported by many authorities: see Com.
Dig. Fait (B. 2), and is recognized by Bayley, B., and the
Court of Exchequer, in the case of Edwards v. Brown. ^ Ac'

Case

2

^Keilw.,

'i

C.

Co.
70,

&J.,

Rep.,
p. 6.

312.

9

b.
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cordingly, it has recently been decided in the Exchequer
Chamber, that, if a deed be dehvered, and a blank left therein
be afterwards improperly filled up (at least if that be done
without the grantor's negligence), it is not the deed of the
grantor; Swan v. North British Australasian Land Company.'
These cases apply to deeds; but the principle is equally
Nevertheless, this
applicable to other written contracts.
principle, when applied to negotiable instruments, must be
and is limited in its

These instruments are not
application.
only assignable, but they form part of the currency of the
A qualification of the general rule is necessary to
country.
If, therefore, a man
protect innocent transferrees for value.
write his name across the back of a blank bill, stamps and
parts with it, and the paper is afterwards improperly filled up,
he is liable as indorser.
If he write it across the face of the
bill, he is liable as acceptor, when the instrument has once
passed into the hands of an innocent indorsee forvalue before
maturity, and liable to the extent of any sum which the stamp

will cover.
In these cases, however, the party signing knows what
he is doing: the indorser intended to indorse, and the acceptor
'2 H. &

C,

175.

Fraud — Personal Defense, Generally. — As

a general rule
fraud is a personal defense and can therefore be interposed between immediate parties only.
Jackson v. Henry, 10 Johnson,
If
the
bill
or
note
gets into the hands of a subsequent party
184.
for value without notice, he can recover.
A contract affected by
fraud is voidable not void.
The party making a negotiable contract induced by fraud may rescind it and treat it as though it had
never been made; but he must do this before it comes into the
hands of a bona fide holder.
Page v. Krekey, 137 N. Y., 313; National Bk. V. Veneman, 43 Hun., 241; Clark v. Pease, 41 N. H.,
414; Soudheim v. Gilbert, 117 Ind., 71; Walker v. Ebert, 29 Wis.,
194; Chapman v. Rose, 56 N. Y., 137; Douglas v. Matting, 29 la.,
498; Lewis v. Clay, 42 Solicitor's Journal, 151.
Fraud. — "Bohemian Oats" Notes. — " Bohemian Oats "
or "Red Line" wheat, contracts have been enforced in some
states while in others they have not.
In Ohio and Iowa they have
been enforced when in the hands of subsequent bona
fide holders.
In Michigan the right of the holder to recover was denied upon
the ground of public policy.
Sutton v. Beckwith, 68 Mich., 303
(t888); McNamara v. Gargett, 68 Mich., 454; Hanks v. Brown,
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intended to accept, a bill of exchange to be thereafter filled
up, leaving the amount, the date, the maturity, and the other
parties to the bill undetermined.
But in the case now under consideration, the defendant,
according to the evidence, if believed, and the finding of the
jury, never intended to indorse a bill of exchange at all, but
intended to sign a contract of an entirely different nature.
It
was not his design, and, if he were guilty of no negligence, it
was not even his fault that the instrument he signed turned
out to be a bill of exchange.
It was as if he had written his
name on a sheet of paper for the purpose of franking a letter,
or in a lady's album, or on an order of admission to the Temple Church, or on the fly-leaf of a book, and there had already
been, without his knowledge, a bill of exchange or a promissory note payable to order inscribed on the other side of the
To make the case clearer, suppose the bill or note on
paper.
the other side of the paper in each of these cases to be written at a time subsequent to the signature, then the fraudulent
misapplication of that genuine signature to a different purpose would have been a counterfeit alteration of a writing
with intent to defraud, and would therefore have amounted to
79 la., 560; Merrill v. Packer, 80 la., 542; Payne v. Raubinek, 82
la., 587; Kitchen v. Loudenback, 48 Ohio St., 177; Jacobs v.
Mitchell, 46 Ohio St.; 22 Ohio Law ]., 388; Hess v. Culver,
(Mich.), 43 N. W. Rep., 994; Davis v. Seely, 71 Mich.
Fraud — Rights of Bona Fide Holder. — The general rule is

well settled that one who acquires a commercial contract, without
notice of existing equities, in the usual course of business, for a
valuable consideration and before maturity, takes it unaffected by
fraud in its origin.
Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet., i; Selser v. Brock, 3
Ohio St., 302; Gridley v. Bane, 57 111., 529; Clapp v. County of
Cedar, 5 la., 15; 68 Am. Dec, 678; Wayne Agricultural Co. v.
Cardwell, 73 Ind., 535; Brown v. Spofford, 95 U. S., 474; Burrill
v. Parsons, 71 Me., 282.
Fraud — Statutory Provisions Relating to. — The question,
whether fraud shall effect the validity of a negotiable contract has
In
been the subject of statutory regulations in some of the states.
be
holder
shall
protected
Georgia it is provided that a bona fide
Merritt v. Bagwell, 70 Ga., 578.
from the defenses of fraud.
In Illinois, however, it is provided by statute that " if any
fraud or circumvention be used in obtaining the making or execuHewitt v. Jones,
ting of any note it shall be void (not voidable).
"
fraud " used "in
the
It is well to observe here that
72 111., 218.

FOSTER

4l8
a forgery.

V. MACKINNON.

[CHAP.

t6,

In that case, the signer would not have been

bound by his signature, for two reasons, — first, that he never
in fact signed the writing declared on, — and, secondly, that
he never intended to sign any such contract.
In the present case, the first reason does not apply, but
the second does apply. The defendant never intended to sign
He never intended to
that contract, or any such contract.
put his name to any instrument that then was or thereafter
He was deceived, not merely as
might become negotiable.
to the legal effect, but as to the actual contents of the instrument.

We are not aware of any case in which the precise question now before us has arisen on bills of exchange or promIn the case of Ingissory notes, or been judicially discussed.
ham V. Primrose,' and the case of Nance v. Lary,^ cited in i
Parsons on Bills inn, both cited by the plaintiff, the facts
were very different from those of the case before us, and have
But, in Putnam v.
but a remote bearing oo the question.
'7 C. B. N. S., 83
'5 Alabama, 370.

(E. C. L. R., vol.97),

28

L. J. C. P.,

294.

" does not apply to the considobtaining the making or executing
Culver v. Hide and
eration upon which the note was given.
Leather Bank, 78 111., 625; Taylor v. Thompson, 3 111. App., 109;
" It must be borne in mind " says
Anten v. Gruner, 90 111., 300.
Walker, C. J., "that the fraud or covin must relate to the obtaining of the instrument itself, and not to the consideration upon
which it is based.
It is not fraud which relates to the quality,
quantity, value, or character of the consideration that moves the
contract, but it is such a trick or device as induces the giving of
one character of instrument under the belief that it is an other of
a different character; such as giving a note or other agreement for
one sum or thing, when it is for another sum or thing; or as giving
a note under the belief that it is a receipt."
Latham v. Smith, 45

III.,

25,

27.

Where the Delivery

of the Contract is Obtained
Through Fraud. — Delivery of a bill or note is a prerequisite to

its existence as a contract.
If therefore its possession is obtained
through fraud the payee cannot maintain any action thereon.
Burson V. Huntington, 21 Mich., 415; 4 Am. Dec, 407; Kinyon
V. Wohlford, 17 Minn., 239; 10 Am. Rep., 165; Clarke v. Johnson,
54 111., 296; Hall V. Wilson, 16 Barb., 548; Cline v. Guthrie, 42
Ind., 227; 13 Am. Rep., 357.
In this last case a man signed his
name upon a blank piece of paper, and subsequently a promissory
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Sullivan, an American case,' and cited in Parsons on Bills of
Exchange,^ a distinction is taken by Ch. J. Parsons between
a case where an indorser intended to indorse such a note as
he actually indorsed, being induced by fraud to indorse
and
case where he intended to indorse
different note and for
different purpose.
And the court intimated an opinion that,
even in such
case as that,
distinction might prevail and
protect the indorsee.
The distinction in the case now under consideration
much plainer one; for, on this branch of the rule, we are to
assume that the indorser never intended to indorse at all, but
to sign a contract of an entirely different nature.
For these reasons, we think the direction of the Lord
Chief Justice was right.
With respect, however, to the second branch of the rule,
we are of opinion that the case should undergo further invesWe abstain from giving our reasons for this part of
tigation.
our decision only lest they should prejudice either party on a
new trial.

Mass., 45.

^Vol.

i.,

'4

The rule, therefore, will be made absolute for

a

second inquiry.

p.

iiin.

4

7

5

a

It was held that he was not liable thereon
note was written over it.
See also
note was ever made.
for the reason that no delivery of
Ala.,
v.
Lary,
Conn. (N. S.), 82; Nance
Ingram v. Primrose,
Am. Rep., 236.
370; Caulkins v. Whisler, 29 Iowa, 495;

Notes Obtained in Blank and Wrongfully Filled up. —

a

2

is

a

4

a

if
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a
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commercial
well settled that where a person executes
former
the
that
an
other
to
contract in blank, and entrusts
the same gets into the
liable according to its completed terms,
Doug., 514;
Russell v. Langstaffe,
hands of
bona fide holder.
Bank of Pittsburgh v. Neal, 22 How. Pa., 107; Erchelberger v.
Ohio St.,
Old Nat. Bank, 103 Ind., 401; Fullerton v. Sturgis,
note
blank
on
an
indorsement
Ld. Mansfield said "that
529.
the
original
As between
letter of credit for an indefinite sum.
parties of course no recovery can be had contrary to the agreement."
McCoy V. Lockwood, 71 Ind., 319; Bedell v. Herring, 11
Am. St. Rep., 307; 77 Cal., 572.

The rule

CHAPTER XVII.
Defenses. — Illegality.*

SECTION

57.

A WANT OR FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION IN A COMMERCIAL CONTRACT IS A PERSONAL DEFENSE AND AVOIDS
THE CONTRACT ONLY PRO TANTO. ILLEGALITY OF
CONSIDERATION IS USUALLY A REAL DEFENSE AND
AVOIDS THE CONTRACT IN TOTO. WHERE A PART OF
THE CONSIDERATION IS LEGAL AND A PART IS ILLEGAL
THE WHOLE CONTRACT IS VOID.
WIDOE

V.

WEBB.'

In the Supreme Court of Ohio, Dec,
\^Reported in 20 Ohio

1870.

St., 431: 5 Am. Rep., 664.]

The Form of Action. — The original action out

of which

proceeding in error arises, was brought by the
present plaintiff against the defendant before a justice of the
peace, and, by appeal from his judgment, came into the court
The suit was upon a
of common pleas of Morrow county.
promissory note, made and delivered by the defendant to the
plaintiff for $50rViT. and the petition was in the usual form.
The defendant answered that the sole consideration of
said note was spirituous liquors sold by the plaintiff to the defendant, which had not been inspected according to law, and

the

present

*See upon the principal proposition as to the effect of illegal
consideration:
Hay v. Ayling, 16 Q. B., 431; Fareira v. Gabell,
St.,
Pa.
v. Howard, 53 111., 455; Scollans v. Flynn,
Shirley
89;
89
120 Mass., 271; Eagle v. Kohn, 84 111., 292; Aurora v. West, 22
Ind., 88; Cowing v. Altman, 71 N. Y., 435.
'

This case is cited in Benjamin's Chalmers on Bills, Notes
Checks,
and
Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 204; Wood's
Byles on Bills and Notes, 241, 243; Tiedeman on Commercial
Contracts, 179.

iii;
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which were so sold to be drank on the premises where sold, in
violation of law.
The subject-matter of this defence was traversed by reply, in which the plaintiff averred that the note was given for
goods, groceries, and provisions sold by plaintiff to defendant
before the date of the note.

The issue made by these ' pleadings was tried by
verdict found for the
moved to set aside and grant
of error in the charge of the
finding of the jury was against

and

a

a

jury

defendant, which the plaintiff
him a new trial, on the ground
court to the jury, and that the
the law, and against the mani-

fest weight of the evidence.

This motion was overruled, and judgment entered on the
verdict, to which plaintiff excepted.
From a bill of exceptions taken by the plaintiff, it is
shown that the defendant testified upon the trial that the note
in suit was given for a balance of an account that had been
running for a year and a half preceding the date of the note;
that not less than three-fourths of the account was for spirituous liquors bought and drank by him from time to time at
plaintiff's grocery, including therein, however, ale and beer;
and that part of the account was for cigars, tobacco, and
lunches.
Other witnesses called by the defendant testified
that they had seen defendant purchase and drink spirituous
liquors at plaintiff's grocery and get the same charged in his
account, and that they had frequently seen him purchase at
plaintiff's grocery and have charged to his account all kinds of
groceries for family use.
On plaintiff's behalf, both he and his clerk testified that
the account which formed the consideration of the note wasfor groceries purchased out of the plaintiff's store, and that no
part of the consideration was for spirituous liquors, to their
knowledge.
Thereupon counsel for plaintiff asked the court to charge'
the jury " that if the consideration of the note in controversy
was an account for spirituous liquors in part, sold by plaintiff
to defendant, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover so
much in this action as the price and value of the groceries so
sold."

WIDOE
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This charge the court refused to give, and instructed the
jury that if any part of the consideration for the note was intoxicating Hquors sold to defendant by the plaintiff in violation
of the statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor to be
drank on the premises where sold, the plaintiff could not recover; the law being, that when any part of the entire consideration of a promise is illegal, the whole contract is void.
To which charge of the court and refusal to charge as requested, the plaintiff excepted.
The plaintiff subsequently filed his petition in error in the
district court, asking for a reversal of the judgment of the
court of common pleas, on the grounds of error in the refusal
to charge as requested, and in the charge given to the jury,
and in overruling the motion to set aside the verdict and grant
The district court affirmed the judgment of
him a new trial.
And to reverse that judgment of affirmthe common pleas.
ance the present petition in error is prosecuted.
The Claim of the Plaintiff in Error. — The common pleas
erred in refusing to charge the

jury

as requested

by the plain-

tiff, and in the charge given.
1.

The consideration

of the

note was several.

It

was

an account that

had been accruing some eighteen months,
and consisted of items that, from the nature of the transaction, must have been sold at divers times and on different
In such dealings between parties, every item must
days.
have constituted a separate contract, as one was in no way
dependent upon another, and the items had no necessary conIn such case the items purchased
nection with each other.
that were valid in law and constituted a good consideration
are not to be affected by those that were illegal and for that
The purchase of each item of the account was
reason void.
a several contract, is illustrated by the case of Robinson v.
Green.'
2.
If the different items composing the account consti'3 Mete,

See also Mayor v. Pyne, 3 Bing., 285; Per159.
Hart, II Wheat., 237, 251; Sickles v. Patterson, 14 Wend.,
257; Robinson v. Snyder, 25 Penn. St., 203; Parsons on Contr.,

kins
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tuted each a several contract, the plaintiff was entitled to recover to the extent of the vahd consideration.'
3.

The verdict was against the weight of the evidence

as

well as against the law.

The Claim of Defendant in Error. — The consideration

of the note being a book account made up in part for intoxi-

cating liquors sold in violation of law, the note is void. Being
tainted with that illegal consideration, destroys the obligation
entirely.^

Decision. — The evidence in this case tended to show that

upon was an existing indebtedness of the defendant to the plaintiff on account for
goods, etc., sold and delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant, the items of which had accrued at various times during
the period of eighteen months preceding the date of the note.
Some of these items were for necessary family groceries and
some for spirituous liquors, sold to be drank at the place
The court instructed
where sold; in violation of the statute.
the consideration of the note sued

Findley, lo Ohio, 51; Morris v. Way, 16 Ohio,
Knox
County Bank, 16 Ohio St., 133; Parish v.
The
469; Doty
Stone, 14 Pick., 198; Robinson v. Green, 3 Mete, 159; 2 Kent's
Com., 467, 468; I Parsons on Contr. , 457.

'The

State v.
V.

'S. & C, 729, 1431; Collins V. Merrill, 2 Mete. (Ky.), 163;
Monr., 98; 9 lb., 90; Deering v.
3 Bibb., 500; 6 Dana, 91; 8 B.
Chapman, 22 Maine, 488; Hunt v. Knickerbocker, 5 Johns., 327;
Greenaugh v. Balch, 7 Greenl. Rep., 462; Wheeler v. Russell, 17
Mass., 258; 5 B. & C, 406; Kepner v. Kelfer, 6 Watts, 231;
Wright V. Gear, 1 Root, 474; Mitchell v. Smith, 4 Dall., 269;
Roby V. West, 4 N. H., 287; i Taunt., 136; Bliss v. Negus, 8
Mass., 51; 5 N. H., 196; 6 N. H., 225; Cro. Eliz., 199; 3 Taunt.,
226; I T. R., 227, 359; Comyn's Dig. — Assumpsit, B. B.; 11 East,
502; 7 T. R., 200; 2 Ventr., 223; 8 Johns., 253; Loomis v. Newhall, 15 Pick., 167; Parsons on Contr.j Chitty on Contr. (5th Am.
ed.), 417, 427, 692, 694; Mete, on Contr. — Amer. Jurist (No. 43),
Trovinger v. McBurney, 5
45 ; Higgins v. Pitt, 4 Exch., 324;
Cowen, 253; Baldwin v. Palmer, 10 N. Y., 232; Jones v. Waite,
Hinman, 11 Verm., 592; Gamble
35 E. C. L., 130; Woodruff v.
2
Carter
v! Grimes,
(Ind.), 392; 9 Verm., 23, 310; Amstrong v.
Toler, ir Wheat, 258; Perkins v. Cummings, 2 Gray, 258; Adams
V.

Bowen,

230;
514;
163.

8 S.

Miller
Bates

v.
V.

&

M.,

Harden,

Watson,

i

Arr

v. Lacey, 2 Doug. (Mich.) Rep.,
v. Nelson, 28 Ala.,
32 Ala., 30; Stanley
Sneed, 376; Nutter v. Stoner, 48 Maine,

624;
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the jury that, if any of the items for spirituous hquors thus
illegally sold entered into and formed part of the consideration
of the note, then the plaintiff could not recover; the law being

that when any part of the entire consideration of a promise is
And the question before us
illegal the whole contract is void.
is: Did the court err in so instructing the jury as to the law
applicable to the case.''
The concurrent doctrine of the text-books on the law of
contracts is, that if one of two considerations of a promise be
void merely, the other will support the promise; but that if
one of two considerations be unlawful, the promise is void.
When, however, for a legal consideration, a party undertakes
to do one or more acts, and some of them are unlawful, the
contract is good for so much as is lawful, and void for the
residue.
Whenever the unlawful part of the contract can be
separated from the rest it will be rejected, and the remainder
established. But this cannot be done when one of two or
more considerations is unlawful, whether the promise be to
do one lawful act, or two or more acts, part of which are unlawful; because the whole consideration is the basis of the
The parts are inseparable.'
whole promise.
Whilst a partial want or failure of consideration avoids
a bill or note only pro tanto, illegality in respect to a part of
The reason of this disthe consideration avoids it in toto.
tinction is said to be founded, partly at least, on grounds of
public policy, and partly on the technical notion that the security is entire, and cannot be apportioned; and it has been
said with much force, that where parties have woven a web
of fraud or wrong, it is no part of the duty of courts of justice to unravel the threads and separate the sound from the
unsound.^

And, in general, it makes no difference as to the effect,
whether the illegality be at common law. or by statute.'
'Metcalf on Contr., 246; Addison on Contr., 905; Chitty on
Contr. , 730; I Parsons on Contr., 456; i Parsons on Notes and
Bills, 217; Story on Prom. Notes, § 190; Byles on Bills, in;
Chitty on Bills, 94.
^

Story on Prom. Notes, and Byles on Bills, supra.
'See authorities, supra.
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This doctrine is abundantly sustained by the whole current of the decisions on the subject, both in England and in

this country.'

Quite a number of these cases cannot be distinguished
from the case under consideration.
Robinson v. Bland was the case of a suit on a bill of
exchange given in part for money lost at play, and in part for
money lent.

The declaration contained special counts on the

bill, and the common count for money lent, and it was held
no recovery could be had on the bill, because part of its consideration was money lost at play, which was illegal; but as
to the money lent, the plaintiff was allowed to recover on the
common count.
In Scott v. Gilmore,^ the suit was also on a bill of exchange, given by the drawer to the keeper of a coffee house,
in payment for the balance of a debt, part of which was for
small sums of money loaned, and part for spirits sold in violation of the statute, and it was held by Ch. |. Mansfield,
that the security being entire could not be apportioned, and
since it was given partly for a consideration not merely void,
but illegal, the whole bill was void.
Heath, J., said: "Perhaps it might he different if for part of the bill there were no
consideration."
The case of Deering v. Chapman, supra, was a suit on
a promissory note in which part of the consideration was, as
here, for spirituous liquors previously sold in violation of a
statute, and several of the other cases cited are of the same
character.
In each of them the whole note was held to be
tainted and utterly void.
In none of them does a distinction
Featherstone v. Hutchinson, Crokes EL, 200; Robinson v.
Bland, 2 Burr. R., 1077; Scott v. Gilmore, 3 Taunt., 226; Thomas
V. Williams, 10 Barn. & Cress., 664; Jones v. Waite, 35 E. C. L.
(S Bing., N. C, 341); Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat., 258; Bates
V. Watson, i Sneed, 376; Orr v. Lacey, 2 Douglass, 230; 9 Verm.,
23; Deering V. Chapman, 22 Maine, 488; Careleton v. Woods, 8
Foster (N. H.), 290; Hinds v. Chamberlain, 6 N. H., 225; HinVerm., 582; Perkins v. Cummings, 2 Gray,
man v. Woodruff,
11
258; 8 Sm. & Marsh:, 624; Loomis v. Newhall, 15 Pick., 159;
'

Crawford v. Morrell,
^3

Taunt., 226.

8

Johns., 253.
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appear to have been taken between the case where the note
was given at the time the illegal transaction took place, which
entered into the consideration of the note, and was the immediate inducement to its execution, and the case where the
note was subsequently given for the purpose of carrying out

original illegal contract.
On the contrary, they clearly proceed on the principle, that
whenever the subject-matter of the contract can be traced
back, between privies, to an original illegal contract, the subor securing the performance

of the

stituted security is void.'
The application of these principles to the present case
compels us to say, that the instruction given the jury by the
court, upon the trial, was correct, and the judgment was
properly affirmed by the district court.
The suit was upon a promissory note alone — upon a
This note was given in settlement
single and entire promise.
of an account embracing transactions between the parties for
The evidence tended to show
a period of eighteen months.
that whilst some of these transactions were proper and legal,
yet many of the items of the account were for intoxicating
liquors sold by the plaintiff to the defendant in direct violation of the provisions of a highly penal statute.
The contract evidenced by the note was illegal and void, because
these sales of liquors, which formed a part of its consideration, were clearly illegal.
With respect to the items of the plaintiff's account which
were unconnected with the illegal sales, he might well have
maintained an action on the original contracts of sale, eiien

For being utterly void it disafter the giving of this note.
cliarged none of the just indebtedness of the defendant. But
he chose to sue upon the note which was prima facie evidence

to the extent of the whole sum promised to
be paid, and thus attempted to throw upon the defendant the
burden of showing how much of it was given upon an illegal
consideration, and upon the court the task of separating the
sound from the unsound.
If this effort should result in his
losing what was justly due him, we carr but repeat what was
said in a similar case: " It is but a reasonable punishment for
of indebtedness

'Adams et al. v. Rowan

et

al.,

8

Smedes

& Marsh., 624.
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including with his just due that which he had no right to take."
We are not unaware of a seeming conflict between the
conclusion at which we have arrived, and the third point in
the syllabus of the case of Doty v. The Knox County Bank.'
We are by no means satisfied that the judgment in that case
was erroneous.
The question there arose upon a petition to
vacate a judgment which had been rendered at a previous term
against Doty and in favor of the bank for upwards of $4,000,
The suit had been
by confession on a warrant of attorney.
brought on a bill of exchange for $4,000, and it appeared upon
the hearing of the petition for vacation, that a portion of a
prior bill for $1,800 entered into and formed part of the consideration of the bill upon which judgment had been entered.
And that, in the previous discounting of the $1,800 bill, some
foreign bank bills of a less denomination than ten dollars had
been paid out by the bank, contrary to the provisions of the
The court below held that the bill
statute upon that subject.

'16O. St., 133.
Illegality — When It Exists. — The

defense of illegality
by the terms, purpose, or consideration
of a negotiable contract it contravenes: (a) some provision of the
statutory law; (b) or the common law; {c) or public policy.
The statute may avoid a contract in two ways: (a) where it
declares the same to be void; and (^b^ where it iixes or inflicts a
This prohibitory
penalty for the violation of such provisions.
Anson on
and
unequivocal.
must
be
clear
of
the
statute
penalty
If
the penContracts,
on
253, 254.
Contracts, p. r72; Pollock
administrative
purfor
alty fixed by the statute for its violation is
of
illegality
poses only and not as a prohibition then the defense
is but a personal defense and a bona fide holder may recover.
may be interposed when

Paton

V.

Coit,

5

Mich., 505.

Illegality — Burden of Proof, When Statute Does Not
Make Void. — Wherever the consideration of a commercial con-

tract, between the original parties has been illegal, especially if in
violation of a positive prohibition of statute, proof of such illegality throws upon the holder the burden of proving that he got it
Harvey v. Towers, 6 Exch., 656;
bona fide, and gave value for it.
Smith V. Braine, 16 Q. B., 201; Bailey v. Bidwell, 13 Mees. & W.,
The same rule applies where it is shown that the paper was
73.
obtained by fraud, or duress, or stolen, or when put in circulation
Mills v. Barber, i Mees. & W., 425; Aldrich v. Warby fraud.
ren, ]6 Me., 465.
When a part of the consideration of a commercial contract is
Coburn v. Odell, 30 N. H.,
illegal, the whole contract is void.
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of the premises, was wholly void, and
the bank thereupon remitted upon its judgment so much of
the $1,800 as had entered into the consideration of the bill on
The residue of this bill
which judgment had been entered.

of $1,800, by reason

found to have a good and valid consideration, to wit,
other and previous bills of exchange on which Doty was justly
The statute forbade the vacating of the judgment
indebted.
until it should be adjudged that there was a valid defence to
the action; and the question was whether, after this remittitur,
the judgment thus reduced should be wholly vacated, and the
bank be required to bring its action on the valid bills, which
had entered into the consideration of the bill in suit, and as to
The court refused to vacate the
which there was no defense.
judgment in toto, and drive the parties into further litigation,
which was required neither by considerations of justice, nor
was

540;

Carlton v. Whittier,

Me., 488.

Illegality — Effect

5

N.

H.,

of Part

196;

Bearing v. Chapman,

Payment. — Neither will

22

the

fact that there has been a partial payment of the note alter this
rule, even though the amount of such payment is equal to the illegal consideration which entered into the note; for the reason that
the law will apply such payment to the consideration of the note
Caldwell v. Wentworth, 14 N. H., 431.
which was legal.

Effect of Illegality Upon the Contract, When Once
Renewed. — If the consideration of a commercial contract is illeNeither will the
gal, a renewal of it does not cure the defect.
of
a
new
contract.
Preston
v.
Jackson, 2 Stark, 237;
substitution
If, however, on the renewal
Chapman v. Block, 2 B. & Aid., 588.

or substitution the illegal part is excluded, the renewal or substituted contract may be enforced.
Hay v. Ayling, 20 L. J. Q. B. ,
171; i6 Q. B., 423; Boulton V. Coghlan, i Bing., 640.
What Contracts are Tainted W^ith Illegality. — It may
be said as a general rule that the following commercial contracts
may not be enforced because of illegality;
1.
Those made with alien enemies and in aid of rebellion
(Harraner v. Doane, 12 Wall., 342; Critcher v. Holleway, 64
N. C, 526, also 528; Kingsbury v. Fleming, 66 N. C, 524).
2.
Bribery, contracts (Parsons v. Thompson, i H. BL, 322;
Nichols V. Mudgett, 32 Vt. , 546; Martin v. Wade, 37 Cal., 168; Ham
V. Smith, 87 Pa. St., 63; Tool Company v. Norris, 2 Wall., 45);
Lobbying contracts (Marshall v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 16
3.
How., 314; Rose V. Truax, 21 Barb., 361);
Wagering contracts (Walpole v. Saunders, 16 Eng. C. L.,
4.
276; Brown v. Leeson, 2 H. BL, 43);
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have

left the parties

where they then stood.

It

is not every defence which might be available when set
up by answer, at the proper time, that will require a judgment
to be vacated in order that it may be interposed.
referred to, the judgment of the court below was

In the case

affirmed by
think
Whilst we
that judgment may well be upheld, yet as to the third point of the syllabus which holds
that, in so far as the prior illegal bill entered into the consideration of the renewed bill, the latter was merely rendered
void pro tanto for want of consideration, a majority of the
court, upon full consideration, think it cannot be reconciled
with the current of the authorities, and that, in so far as it
conflicts with the present decision, it is untenable.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Day, J. , concurred in the judgment of affirmance, but not in
the modification of the case of Doty v. The Knox County Bank.

this court.

Compounding of crimes (Galton v. Taylor, 7 T. Rep.,
Murphy v. Bottomer, 40 Mo., 67;" Roll v. Ragnet, 4 Ohio,
Gardner v. Moxey, 9 B. Mon., 90);
6.
Contract in restraint of trade (Mitchell v. Reynolds, i P.

5.

475;
400;

Wm.,

181;

Mich., 490);

Ross v.

Sadgleer,

21

Wend.,

166;

Beal

v.

Chase,

31

Contracts for the procurement of marriage and divorce
(Adams v. Adams, 25 Minn., 72; Everhart v. Puckett, 73 Ind.,
409; Adams v. Adams, 91 N. Y., 381; Phillips v. Meyer, 82 111. ,67);
8.
Contracts in restraint of marriage (Hartley v. Rice, 10
East, 22 );
Contracts in relation to offenses against morality and
9.
religion, (Jackson v. Duchaire, 3 T. Rep., 551; Brown v. Kinsey,
81 N. C, 245);
TO.
Usury (Byles on Bills, 140).
Illegality — Usury. — Usury is said to be an indictable misTo make a
Byles, Bills 5: N., 312.
demeanor at common law.
contract void on account of usury, there must be a loan of money
Again, it is said that at common
as well as a corrupt intention.
law it was lawful to exact any rate of interest. Tied. Com. Paper,
No one can become a bona fide holder of a note or bill
§ 196.
Rodecker v. Litwhich the statute declares to be void for usury.
Fed., 857; Claflin v. Boorum, 122 N.
tauer, 8 C. C. A., 320;
7.

59
385, 25 N. E., 360; Tilden V. Blair, 21 Wall., 241; Colby v.
The statutes of each state
Parker, 34 Neb., 510, 52 N. W., 693.
must be examined to know the effect of usury in each of the juris-

Y.,

dictions.

CHAPTER XVIII.
Defenses — Infancy. *
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MAY ALWAYS PLEAD INFANCY IN BAR OF ACTIONS UPON THEIR COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS UNLESS
THE SAME WERE EXECUTED AND DELIVERED FOR:
OF A TORT.
(a) NECESSARIES, OR (b) IN SATISFACTION

MINORS

WILLIAMSON
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In the Court of King's Bench,

[Reported in

i

Campbell,

The Form of Action. — Assumpsit

1808.

SS--]
on

a

bill of exchange.

Replication, that the bill was accepted
and issue thereupon.

Plea, infancy.
necessaries,

Dec,

for

'This case is cited in, Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 225;
Wood's Byles on Bills and Notes, 117, 120; Randolph on Commercial Paper, 393; Story on Bills, 84, 85; Chitty on Bills, 18, 19;
Ames on Bills and Notes, 463; Benjamin's Chalmers, on Bills,
Notes and Checks, 73; Norton on Bills and Notes, 208, 210.
*An infant cannot accept a bill of exchange for necessaries.
Incapacity — Infants — Liability for Necessaries and
Torts. — Infants are not liable upon their contracts as a general

rule, unless the same have been duly ratified.
If, however, the
contracts are e.\ecuted for necessaries, or given in satisfaction of
damages growing out of a tort, his infancy is no bar to a recovery.
Guthrie v. Murphy, 4 Watts (Pa.), 80; Angel v. McClellan, 16
Mass., 28; Bradley v. Pratt, 23 Vt., 378.
That he is liable for
his torts see, Ray v. Tibbs, 50 Vt., 688; Cooley on Torts, 103
et. seq.

If an infant and an adult execute a note jointly, the adult only
In England it is held that the action may be brought
is liable.
against the adult without making the infant a party.
Burgess v.
Merrill, 4 Taunt., 468.
See also Taylor v. Dansby, 42 Mich., 84;
Slocum V. Hooker, 12 Barb., 563.
See as well the statutes of
your state.
Incapacity — Coverature. — At common law a married woman

could not bind herself

as the

drawer, acceptor, maker, or indorser
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Decision. — Sir James Mansfield, C. J., said, This action

The defendant is allowed to
certainly cannot be maintained.
be an infant; and did any one ever hear of an infant being
liable as acceptor of a bill of exchange.'' The replication is
contract.
Chitty on Bills, 28; Waterbury v. AnMich.,
drews, 67
282; Mason v. Morgan, 2 Ad. & EL, 30; Howe
This common law rule has been greatly
V. Wildes, 34 Me., 566.
modified in many jurisdictions so that now she may execute these
of

a

commercial

contracts and render her sole and separate estate liable as though
As a general rule, however, it must appear
she were feme sole.
expressly:
1.
That she intended to charge her separate estate; and
2.
That the consideration was for the benefit of her estate.
McVey v. Cantrell, 70 N. Y., 295; Yale v. Dederer, 22 N. Y., 450;
Corn Exchange Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 42 N. Y., 613; Frank v.
Lillienfield, 33 Grat. (Va. ), 394; Morrison v. Thistle, 67 Mo.,
See also Kenston
596; Williams v. Urmston, 35 Ohio St., 296.
Ins. Co. V. McClellan, 43 Mich., 564.
Incapacity of Bankrupts. — A bill or note, executed by a
bankrupt after his discharge, for a prior debt, the consideration of
which being the discharge of bankruptcy proceedings, is void.
Fell V. Cook, 44 Iowa, 485; Hersey v. Elliott, 67 Me., 527; Story
on

Bills,

§ 102.

Incapacity of Persons Under Guardianship. — "Persons

under guardianship,'' says Mr. Daniel, " whether for infancy, imbecility, improvidence, or otherwise, cannot contract, and thereTherefore if a
fore cannot be parties to negotiable instruments.
spendthrift, under guardianship, indorse a note, he does not pass
It is simply void."
title, and is not bound by the indorsement.
v. Dodge, 130
Lynch
Instruments,
250;
Daniel on Negotiable
§
Mass., 458.

Incapacity of Persons Who Execute Commercial Contracts While Intoxicated. — In speaking of the effect of intoxication of the maker upon commercial contracts, Williams, J. , in
the case of The State Bank v. McCoy, (19 P. F. Smith (Pa.),

"If

a man voluntarily deprives himself of the use of
204), said:
his reason by strong drink, why should he not be responsible to an
innocent party for the acts which he performs when in that condition? It seems to me that he ought, on the principle, that where
a loss must be borne by one of two innocent persons, it shall be
. But there is another
borne by him who has occasioned it
liable to the indorsee
maker
and controlling reason for holding the
in such case, founded on principles of public policy and the necesThe exigencies of trade require that there
sities of commerce.
should be no unnecessary impediments to the ready circulation and
currency of negotiable paper, but that it should be left free to pass
from hand to hand like bank notes, and perform the functions of

...
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As the point
nonsense and ought to have been demurred to.
clear,
of law is so
I am strongly inclined to non-suit the plainHowever, i( I am required to hear the evidence, I will
do so, and the defendant will find redress in the court above,
should the verdict be against her.

tiff.

money, untrammelled by any equities or defenses between the
If, then, it should be held that the drunkenness
original parties.
of the maker avoids the note in the hands of the indorsee, it is obvious that such a rule would greatly clog and embarrass the circulation of commercial paper, for no man could safely take it without ascertaining the condition of the maker or drawer when it was
given, although there might be nothing suspicious in its appearance or unusual in the character of the signature."
The law formerly was that a party to a contract could not
avoid it because he was so drunk at the time he signed it that he
could not understand it.
It has also been held that a party to a
contract cannot avoid it on account of intoxication, unless another
party to it used means to induce such intoxication; but the decided weight of authority now is that a party may avoid a contract
made by him when he is so drunk that he cannot understand its
effects and consequences, though no such means were used.
It is
a violation of moral obligation and legal duty to take advantage of
a man in such a defenseless situation, and, if the intoxication was
induced by the party taking such advantage, he would be guilty of
still greater moral turpitude.
Barrett v. Buxton, 2 .\.iken, 167;
Bush V. Breinig, 113 Pa. St., 310, 6 Atl., 86; Prentice v. Achorn,
2 Paige, 29;
A person entering into a
Neg. Inst. § 214.
7 Daniel,
contract, while temporarily deprived of his reason by intoxication,
may avoid or ratify it when he becomes sober.
It is not absolutely
void. If the paper is negotiable, it cannot be avoided in the hands
of an indorsee in good faith for a valuable consideration; and if
such paper is indorsed before it has become due, for a valuable
consideration, such defense cannot avail against the assignee without proving that he had notice of the defense before the indorsement, or notice of facts or circumstances sufficient to induce a reasonable man to inquire of the maker as to the defense.
It may be
said that a person who executes a proposed negotiable paper, while
deprived of reason by insanity, may avoid it in the hands of an innocent indorsee, and that the same rule should apply when the
person is deprived of reason by intoxication.
The considerations
upon which the rules stand are dissimilar.
Insanity is involuntary,
it is a disease, and is a more permanent state, and usually is not
the result of the act of the person imposed upon; while drunkenness is voluntary, and is a temporary state, and is regarded as a
vice, — the helpless condition of the drunkard is his own fault.
Other reasons support the rule that negotiable paper cannot be
avoided in the hands of innocent holders because of intoxication.
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the defendant was a woman of the town,

and that the consideration for the acceptance

silk stockings and other expensive
upon a non-suit was directed.'

was the sale of

articles of dress.

Where-

If

if

&

a

2

),

a

a

4 is

8

is

it,

the loss must fall upon one of two innocent persons, it should be
the fault of either
borne by the one whose fault contributed to
There are also considerations of public policy which condid.
It
believed that the exigencies of
tribute to support the rule.
business and the necessities of commerce demand that negotiable
paper shall pass from hand to hand without unnecessary impediment.
McSparran v. Neeley, 91 Pa. St., 18; Miller v. Finley, 26
Mich., 249; Smith v. Williamson,
It has been held
Utah, 219.
that total drunkenness producing complete suspension of reason
bill or note. Berkley v. Cannon,
defense to an action on
Exch., 487; Gore
C.
Molton
v. Camroux,
Law
Rich.
136;
(S.
v. Gibson, 13 Mees. & W., 623; Holland v. Barnes, 53 Ala., 83.
man could not protect himself from
The former rule was that
any deed or agreement by pleading drunkenness, unless he could
show that the drunkenness was brought about by the connivance
Cooke v. Clayof him who procured the deed or agreement.
Drunkenness must be specially pleaded.
worth, 18 Ves., 12.
W., 623. Illustrative cases on Bills
Gore v. Gibson, 13 Mees.
do not find any case in which

it

I

'

and Notes, 193.

has been expressly decided,

bind himself by negotiable instrument for
necessaries; and in Williams v. Harrison, Carth. 160, the court of
K. B. in the time of Ld. Holt, seem rather to have been of opinbill of exchange
ion, that he might, although not liable upon
however, that an
settled,
It now
drawn in the course of trade.
account stated by an infant, even of moneys due for necessaries,
T. R., 40; Bartlettv. Emery, lb., 42;
invalid, Trueman v. Hurst,
and
seems inevitably to follow, that he cannot be bound by
his signature to
negotiable bill or note, as that not only prima
valid, would render him liable to an
facie admits the debt, but
action at the suit of the indorsee in which the amount of the origThe old doctrine, that single
inal debt could not be disputed.
binding, though of no imbill given by an infant for necessaries
being now as rare as
instrument
an
mediate practical use such
from
analogy to show,
statute staple, seems to afford an argument
that
promissory note given by an infant for necessaries would be
Co.
binding,
payable only to the person who supplied them.
if

a

a

is

a

if

a

it

i

is

is

a

a

that an infant may not

Litt.,
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CHAPTER XIX.
Bona Fide Holder.— Who Is?''

SECTION
A

59.

PAPER, WHO TAKES IT
HOLDER OF NEGOTIABLE
BEFORE MATURITY, FOR A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, IN THE USUAL COURSE OF TRADE, AND WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS WHICH IMPEACH ITS
VALIDITY BETWEEN ANTECEDENT PARTIES, HOLDS
IT BY A GOOD TITLE, AND MAY MAINTAIN AN ACTION
UPON THE SAME.
JOHNSON

.'.

WAY.i

In the Supreme Court, Ohio, Dec,
\Reported in

2"^

Ohio St.

,

1875.

J/4. ]

The Form of Action.— The plaintiff brought

suit in the

Court of Common Pleas of Portage county to recover of the

'This

case is cited in Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 769,
Wood's
775;
Byles on Bills and Notes, 210; Benjamin's Chalmers
Bills,
on
Notes and Checks, 103; Tiedeman on Commercial Paper,
280, 289; Norton on Bills and Notes,
301, 304.

in,

*i. A holder of negotiable paper, who takes it (i) before
maturity, (2) for a valuable consideration, in the usual course of
trade, and (4) without knowledge of facts which impeach its validity between antecedent parties, holds it by a good title.
2.
To defeat his recovery thereon, it is not sufficient to show
that he took it under circumstances which ought to excite suspicion in the mind of a prudent man.
To have that effect, it must be shown that he took the
3.
paper under circumstances showing bad faith or want of honesty on
his fart.
Circumstances tending to show bad faith or fraud in tak4.
ing such paper, are admissible in evidence, and the establishment
of such bad faith or fraud, whether by direct or circumstantial evidence, subjects the holder of paper so taken to defenses existing
between antecedent parties.
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defendant the amount of two promissory notes of seventy-five
dollars each, of which the following is a copy:
State of Ohio, July 2p, i86p.
Three months after date,
promise to pay to the order
of L. A. Wilder, seventy-five dollars, for value received,
' '

"

I

with use.

''Solomon

[Stamp.]

Way."

"Indorsed.- I hereby certify that I ain worth $8,000,
consisting of personal property to the amount of $1,000 and
one hundred and seventeen acres of land.
make this statethe
ment for
purpose of obtaining credit.

I

"

"Indorsed, without recourse,
The second

to

Solomon Way."

L. A. Wilder."

note is like the first,

except

due in

four

months after date.
On the trial the plaintiff admitted that the notes were
given for a worthless patent right metallic roofing cement,
as between the original
and were without consideration,
parties.

The proof shows that one Lewis D. Joy bought the notes
maturity; that Joy paid $100 cash for each $150 of
"
that
notes, and received them indorsed "without recourse;
the plaintiff bought the notes of Joy before maturity, and paid
the face thereof in coal stock of the Trumbull Coal Company
incorporated mining company), at fifty cents on the dollar

before

(an
of its par value; that the coal stock was delivered to Joy and
the notes to Johnson before they matured, and without any
actual notice of any defense.

On the trial the plaintiff asked the court to charge the
jury as follows:
"I. Suspicion of defect of title, or fraudulent inception,
or the knowledge of circumstances which would excite such
suspicion in the mind of a prudent man, or gross negligence
on the part of the taker at the time of the transfer, will not
defeat his title; that result can be produced only by bad faith
on his part; mere want of caution and care is not enough.
"2. In brief, did the plaintiff or Joy buy the notes in
good

faith and without

fraud, for value, before

due.?

If

so,
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and without notice of any defect, plaintiff is entitled to reIt is a question of good faith and fraud, and not of
cover.
carelessness or negligence on the part of plaintiff or Joy, unless it amounts to fraud or want of good faith.

prima facie in favor of
He is the owner
every holder of negotiable paper, that, ist.
Before due; 4th.
That he took it for value; 3d.
of it; 2d.
In the regular course of trade; and plaintiff is entitled to re-

"3.

That the law presumes

cover, unless these presumptions of law are overcome by proof
in the case."

The court refused to charge
the jury upon the point in question

"If

as requested,
as

but charged

follows:

proof shows that both Johnson and Joy took
these notes with notice of their infirmities, then plaintiff ought
not to recover, and upon this proposition the burden of proof
rests upon the defendant.
"To constitute a sufficient notice, it is not essential that
the party should have had actual positive notice of the defects
of the notes, but if the circumstances and facts connected
with, and surrounding the transfer, whether they appeared
upon the notes themselves, or outside of them, were of such
strong and pointed character as to put the purchaser on inthe

quiry, then the law presumes that he did make those inquiries,
or that if he did not he should bear the responsibility in the
same manner as if he had made them, and they had led him
to a full knowledge of the whole truth connected with giving
The purchaser was not bound to make inquiries,
the notes.
unless there was something in the circumstances of the case
that would have put an ordinarily careful and prudent man
But while the purchaser was not bound
upon investigation.
to make inquiries from motives of mere curiosity and suspicion, yet he was not at liberty to shut his eyes to facts and
circumstances that presented themselves to him, if those facts
and circumstances would have attratted the attention of a
man of common prudence.
It was not enough if the facts
and circumstances were merely sufficient to suggest inquiry by
the most cautious; nor does the law require circumstances so
startling as to awaken investigation on the part of the most
dull and stolid.
But if the defendant has shown you by testi-
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to your satisfaction, that Joy and
Johnson had actual
notice of the time of the purchase of the notes of their defects and infirmities, or if they had such knowledge of facts
mony,

and circumstances

to put a reasonable and prudent man
upon inquiry, then the plaintiff can not recover."
To the refusal of the court to charge as requested, and
as

to the charge as given, the plaintiff excepted.
Judgment was
rendered for the defendant, and on petition in error the judgment of the Common Pleas was affirmed by the District
Court.
It is now sought to reverse the judgments of the,
courts below for error in the charge given to the
trial in the Court of Common Pleas.
its

jury on the

The Claim of Plaintiff in Error. — The court erred in
charge, which was, in substance,
that "the plaintiff,

having admitted that the notes were without consideration
between the original parties, he is not entitled to recover,
unless he proves (independent of any presumption of law)
that he bought them before due, and paid value in the regular course of trade.'
And as to notice, see the following
cases: — Goodman v. Simons,^ Andrews v. Pond,' Fowler v.
Brantly,* Bank of Pittsburg v. Neal.'*
The indorsement furnished no evidence or ground of
suspicion to put plaintiff on inquiry."
The purchaser of commercial paper, before due, in good
faith, for value, in the regular course of trade, holds it disCircumstances of suspicion
charged of all prior equities.
that would attract the attention of a man of common prudence, or even carelessness or gross negligence on his part, at

'i Parsons on Notes and Bills, 185; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet.,
i6; Nixon v. DeWolf, 10 Gray, 348; Dumont v. Williamson, i&
Ohio St., 115; Davis v. Bartlett, 12 lb., 544.
^

20

'13

How., 365.

Pet,

*i4lb.,

65.

318.

How., 108; 2 Parsons on Con., 3, 4.
"Russell V. Ball, 2 Johns., 50; Goddard v. Lyman, 14 Pick.,
268; Bisbing v. Graham,
14 P. S., 14; Epler v. Funk, 8 Barr.,
*22

468.
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will not defeat his title.

the time of jthe purchase,

I9,

That can

a

if

it

it,

only be effected by actual notice, or fraud on his part.'
The rule in England originally for a long period protected
the holder against the fraud of antecedent parties, unless he
was shown to have had actual notice, or was guilty of bad
It was first announced by Ld. Mansfield in 1758, in
faith.
Miller v. Race,^ and was reaffirmed by the same judge in
Grant v. Vaughn.' In 1764, and through all the long period
not only in that, but the various other courts of
following
remained the unquestionable law of the land
that country,
down to 1824, when Gill v. Cubit,* changed the rule, and
the circummade the holder chargeable with knowledge,
stances were such as ought to have excited the suspicions of
person of reasonable care and prudence.
In 1834, in Crook v. Jadis,^ the Court of King's Bench
again changed the law, and held that the owner should be
protected unless guilty of gross negligence in the purchase.
But in 1836, the law having been found not only unsatisfactory to commerce, but to the courts themselves as being too
variant and changeable, and depending upon the intelligence
and capacity not only of the purchaser, but even of the jury
who might try the question, that same court, in Goodman v.
Harvey, rising above the erroneous precedents of the cases,
commencing with Gill v. Cubit, and seeming to appreciate
constantly increasing requirements of the
business interests of the country and of trade, brushed away
the uncertainty and changeableness attendant on the application of the rule as held in Gill v. Cubit and Crooks v. Jadis,
and returned to the original doctrine of Miller v. Race, which
has ever since been the settled law of that country, affirmed
by numerous decisions since then, so repeatedly and decidedly
that no late jurist or elementary writer
found to dispute the
increased

and

Bur. King's Bench Rep., 452.
Bur. 15, 16.

"5

*3 Barn.

Barn.

& &

'3

^i

Cress., 466.

Ad., 909.

121;

Goodman

v. Harvey,

4

Wall.,

&

'Murray v. Lardner,
Ellis., 470.
Adol.

2

is

the
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proposition, "tliat nothing short of actual notice, or bad
faith (fraud) will defeat the title of the holder."'
For the law as declared in this country see: Swift v. Tyson," Goodman v. Simons,' Bank of Pittsburg, v. Neal,* Mur-

Lardner,' Edwards on Bills and Notes,* Uther v. Rich,'
Steinbacker v. Boker,' Magee v. Badger, « Belmont Bank v.
Hodge," Brush v. Scribner."
Decision. — The questions made in the case relate to the

ray V.

rights of indorsees of negotiable paper, and arise upon the
charge of the court to the jury.
Though other questions are
made in argument, we do not deem it important to notice here
but one of the grounds of exception.
The court charged the jury, that, as the notes were conceded to

be

invalid

as between the

original parties,

the plain-

tiff, though an indorsee of the notes for value before due,
could not recover,
he had such knowledge of facts and circumstances as to put an ordinarily careful and prudent man
upon inquiry as to the infirmities of the notes.
The question, then
whether this rule
to be applied
to a holder of negotiable paper, and to whom
the usual course of trade, for value before due.

It

is

it is

is,

if

indorsed in

early the settled law in England, in regard to
paper drawn in a form to pass from hand to hand in the course
of business and trade, that the holder, who came by
fairly
it

was

'Raphael v. Bank of England, 84 English Com. Law, 161;
Carlon v. Ireland, 85 Com. Law, 765.
'16 Pet,

15.

*

"20 How., 343.
22

^2

lb.,

108.

Wall., no.

'34 N. Y., 247.
'"35 lb., 65.
" II Conn., 388;

10

Cush., 488;

4

'

»3i8.
10 Adol. & Ellis, 784.
'34 Barb., 436.

Ga., 287;

13

Ala., 390.
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and honestly, before due, for a valuable consideration,

had

1 9,

a

good title.'

in Gill v. Cubit, ^ the Court of King's Bench added a new limitation to the title of the holder of negotiable
paper, and held that he acquires no title, as against the equities of antecedent parties, if he takes it under circumstances
which would excite the suspicions of a prudent and careful
This rule was followed for a number of years in Engman.
land, and by many of the courts of this country.
But in 1834, in Crook v. Jadis," this rule was so far
shaken, that an indorsee of a bill of exchange was permitted
to recover against the drawer unless he proved that the indorin taking the bill; and two
see was guilty of gross negligence
years later, in Goodman v. Harvey,^ it was decided that gross
negligence is not alone enough to destroy the title of a holder
for value, but that a case of bad faith in taking the security
must be made against him, in order to defeat the claim.
Since 1836, the rule established in Goodman v. Harvey
has been followed by the British courts, and may now be regarded as the settled law of that country.^
Although the rule declared in Gill v. Cubit has been followed by many of the courts of this country, it has been so
generally repudiated by the more modern decisions, and that
of Goodman v. Harvey, approved, that the doctrine of this
case may now be regarded to be the American as well as English law upon the subject.''

In

1824,

'Salk., 126; Miliary. Race, i Bur., 452; Peacock v. Rhodes,
Doug., 633; Lawson v. Weston, \ Esp., 26; Gorgier v. Mieville, 3
Barn. & Cres.,
^3
■'
5

45.

Barn. & Cres., 466.
Barn. & Ad., 909.

*4 Ad. &

EL,

870.

The Bank of England,

C. B. (84 E.G. L. ), i6i"Worcester County Bank v. Dorchester and Milton Bank, 10
Cush., 488; Smith v. Livingston, 11 1 Mass., 342; Matthews v. Poythress, 4 Geo., 287; Miller v. Einley, 26 Mich., 249; Phelan v.
Moss, 67 Penn. St., 59; Magee v. Badger, 34 N. Y., 247; Belmont
Bank v. Hoge, 35 N. Y., 65; Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How., 343;
Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall., no; Hotchkiss v. National Bank, 21
Wall., 354; i Smith's Lead. Cas. (7 Am. ed.), 825; Redfield &
Bigelow's Lead. Cas. on Bills and Notes, 257.
^Raphael

v.

17

SEC.

59-]

JOHNSON

V. WAY.

441

In the case of the Belmont Bank v. Hoge, supra, the
view of the New York Court of Appeals upon the question is
stated as follows:

One who, for full value, obtains from the
owner
a
apparent
transfer of negotiable paper before it matures, and who has no notice of any equities between the
original parties, or of any defects in the title of the presumptive owner, is to be deemed a bo7ia fide holder.
He does not
' '

owe to the party who puts such paper in circulation the duty
of active inquiry, to avert the imputation of bad faith.
The
rights of the holder are to be determined by the simple test of
honesty and good faith, and not by mere speculation as to his

probable diligence or negligence."
In Smith v. Livingston,' the court disapprove the rule of
Gill v. Cubit, and say: "Circumstances which might excite
the suspicions of one man might not attract the attention of
another.
It is a rule which business men can not act upon in
the ordinary affairs of life with any certainty that they are
safe."
'

"

III

Mass., 345.

Purchaser

for

Value

Without

Notice — Defined. — A

bona fide holder," or a "purchaser for value without notice," of
commercial contract, is one who has taken it:
1.
Before maturity;
2.
For a valuable consideration;
In the due course of business; and
3.
Without notice of its dishonor or of facts which impeach
4.
its validity.
Miller v. Race, i Burr., 452; McCauIey v. Murdock,
Ind.,
Scotten v. Randolph, 96 Ind., 581; Doane v. Kind,
230;
97
Fed.
Rep., 106; Adams v. Robinson, 69 Ga., 627; Trust Co. v.
30
101
Bank,
U. S., 68; Whistler v. Forster, 14 C. B. (N. S.), at
258; Barnum v. Phenix Co., 60 Mich., 388; Gee v. Saunders, 66
Tex., 333; Palmer v. Marshall, 60 111., 289; Swall v. Clarke, 51
Col., 227; Ward v. Howard, 88 N. Y., 74; Johnson v. Way, 27
Ohio St., 374; Robertson v. Coleman, 141 Mass., 231; Dreilling v.
First Nat. Bk., 43 Kan., 197; 23 Pac. Rep., 94.
Purchaser Before Maturity. — In the case of Fisher v. Leland, Shaw, C. J., said, "where a negotiable note is found in cirThe
culation after it is due, it carries suspicion on the face of it.
Why is it not
question instantly arises, why is it in circulation?
Therefore, although it does not
paid? Here is something wrong.
give the indorsee notice of any specific matter of defense, such as
set-off, payment, or fraudulent acquisition, yet it puts him on inquiry; he takes only such title as the indorser himself has, and
a
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supra, the law in regard to negotiable paper, as settled by the Supreme Court of the United
States, is summarized, as follows: "The party who takes it
before due for a valuable consideration, without knowledge of
any defect of title, and in good faith, holds it by a title valid
Suspicion of defect of title or the
against all the world.
knowledge of circumstances which would excite such suspicion
in the mind of a prudent man, or gross negligence on the part
of the taker at the time of the transfer, will not defeat his
That result can be produced only by bad faith on his
title.
The rule may perhaps be said to resolve itself into
part.
a question of honesty or dishonesty, for guilty knowledge and
willful ignorance alike involve the result of bad faith."
It was, moreover, settled in that case, that circumstances
tending to show bad faith or fraud in taking such paper,
though not conclusive in themselves, are admissible in evidence, and the establishment of bad faith or fraud, whether by
direct or circumstantial evidence, is fatal to the title of the

In Murray

v.

Lardner,

party so taking it.
subject to any defense which might be made if the suit were
brought by the indorser." 4 Cush., 456; Morgan v. U. S., 113
U. S., 500; Churchy. Clapp, 47 Mich., 257; Woodsmer v. Cole,
69 Cal., 142; Haywood v. Sealer, 61 la., 574; Speck v. Pullman
Car Co., 121 111., 57; Hinckley v. Union P. R. R., 129 Mass., 61
Ford V. Phillips, 83 Mo., 530; Griffin v. Hartz, 94 N. C, 440;
Woodworth v. Huntoon, 46 111., 131; Watson v. Alley, 141 111.,
284; 31 N. E. Rep., 419.
Exception. — There is one exception to the rule as
((7.)
stated above and that is, if the holder acquired the bill or note
after maturity, from one who became a bona fide holder before
maturity, he then will have a good title, freed from personal
defenses.
This principle rests upon the doctrine that the indorsee
takes no less title than his indorser has.
Roberts v. Lane, 64 Me.,
108; Bassett v. Avery, 15 Ohio St., 299; Richert v. Tulford, 52 111.,
166; Woodman v. Churchill, 52 Me., 58; Wilson v. Mechanic's
Bank, 45 Pa. St., 494; Bissell v. Gowdy, 31 Conn., 48.
This
it
is
held does not apply against an accommodation
exception
Dun v. Weston, 71 Me., 270; Daniel on Negotiable Instruparty.
ments,

§ 786.

Bill

or Note Payable on Demand or at Sight. — When
Over Due. — A bill or note payable on demand or at sight is pay-

able within a " reasonable time," when that tima has passed such
instruments are over or past due.
What a "reasonable time " is
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The rule established in these cases neither restricts the
of paper made to pass from hand to hand in commerce, nor does it relieve the party taking it from the obliga-

usefulness

tions of good faith.
This rule may be more readily applied
than that laid down in Gill v. Cubit, for a rule based on good
faith as a standard is more easily comprehended than one
grounded upon speculations as to what ought to excite the
A prudent man, it has been
suspicions of a prudent man.
well said, may be more or less suspicious under similar circumstances at one time than at another, and may also suspect
where another equally prudent would not, and the standard of
the jury may be higher or lower than that of other men who
are prudent in the management of their affairs.
The point in controversy has not been directly determined by the Supreme Court of this state.
The rules laid
down in Davis v. Bartlett,' which are stated in the syllabus,
'

12

Ohio St., 534.

What would be
cannot be fixed by any definite and precise rule.
a reasonable time in one case might be unreasonable in an other
For illustrations see, Mitchell v.
under different circumstances.
Catchings, 23 Fed. Rep., 710; Paine v. Cent. Vt. R. R. Co., 14
Fed. Rep., 270; First Nat. 13k. v. Needham, 29 Iowa, 249; Herrick V. Wolverton, 41 N. Y., 581; Cowing v. Altman, 71 N. Y.,
In Michigan it is
435; Cripps V. Davis, 12 M. & W., 159, 165.
once,
and without
held that a demand note is due and payable at
demand.
Palmer v. Palmer, 36 Mich., 487; 94 Mich., 411; 132
Mass., 338; 146 Mass., 118; 83 N. Y., 456; 11 Ohio St., 601.
This question is regulated in some states by statute.

in Installments, Either of Principle
—
or Interest When Over Due. — If the commercial contract is

Bill or Note Payable

payable in installments, the maturity and non-payment of the installment makes the same overdue so that a purchaser thereof
Field
would be chargeable with equities between original parties.
Hart
v.
Allen,
v.
561;
King,
Vinton
V. Tibbetts, 57 Me., 359;
4
of
an
the
non-payment
The rule, whether
Stickney, 41 Wis., 630.
installment of interest when due, is equivalent to notice of disIn support of the rule see, Newell v.
honor, is controverted.
Contra,
Kelly v. Whitney, 45 Wis., no;
Barb.,
Gregg, 51
263.
Mass.,
497; 3° Am. Rep., 702.
National Bk. v. Kirby, 108

or Note, Not Matured Until Expiration of the Day
W^hen it is Legally Due. — A bill or note is not past maturity or
over due until after the expiration of the day on which it becomes

Bill

legally due, unless the same has been actually dishonored before
Bosch v. Cassig, 64 la., 314;
the last day has fully expired.
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that of Goodman v. Harvey;
so is the decision in Bassett v. Avery,' as well as the principle
But a remark upon a
upon which the case was decided.
hypothetical case stated in the opinion delivered in Bassett v.
Avery warrants the charge to the jury complained of in this
case.
Speaking of what might constitute a defense against
an indorsee of a negotiable note, it is said: "If such circumstances of suspicion had been shown to exist as ought to have
put Bassett upon inquiry before purchasing, he would be presumed to have either made the inquiry and ascertained the
truth, or have been guilty of a degree of negligence equally
fatal to his claim to be considered a bona fide purchaser.''
are, however,

'

15

in harmony with

Ohio St., 299.

v. Grant, 36 N. H., 273; Continental N. B. v. Townsend,
N. Y., 10.
Therefore a purchaser may be a bona fide holder,
who purchases a bill or note on the last day of grace.
See contra.
Pine V. Smith, i i Gray, 38.
Purchaser for a Valuable Consideration. — One of the
requisites of a bona fide holding of a negotiable contract is that the
holder must have paid a valuable consideration
for the same.
Value is either money or money's worth.
The amount of value or
money paid is not important except as it may have a bearing upon
the question of actual or constructive notice of equities.
DeWitt
V. Perkins, 22 Wis., 451; Lay v. Wissman,
36 la., 305; King v.
Nichols, 138 Mass., 20; Smith v. Jansen, 12 Neb., 125; Dreilling
v. First Nat. Bk., 43 Kan., 197.
Valuable Consideration — Defined. — The following considerations have been held to be valuable:
1.
The surrendering of negotiable securities;
2.
Giving one's signature to a negotiable paper;
an existing debt, (upon this question there is
Releasing
3.
much conflict of authority see in favor. Swift v. Tyson,
i6
Peters, i; and contra. Bay v. Coddington, 5 Johnson Ch., 54);
An agreement to forbear (Oates v. First Nat. Bk., 100
4.
U. S., 239);
Holding as collateral security (see contra, Bay v. Cod5.
dington. )
If the purchaser receives actual notice of dishonor after the
agreement to purchase and before the purchase money is paid, he
is only protected to the extent of money or value actually paid.
Dresser v. Railway Company.

Crosby
87

Purchaser in the Due Course of Business — Defined. —
A bona fide holder in order to be protected must have purchased in
the due or ordinary course of business.
The " due or ordinary
course of business " means

a

transaction

according

to the usages
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This statement is made upon the authority of Williamson v.
Brown;' but that case did not relate to negotiable paper; and
we have

seen, moreover, that a different rule now obtains in

New York in reference to that kind of instruments.
In McKesson v. Stanbury,^ it was only necessary to determine upon which party the burden of proof rested, and the
case, as explained, and upon the principles settled in Davis v.
Bartlett, was decided right.
The statement in the opinion in
regard to the prudence required of an indorsee of negotiable
paper was unnecessary in the decision of the case, and like
that of a similar character in Bassett v. Avery, may be re■■'3

'15 N.

Y.,

354.

Ohio St., 156.

a

a

and customs of commercial transactions.
Elias v. Finnegan, 37
Minn., 145; Kellogg v. Curtis, 69 Me., 212. One who receives
receiver, or as assignee for the benefit of creditbill or note as
ors, or as executor or administrator, or as trustee, does not receive
the same in the " due course of business."
Briggs v. Merrill, 58
Barb., 379; Billings v. Collins, 44 Me., 271; Roberts v. Hall, 37
Conn., 205; Earhart v. Gant, 32 la., 481; Kemper v. Comer, 73
Tex., 201; Gilson v. Miller, 29 Mich., 355.

Purchaser " Without Notice" — Kinds of Notice — Actual and Constructive — Defined. — A bona fide YioXAtr musthave

47°-

&

4

4

is

a

is

a a

it

is

a

is a

is

acquired the commercial contract without notice of its dishonor.
either actual or conprivity
The notice necessary to establish
"
meant either knowledge of
structive.
By " actual notice
fact or the means of such knowledge to which the holder has disBy " constructive notice"
honestly or corruptly shut his eyes.
and
commercial contract has read
meant that the purchaser of
knowledge of everything apparent
therefore
chargeable with
upon the face of such paper.
purchaser with "actual
Mere "negligence" will not charge
faith.
Negligence howto
bad
amounts
notice," unless the same
v.
Way, 27 Ohio St., 374;
ever
evidence of bad faith.
Johnson
E.,
A.
Lawson v. Weston,
Esp., 56; Goodman v. Harvey,

9

i

a

if

his
Neither will actual notice defeat recovery by an mdorsee
v.
BenKost
notice.
without
value
indorser was
purchaser for
Camp., 383; Bank etc.,
der, 25 Mich., 615; Chalmers v. Lanion,
Ex., 690; Eckhertv.
V. Gore, 63 Cal., 355; Fairclough v. Pavia,

Ellis, 26 Hun., 663.
The purchaser

is

charged with constructive notice of every defect apparent upon the paper, such as for example, the kinds of
indorsements, whether restrictive or conditional, or anomolous,
etc.; the time of payment; want of signature; that blanks are not
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Without questioning the 'correctonly as a dictum.
ness of the decisive points of these cases, we do not feel bound
Although entitled to great
to follow the dicta referred to.
weight as the utterances of able judges, and warranted by a
line of decisions, they were, however, only incidental remarks
in the cases in which they were made, and are not in accordance with the rule as now settled by repeated decisions of the
highest courts of England and America.
Guided by the leading authorities of both countries, we
are brought to the following conclusions:
A holder of negotiable paper, who takes it before maturity, for a valuable consideration, in the usual course of trade,
without knowledge of facts which impeach its validity between
antecedent parties, holds it by a good title.

garded

filled; that there has been a cancellation or alteration apparent
See Angle v. N. W. Ins. Co., 92 U. S., 342; Rowupon its face.
land V. Fowler, 47 Conn., 347; Davis Mach. Co. v. Best, 105 N.
Y., 59; McBain v. Seligman, 58 Mich., 294; Merchants Bk. v.
Hanson, 33 Minn., 43.
Notice to Agent — Effect Of. — In the case of notice, the
general rule is that notice to an agent is notice to the principal. But
this rule is subject to these qualifications;
(a) that the notice to
the agent which will affect the principal, must have been received
in the same transaction or at least so recently that it may be presumed to have remained in his memory; and (b) it must be a notice
of a material fact, and one which it would be the duty of the agent
to communicate to his principal.
Kaufman v. Robey, 60 Tex.,
308; 48 Am. Rep., 266.
Notice of Equities — \A^hen the Rule Does Not Apply.
— The rule that a purchaser of a commercial contract cannot recover, when he either has notice of equities or where he purchases
after maturity, does not apply when he purchases of one having a
Kost V. Bender, 25 Mich., 515; Scotland Co. v. Hill,
good title.
132 U. S., 117; Shaw v. Clark, 49 Mich., 384; Bodley v. Nat. Bk.,
38 Kan., 61; Graham v. Larimer, 83 Cal., 179; Woodworth v.
Huntoon, 40 111., 13 t; Bassett v. Avery, 15 Ohio St., 299; Suffolk
Bk. V. Boston, 149 Mass., 305; Hereth v. Merchants Bk., 34 Ind.,
There is one limitation upon this exception, and that is
380.
when he is one of the original parties.
Kost v. Bender, supra.
Transfer of Bill or Note, Payable
Order" W^ithout Indorsement. — "It is too well settled by authority, both in
England and in America, to permit of questioning, that the purchaser of a draft, check or promissory note, who obtains title
without indorsement (where it is payable to order) by the payee.

"To
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is not sufficient to show

that he took it under circumstances which ought to excite suspicion in the mind of a prudent man.
To have that effect, it must be shown that he took the
paper under circumstances showing bad faith or want of honesty on his part.
Circumstances tending to show bad faith or fraud in taksuch
ing
paper, though not conclusive in themselves, are admissible in evidence; and the establishment of such bad faith
or fraud, whether by direct or circumstantial evidence, subjects the holder of paper so taken to defenses existing between antecedent parties.
It follows that the judgment of the District Court and that
of the Common Pleas must be reversed, and that the cause
must be remanded for further proceedings.
Judgment accordingly.
holds it subject to all equities and defenses existing between the
original parties, even though he has paid full consideration, without notice of the existence of such equities, and in the due course
of trade and before maturity."
The Goshen Bank v. Bingham, 118 N. Y., 349; Trust Company v. National Bank, loi U.
S., 68; Lancaster
Bank v. Taylor, 100 Mass., 18; Harrop v.
Fisher, 30 L. J., 283.
The reasoning on which this doctrine is founded may be
briefly stated as follows: "The general rule is that no one can
transfer a better title than he possesses.
An exception arises out
of the rule of the law merchant, as to negotiable instruments.
It
is founded on the commercial policy of sustaining the credit of
commercial paper.
Being treated as currency in commercial
transactions, such instruments are subject to the same rule as
If transferred by indorsement, for value, in good faith
money.
and before maturity, and in the due course of trade, without
notice of equities, they become available in the hands of the
holder, notwithstanding
the existence of equities and defenses
which would have rendered them unavailable in the hands of- a
prior holder. " But when a negotiable contract is payable to a
person or his order and is transferred without indorsement, it is
treated as a chose in action transferred by assignment to the purchaser.
The assignee, under the modern rule, acquires all the
title of the assignor and may maintain an action thereon in his
own name.
But he is treated as an assignee the same as an
assignee of a common law contract and is subject to all the equities and defenses existing in favor of the maker or acceptor against
the previous holder.
The Goshen Bank v. Bingham, supra.

CHAPTER

XX.

Checks and Bills of Exchange Distinguished.

SECTION

60.

A CHECK IS A WRITTEN ORDER OR REQUEST, ADDRESSED
TO A BANK OR TO PERSONS CARRYING ON THE BUSINESS OF BANKING, BY A PARTY HAVING MONEY IN
THEIR HANDS, REQUESTING THEM TO PAY ON PRESENTMENT TO ANOTHER PERSON, OR TO BEARER, OR
ORDER, A CERTAIN SUM OF MONEY SPECIFIED IN THE

INSTRUMENT.*
MORRISON ET AL.

v.

BAILEY ET AL.'

In the Supreme Court of Ohio, December,
\_Reported in

§

Ohio Si.,

Decision. — This suit was brought
drawer,

and

Burgess,

1S55.

ij.]

Bailey, as
as indorser, of a paper, of which the
against

following is a copy:

*A check is always payable on presentation and demand, and
is not entitled to days of grace.
A draft for money, in the usual form of a check, but payable
on a future specified day is a bill of exchange, and entitled to days
of grace.
Whether days of grace are to be allowed on a draft in the form
of a check depends upon the question whether the instrument is
payable on demand, or at a future day.
The usage of banks in any particular place, to regard drafts
upon them, payable at a day certain after date, as checks, and not
entitled to days of grace, is inadmissible to control the rule of
law in relation to such paper.
'This case is cited in Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 1568,
1569, 1574, 1576, 1587, 1590, 1600, 1638; Randolph on Commercial Paper, 93; Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, 421, 432, 434,
442, 443, 452; Norton on Bills and Notes, 29, 382; Benjamin's
Chalmers on Bills, Notes and Checks, 31, 66, 267; Wood's Byles,
on Bills and Notes, S7. 280; Illustrative Cases, 40; Paige's Illus-
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jo, iSjj.

Wicks, Oils & Brownell:
Pay to L. F. Burgess, on
the ijth day of July, 'sj, or order, three hundred dollars.
' '

Indorsed by

" Z. F.

R. B. Bailey."
Burgess.''

The paper was presented to Wicks, Otis & Brownell, for
payment, on the i6th day of July, 1853; payment refused,
and notice of non-payment given on that day.
It is claimed, on the part of the defence,

is

a

is

A

it,

a

a

is

is

is,

is is,

that presentment was not made, and notice given, in due time.
And the
question for determination
whether this instrument, upon
which suit
brought,
or
not, entitled to days of grace;
and this depends upon the question, whether this instrument
a check eo nomine, or
bill of exchange, subject to the
rules and usages governing ordinary bills of exchange.
Bills of Exchange and Checks Distinguished. — The
distinction between a bill of exchange and
check, although
much confused, in some respects, by the apparently inconsistent language of some of the adjudicated cases, as well as
some of the elementary writers bearing upon
founded in
the difference in the nature of these two classes of commercial paper.
Checks, being drafts or orders for immediate payment of money, have come into such common use as to supersede, in frequent payments of considerable amounts, not only
gold and silver coin, but even bank notes.
And with their
general use, certain usages have grown up peculiar to that
class of instruments, and which have become engrafted on the
commercial law of the country.
check
subject to many of the rules and which regulate
the rights and liabilities of parties to bills of exchange, and so
nearly resembles the latter class of instruments, that some
authors have defined
check to be, in substance and in legal
effect, an inland bill of exchange, payable on demand.
But,
See also Andrew v.
trative Cases on Commercial Paper, 324.
Smith,
Blachley, 11 Ohio St., 89; Stewart v.
17 Ohio St., 83; Merchant's Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall, 647; Culter v. Reynolds, 64
Bank, 25 Wend., 673; Bickford
111., 321; Woodruff V. Merchants'
V. First Nat. Bank, 42 111., 238; Attorney General v. Continental
Life Ins. Co., 71 N. Y., 325.
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Judge Story well said, in the matter of Brown,' although a
check ' ' nearly resembles a bill of exchange, yet nullum simile
est idem."
By statute, in Ohio, all bills made negotiable are
But
entitled to three days grace in the time of payment.^
days of grace in the time of payment would be inconsistent
with the nature and purpose of a check, which requires on
acceptance, and is always payable immediately on presentas

ment.
'
-

Story, 502.
Revised Stat., 576.

2

Check — Defined. — "A check

or order on a bank
or banker, purporting to be drawn on a deposit of funds, for the
payment, at all events, of a certain sum of money to a certain
person therein named, or to him or his order, or to bearer, and
payable instantly on demand. Van Schaack, Bank Checks, i, citing Blair v. Wilson, 28 Grat. (Va. ), 170; Story, Prom. Notes (7th
ed.), § 487; 2 Daniel Neg. Inst. (3d ed. ), § 1566; Norton on
Bills and Notes, 380.
"A check resembles an inland bill of exchange payable on
demand, except that it is always drawn on a banker; and many,
but not all, of the rules governing a bill, are applicable to it.
"In some, but not all, states, an instrument, in the form of a
check, drawn in one state on a banker in another state, is held to
be a foreign bill of exchange, and not a check."
Check — Form Of. — The following is the ordinary form of a
check:
Ann Arbor, Mich., Sept. isi, l8g8.
The Ann Arbor Savings Bank,
Pay to Ada?n Sfnith or order \or to Adam Smith simply, or to
Adam Smith or bearer, or simply to bearer~\
Five hundred and -{^
Dollars.
$500 1%.
John Jones.
is a draft

Check— Presentment and Demand. — A check should

be

presented and paid promptly.
Fegley v. McDonald, 89 Pa. St.,
128.
Checks are negotiable instruments, and are transferred by
indorsement and delivery.
Conroy v. Warren, 3 Johns. Cas.,
The same rules apply to checks, as to presentment and
259.
notice of dishonor, as to bills of exchange.
Harker v. Anderson,
21 Wend., 372; Pollard v. Bowen, 57 Ind.,
234.
EfTect of a Delay in Presentment. — When a person receives a check, he must present it for payment within a reasonable
time, in order to preserve his right of recourse on the drawer and
indorsers in case of non-payment by the drawee.
Grange v.
Reigh, 93 Wis.. 552; Bull v. Bank, 123 U. S., 105; Daniel on
Neg. Inst, Sees. 1590, 1591; Gregg v. Beane, 69 Vt., 22.
And
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1

These two classes of commercial paper, although in many
respects similar, are to be distinguished in the following particulars, to wit:
1.
A check is drawn upon an existing fund, and is an
absolute transfer or appropriation, to the holder, of so much
money in the hands of the drawee; whereas a bill of exchange
is not always, or necessarily, drawn upon actual funds in the
hands of the drawee, but very frequently drawn in anticipation of funds, or upon a previously arranged credit.
2.
The drawer of a check is always the principal;
whereas the drawer of a bill frequently stands in the position
of a mere surety.
what is considered a reasonable time is within the next secular
Grange v. Reigh, supra; Gregg v. Beane, supra; Holmes v.
day.
Roe, 62 Mich., 199; 28 N. W. Rep., 864;Bank v. Miller, 37 Neb.,
500; 40 Am. St. Rep., 499; 55 N. W. Rep., 1064; Gifford v. Hardell, 88 Wis., 538; 43 Am. St. Rep., 925; 60 N. W. Rep., 1064.
The drawer, however, will not be released by the delay unless he
Bull v. Bank, 123 U. S., 105;
has suffered some loss thereby.
Y.
N.
Sup., 190.
Woodin V. Frazee, 38
Memorandum Checks — Defined. — Mr. Norton in his valuable work on Bills and Notes says:
"It is necessary to notice shortly a class of checks of a pecuIn form and
liar character, known as 'memorandum checks.'
from ordinary
not
differ
does
check
appearance a memorandum
word 'memthe
is
written
checks, except that on the face of them
'is
given by the
Such a check
orandum,' or 'mem.,' or 'memo.'
maker to the payee rather as a memorandum of indebtedness than
those parties it is considered as a due^Between
as a payment.
It
can be sued upon as a promissory note,
bill or an I. O. U.
without presentment to the bank, whereas the holder of a regular
check must first demand its payment at bank, and be refused, before he can maintain an action against the drawer.. Van Schaack,
The fact that the word 'memorandum,' or
Bank Checks, 184.
written on a check, makes it a memorandum
is
'mem.,' or 'memo.'
The bank, however, is not bound to pay any attention to
check.
these words, or to recognize any contract as implied between the
maker and payee which gives the check any peculiar character.
If such a check is presented for payment, and the drawer has sufficient funds to meet, it the bank must honor it like any ordinary
If the agreement between the maker and the payee is that
check.
it shall not be presented for payment, any remedy of the drawer
for the breach of such agreement is solely against the payee.
Morse, banks, 313.
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As between the holder of a check and an indorser,
demand of payment within due time is essential to the liabilWhere the parties reside in the same place,
ity of the latter.
the holder should present the check on the day it is received,
or within business hours of the following day; and when payable at a different place from that in which it is negotiated,
the check should be forwarded by mail on the same, or the
Bat days of grace
next succeeding day, for presentment.
being allowed to bills of exchange, the time for demanding
payment of a bill is different.
As between the holder and drawer, however, mere
4.
3.

delay in presenting a check in due time for payment would

"A

memorandum check presents all the features of other neinstruments
when transferred or indorsed to a bona fide
gotiable
^
Van Shaack, Bank Checks, 185.
holder for value.
A meinorandiiiH check is a contract by which the maker engages to pay to
the bona fide holder absolutely, and not upon a condition to pay if
the bank upon which it be drawn should not pay, upon presentation
at maturity, and if due notice af the presentation and non-payment
should be given." Franklin Bank v. Freeman, 16 Pick. (Mass.), 535.
See also, as to this class of checks, Gushing v. Gore, 15 Mass., 69;
Bank, 11 Paige (N. Y.), 612;
Dykers V. Leather Manufacturers'
Norton on Bills and Notes, 383.
See also, American Emigrant
Co. v. Clark, 47 la., 671; Franklin Bk. v. Freeman, 16 Pick., 535;
U. S. V. Isham, 17 Wall., 496.

Checks — Certification of— Effect Upon Drawer's Liability. — As has been said, a check is an order to pay the holder a

sum of money at the bank on presentment of the check and demand
of the money; no previous notice is necessary, no acceptance is
required or expected; it has no days of grace.
It is payable on
It is the duty of the bank to pay the
presentment and not before.
checks of its depositors when they are presented for payment, if it
has sufficient funds on deposit.
By the certification of a check is meant that the banker undertakes to pay the same to any holder upon demand.
This certification may be made by a telegraphic promise.
Henrietta Nat.
Bk. V. State Nat. Bk., 80 Tex., 648; 16 S. W. Rep., 321.
The weight of authority is that if the drawer, in his own behalf
or for his own benefit, gets his check certified and then delivers it
to the payee, the drawer is not discharged; but that if the payee or
holder, in his own behalf or for his own benefit, gets it certified,
instead of getting it paid, then the drawer is discharged.
This rule
of law seems to be based upon sound reasons.
Born v. First National Bank, 123 Indiana, 78; Brown v. Leckie, 43 Illinois, 497;

First National Bank

v.

Leach,

52

N.

Y.,

350;

Continental National
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not discharge the latter, unless he had been injured thereby,
and then only to the extent of his loss; but a different rule, in
this respect, prevails in case of a bill of exchange.
A check requires no acceptance, and, when presented,
5.
the presentment is for payment.
6.
It is not protestable, or in other words, protest is not
'
requisite to hold either the drawer or an indorser.
From these distinguishing characteristics, arising out of
the nature of these two classes of instruments, it follows that

'This rule is now changed by
that all negotiable instruments

statute in some of the states so
must be protested when dishonored.

Bank v. Cornhauser, 37 111. App., 475; Minot v. Russ, 156 Mass.,
458; Bank v. Whitman, 94 U. S., 343; Bank v. Jones, 27 N. E. R.,
533; Larsen v. Breene, 12 Colo., 480; Bank v. Miller, 77 Ala.,
168.

If

Check — Payment Upon Unauthorized Indorsement. —

the bank or drawee of a check pays it upon an unauthorized indorsement, it is liable for the amount of the check to the true
holder on demand.
First National Bank v. Whitman, 94 U. S.,
343j 10 Wall., 152; Dodge v. National Exchange Bank, 20 Ohio
State, 234; Citizen's Nat. Bk. v. Importer's & Trader's Bk., 119
N. Y., 19s; 23 N. E. Rep., 540; Bank of British N. A. v. MerVicts v. Bank, 101 N. Y., 563; Marchant's Bk., I N. Y.,
zetti V. Williams, i Barn. & Adol., 415; Corn Exchange Bk. v.

iir;

91 N. Y., 74.
Check — Liability of Banker for Failure

Nassau Bk.,

to Honor. —
Whenever a banker receives money on deposit, he impliedly contracts thereby with the depositor that he will pay checks drawn

.

upon him to the amount of such deposit, and a failure to comply
with such implied contract entitles the depositor to recover any
The banker,
.damages that he may suffer by reason of such failure.
however, must be given a reasonable time after the deposits are
Marzetti v. Williams, i
made, to enter the credit on his books.
Peck,
Barn. & Adol., 415; National Bank v.
127 Mass., 298.
—
—
Coupon Bonds Defined. Coupon bonds belong to commercial contracts in the sense that they are negotiable contracts.
They are not, however, subject to all the rules of commercial
Daniel in
paper, but are governed by special rules and customs.
in"a
bond
is
that
his work on Negotiable Instruments says,
an_
several
distinct
of
strument complete in itself, and yet composed
instruments each of which is in itself as complete as the whole
As originally issued the coupon bonds consisted of
together.
of money at a future
(first) an obligation to pay a certain amount
of
coupons each one
a
series
day; and (second) annexed to it is
of which is a promise for the payment of a periodical installment of
28
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check is always payable on presentation and demand; and
that, if a draft for money be in the usual form of a check, except that it is payable on a specified day in future, it is a bill
This is the result
of exchange and entitled to days of grace.
of the doctrine of the most recent and well considered author■
ities having a bearing upon this subject.'
a

'Bowen et al. v. Newell at al., 4 Selden, 190; Brown v. Lusk,
Wood4 Yerger, 240; Daniels v. Kyle et al., i Kelley (Ga.), 304;
Hill,
on
Chitty
6
174;
ruff V. Merchants' Bank, 25 Wend., 673,
Bills, 512, 515; Byles on Bills, 71; Story on Prom. Notes, sees.
481-491;

3

Kent's Com.,

104.

The contract between the payer and the holder is coninterest.
tained in the bond, but the coupons are furnished as convenient
instruments to enable the holder to collect interest without presenting the bond by separating and presenting the proper coupon,
and it also enables him to anticipate his interest by negotiating the
coupon which represents it to another person at any time before its
maturity." Dan. on Negot. Inst.; Morris Canal and Banking Co.
V. Fisher, 64 Am. Dec, 428, and cases there collected; McClelland
N. Y., 397-401; Commissioners v.
V. Norfolk R. R. Co., no
21
How. (U. S.), 539; Frank v. Wessels, 64 N. Y., 155.
Aspinwall,
These coupon bonds, which are usually issued by corporations, but may be issued by private persons, constitute or repreThey may be
sent a vast portion of the wealth of the country.
transferred by delivery or indorsement; and the purchaser of them
in good faith takes them freed from all equities, and the burden of
proof on the question of such good faith lies on the part of him
who assails the title.
Coupon — Defined. — The term "coupon" is derived from
the French "couper" — to cut — and is defined by Worcester, in
his dictionary, to signify "one of the interest certificates attached
to transferable bonds, and of which there are usually as many as
there are payments to be made; so called, because it is cut off
when it is presented for payment."
Coupons resemble promissory
in
than
form
more
other
kind
of negotiable instruments.
notes
any
They may, however, be in the form of drafts, or orders, or checks.
It is said that they differ from bills of exchange inasmuch as they
are not intended for acceptance when drawn upon a bank.
They
are independent securities and may be separate from the bond
from which they are originally attached and in this condition are
in legal effect negotiable in the same manner and affected with the
Ketchum v. Duncan, 96
legal attributes of all negotiable paper.
U. S,, 659; Town of Cicero v. Cifford, 53 Ind., 191; White v. Vt.
& Mass. R. R. Co., 21 How. (U. S.), 575; City of Memphis v. Brown,
Law Times, 424; Trustees v. Lewis, 34 Fla., 424; 43 Am.
5 Am.
St. Rep., 209; Morris Canal and Banking Co. v. Fisher, supra.
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in Woodruff v. Merchants' Bank, and
Bowen v. Newell, above referred to, that any supposed usage
of banks in any particular place to regard drafts upon them,
payable at a day certain after date, as checks, and not entitled
to days of grace, is inadmissible to control the rules of the law
in relation to such paper.
Motion for new trial overruled, and judgment for the
plaintiff.
These coupons, however, to be negotiable must bear upon
their face the indicia of negotiability — that is, they must be payable to a particular person or order, or bearer, and must also conAugusta Bank
tain all the other essentials of negotiable contracts.
V. Augusta, 49 Me., 507; Smith v. Clark Co., 54 Mo., 58; Johnson V. County of Stark, 24 111., 75; Haven v. Grand Junction R.
R. Co., 109 Mass., 88; McClelland v. Norfolk R. R. Co., no
N. Y., 397.

CHAPTER XXI.
Quasi-Negotiable

SECTION
QUASI-NEGOTIABLE

Contracts.

61.

CONTRACTS ENUMERATED
FINED.

AND DE-

Letters of Credit — -Defined. — A letter of credit may

be

defined to be a letter of request, whereby one person requests
some other person to advance money or give credit to a third
person, and promises that he will pay or guarantee the same
to the person who makes the advancement, or accept bills

it,

drawn upon himself for a like amount.'
A letter by one person to another requesting the latter to
make advances to a third person on the credit of the former
is a letter of credit.
Letters of credit are of two kinds, general and special.
A general letter of credit is addressed to any and every person, and therefore gives any person to whom it may be shown
The privity of conauthority to advance upon its credit.
tracts springs up between him and the drawer of the letter and
it becomes in legal effect the same as if addressed to him by
While a special letter of credit is one addressed to a
name.
particular individual by name, and' is confined to him and
Letters of credit
gjives no other person a right to act upon it.
may further be subdivided into those that contemplate a single transaction and those that contemplate an open and continued credit embracing several transactions.
In the latter
case they are not generally confined to transactions with a
single individual, but if the nature of the business requires
different individuals are authorized to make advancement upon

'Dan. on Negot. Inst.,

Sec.

1790.

6l.j

it,
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"

a

The following

is

a

it

then becomes
several contract with each individual
to the amount advanced.'
and

sufficient form for a letter of credit:

''Ann Arbor, Mich., Sept.

To Barring Bros.,
London, England.

1st, 1898.

:

Sirs —

"

TAe Ann Arbor Savings Bank" hereby agrees to accept and pay at maturity any draft or drafts on it at sixty
days sight issued by you, to the extent of $^,000.
Chas. E. Hiscock, Cashier."

203; Russell V. Wiggins,

2

'The Union Bank of La.

v. The Executors,
Story's Rep., 214.

'Vermilye Co. v. Adams Express
more,

etc. V. Duncan,

etc.,

57

N. Y.,

Co.,

21

etc.,

Wall,

3

'
'

is

a

A

it

a

is

is

a

Letters are commonly used by tourists throughout the
world.
In almost every city there are certain banking firms
which make
special business of furnishing travelers with
these letters of credit.
United States Treasury Notes — Defined. — The treasury
notes of the United States, payable to bearer, are negotiable
commercial contracts and their transferability
subject to the
commercial law of other paper of that character.
If such
definite future time, one who becomes
payable at
paper
the holder of such paper after such time takes
subject to the
rights of antecedent holders to the same extent as any other
paper bought after its maturity.^
Bank Notes — Defined. — bank note has been defined to
be
promissory note made by a banker, payable to bearer on
Mr. Daniel
demand and intended to circulate as money.
the note of an incorporated bank designed to
says that "it
circulate like money and payable to bearer on demand."*
The terms "bank notes" and "bank bills," says Mr.
are
Daniel, in his valuable work on Negotiable Instruments,
N.

Y.,

138; Dens-

573.

a

of money."

a

is

4

III.,
^Dan. on Negot. Inst, Sec. 1664; Townsend v. People,
written
326, where Butterfield, J., said that "a bank note
certain sum
promise on the part of the bank to pay to the bearer
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of the like significations, and for the purposes of interpretation both in criminal and civil jurisprudence are equivalent

and interchangeable."'
Race (1758), Ld. Mansfield said
that
bank notes are treated as money — as cash in the ordinary course and transaction of business — by the general consent of mankind, which gives them the credit and currency of
They are as much money
money to all intents and purposes.
as guineas themselves are, or any other current coin that is
used in common payment as money or cash, and are never
considered as securities for money, but as money itself."^
While "bank notes" in ordinary business transactions
are treated as money, they are not money in the strict sense
of that term.
They are negotiable instruments, however, and
As a general rule
pass from hand to hand by delivery simply.
the transferrer of a bank note makes all the warranties of a
transferrer of other negotiable contracts.'
They may be transferred also by indorsement, in which
case the indorser would be liable in the same way and to the
same extent as if his indorsement had been placed upon an
ordinary promissory note or bill of exchange.^
Bank notes are intended for indefinite circulation, and as
long as they continue to 'circulate they are never due and
therefore the statute of limitations will never run against
them.
It is held, however, that if they cease to circulate the

In the case of Miller

v.

' '

statute does begin to run.^

Neither are they discharged because they have been redeemed by the bank which issued them, but may be issued
'

4

Dan. on Negot. Inst., Sec. 1664; Eastman v. Commonwealth,
Gray, 416.
^i

Burr, 452.

Inst., sec. 1675-79.
■•Ramsdale
v. Horton, 3 Pa. St., 330; Corbett v. Bank of
2
Harr.
Smyrna,
(Del), 235; Westfall v. Braley, 10 Ohio St., 188;
11
Vt., 516; Bayard v. Shunk, i Watts & S., 92.
Gilman v. Peck,
^Dan. on Negot.

'^Kimbro

of England,

of Fulton, 49 Ga., 419; Solomons v. Bank
East, 135; Morse on Banking, 402.

v. Bank
13
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and again, and kept in circulation during tlie corporative existence of tiie bank.'
Gold and Silver Certificates.— Tlie treasurer of the Uniagain

ted States has been

authorized to issue what are known as
"gold and silver certificates." These certificates are intended
to circulate as money, but, like bank notes, are not money.
They are negotiable and pass from hand to hand by delivery
simply.
They contain a certificate that ' ' there have been
deposited in the treasury of the United States
gold (or silver) dollars payable to bearer on demand."
It has
been held, however, that a "silver certificate" is not, in common parlance, a promissory note, and evidence that one stole
"
a ' ' silver certificate
is not admissable against one charged
with stealing a "promissory note."''
Bills of Lading— Defined.— A bill of lading may be defined to be "a formal acknowledgment of the receipt of goods
and an engagement to deliver them to the consignee or his
assigns."'
A bill of lading serves a two-fold capacity: (i) It is a
contract for the transportation of the goods, as well as (2) a
As a receipt for the goods, it is prima
receipt for the goods.
facie evidence of the quantity, condition and quality of the
goods received.

A bill of lading is not a negotiable instrument in the sense
that a bill or note is.
It represents goods, wares and merchandise and not money.
It may be transferred by indorsement or delivery, and will thus operate to transfer or deliver
all the right and title to the goods, wares and merchandise
which it represents, so that the indorsee may have a good
Several of the
title to the same as against the transferrer.
states have by statute made bills of lading absolutely negotiable.
It was said in the case of Shaw v. Railroad Co. , that
'Parsons on Bills and Notes, 95; Dan. on Negot. Inst., sec.
1683.

Md., 412.
''Empire Transportation Co. v. Wallace, 68 Pa. St., 302; Merchants Bank v. Hewitt, 3 Iowa, 93; Merchants Bk. v. Union, etc.
Co., 69 N. Y., 373, and cases cited; Barnard v. Campbell, 55
^Stewart v. State,

N.

Y.,

456.
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statute makes a bill of lading negotiable by indorsement and delivery, it does not follow that all the consequences incident to all the indorsements of bills and notes
ensue or intended to ensue from such negotiation.'"
A thief or the finder of a negotiable contract may in certain cases transfer it so that the transferree may be a bona fide
This is not true in the case of a bill
holder of such contract.
A thief or a finder of a bill of lading cannot divest
of lading.
the true owner of the title to the goods, wares and merchan^
dise by transferring the same to an innocent party.
Receipt — Defined. — "A warehouse receipt"
■Warehouse
may be defined to be a receipt given by a warehouseman for
These receipts, like bills
goods received by him for storage.

"although

a

representatives of the goods, wares and
These certificates
merchandise for which they were given.
may be transferred either by indorsement or by delivery, and
which transfer operates as effectually to transfer the goods as
While their
the actual transfer of the goods themselves.
transfer operates to pass the title to the goods which they represent, they are not absolutely negotiable, for the reason
that their transfer cannot operate to deprive the real owner of
In many of the states these inthe goods of his title thereto.
struments have been made negotiable, under certain rules and
of lading,

are the

regulations, by statute.^
Warehouse receipts are not negotiable so as to enable the
person holding, them to transfer a greater right or title to the
The deproperty mentioned in them than he has himself.
livery of the receipt has the same effect as the delivery of the
In the absence of statutorj' provision warehouse
property.'
'100 U. S., 557.
^Shaw V. R. R. Co., supra; Price v. Wis. Co., 43 Wis., 267;
Emery v. Irving Nat. Bk., 25 Ohio St., 255; Barnard v. Campbell, 55 N. Y., 462; Friedlander v. Texas Ry. Co., 130 U. S., 416.

' Cleveland v. Sherman,
40 Ohio St., 176; Conrad v. Fisher,
37 Mo. App., 367; State v. Loomis, 27 Minn., 521; Nat. Bk. v.
Wilder, 34 Minn., 149; Brooks v. Hanover Nat. Bk., 26 Fed. R.,
301.

'Burton

v.

Curyea, 40

111.,

320; 89 Am.

D., 350, 361.
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receipts are not negotiable instruments in the sense that bills
and notes are.
They do not call for the payment of money.'

Receiver's Certificate— Defined.— " Receiver's

"

are au-

thorized under certain circumstances, by authority of the court,
to issue certificates, certifying that a given amount is due for
labor, materials or supplies.
This certificate becomes a lien
property controlled by the receiver and takes
priority over mortgage indebtedness and will be paid out of
the proceeds in a foreclosure proceeding before the original
against

the

indebtedness.

The effect of granting these certificates by

a

receiver is to create a new lien against the property and which
will be paid prior to the lien held by the mortgagees or bond
holders.

They are usually negotiable in form and pass upon

delivery so that the transferree may enforce the payment of
the same by an action thereon; but nevertheless they are not
commercial contracts in the sense that an innocent purchaser
will be protected against equities.^
Certificates of Stock— Defined. — A certificate of stock,
is a certificate of a corporation or joint stock company, that
the person named therein is the owner of a designated number
of shares of the stock of such corporation or joint-stock comThey may be negotiable in form but are not strictly
pany.
If they are negotiable in form the
negotiable instruments.
holder may transfer by indorsement all his claim represented
thereby against the company or corporation so that the comThe corporation
pany would be liable to the transferree.
may, and usually does provide how its certificates of stock
may be transferred in which case the corporation would not be
liable to any holder of the stock to whom it has been transNeither may
ferred contrary to the rule of the corporation.
a thief or the finder of a certificate of stock deprive the right'

Rice y. Cutler, 17 Wis., 351; 84 Am. D., 747; Robson v.
Swart, 24 Minn., 371; 100 Am. D., 238; Ins. Co. v. Kiger, 103
U. S., 352; Planter's Mill Co. v. Merchant's Nat. Bk., 78 Ga.,
582.

^Wallace V. Loomis, 97 U. S., 146; Meyer v. Johnston, 53
Ala., 237; Union Trust Co. v. 111. R. R. Co., 117 U. S., 434;
Swan V. Clark, no U. S., 602; Turner v. Peoria R. R. Co., 75
101 IlL, 490; McCurdy v. Bowes,
111., 134; Humphreys v. Allen,
88 Ind., 583; Bank of Montreal v. Thayer, 7 Fed. R., 622.
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ful owner of his right and interest therein by an indorsement
and transfer of the same.
Due Bill — Defined. — A due bill is simply an acknowledgement of a debt without any express promise to pay the same.
The following are illustrations of due bills: I. O. U. ; due
" A. " $50; I acknowledge myself indebted to " B. " in the sum
of $100.2
382; 97 Am. D., 107; Graves
Cal., 325; Allen v. Pegren, 6 Iowa, 173; John103 U. S., 804; Farmer's Bank v. Wasson, 48 Iowa,
338; Hammond V. Hastings, 134 U. S., 401; Leitch v. Wells, 48
N. Y., 586, 613; McNeil v. Tenth Nat. Bk., 46 N. Y., 325.

'Shaw

V.

Spencer, loo Mass.,

Mining Co.,
ston V. Laflin,

V.

2

Fisher

v.

81

Lealie,

i Esp.,

425; Israel v. Israel,

i Camp.,

499;

40 Conn., 348; Smith v. Allen, 5 Day
Moon, 131 N. Y., 462; Brooks v. Elv.
Hegeman
337;
(Conn.),
&
Wels.,
74; Schmitz v. Hawkeye Gold Mining Co.,
kins, 2 Mees.
67 N. W. Rep., 618; Hussey v. Winslow, 59 Me., 170; See Sec.

Currier v.

13,

Lockwood,

p. 72 of this text.

CHAPTER XXII
Conflict of Laws.
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62.

WHERE A NEGOTIABLE CONTRACT IS EXECUTED AND
DELIVERED AT ONE PLACE TO BE PERFORMED AT
ANOTHER AND THE RATE OF INTEREST IS DIFFERENT AT THE TWO PLACES, THE PARTIES MAY STIPULATE WITH REFERENCE TO THE LAWS OF WHICH
PLACE SHALL GOVERN.
KILGORE

DEMPSEY.i

V.

In the Supreme Court, Ohio, Dec.
\^

Reported in 25 Ohio St.,

4.13;

1874.

18 Am. Rep., 306.

The Form of the Action. — Motion for

leave to file pe-

tition in error to reverse the District Court of Pike County.
Andrew Kilgore executed to Richard Dempsey the note
upon which this action was brought, of which the following is
a copy:

"$7,000.

Piketon, O., May 29, 1856.
promise to pay to the order of
Two years after date
Richard Dempsey the sum of seven thousand dollars, at the
Bank of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, with interest at the
rate of ten per cent, per annum — the interest to be payable
semi-annually, at the end cf every six 'inonths from this date,
at said Bank.

I

' '

Andrew Kilgore."

Signed:
'This

case is cited

Tiedeman

in Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 922,

on Commercial

See also, Potter v.
511.
Bk.,
Globe
12 Wis., 692;
182; Richards v.
35
DePaw V. Humphreys, 20 Mart. (La.), i; Edwards on Bills, 183;
Miller V. Tiffany, i Wall., 310; Staples v. Nott, 28 N. E. Rep,, 515;
Sheldon v. Haxtun, 91 N. Y., 124; Bank v. Low, 81 N. Y., 566.
923;

Tollman,

Barb.,

Paper,
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Kilgore resided in Pike County, Ohio, and Dempsey in
Philadelphia, at the date of the note, but both parties were
A
present at Piketon when the transaction was concluded.
mortgage on lands in Pike County was given by Kilgore to
At the date of
secure the amount ot the note and interest.
the note the stipulated rate of interest was lawful in Ohio,
but illegal in Pennsylvania, where the legal rate was six per
cent, and no more.

The interest was paid bn the note up to May

29,

1871.
to foreclose his motgage in

Dempsey commenced an action
Pike Common Pleas on the 26th of June, 1872.
the laws of
Kilgore set up two defenses:
( i) That under
Pennsylvania the contract was usurious; and (2) that Dempsey
was entitled to recover only six per cent, interest on the note.
A demurrer, to both of these defenses, was sustained as to
the first, and Kilgore thereupon asked and obtained leave to
file an amendment to his second defense.
The Distript Court affirmed the decree of the Common
Pleas.
The object of this motion is to obtain leave to file a
petition in error to reverse the judgment of the District Court.
i. That the District
The principal errors assigned are:
Court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the first defense.
There are other errors assigned; but we do not find them
well taken, and they are not of sufficient importance to require
.further notice.

The Claim of the Plaintiff in Error (defendant below).
— The plaintiff in error argued:
i. That his note is to be
contract made in Pennsylvania, and must be
governed by the laws of that state.
The precise question raised is: Where a note is executed
in one state, expressing a rate of interest authorized by the
laws of that state, but expressly being made payable in another
state, where the law does not authorize so high a rate, in a
suit upon the note, the laws of which state are to govern.''
When a note is made in a state where the rate of interest
is less than in a state where the same is to be paid, the higher
rate may be collected.'
regarded

as a

'Story's Con. of Laws, sees. 2 9 1-2 93a, 298-306, and note to each
section; Edwards on Notes and Bills, sees. 180, 182, 183, and notes.
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The note is governed by the law of the place where made
'
There is no good reason for making the rule in cases
payable.
like this an exception to the rule that applies to all other personal contracts.^
2. If the note was governed by the laws of Ohio, the
This
agreement to pay exchange made the contract usurious.
was a shift or device to get more than legal interest.^
The Claim of the Defendant in Error (plaintiff below).
— The defendant in error argued:
i. That the lex loci contractus of personal contracts determines their nature and
If valid where made, they are valid everywhere.
validity.
If invalid where made, they are invalid everywhere.*
2.
If a note or bill be executed in one country and made
payable in another, the parties may, by agreement, elect the
rate of interest of either country without incurring the penal-

ties of usury.
3.

^

When the maker of a note resides in one state, and

the payee in another, the parties may fix upon the residence
of the maker as the place of payment, m which case they may

stipulate that, in addition

to legal interest, the debtor shall

'Parsons on Notes and Bills, 324-327, 333-336, and 376-380
and notes; 43 N. H., 113; Tyler on Usury, 79-90; Scofield v. Day,
20 Johns., 102; Healey v. Gorman, 3 Green, 328; Vinson v. Piatt
et al., 21 Ga., 135; 2 Parsons on Notes and Bills, 376, note e.
^Butler V. Meyer, 17 Ind., 77; Little v. Riley, 43 N. H., 109;
Boulton V. Street, 3 Coldwell, 31; Bigelow, 162.
'2 Parsons on Notes and Bills, 426; 6 Ohio St., 19; i Ohio St.,
409; 12 Ohio St., 544; 13 Ohio, i; 5 Ohio St., 266; 10 Ohio, 378;
Tyler on Usury, 335-338; Butick v. Harries, 3 Am. L. Reg., 112;
Cornell v. Barnes, 26 Wis., 473.
*2 Kent's Com., 458; 2 Parsons on Notes and Bills, 378; Andrews V. Pond, 13 Pet, 77; De Wolf v. Johnson, 10 Wheat, 367;
Dunscomb v. Bunker, 2 Met, 8; Mix v. Insurance Co., 11 Ind.,
117.

Humphreys, 10 Martin, i; 2 Parsons on Contracts, 583-585, and note (5th ed. ); 1 Paige, 220; Andrews V. Pond, 13 Pet, 65; Peck v. Mayo, 14 Vt., 33; Chapman
V. Robinson, 6 Paige, 627; Edwards on Bills, 717; 2 Parsons on.
Notes and Bills, 336, 337, 377, 378°

2

Kent, 460, 461; Depaw

V.
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also pay the creditor the current exchange between the two
places, and the note will not be usurious.'
Decision. — The question under the first assignment of
arises out of the conflict of the laws of Ohio and PennIts determinasylvania relative to the legal rate of interest.
tion has been greatly aided by the ability with which it has
error,

been discussed and presented

on principle

and authority.

It

by counsel for plaintiff in error, that the authoriare conflicting on the subject, and this is apparent from

is conceded
ties

an examination of those cited.
It is observable, however,

that few of the cases cited deSome of them precide the precise question here presented.
sent questions of fact as to where the contract was executed,
which had to be determined before the law was applied.
Others are cases in which a note bearing interest, but no rate
stipulated, was made in one country and payable in another,
the laws of which were in conflict on the subject of interest;
and the question was whether the rate of interest in the country where the contract was made, or that in which it was to
In others, notes which did not
be performed, should control.
bear interest till due, were made in one state and by their
terms payable in another, where there was like conflicts in
the laws, the question was, whether damages allowed for detaining the money after it was due, should be measured by the
rate of interest at the place the contract was made, or that at
which it was to have been performed.
As the decisions in
these cases, and others referred to which are not directly in
point, would throw but little light on the question here, a review of them will not be attempted.
But coming to another class of authorities more directly
in point, and in which there is likewise a conflict, we are left
to decide between them.
According to some of these authorities,
a note is made payable at a designated place, it imist
in respect to interest conform to the law of the place of pay-

if

'3 Parsons on Contracts (5th ed. ), 136, and authorities cited;
Edwards on Bills, 360; Merritt v. Benton, 10 Wend., 116; Cayuga
Bank V. Hunt, 2 Hill, 635; Curwen, 1524; Swan, 1854, p. 99,860.
61; Buckingham v. McLean, 13 How., 212; Southern Bank v.
Brashears, i Disney, 207.
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it was

inade or

signed.
According to others, if a note is made in one state and
payable in another, and the interest laws of such states are in
conflict, the laws of either state may be applied; in other
words, that such a note may have two different places the
laws of which may enter into its construction.
This latter point is supported by a few authorities directly
in point, and which, in our opinion, establish the rule that
ought to be followed.
In Depaw v. Humphreys,' the note was given in New Orleans, payable in New York, for a large sum of money, bearing interest at ten per cent. , being legal interest in Louisiana,
the New York legal interest being seven per cent. only.
The
question was whether the note was usurious, and therefore
void, as it would be if made in New York.
The Supreme
Court of Louisiana decided that it was not usurious and that,
although the note was made payable at New York, yet the
interest might be stipulated for, either according to the law of
Louisiana, or according to that of New York.
The court expressly said: "That in a note executed here (New Orleans) on
'10 Martin (La.), p. i.

of Miller v. Tiffany, persons — ^Palmer of New
York and Wallace of Cleveland, O., assignees of insolvent firms,
sold to one Miller of Ft. Wayne, Ind., goods to the amount of
On this note the
^20,000, taking a note secured by a mortgage.
in
Indiana
and made
action was brought, the note being drawn
payable in Cleveland, O., the bargain for the goods being concluded
in New York. Legal interest in New York was 6 %, in Indiana 7 %,
in Ohio 10%, and the note called for 10% interest.
Justice Swayne, of the U. S. Supreme Court, in his decision
said: " The general principle in relation to contracts made in one
They are to be
place to be performed in another, is ■well settled.
governed by the law of the place of performance, and if the interest of the place of performance is higher than that permitted in
the place of contract, the parties may stipulate for the higher inThe converse of
terest without incurring the penalties of usury.
of interest be
rate
If the
this proposition is also well settled.
higher at the place of contract than at the place of performance,
the parties may lawfully contract in that case also for the higher
i Wall, 298.
interest."
In the 35 N. J. L., there was a case of a bill drawn in Illinois
and delivered to drawee in New York, and was- governed by the

In

the

case
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loan of money made here, the creditor may stipulate for the
legal rate of interest authorized by our law, although such a
rate be disallowed in the place (New York) at which payment
In Peck v.
is to be made."
This is the exact question here.
Mayo,' the notes sued on were made at Montreal, Canada,
where the makers resided, payable in Albany, New York.
The lawful rate of interest in Montreal was six per cent. , and
Redfield, J., in dein New York seven per cent, per annum.
livering the opinion of the court, after an examination of all
the authorities, said: "If a contract be entered into in one
place to be performed in another, and the rate of interest
differ in the two countries, the parties may stipulate for the
rate of interest of either country, and thus, by their own express contract, determine with reference to the law of which
a

'

14

Vermont,

33.

laws of the latter place, but if in good faith the bill had been made
payable in the former state any rate of interest not exceeding that
there allowed, might have been reserved.
In the case of Townsend v. Riley, the defendant had given his
note for ^2,000, secured by a mortgage on his property in New
He afterwards removed to New York, and by subseHampshire.
quent agreement promised to pay the rate of interest of New York.
Justice Bellows in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire, entered very fully into the discussion of the validity of interest allowed in cases where the laws of the states conflict.
He said: "The question arises whether the parties to a contract
made in one state and payable in another may lawfully stipulate for
the interest of the state where the contract is made, although
higher than is allowed in the state where the money is payable.
Upon careful consideration of the authorities bearing upon this
question, we think that the parties may stipulate for the interest of
either state unless the arrangements be entered into merely as a
cover for usury.
If then the contract was made in New York in
good faith, and not to avoid the usury laws of New Hampshire, it
must be regarded as valid although the New York rate of interest
was higher than that of New Hampshire.
These views are sustained by decided cases in New York, Vermont and Louisiana, and
none of an opposite character have been brought to our notice."
46
N. H., 300.
For further authority in the same line see: — 25 Ohio, 413; 2
Kent, 460-461; 2 Parsons on Con., 583-5; i Page, 220;
13 Peters,
65; 14 Vermont, 33; 6 Paige, 627; Edwards on Bills, 717; Parsons
on Notes and Bills, 336-7, 377, 378; 22 Iowa,
Tiedeman on
194.
Commercial Paper, page 798, says: "In order to carry out the intention of parties to legal transactions their contracts must be
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country that incident of the contract shall be decided."
In
Chapman v. Robertson,' the plaintiff resided in England,
where the legal rate of interest was lower than in New York,
where it was seven per cent, per annum.
The contract for
the loan was made in England, but the bond was to be secured by a mortgage on lands in New York, and the arrangement made and carried out was, that Robertson was to execute the bond bearing seven per cent, interest, and execute
and record the mortgage securing it in New York, and then
'

Paige, 627.
construed in the light of that law which the parties themselves had
in contemplation." In support of which, see Bank v. Morris, i
Hun., 680; Bank of State of Ga. v. Lewis, 45 Barb., 340. See
further, Olcott v. Rathbone, 5 Wend., 492; Welsh v. Arlington,
23

6

Cal., 322; 8 Pick., 522; 16 Pick., 22.
Mr. Parsons in his work on Bills and Notes lays down the fol-

lowing propositions:

That if

bill or note be payable in a particular place it
is to be treated as if made there without reference to the place
where it was written, signed or dated.
bill or note, or by legal
2.
That
by the express terms of
a

a

if,

1.

it

is

is

is

a

it
is

is

a

7

J.

§

§

is

is

is

is

it

2

is

3.

is

is

it

construction of its terms,
payable specially in any place
this fact.
knew
that
both
parties
presumed
that
both
parties knew the law of the place
It presumed
in which the paper
payable.
That both parties intended that this law should govern the
4.
Parsons Bills and Notes, 324.
contract.
agreed to be
made in one place and
If the contract
of
of
the
performance
the
law
place
performed in another place,
But
instead of the lex loci contractus will govern the contract.
to
the
an express agreement
the place of payment, unless there
made.
contrary,
presumed to be the same as where the contract
Commercial
paper,
Tiedeman
Laws,
280;
of
Conflict
508.
Story
Marshall
says:
Mon.,
C.
B.
577,
InGoddinv. Shipley,
"The general principle that contract referring by its own terms.
to receive its
to be performed
to
particular place where
construction and legal character and effect from the laws of the
in itself so obviously reasonable and on
place thus referred to,
the score of authority so well established as to preclude all dis-

2

5

is

cussion as to its correctness."
supported by the following cases: Cook v.
This proposition
How., 29s; Woodruff v. Hill, 116 Mass., 310; Drake
Moffatt,
V. Found Treas. Mining Co., 53 Feb., 474; Blodgett v. Durgin, 32
Vt, 364; Hunt V. Standard, 15 Ind., 33; Freeman's Bank v. PuckBurr, 1077; Kaufman
man, 16 Grat., r26; Robinson v. Bland,
V. Bank of Ky., 41 Miss., 212.
29
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forward them to England, where Chapman placed the amount
It was
of the bond with Robertson's banker to his credit.
held that this transaction was not usurious.
From these authorities, and on principle, we are of opinion that Kilgore and Dempsey had a legal right to contract
with reference to the laws of either Ohio or Pennsylvania, as
they might in good faith agree, and that the note made in
Ohio, by which Kilgore agreed to pay ten per cent, interest
where six per cent, was the
and principal at Philadelphia,
The delegal rate of interest, was not, therefore, usurious.
murrer to this defense was properly sustained.
Motion overruled.
The general conclusion is that the validity of contracts for
notes of interest depends upon the laws of the place where the
contract is made and payable, whether it be in the domicile of the
debtor, or in that of the creditor, or in that where the propety hypothecated is situated or elsewhere.
Story Conflict of Laws, 294.
The question whether a contract is usurious or not depends
upon the validity of the interest in the country where the contract
is made and is to be executed.
Story Conflict of Laws, 292, 304;
Andrews v. Pond, supra; Pratt v. Wallbridge, 16 Ind., 54; McAllister v. Smith, 17 111., 328.
It is in accord with the weight of authority that where two
parties make a contract of loan in one state, to be performed in
another, they may, acting in good faith, and without the intent to
evade the law, agree that the law of either shall control the rate of
interest.
Smith v. Parsons, 55 Minn., 528-9; i Randolph ComBrown v. Gardner, 4 B. J., Lea, 156; Pomeroy v.
28;
Paper, §
Ainsworth, 22 Barb., 126-8-9; Arnold v. Potter, 22 la., 198.
Where a contract is made with reference to the place of performance, as is generally the case, the law of the place of contract
yields to the law of the place of performance.
Fanning v. Con.
sequa, 17 Johns, 510-18; Shillits v. Reineking, 30 Hun., 345.
For further authorities on the proposition that the place of
payment or performance will govern the construction and validity
of a contract, see, Sands v. Smith, i Neb., 108; Matthews v.
Paine, 47 Ark., 54; Prior v. Wright, 14 Ark., 189; Tyler v. Trahue,
8 B. Mon., 306; Cox & Disk v. U. S., 6 Pet., 173, 203; Denny v.
Williams, 5 Allen, 1; Bell v. Bruen, i How., 182; Hyde v.
Goodnow, 3 Comst., 36q; Staples v. Nott, 28 N. E. Rep. (N.Y.),
515; Lee V. Selleck, 33 N. Y., 615; Bank v. Low, 81 N. ¥., 566;
Transportation Co. v. Kilderhouse, 87 N. Y., 430; Sheldon v.
Haxtun, 91 N. Y., 124; Bigelowv. Burnham, 49 N. W. Rep.(Ia. ),
104; Burrows v. Stryker, 47 la., 477; Orcutt v. Hough,
54 N. H.,
472; Scott V. Perlee, 39 Ohio st, 63; Martin v. Johnson, 10 S. E.
Rep., 1092; 8 L. R. A., 170; Daniel on Neg. Inst, sec. 922;
Story on the Conflict of Laws, sees. 242, 280, 281.

CHAPTER XXIII.
Sureties or the Contract of Suretyship.

SECTION

63.

THE CONTRACT OF SURETYSHIP OR OF SURETY CORRESPONDS IN MANY RESPECTS WITH THAT OF GUARANTY,
BUT MANY IMPORTANT DIEFERENCES EXIST, WHICH
SHOULD BE CAREFULLY NOTED.
Surety — Defined. — The contract of surety may be defined
as an original undertaking to answer for the debt, default or
miscarriage of another.
Form of the Contract. — It may be stated as a general
rule that no particular form is required.
be in writing.
But when connected with

It

may or may not

a

commercial con-

written.'
Consideration of. — i.

tract, it must be

If the contract of suretyship is
executed and delivered at the same time and as a part of the
principal negotiable contract, then the same consideration
which supports the negotiable contract is sufficient to supLeonard v. Vredenburgh,^
port the contract of suretyship.
Parkhurst v. Vail.^
2.
If the contract of suretyship is executed and delivered
at a different time than the principal contract, there must be
some new consideration.*
'Tiedeman on Bills and Notes, Sec. 158; Allen v. Harrah, 30
la., 363; Larrusse v. Barker, 3 Wheat., loi.
^8 Johns., 29.
Co. Bk., 149 U. S., 298;
^73 111., 343; Moses V. Lawrence
Leonard v. Vredenburgh, 8 Johnson, 29.
*
Leonard v. Vredenburgh, supra; Rigby v. Norwood, 34 Ala.,
129; Star Wagon Co. v. Swezey, 63 la., 520; Draper v. Snow, 20
N. Y., 331; 75 Am. Dec, 408; Good v. Martin, 94 U. S., 90;
Evansville Nat. Bk. v. Kaufman, 93 N. Y., 273; 45 Am. Rep.,
204; Williams v. Williams, 67 Mo., 667; Seyfert v. Harrison, 88
Ky., 461; Farmer V. Perry, 70 la., 358.
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Negotiability of. — i.

OF

SURETYSHIP. [CHAP.

23,

Being a common law contract, it

is therefore not negotiable.

But when connected with and made a part of a negotiable commercial contract, the weight of authority is that
it passes with the commercial contract.'
Grace. — Inasmuch as the contract of suretyship is a common law contract, it is not entitled to grace as a distinct conBut when it is connected with and made part of a
tract.
commercial contract, no liability can arise upon it until the
2.

lapse of grace.

Presentment, Demand, Notice

sity for. — It may be stated

of Dishonor — Neces-

rule that presentment,
demand and notice of dishonor are not necessary in order to
render a surety liable.
A surety is bou7id with his principal
as an original promisor, and his obligation is equally absolute} Mere delay of the creditor to sue the principal will not
discharge

as a general

a surety."

Liability of Sureties. — A surety

is liable as follows:

3.

He is liable for the amount of the contract;
He is liable with the principal and at the same time;
He is liable alone and independently of the principal;

4.

He may

5.

He is liable without

1.
2.

be sued before the

principal;
presentment and

demand,

un-

less those steps are required by the terms of his contract.

Surety's Liability — How Discharged. — i.

It

may

be

stated as a general rule that whatever discharges the principal
But the principal may be discharged
discharges the surety.

'Barlow v. Meyers, 64 N. Y., 41; 21 Am. Rep., 547; First
Nat. Bk. V. Carpenter, 41 la., 518; McLaren v. Watson, etc., 20
Wend., 425; 37 Am. Dec, 260; Gage v. Mechanics Bk., 79 111.,
62; Ellsworth V. Harmon, loi III., 274; Green v. Burroughs, 47
Mich., 70; Baldwin v. Dow, 130 Mass., 416; Jones v. Dow, 142
Mass., 130; 7 N. E. Rep., 839.
'Roberts v. Hawkins, 70 Mich., 566; 38 N. W. R., 575; Gage
Bank, 79 111., 62; Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. Jones, 61 Mo.,
409; Dole V. Young, 24 Pick., 252; Parkhurst v. Vail, 73 111., 343;
Green v. Thompson, 33 la., 293.
V.

^Lenox v. Prout, 3 Wheat., 524, Powell v. Waters, 17 Johns.,
176; Rodabaugh v. Pitkin, 46 la., 544; Cromwell v. Hewitt, 40
N. Y., 491; 100 Am. Dec, 527; Dorglass v. Reynolds, 7 Pet. 126;

Wright

V.

Dyer,

48

Mo., 525.
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when the surety is not.
As, for instance, when the principal
is (a) a married woman, (d) an infant, or (c) where the surety
has actually signed and the signatures of the other parties
have been forged.
2.

But specially the surety may be discharged in the fol-

lowing ways:
(«) by payment; {d) by alteration in a material part; (c) by release of the principal, unless there has been
a reservation against the surety;' (d) misrepresentation on the
part of the principal releases the surety as to all parties to
such transaction;^ (e) by satisfaction; (/") by creditors' parting
with securities.'
however, is only pro
(This discharge,
tanto)\ {£■) by diversion of the funds,* (k) by entering into a
binding agreement not to sue prior parties; (?) by a valid
agreement for the extension of time by the principal obligee.
It may be said, however, that a mere extension of time simply
is no consideration.'^
Neither will a part payment of the principal or interest be a £ood consideration for the extension of
time.
The extension of time which will release a surety must
It
be upon a valid consideration and for a definite period.
has been held that a part payment of the principal in advance
is a good consideration, as well as a payment of interest in adSo also will an agreement to pay a larger rate of invance.
terest, in consideration of an extension of time, be a good
consideration.
A mere forbearance to sue simply is no conIf, however, the surety
sideration for the extension of time.
offers to indemnify the principal obligee against loss in case an
action is brought against the principal debtor, then the principal obligee must bring an action, or otherwise the surety

will be released.''
'10 Pick., 528;

7

Wend., 429;

2

Cal., 121;

Mo. App., 317.
'^
Iowa, 94.
3 Ohio State, 302; 52
=
5 Pick., 507; 2 Neb., 265.
' I Par. B. & N.,
236.
"HI Pa. State, 187; 41 Ohio State, 603;
Mich., 343; 100 N. Y., 539.
*

4

Johns. Chancery,

123.

26

95

Kan., 573; 24

Ind.,

156;

58
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Rights of Surety. — i.

OF

SURETYSHIP.

[CHAP. 23,

He may commence proceedings

in chancery to compel creditors to sue the principal obligor.'
2.
He may go into chancery and compel the creditor to
sue by indemnifying him.''
He may pay the debt himself and
3.

bring an action

against the principal obligee.
If there are co-sureties, after he has paid the debt he
4.
may sue them for contribution.^
If he compromises with the creditor, he may recover
5.

that amount only of the debtor.*
6.

If

he pays the debt in a depreciated currency, he may

recover its actual value only.^
'17 [ohns., 324.
^

6

Grat., 524.

'Johnson v. Harvey, 84 N. Y., 363; 38 Am. Rep., 515; Voss
Lewis, 126 Ind., 155; Houck v. Graham, 123 Ind., 277; Robertson V. Deatherage, 82 111., 511; Stump v. Richardson Co. Bk., 24
Neb., 522.

V.

Grat., 524.
'22 Grat., 753.
*22

CHAPTER XXIV.
Guarantor, or Contract of Guaranty.

SECTION

64.

THE CONTRACT OF GUARANTY DIFFERS IN SOME IMPORTANT RESPECTS FROM THE CONTRACT OF SURETY,
AND IT IS NOT EASY TO DEFINE IT IN ANY BRIEF AND
COMPREHENSIVE FORMULA.
The Contract of Guaranty— Defined.— The contract of
guaranty may be defined as a collateral undertaking to answer
for the debt, default or miscarriage of another. It may be
distinguished from the contract of surety in this, that it is secondary and collateral to the principal debt, while the contract
of surety is primary and principal.
In other words, a guarantor promises to pay the contract if the principal cannot,
while a surety promises to pay the contract if the principal
does not; i. e. , a guarantor insures the solvency of the debtor,
while a surety insures the payment of the debt.

Form Required. — The contract of guaranty comes within

the Statute of Frauds,

and therefore must be in writing.

No

particular phraseology, however, is required.
Consideration for. — The contract of guaranty being a
common law contract, it must be supported by a consideration.
The consideration of the principal contract, however, is sufficient to support the contract of guaranty when they are executed and delivered at the same time and as a part of the same
If, however, the contract-of guaranty is written
instrument.'
upon a promissory note after the note has been delivered and
taken effect as a contract, there must be a new and distinct
consideration to support it.^ A forbearance to sue is sufficient
consideration to support the contract of guaranty.
'Parkhurst v. Vail, 73 111., 343; 20 N. Y., 331.
^Rigby V. Norwood, 34 Ala., 129; 67 Mo., 667,

5

Gush., 80.
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24,

Negotiability of. — The contract of guaranty being a comBut when it is conmon law contract, it is not negotiable.
part of a commercial contract, the
weight of authority permits it to pass with the principal contract.
Upon this question, however, there is much conflict in
the authorities.'
Grace. — The contract of guaranty being a common law
contract standing alone, of course is not entitled to grace.
But when the same is connected with a commercial contract
it partakes of this characteristic, inasmuch as no liability can
accrue against the guarantor until the principal debtor has
become absolutely liable.
Kinds of Guarantees. — The kinds of guarantees may be
enumerated as follows: They are general, special, conditional,
The
absolute, limited, unlimited, temporary and continuing.
term used to designate the particular kind of a guaranty sufficiently explains its meaning.
Presentment, Demand, Notice of Dishonor — Necesnected with and made

a

sity for. — It may be stated

general rule that the undertaking of a guarantor is not conditional; it is absolute, — that
the maker shall pay the note when due or he will; and to
But if the conrender him liable no demand is necessary.
tract of guaranty depends upon a contingency, then a demand
and notice must be given within a reasonable time.
It will
however,
here,
that the strict rule of presentment,
be noticed
demand and notice of dishonor does not apply to the contract
of guaranty even in this case.^
When the terms of the contract are absolute, the courts do not agree as to the necessity
of presentment, demand and notice of dishonor.
For the
cases holding that no demand is necessary, see 20 Johns. , 366;
Holding that demand, etc.,
19 Ohio State, 553; 40 111., 159.
is necessary, see 7 Peters, 126; 12 Peters, 523.
It may be said that even where presentment and demand
and notice of dishonor are required, it is sufficient if they are
made and done in a reasonable time.
And even if omitted
as a

'See in favor of the proposition, Story on Bills,
contra, Parsons on B. & N., 133.
^See 12

State,

453.

Peters, 207;

45

Ohio State, 388; 39

111.,

§ 458, and

577; 19 Ohio
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altogether, the guarantor is not released unless he has suffered
some loss, and then only pro tanto}
If the principal debtor
is insolvent at the time of the maturity of the contract and so
continues, the guarantor cannot complain of a failure or delay
to make demand.^

Liability of

a

Guarantor.— At common law he was not

liable until it was shown that the principal debtor could not
pay the debt, i. e., a judgment and execution had to precede
an action against the guarantor.
But now by statute in many
of the states this common law rule has been changed so that
guarantor may be sued with the principal and at the same
time. He is liable for the full amount of the contract.
a

Liabilities of Guarantor — How Discharged. — It

may be

generally that whatever discharges the principal discharges the guarantor.
The guarantor may also be discharged
by payment, by extension of time by the creditor
upon
sufficient consideration), by surrender of any security held by
the creditor, and by
forbearance to sue the principal within
reasonable

time.

Rights of Guarantor. — I.

When

he pays the debt, he

is

a

a

(if

stated

to all the rights of the original creditor.
2.
When he pays the debt, he should insist upon keeping
the note alive,
e., he should not allow the note to be cani.

subrogated

celled.
3.

is

If, however, the note
cancelled, he may still sue
for money paid for the use of the debtor.
'2 Mich., 504; 39
^12

Peters, 525.

111.,

577;

40

111.,

155.
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CHAPTER XXV.
General Provisions.

SECTION

65.

SHORT TITLE.

[i.]

This act shall be known

as the

negotiable instru-

ments law.

SECTION

66.

DEFINITIONS AND MEANING OF TERMS.
[2.

J

In this

"

act, unless the context otherwise requires:

means an acceptance completed by delivAcceptance
ery or notification.
" Action" includes counter-claim and set-off.
' '
Bank " includes any person or association of persons
carrying on the business of banking, whether incorporated or
' '

not.

"
Bearer
means the person in possession of a bill or
note which is payable to bearer.
"Bill "means bill of exchange, and " note " means ne' '

it,

gotiable promissory note.
" Delivery" means transfer of possession, actual or constructive, from one person to another.
' '
Holder " means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note,
or the bearer thereof.
who is in possession of
"Indorsement" means an indorsement completed by
delivery.

" Instrument" means negotiable
" Issue" means the first delivery

instrument.
of the instrument, com-

a

a

a

it

holder.
as
person who takes
"Person" includes body of persons, whether incorporated or not.

plete in form to

GENERAL

482

PROVISIONS.

[CHAP.

'Value" means valuable consideration.
'Written" includes printed, and "writing"

25,

includes

print.

SECTION

67.

PERSON PRIMARILY LIABLE ON INSTRUMENT.
The person "primarily" liable on an instrument
[3. J
is the person who by the terms of the instrument is absolutely
All other parties are "secondarily"
required to pay the same.
liable.

SECTION

68.

REASONABLE TIME, WHAT CONSTITUTES.
In determining what is
unreasonable time' regard is to

time" or an
be had to the nature of the
instrument, the usage of trade or business
any) with reinstruments,
and the facts of the particular
spect to such

[4.]

a

"reasonable
(if

•

case.

SECTION
TIME,

HOW

69.

COMPUTED: WHEN LAST DAY FALLS
HOLIDAY.

ON

Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act
herein required or permitted to be done falls on Sunday or on
holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding secular or business day.

a

J

[5.

SECTION

70.

APPLICATION OF CHAPTER.

J

[6.

ble

The provisions of this act do not apply to negotia-

instruments

hereof.

made

and

delivered

prior

to the

passage

SEC. 71.

GENERAL PROVISIONS.

J

SECTION
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71.

LAW MERCHANT; WHEN GOVERNS.
[7.]

In any

case not provided for in this act the rules

of the law merchant shall govern.

CHAPTER XXVI.
Form and Interpretation.

SECTION

72.

FORM OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT.
must conform to
[20. J An instrument to be negotiable
the following requirements:
1.
It must be in writing and signed by the maker or
drawer;
2.
Must contain an unconditional promise or order to
pay a sum certain in money;
Must be payable on demand, or at a fixed or deter3.
minable future time;
Must be payable to order or to bearer; and
4.
Where the instrument is addressed to a drawee, he
5.
must be named or otherwise indicated therein with reasonable certainty.

SECTION

73.

CERTAINTY AS TO SUM; WHAT CONSTITUTES.'
The sum payable is a sum certain within the
[21.]
meaning of this act, although it is to be paid:
1.
With interest; or
2.
By stated installments; or
By stated installments, with a provision that upon
3.
default in payment of any installment or of interest, the
whole shall become due; or
'

The foregoing section, with the exception of the last subdivision, is taken from the English Bills of Exchange Act, Sec. 9,
subd. I.

SEC.

74.

J

FORM AND INTERPRETATION.

With

4.

exchange,

current rate, or

whether at a fixed rate or at the

With costs of collection or

5.
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an attorney's fee, in case

payment shall not be made at maturity.

SECTION

74.

WHEN PROMISE IS UNCONDITIONAL.'
An unqualified order or promise to pay is unconditional within the meaning of this act, though coupled with:
1.
An indication of a particular fund out of which
[22.

]

reimbursement
debited
2.

is to be made, or a particular account to be

with the amount; or
A statement of the transaction

the instrument.

which gives rise to

But an order or promise to pay out of a particular fund
is not unconditional.

SECTION

75.

DETERMINABLE FUTURE TIME; WHAT

CONSTITUTES.^

J An instrument is payable at a determinable future
time, within the meaning of this act, which is expressed to be
[2 3.

payable:

At

fixed period after date or sight; or
2.
On or before a fixed or determinable future time
specified therein; or
On or at a fixed period after the occurrence of a
3.
specified event, which is certain to happen, though the time of
happening be uncertain.
An instrument payable upon a contingency is not negotiable, and the happening of the event does not cure the de1.

a

fect.

'This section

is

taken from

the

English Bills of Exchange

Act, Sec. 3, Subd. 3.
''This section is substantially Section 11 of the English Bills of
Exchange Act, with the exception of subd. 2, which is added.
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SECTION
ADDITIONAL
[24.]

[CHAP.

26,

76.

PROVISIONS NOT AFFECTING NEGOTIABIL-

ITY.

An instrument which contains an order or promise

to do any act in addition to the payment of money is not neBut the negotiable character of an instrument
gotiable.

otherwise negotiable is not affected by a provision which:
1.
Authorizes the sale of collateral securities in case the
instrument be not paid at maturity; or
Authorizes a confession of judgment if the instru2.
ment be not paid at maturity; or
Waives the benefit of any law intended for the ad3.
vantage or protection of the obligor; or
Gives the holder an election to require something to
4.
be done in lieu of payment of money.
But nothing in this section shall validate any provision or
stipulation otherwise illegal.

SECTION 77.
OMISSIONS; SEAL; PARTICULAR MONEY.'
[25.] The validity and negotiable character of an instrument are not affected by the fact that:
1.
It is not dated; or
2.
Does not specify the value given, or that any value
has been given therefor; or
Does not specify the place where it is drawn or the
3.
place where it is payable; or
Bears a seal; or
4.
Designates a particular kind of current money in
5.
which payment is to be made.
But nothing in this section shall alter or repeal any
statute requiring in certain cases the nature of the consideration to be stated in the instrument.
'

The first three subdivisions
change Act, Sec. 3.

are from the

English Bills of Ex-

SEC.

78.

FORM AND INTERPRETATION.

]

SECTION
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78.

WHEN PAYABLE ON DEMAND.
An instrument is payable on demand:

[26.]

Where it is expressed to be payable on demand,
at sight, or on presentation; or
2.
In which no time for payment is expressed.
1.

or

indorsing

it,

it

overdue,

is,

Where an instrument is issued, accepted or indorsed when
regards the person so issuing,
payable on demand.
as

SECTION

accepting or

79.

WHEN PAYABLE TO ORDER.
is

it

is

6. 5.

3.

is

A

is

The instrument
payable to order where
[27.]
drawn payable to the order of a specified person or to him or
his order.
It may be drawn payable to the order of:
1.
not maker, drawer or drawee; or
payee who
2.
The drawee' or maker; or
The drawee; or
Two or more payees jointly; or
4.
One or some of the several payees; or
The holder of an office for the time being.
Where the instrument
payable to order the payee must
be named or otherwise indicated therein with reasonable certainty.

SECTION

80.

bearer;

is is

it it

J

is

WHEN PAYABLE TO BEARER.^
The instrument
payable to bearer:
[28.
1.
When
expressed to be so payable; or
2.
When
payable to a person named therein or
or

8

'

Probably intended for drawer.
^This section is, in substance, Section
of Exchange Act.

of the English Bills

FORM AND INTERPRETATION.
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[CHAP.

26,

fictitious or nonexisting person, and such fact was known to the person making it so payable; or
When the name of the payee does not purport to be
4.
the name of any person; or
When the only or last indorsement is an indorsement
5.
3.

When it is payable to the order of

a

in blank.'

SECTION

81.

TERMS WHEN SUFFICIENT.
The instrument need not follow the language of
[29. J
this act. but any terms are sufficient which clearly indicate an
intention to conform to the requirements hereof.

SECTION

82.

DATE PRESUMPTION AS TO.
[30.] Where the instrument or an acceptance or any indorsement thereon is dated, such date is Aeemed pritna facie
to be the date of the making, drawing, acceptance or indorsement, as the case may be.

SECTION

83.

ANTE-DATED AND POST-DATED. [31.] The instrument is not invalid for the reason only
that it is ante-dated or post-dated, provided this is not done
for an illegal or fraudulent purpose.
The person to whom an
instrument so dated is delivered acquires the title thereto as
of the date of delivery.
'Armstrong v. Pomeroy,
V. Farwell,

i Campb.,

^Thisis Sec.
Act, in substance.

13,

130.

subd.

Nat. Bk., 46 Ohio St., 512; Bennett

i,

of the

EngHsh

Bills of Exchange

SEC.
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84.

WHEN DATE MAY BE INSERTED.'
Where an instrument expressed to be payable at
[32. J
a fixed period after date is issued undated, or where the acceptance of an instrument payable at a fixed period after sight
is undated,

any holder may insert therein the true date of issue or acceptance, and the instrument shall be payable acThe insertion of a wrong date does not avoid the
cordingly.
instrument in the hands of a subsequent holder in due course;
but as to him, the date so inserted is to be regarded as the
true date.

SECTION

85.

BLANKS; WHEN MAY BE FILLED.-'
Where the instrument is wanting in any material
particular, the person in possession thereof has ^. prima facie
[33-]

authority to complete it by filling up the blanks therein. And
a signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making
the signature in order that the paper may be converted into a
negotiable instrument operates as a prima facie authority to
fill up as such for any amount. In order, however, that any
such instrument, when completed, may be enforced against
any person who became a party thereto prior to its completion, it must be filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time.
But if any such
instrument, after completion, is negotiated to a holder in due
course, it is valid and effectual for all purposes in his hands,
and he may enforce it as if it had been filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable
time.

'This

is, in substance, Section

12

of the English Bills of Ex-

change Act.

Act.

^This is taken from Section

20

of the English Bills of Exchange
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SECTION
INCOMPLETE INSTRUMENT

[CHAP.

26,

86.

NOT DELIVERED.

[34.] Where an incomplete instrument has not been delivered it will not, if completed and negotiated, without authority, jbe a valid contract in the hands of any holder, as against any
person whose signature was placed thereon before delivery.

SECTION
DELIVERY;

87.

WHEN EFFECTUAL; WHEN PRESUMED.

Every contract on

negotiable instrument isin complete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As between immediate parties, and
as regards a remote party other than a holder in due course,
the delivery, in order to be effectual, must be made either by
or under the authority of the party making, drawing, accepting or indorsing, as the case may be; and in such case the delivery may be shown to have been conditional, or for a special
purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the propBut where the instrument is in the
erty in the instrument.
hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by
all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is
conclusively presumed.
And where the instrument is no
longer in the possession of a party whose signature appears
thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed
until the contrary is proved.

[35.]

a

SECTION

88.

CONSTRUCTION WHERE INSTRUMENT

IS AMBIGUOUS.'

Where the language of the instrument is ambiguous,
or there are omissions therein, the following rules of construction apply:
[ 36.

Subd. I.
The first clause in this subdivision is taken from
English Bills of Exchange Act, sec. 9, subd. 2.
'

the

J

SEC.

89.
1.

J

FORM AND INTERPRETATION.

Where the sum payable is expressed

49

1

in words and

also in figures and there is a discrepancy between the two, the

denoted by the words is the sum payable; but if the
words are ambiguous or uncertain, reference may be had to
the figures to fix the amount;
2.
Where the instrument provides for the payment of
interest, without specifying the date from which interest is to
run, the interest runs from the date of the instrument, and if
the instrument is undated, from the issue thereof;
Where the instrument is not dated, it will be consid3.
ered to be dated as of the time it was issued;
When there is a conflict between the written and
4.
printed provisions of the instrument, the written provisions

sum

prevail;

Where the instrument is so ambiguos that there is
doubt whether it is a bill or note, the holder may treat it as
5.

either at his election;
6.
Where a signature is so placed upon the instrument
that it is not clear in what capacity the person making the
same intended to sign, he is to be deemed an indorser;
" I promWhere an instrument containing the words
7.
"
is signed by two or more persons, they are deemed
ise to pay
to be jointly and severally liable thereon.

SECTION

LIABILITY

89.

OF PERSONS SIGNING IN TRADE OR ASSUMED
NAME.

on the
[ 37. ] No person is liable
does not appear thereon, except as
But one who signs in
provided.
will be liable to the same extent as

instrument whose signature
herein otherwise expressly
a trade or assumed name
if he had signed in his own

name.

SECTION

90.

SIGNATURE BY AGENT; AUTHORITY HOW SHOWN.
of any party may be made by a
[38. ] The signature
No particular form of appointment is
duly authorized agent.

FORM AND INTERPRETATION.

492

[CHAP.

26,

necessary for this purpose; and the authority of the agent may
be estabhshed as in other cases of agency.'

SECTION

LIABILITY

91.

OF PERSON SIGNING AS AGENT, ETC.

[39. j Where the instrument contains or a person adds
to his signature words indicating that he signs for or on behalf
of a principal, or in a representative capacity, he is not liable
on the instrument if he was duly authorized; but the mere addition of words describing him as an agent, or as filling a representative character, without disclosing his principal, does not
exempt him from personal liability.

SECTION

92.

SIGNATURE BY PROCURATION; EFFECT

OF.^

A signature by " procuration" operates

[40.

as notice

that the agent has but a limited authority to sign, and the
principal is bound only in case the agent in so signing acted
within the actual limits of his authority.

SECTION

93.

EFFECT OF INDORSEMENT BY INFANT
[41.

OR CORPORATION.'

The indorsement or assignment of the instrument

J

by a corporation or by an infant passes the property therein,
notwithstanding that from want of capacity the corporation or

infant may incur no liability thereon.
Cal., 403.
English Bills of Exchange Act, sec. 25.
^This section is taken from the English Bills of Exchange Act,
'Allen

'

V.

Williams,

sec. 22, subd. 2.

97

SEC.

94. ]

FORM AND INTERPRETATION.

SECTION

493

94.

FORGED SIGNATURES; EFFECT OF.'
[42. ] Where a signature is forged or made without authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is
wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument, or
to give a discharge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof
against any party thereto, can be acquired through or under
such signature, unless the party against whom it is sought to
enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or
want of authority.
'

See sec. 24 of the

English Bills of Exchange Act.

CHAPTER XXVII.
Consideration of Negotiable Instruments

SECTION

95.

PRESUMPTION OF CONSIDERATION.
[50.

]

Every negotiable instrument is deemed /r2»«« /«-

cic to have been issued for a valuable consideration;

and every

person whose signature appears thereon to have become
party thereto for value.

SECTION

a

96.

CONSIDERATION, WHAT CONSTITUTES.
[5 1. J Value is any consideration sufficient to support a
An antecedent or pre-existing debt constisimple contract.
tutes value; and is deemed such whether the instrument is
payable on demand or at a future time.

SECTION

97.

WHAT CONSTITUTES HOLDER FOR VALUE.'
[52. j Where value has at any time been given for the
instrument, the holder is deemed a holder for value in respect
to all parties who became such prior to that time.
This section is taken from the English Bills of Exchange Act,
sec. 27, subd. 2, and is founded upon Hunter v. Wilson, 4 Ex.,See Daniel, sec. 174a.
489.
'

SEC.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

98.]

SECTION

495.

98.

WHEN LIEN ON INSTRUMENTS CONSTITUTES HOLDER
FOR VALUE.i

J

Where the holder has

a Hen on the instrument,
arising either from contract or by iniphcation of law, he is
deemed a holder for value to the extent of his lien.

[53.

SECTION

99.

EFFECT OF WANT OF CONSIDERATION.

j

Absence or failure of consideration is matter of
defense as against any person not a holder in due course; and
partial failure of consideration is a defense pro tanto whether
the failure is an ascertained and liquidated amount or other[54.

wise.

SECTION

LIABILITY

100.

OF ACCOMMODATION

INDORSER.''

[55. J An accommodation party is one who has signed
the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending
his name to some other person.
Such a person is liable on
the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such
holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him to be
only an accommodation party.
'

This section is taken from the English Bills of Exchange Act,
sec. 27, subd. 3, and is founded upon Collins v. Martin, i Bos. &
P., 648.
Act.

^This is taken from sec.

28,

of the English Bills of Exchange

CHAPTER XXVIII.
Negotiation.

SECTION

101.

WHAT CONSTITUTES NEGOTIATION.
[60.

J

An instrument is negotiated when it is transferred

from one person to another in such manner as to constitute
If payable to bearer it is
the transferree the holder thereof.
negotiable by delivery; if payable to order it is negotiated by
the indorsement of the holder completed by delivery.

SECTION

102.

INDORSEMENT; HOW MADE.
[61. J The indorsement must be written on the instruThe signature
ment itself or upon a paper attached thereto.
of the indorser, without additional words, is a sufficient indorsement.'

SECTION

103.

INDORSEMENT MUST BE OF ENTIRE INSTRUMENT.
[62.

J

The indorsement must

be

an indorsement of the

An indorsement, which purports to transentire instrument.
fer to the indorsee a part only of the amount payable, or
which purports to transfer the instrument to two or more indorsees severally, does not operate as a negotiation of the instrument.
But where the instrument has been paid in part,
it may be indorsed as to the residue.
'

Brown v. Butchers and Drovers
Dec. 755; Johnson III. Cases, 114.

Bank,

6

Hill,

443;

41

Am.

SEC.

I04.J

NEGOTIATION.

SECTION

497

104

KINDS OF INDORSEMENT.
[63. J An indorsement may be either special or in blank;
and it may also be either restrictive or qualified, or conditional.

SECTION

105.

SPECIAL INDORSEMENT; INDORSEMENT IN BLANK.
A special indorsement specifies the person tO'
[64. ]
whom, or to whose order the instrument is to be payable;
indorsement of such indorsee is necessary to the
further negotiation of the instrument.
An indorsement in
blank specifies no indorsee, and an instrument so indorsed is
and

the

payable to bearer,

and may be negotiated by delivery.

SECTION

106.

BLANK INDORSEMENT; HOW CHANGED TO SPECIAL
INDORSEMENT.

j

blank indorsement intoa special indorsement by writing over the signature of the indorser in blank any contract consistent with the character of
the indorsement.
[65.

The holder may convert

SECTION

a

107.

WHEN INDORSEMENT RESTRICTIVE.
[66.
1.

An indorsement is restrictive, which either:
Prohibits the further negotiation of the instrument; or

J

Constitutes the indorsee the agent of the indorser; or
Vests the title in the indorsee in trust for or to the3.
use of some other person.
But the mere absence of words implying power to negotiate does not make an indorsement restrictive.
2.

[chap.

NEGOTIATION.
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SECTION

28,

108.

EFFECT OF RESTRICTIVE INDORSEMENT;

RIGHTS OF

INDORSEE.

A restrictive
[67.]
dorsee the right:
1.

2.

indorsement

confers

upon the in-

To receive payment of the instrument;
To bring any action thereon that the indorser could

bring;
3.

To transfer his rights

as

such

indorsee, where the

form of the indorsement authorizes him to do so.
But all subsequent indorsees acquire only the title of the
first indorsee under the restrictive indorsement.

SECTION

109.

QUALIFIED INDORSEMENT.
[68. J Qualified indorsement constitutes the indorser a
mere assignor of the title to the instrument.
It may be made
by adding to the indorser's signature the words ' ' without recourse" or any words of similar import.
Such an indorsement does not impair the negotiable character of the instrument.

SECTION

110.

CONDITIONAL INDORSEMENT.
[69. ] Where an indorsement is conditional, a party required to pay the instrument may disregard the condition, and
make payment to the indorsee or his transferee, whether the
condition has been fulfilled or not.
But any person to whom
an instrument so indorsed is negotiated, will hold the same,
or the proceeds thereof, subject to the rights of the person indorsing conditionally.

SEC.

III.]

NEGOTIATION.

SECTION

499

111.

INDORSEMENT OF INSTRUMENT PAYABLE TO BEARER.
[70.]

Where an instrument, payable to bearer, is in-

dorsed specially, it may nevertheless be further negotiated by
delivery; but the person indorsing specially is liable as indorser to only such holders as make title through his indorsement.

SECTION
INDORSEMENT

112.

WHERE PAYABLE TO TWO
PERSONS.

OR MORE

[71. J Where an instrument is payable to the order of
two or more payees or indorsees who are not partners, all
must indorse, unless the one indorsing has authority to indorse
for the others.

SECTION

113.

EFFECT OF INSTRUMENT DRAWN

OR

PERSON AS CASHIER.

[72.]
person as

INDORSED TO A

Where an instrument is drawn or indorsed to a
"cashier" or other fiscal officer of a bank or cor-

poration, it is deemed prima facie to be payable to the bank
or corporation of which he is such officer; and may be negotiated by either the indorsement of the bank or corporation,
or the indorsement of the officer.

SECTION

114.

INDORSEMENT WERE NAME IS MISSPELLED,

ET CETERA.

or indorsee is wrongly
designated or misspelled, he may indorse the instrument as
therein described, adding, if he think fit, his proper signature.

[73.]

Where the name of

a payee

NEGOTIATION.
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SECTION

[CHAP.

28,

115.

INDORSEMENT IN REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY.
[74. J Where any person is under obligation to indorse
in a representative capacity, he may indorse in such terms as
to negative personal liability.

SECTION

116.

TIME OF INDORSEMENT; PRESUMPTION.
[75. ] Except where an indorsement bears date after
the maturity of the instrument, every negotiation is deemed
prima facie to have been effected before the instrument was
overdue.

SECTION

117,

PLACE OF INDORSEMENT; PRESUMPTION.
[76. J Except where the contrary appears, every indorsement is presumed prima facie to have been made at the place
where the instrument is dated.

SECTION

118.

CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIABLE CHARACTER.
[77. J An instrument negotiable in its origin continues
to be negotiable until it has been restrictively indorsed or discharged by payment or otherwise.

SECTION

119.

STRIKING OUT INDORSEMENT.
[78. J The holder may at anytime strike out any indorsement which is not necessary to his title.
The indorser

SEC. 120.]

NEGOTIATION.

50I

whose indorsement is struck out, and all indorsers subsequent
to him, are thereby relieved from liability on the instrument.

SECTION

120.

TRANSFER WITHOUT INDORSEMENT; EFFECT OF.

a

is

is

it,

[79. ] Where the holder of an instrument payable to his
order transfers it for value without indorsing
the transfer
vests in the transferee such title as the transferrer had therein,
and the transferee acquires, in addition, the right to have the
indorsement of the transferrer.
But for the purpose of deterwhether
the
transferee
holder in due course, the
mining
takes
effect
of
as
the time when the indorsement
negotiation
actually made.

SECTION

121.

WHEN PRIOR PARTY MAY NEGOTIATE INSTRUMENT.

is

is

]

Where an instrument
negotiated back to a prior
[80.
party, such party may, subject to the provisions of this act,
But he
not entitled
reissue and further negotiate the same.
to enforce payment thereof against any intervening party to
whom he was personally liable.

CHAPTER XXIX.
Rights of Holders.

SECTION

122.

RIGHT OF HOLDER TO SUE; PAYMENT
[90. ] The holder of a negotiable instrument may sue
thereon in his own name; and payment to him in due course
discharges the instrument.

SECTION

123.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE.'
[91. J A holder in due course is a holder who has taken
the instrument under the following conditions:
1.
That it is complete and regular upon its face;
That he became the holder of it before it was over2.
due, and without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact;
That he took it in good faith and for value;
3.
That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no
4.
notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title
of the person negotiating it.

SECTION
WHEN PERSON

124.

NOT DEEMED HOLDER IN DUE COURSE.

[92. ] Where an instrument payable on demand is negotiated an unreasonable length of time after its issue, the
holder is not deemed a holder in due course.

'This section
sec. 29.

is taken from the

English Bills of Exchange Act,

SEC.

125.]

RIGHTS

OF

HOLDERS.

SECTION
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125.

NOTICE BEFORE FULL AMOUNT PAID.
[93. J Where the transferee receives notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person
negotiating the same before he has paid the full amount
agreed to be paid therefor, he will be deemed a holder in due
course only to the extent of the amount theretofore paid by
him.

SECTION

126.

WHEN TITLE DEFECTIVE.
[94. j The title of a person who negotiates an instrument is defective within the meaning of this act when he obtained the instrument, or any signature thereto, by fraud,
duress, or force and fear, or other unlawful means, or for an
illegal consideration, or when he negotiates it in breach of
faith, or under such circumstances as amounts to a fraiud.

SECTION

127.

WHAT CONSTITUTES NOTICE OF DEFECT.
[95. J To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating the same,
the person to whom it is negotiated must have had actual
knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such
facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad
faith.

SECTION

128.

RIGHTS OF HOLDER IN DUE COURSE.
the instrument free
[96. j A holder in due course holds
from any defect of title of prior parties and free from defenses
available to prior parties among themselves, and may enforce

RIGHTS

504

OF

HOLDERS.

[CHAP.

29,

payment of the instrument for the full amount thereof against
all parties liable thereon.

SECTION

129.

WHEN SUBJECT TO ORIGINAL DEFENSES.
[97.

]

In the hands of any holder other than

a

holder in

due course, a negotiable instrument is subject to the same de-

But a holder who derives
his title through a holder in due course, and who is not himself a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument,
has all the rights of such former holder in respect of all parties
prior to the latter.

fenses as if it were non-negotiable.

SECTION

130.

WHO DEEMED HOLDER IN DUE COURSE.
[98. ] Every holder is deemed prima facie to be a
holder in due course; but when it is shown that the title of
any person who has negotiated the instrument was defective,
the burden is on the holder to prove that he or some person
under whom he claims acquired the title as a holder in due
But the last-mentioned rule does not apply in favor
course.
of a party who became bound on the instrument prior to the
acquisition of such defective title.

CHAPTER XXX.
Liabilities of Parties.
SECTION

LIABILITY

331.

OF MAKER.

The maker of a negotiable instrument by making it engages that he will pay it according to its tenor; and

[no. J

admits the existence

of the payee

and

his then capacity to

indorse.

SECTION

[iii.j

LIABILITY

132.

OF DRAWER.

The drawer by drawing the instrument

admits
the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse;
and engages that on due presentment the instrument will be
accepted and paid, or both, according to its tenor, and that if
it be dishonored, and the necessary proceedings on dishonor
be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder,
or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay
it.
But the drawer may insert in the instrument an express
stipulation negativing or limiting his own liability to the holder.

SECTION

LIABILITY

133.

OF ACCEPTOR.

[II 2. J

The acceptor by accepting the instrument engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his acceptand admits:

ance;
1.

The existence of the drawer, the genuineness

of his

signature, and his capacity and authority to draw the instrument; and
2.
The existence of the payee and his then capacity to
indorse.

LIABILITIES

5o6

OF

SECTION

PARTIES.

[CHAP.

30,

134.

WHEN PERSON DEEMED INDORSER.
[113.] A person placing his signature upon an instrument otherwise than as maker, drawer or acceptor is deemed
to be an indorser, unless he clearly indicates by appropriate
words his intention to be bound in some other capacity.

SECTION

LIABILITY

135.

OF IRREGULAR INDORSER.

Where a person, not otherwise a party to an in[1 14. J
strument, places thereon his signature in blank before delivery, he is liable as indorser in accordance with the following
rules:
1.

person,
2.

If

the instrument is payable

to

the

order of a third

he is liable to the payee and to all subsequent parties;
If the instrument is payable to the order of the

maker or drawer,

or is payable to bearer, he is liable to all
parties subsequent to the maker or drawer;
If he signs for the accommodation of the payee, he is
3.
liable to all parties subsequent to the payee.

SECTION

136.

WARRANTY WHERE NEGOTIATION BY DELIVERY,
ET CETERA.
[115.] Every person negotiating an instrument by delivery or by a qualified indorsement, warrants:
I. That the instrument is genuine and in all respects
what it purports to be;
That he has a good title to it;
That all prior parties had capacity to contract;
That he has no knowledge of any fact which would
impair the validity of the instrument or render it valueless.

SEC.

LIABILITIES

137.]

OF

PARTIES.
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But when the negotiation is by delivery only, the warranty extends in favor of no holder other than the immediate
transferree.
The provisions of subdivision three of this section do not apply to persons negotiating public or corporate
securities, other than bills and notes.

SECTION

LIABILITY

137.

OF GENERAL INDORSER.

Every indorser who indorses without qualifica[116.]
tion, warrants to all subsequent holders in due course:
The matter and things mentioned in subdivisions one,
1.
two and three of the next preceding section; and,
2.
That the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and subsisting.
And, in addition, he engages that on due presentment, it
shall be accepted or paid, or both, as the case may be, according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored, and the
necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay
the amount thereof to the holder, or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it.

SECTION

LIABILITY

138.

OF INDORSER WHERE PAPER NEGOTIABLE BY

DELIVERY.

person places his indorsement on an instrument negotiable by delivery he incurs all the liabilities of
an indorser.
[117.

J

Where

a

SECTION

189.

ORDER IN WHICH INDORSERS ARE LIABLE.
As respects one another, indorsers are liable
prima facie in the order in which they indorse; but evidence
is admissible to show that as between or among themselves
they have agreed otherwise.
Joint payees or joint indorsees
who indorse are deemed to indorse jointly and severally.
[118.]

LIABILITIES

5o8

OF

SECTION

LIABILITY

PARTIES.

[CHAP.

30,

140.

OF AGENT OR BROKER.

[119.] Where a broker or other agent negotiates an instrument without indorsement, he incurs all the liabilities prescribed by Section 115' of this act, unless he discloses the
name of his principal, and the fact that he is acting only as
agent.
'

This is Sec.

65

in the other states.

CHAPTER XXXI.
Presentment for Payment.

SECTION
.

EFFECT OF WANT OF DEMAND

141.

ON

PRINCIPAL DEBTOR.

Presentment for payment is not necessary in or30. J
der to charge the person primarily Hable on the instrument;
but if the instrument
by its terms, payable at a special
place,

and he

is

is,

[1

able and

willing to pay

vided,

presentment for payment
the drawer and indorsers.

is

SECTION
PRESENTMENT

WHERE

it

there at maturity,
such ability and willingness are equivalent to a tender of payment upon his part.
But except as herein otherwise pronecessary in order to charge

142.

IS NOT PAYABLE

INSTRUMENT

ON DEMAND.

if a a

is

it

it

is

Where the instrument
not payable on demand,
[131.]
presentment must be made on the day
falls due.
Where
demand,
payable on
presentment must be made within
reasonable time after its issue, except that in the case of
bill of exchange, presentment for payment will be sufficient
made within a reasonable time after the last negotiation

thereof.

SECTION

143.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A SUFFICIENT PRESENTMENT.
[132.]

Presentment for payment, to be sufficient,

must

taken largely from the English Act and
of the law.

gen-

is

'

This article
erally declaratory

is

be made:

PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT.

5IO
1.

[CHAP.

3I,

By the holder, or by some person authorized to re-

ceive payment on his behalf;

At a reasonable hour on a business day;
At a proper place as herein defined;
3.
To the person primarily liable on the instrument, or
4.
if he is absent or inaccessible, to any person found at the
place where the presentment is made.
2.

SECTION

144.

PLACE OF PRESENTMENT.
Presentment for payment is made at the proper
[133.]
place:
1.
Where a place of payment is specified in the instrument and it is there presented;
2.
Where no place of payment is specified, but the address of the person to make payment is given in the instrument and it is there presented;
Where no place of payment is specified and no ad3.
dress is given and the instrument is presented at the usual
place of business or residence of the person to make payment;
In any other case if presented to the person to make
4.
payment wherever he can be found, or if presented at his last
known place of business or residence.

SECTION
INSTRUMENT

145.

MUST BE EXHIBITED.

The instrument must be exhibited to the person
[134.]
from whom payment is demanded, and when it is paid must
be delivered up to the party paying it.

SECTION
PRESENTMENT

146.

WHERE INSTRUMENT

PAYABLE AT BANK.

When the instrument is payable at a bank, pre[135. J
must
be made during banking hours, unless the persentment

SEC.

147.

J

PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT.

son to make payment has

5

II

no funds there to meet

it at any
time during the day, in which case presentment at any hour
before the bank is closed on that day is sufficient.

SECTION

147.

PRESENTMENT WHERE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR IS DEAD.
Where the person primarily liable on the instru[136. J
ment is dead, and no place of payment is specified, presentif,

ment for payment must be made to his personal representative,
if such there be, and
with the exercise of reasonable diligence, he can be found.

SECTION

148.

PRESENTMENT TO PERSONS LIABLE AS PARTNERS.

them, even though there has been

SECTION

a

is

J

Where the persons primarily liable on the instru[137.
ment are liable as partners, and no place of payment
specified, presentment for payment may be made to any one of
dissolution of the firm.

149.

PRESENTMENT TO JOINT DEBTORS.
J

[138.

Where there are several

partners
no place of payment

persons

not

is

primarily liable on the instrument, and
specified, presentment must be made to them all.

SECTION

150.

WHEN PRESENTMENT NOT REQUIRED TO CHARGE
DRAWER.

THE

J

is

not required in order
Presentment for payment
[139.
to charge the drawer where he has no right to expect or require that the drawee or acceptor will pay the instrument.

PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT.

JI2

SECTION

[CHAP.

3 1,

151.

WHEN PRESENTMENT NOT REQUIRED TO CHARGE THE
INDORSER.
Presentment for payment is not required in order
[140. J
to charge an indorser where the instrument was made or accepted for his accommodation, and he has no reason to expect
that the instrument will be paid if presented.

SECTION
WHEN DELAY

IN MAKING

15'2.

PRESENTMENT

IS EXCUSED.

Delay in making presentment for payment is ex[141. ]
cused when the delay is caused by circumstances beyond
the control of the holder and not imputable to his fault, misconduct or negligence.
When the cause of delay ceases to
operate, presentment must be made with reasonable diligence.

SECTION

153.

WHEN PRESENTMENT MAY BE DISPENSED WITH.
Presentment for payment is dispensed with:
1.
Where after the exercise of reasonable diligence presentment as required by this act cannot be made;
2.
Where the drawee is a fictitious person;
By waiver of presentment expressed or implied.
3.
[142.

J

SECTION
WHEN INSTRUMENT
[143.

J

154.

DISHONORED

BY NON-PAYMENT.

The instrument is dishonored by non-payment

when:

I.

It

is duly presented

fused or cannot be obtained;

for payment and payment is reor

SEC.

PRESENTMENT

155.]
2.

Presentment

FOR

PAYMENT.
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is excused

and the instrument is over-

SECTION

155.

due and unpaid.

LIABILITY
[1

44. J

instrument

OF PERSON SECONDARILY LIABLE, WHEN INSTRUMENT DISHONORED.
Subject to the provisions of this act, when the
is dishonored
an immediate
by non-payment,

fight of recourse to all parties secondarily Hable thereon,
crues to the holder.

SECTION

ac-

156.

TIME OF MATURITY.
payable at the time
When the day of maturity falls
fixed therein without grace.
upon Sunday, or a holiday, the instrunaent is payable on the
Instruments falling due on
next succeeding business day.
Saturday are to be presented for payment on the next succeeding business day, except that instruments payable on demand may, at the option of the holder, be presented for
payment before twelve o'clock noon on Saturday when that
[145.

]

Every negotiable instrument

is

entire day is not a holiday.

SECTION

157.

TIME; HOW COMPUTED.
Where the 'interest is payable at a fixed period
after date, after sight, or after the happening of a specified
event, the time of payment is determined by excluding the
day from which the time is to begin to run, and by including
[1 46.

J

the date of payment.

SECTION

158.

RULE WHERE INSTRUMENT PAYABLE AT BANK.
[147.]

Where the instrument is made payable

at a

bank

PRESENTMENT
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FOR

PAYMENT.

[CHAP.

3 1,

it is equivalent to an order to the bank to pay the same for
the account of the principal debtor thereon.

SECTION

159.

WHAT CONSTITUTES PAYMENT IN DUE COURSE.
Payment is made in due course when it is made
maturity of the instrument to the holder thereof in good faith and without notice that his title is defective.
[148.

J

at or after the

CHAPTER XXXII.
Notice of Dishonor.

SECTION

160.

TO WHOM NOTICE OF DISHONOR

Except

MUST BE GIVEN.

herein otherwise provided, when a negotiable instrument has been dishonored by non-acceptance
or non-payment, notice of dishonor must be given to the
drawer and to each indorser, and any drawer or indorser to
whom such notice is not given is discharged.

[i6o.]

as

SECTION

161.

BY WHOM GIVEN.
The notice may be given by or on behalf of the
[161.J
holder, or by or on behalf of any party to the instrument who
might be compelled to pay it to the holder, and who, upon
taking it up would have a right to reimbursement from the
party to whom the notice is given.

SECTION

162.

NOTICE GIVEN BY AGENT.
Notice of dishonor may be given by an agent
[162. J
either in his own name or in the name of any party entitled
to give notice, whether that party be his principal or not.

SECTION
EFFECT OF NOTICE GIVEN

163.

ON

BEHALF OF HOLDER.

Where notice is given by or on behalf of the
[163.]
holder, it enures for the benefit of all subsequent holders and

NOTICE

5l6

all prior parties who have
party to whom it is given.

OF

a

DISHONOR.

right of recourse

SECTION

[CHAP.

against

32,

the

164.

EFFECT WHERE NOTICE IS GIVEN BY PARTY ENTITLED
THERETO.

Where notice is given by or on behalf of a party
[164. J
entitled to give notice, it enures for the benefit of the holder
and all parties subsequent to the party to whom notice is
given.

SECTION

165.

WHEN AGENT MAY GIVE NOTICE.
Where the instrument has been dishonored in
[165. J
the hands of an agent, he may either himself give notice to
the parties liable thereon, or he may give notice to his principal.
the

If

he give notice to his principal, he must do so within
same time as if he were the holder, and the principal

upon the receipt of such notice has himself the same time for
giving notice as if the agent had been an independent holder.

SECTION

166.

WHEN NOTICE SUFFICIENT.
A written notice need not be signed, and an in[166.]
sufficient written notice may be supplemented and validated
A misdescription of the instruby verbal communication.
ment does not vitiate the notice unless the party to whom
the notice is given is in fact misled thereby.

SECTION

167.

FORM OF NOTICE.
[167.
may

be

J

The notice may be in writing or merely oral and

given

in any terms which sufficiently identify the

SEC.

1

NOTICE

68.]

OF

DISHONOR.
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instrument, and indicate that it lias been dishonored by nonIt may in all cases be given by
acceptance or non-payment.
delivering it personally or through the mails.

SECTION

168.

TO WHOM NOTICE MAY BE GIVEN.
Notice of dishonor may be given
[168.]
party himself or to his agent in that behalf.

SECTION

either to the

169.

NOTICE WHERE PARTY IS DEAD.

if,

"When any party is dead, and his death is known
[169. J
to the party giving notice, the notice must be given to a perwith reasonable
sonal representative, if there be one, and

there be no personal representative, notice may be sent to the last residence or last place

If

he can be found.

diligence,

of business of the deceased.

SECTION

170.

NOTICE TO PARTNERS.

J

[170.

Where the parties to be notified are partners,
is

notice to any one partner
there has been a dissolution.

notice to the firm even though

SECTION

171.

NOTICE TO PERSONS JOINTLY LIABLE.
to joint parties who are not partners
each of them, unless one of them has
authority to receive such notice for the others.

J

Notice
[17 1.
must be given to

NOTICE

51^

OF

DISHONOR.

SECTION

[CHAP. 32,

172.

NOTICE TO BANKRUPT.
party has been adjudged a bankrupt or
an insolvent, or has made an assignment for the benefit of
creditors, notice may be given either to the party himself or
[172.

J

Where

a

to his trustee or assignee.

SECTION

173.^

TIME WITHIN WHICH NOTICE MUST BE GIVEN.
instrument
[173.] Notice may be given as soon as the
is dishonored; and unless delay is excused as hereinafter provided, must be given within the times fixed by this act.

SECTION

174.

WHERE PARTIES RESIDE IN SAME PLACE.
person giving and the person to receive notice reside in the same place, notice must be given
within the following times:
If given at the place of business of the person to
1.
receive notice, it must be given before the close of business
hours on the day following;
If given at his residence, it must be given before the
2.
[174.

J

Where

the

usual hours of rest on the day following;
If sent by mail, it must be deposited in the postoffice
3.
in time to reach him in usual course on the day following.

SECTION

175.

WHERE PARTIES RESIDE IN DIFFERENT PLACES.
Where the person giving and the person to re[175.]
ceive notice reside in different places, the notice must be given
within the following times:

SEC.

176. J

NOTICE

OF DISHONOR.
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If

sent by mail, it must be deposited in the postoffice
in time to go by mail the day following the day of dishonor,
1.

or if there be no mail at a convenient hour on that day, by
the next mail thereafter.
2.
If given otherwise than through the postoffice, then
within the time that notice would have been received in due
course of mail, if it had been deposited in the postoffice
within the time specified in the last subdivision.

SECTION

176.

WHEN SENDER DEEMED TO HAVE GIVEN DUE NOTICE.
[176.

J

Where notice of dishonor is duly addressed and

deposited in the postoffice, the sender is deemed to have given
due notice, notwithstanding any miscarriage in the mails.

SECTION

177.

DEPOSIT IN POSTOFFICE; WHAT CONSTITUTES.
Notice is deemed to have been deposited in the
[177. J
postoffice when deposited in any branch postoffice or in any
letter box under the control of the postoffice department.

SECTION

178.

NOTICE TO SUBSEQUENT PARTY; TIME OF.
Where a party receives notice of dishonor, he
[178.]
has, after the receipt of such notice, the same time for giving
notice to antecedent parties that the holder has after the dishonor.

SECTION

179.

WHERE NOTICE MUST BE SENT.
Where a party has added an address to his sig[179.]
nature, notice of dishonor must be sent to that address; but

NOTICE
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if

he has not given

as

follows:

OF

DISHONOR.

[CHAP. 32,

such address, then the note must be sent

Either to the postoffice nearest to his place of resi-

1.

dence, or to the postoffice

where he is accustomed to receive

his letters; or

If

place, and have his place of business in another, notice may be sent to either place; or
If he is sojourning in another place, notice may be
3.
2.

he live in one

sent to the place where he is so sojourning.
But where the notice is actually received by the party

time specified in this act, it will be sufficient,
though not sent in accordance with the requirements of this
within

the

section.

SECTION

180.

WAIVER OF NOTICE.
Notice of dishonor may be waived, either before
[180]
the time of giving notice has arrived, or after the omission to
give due notice,

and the waiver may be express or implied.

SECTION
WHOM AFFECTED

181.

BY WAIVER.

Where the waiver is embodied in the instrument
itself, it is binding upon all parties; but where it is written
above the signature of an indorser it binds him only.
[181.

J

SECTION

182.

WAIVER OF PROTEST.
A waiver of protest, whether in the case of a
foreign bill of exchange or other negotiable instrument, is
deemed to be a waiver not only of a formal protest, but also
of presentment and notice of dishonor.
[182].

SEC.

183.

NOTICE

]

OF

DISHONOR.

SECTION

52

1

183.

WHEN NOTICE IS DISPENSED WITH.
Notice of dishonor is dispensed with when, after
the exercise of reasonable diligence, it cannot be given to or
does not reach the parties sought to be charged.
[183].

SECTION

184.

DELAY IN GIVING NOTICE; HOW EXCUSED.
Delay in giving notice of dishonor is excused
[184].
when the delay is caused by circumstances beyond the control
of the holder and not imputable to his default, misconduct or
When the cause of delay ceases to operate, nonegligence.
tice must be given with reasonable diligence.

SECTION

185.

WHEN NOTICE NEED NOT BE GIVEN TO DRAWER.
Notice of honor is not required to be given to
the drawer in either of the following cases:
1.
Where the drawer and drawee are the same person;
2.
Where the drawee is a fictitious person or a person
not having capacity to contract;
Where the drawer is the person to whom the instru3.
[185].

ment is presented for payment;
Where the drawer has no right to expect or require
4.
that the drawee or acceptor will honor the instrument;
5.

Where the drawer has countermanded payment;

SECTION

186.

WHEN NOTICE NEED NOT BE GIVEN TO INDORSER.
Notice of dishonor is not required to be given to
[186].
an indorser in either of the following cases:

NOTICE
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OF

DISHONOR.

[CHAP.

32,

Where the drawee is a fictitious person or a person
not having capacity to contract, and the indorser was aware
of the fact at the time he indorsed the instrument;
2.
Where the indorser is the person to whom the instrument is presented for payment;
Where the instrument was made or accepted for his
3.
accommodation.
1.

SECTION

187.

NOTICE OF NON-PAYMENT WHERE ACCEPTANCE
REFUSED.
Where due notice of dishonor by non-acceptance
[187].
has been given, notice of a subsequent dishonor by non-payment is not necessary, unless in the meantime the instrument
has been accepted.

SECTION

188.

EFFECT OF OMMISSION TO GIVE NOTICE OF NONACCEPTANCE.

An omission to give notice of dishonor by non[188].
acceptance does not prejudice the fights of a holder in due
course subsequent

to the omission.

SECTION

189.

WHEN PROTEST NEED NOT BE MADE; WHEN MUST BE
MADE.
Where any negotiable instrument has been disdonored it may be protested for non-acceptance or non-payment, as the case may be; but protest is not required, except
in the case of foreign bills of exchange.
[189].

CHAPTER XXXIII.
Discharge of Negotiable Instruments.

SECTION
INSTRUMENT;
[200].

190.

HOW DISCHARGED.

A negotiable instrument

By payment in due course

1.

is discharged:
by or on behalf of the

debtor;

principal

By payment in due course by the party accommo-

2.

dated, where the instrument is made

or accepted for accom-

modation;
3.

4.

By the intentional cancellation thereof by the holder;
By any other act which will discharge a simple con-

tract for the payment of money.
When the principal debtor becomes the holder of
5.
the instrument at or after maturity in his own right.

SECTION

191.

WHEN PERSONS SECONDARILY LIABLE ON, DISCHARGED.
[20

1.

J

A person secondarily liable on the instrument is

discharged:
1.

2.

By any act which discharges the instrument;
By the intentional cancellation of his signature by the

holder;
3.

4.
5.

By the discharge of a prior party;
By a valid tender of payment made by a prior party;
By a release of the principal debtor, unless the

holder's right of recourse against the party secondarily liable
is expressly reserved;
6.
By any agreement binding upon the holder to extend
the time of payment or to postpone the holder's right to en-

DISCHARGE
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OF

NEGOTIABLE

INSTRUMENTS.

[CHAP.

33,

force the instrument, unless the right of recourse against such

party is expressly reserved.

SECTION

192.

RIGHT OF PARTY WHO DISCHARGES INSTRUMENT.
Where the instrument is paid by a party secondarily liable thereon, it is not discharged; but the party so paying it is remitted to his former rights as regards all prior parties, and he may strike out his own and all subsequent indorsements, and again negotiate the instrument, except:
1.
Where it is payable to the order of a third person,
and has been paid by the drawer; and
2.
Where it was made or accepted for accommodation,
[202. J

and has been paid by the party accommodated.

SECTION

193.

RENUNCIATION BY HOLDER.
[203.]

The holder may expressly renounce his rights

against any party to the instrument, before, at or after its maAn absolute an unconditional renunciation of his
turity.

rights against the principal debtor made at or after the maturity
But a renunof the instrument, discharges the instrument.
ciation does not affect the rights of a holder in due course
A renunciation must be in writing, unless the
without notice.
instrument is delivered up to the person primarily liable
thereon.

SECTION
CANCELLATION;

194.

UNINTENTIONAL;

BURDEN OF PROOF.

A cancellation made unintentionally,

or under a
mistake, or without the authority of the holder, is inoperative;
but where an instrument or any signature thereon appears to
have been cancelled, the burden of proof lies on the party who
[204.

J

SEC.

195.

DISCHARGE

]

OF

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

alleges that the cancellation was made unintentionally,
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or un-

der a mistake, or without authority.

SECTION

195.

ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENT; EFFECT OF.
negotiable instrument is materially altered without the assent of all parties liable thereon, it is
avoided, except as against a party who has himself made, authorized or assented to the alteration and subsequent indorsers.
But when an instrument has been materially altered
and is in the hands of a holder in due course, not a party to
the alteration, he may enforce payment thereof according to
I"

205.

]

Where

a

its original tenor.

SECTION
WHAT CONSTITUTES
[206.

I.

2
3

4
5

J

The
The
The
The
The

196.

A MATERIAL ALTERATION.

Any alteration which changes:
date;
sum payable, either for principal or interest;
time or place of payment;

number or the relations of the parties;
medium or currency in which payment is to be

made

place of payment where no place of payment is specified, or any other change or addition which alters
the effect of the instrument in any respect, is a material alteration.

Or which adds

a

CHAPTER XXXIV.
Bills of Exchange; Form and Interpretation.
SECTION

197.

BILL OF EXCHANGE DEFINED.
unconditional order in
addressed by one person to another, signed by the
giving it, requiring the person to whom it is addressed
on demand or at a fixed determinable future time a sum
in money to order or to bearer.

[210.]
writing
person

to pay
certain

A bill of exchange

is an

SECTION

198.

BILL NOT AN ASSIGNMENT OF FUNDS IN HANDS OF
DRAWEE.

[211.]

A bill of itself does not operate

as an assignment

of the funds in the hands of the drawee available for the payment thereof, and the drawee is not liable on the bill unless
and until he accepts the same.

SECTION

199.

BILL ADDRESSED TO MORE THAN ONE DRAWEE.
J A bill may be addressed to two or more drawees
jointly, whether they are partners or not; but not to two or
more drawees in the alternative or in succession.
[2

1

2.

SECTION

200.

INLAND AND FOREIGN BILLS OF EXCHANGE.i

V.

An inland bill of exchange is a bill which is, or
[213.]
'
See English Bills of Exchange Act, Sec. 4; Commercial Bk.
Varnum, 49 N. Y., 269.

SEC.

BILLS

20I.]

OF

EXCHANGE.
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on its face purports to be, both drawn and payable within this
state.
Any other bill is a foreign bill.
Unless the contrary
appears on the face of the bill, the holder

may treat it as an

inland bill.

SECTION

201.

WHEN BILL MAY BE TREATED AS PROMISSORY NOTE.i
[2

1 4.

J

Where in

a

bill drawer and drawee are the same

or where the drawee is a fictitious person, or a person
not having capacity to contract, the holder may treat the instrument, at his option, either as a bill of exchange or a prom-

person,

issory note.

SECTION

202.

DRAWEE IN CASE OF NEED."
[2

1

5.

J

The drawer of

a

bill and any indorser may insert

thereon the name of a person to whom the holder may resort
in case of need, that is to say, in case the bill is dishonored

Such person is called
the referee in case of need.
It is in the option of the holder
to resort to the referee in case of need or not as he may see
by non-acceptance

or non-payment.

fit.

'See English Bills of Exchange Act, Sec.
Thompson, 3 M. & Or., 576; Smith v. Bellamy,
Daniel, Sec. 131.
^

See

English Bills of Exchange Act, Sec.

15.

(2); Miller v.

5
2

Stark.,

223^

CHAPTER XXXV.
Acceptance of Bills of Exchange.

SECTION

203.

ACCEPTANCE; HOW MADE, ET CETERA.
The acceptance of a bill is the signification by
[220, J
The acthe drawee of his assent to the order of the drawer.
It
ceptance must be in writing and signed by the drawer.
must not express that the drawee will perform his promise by
any other means than the payment of money.

SECTION

204.

HOLDER ENTITLED TO ACCEPTANCE ON FACE OF BILL.
[22

1.

J

The holder of

a

bill presenting the same for ac-

ceptance may require that the acceptance be written on the
bill and if such request is refused, may treat the bill as dishonored.

SECTION

205.

ACCEPTANCE BY SEPARATE INSTRUMENT.
[222. J

Where an acceptance is written on

a

paper other

than the bill itself, it does not bind the acceptor except in
favor of a person to whom it is shown and who, on the faith
thereof, receives the bill for value.

SECTION

206.

PROMISE TO ACCEPT; WHEN EQUIVALENT TO
ACCEPTANCE
[223.]

An unconditional promise in writing to accept

a

bill before it is drawn is deemed an actual acceptance in favor

SEC.

207.

J

ACCEPTANCE

OF

BILLS

OF

EXCHANGE.

of every person who, upon the faith thereof, receives the
for value.

SECTION

529.

bill

207.

TIME ALLOWED DRAWEE TO ACCEPT.
The drawee is allowed twenty-four

hours after
presentment in which to decide whether or not he will accept
the bill; but the acceptance if given dates as of the day of
presentation.
[224.

]

SECTION

LIABILITY

208.

OF DRAWEE RETAINING OR DESTROYING

BILL.'

Where

J

a drawee

to whom a

bill is delivered

for
destroys the same, or refuses within twenty-four
hours after such delivery, or within such other period as the
holder may allow, to return the bill accepted or non-accepted
to the holder, he will be deemed to have accepted the same.
[22 5.
acceptance

SECTION

209.

ACCEPTANCE OF INCOMPLETE BILL.^
A bill may be accepted before it has been signed
[226. j
by the drawer, or while otherwise incomplete, or when it is
or after it has been dishonored by a previous refusal
to accept, or by non-payment.
But when a bill payable after
sight is dishonored by non-acceptance and the drawee subsethe holder, in the absence of any different
quently accepts
entitled to have the bill accepted as of the date
agreement,
of the first presentment.
is

it,

overdue,

ii

Hun., 268; Gates v. Erie, 4Hun., 96.
'See English Bills of Exchange Act, Sec. 18.
'Mattesonv. Moulton,

ACCEPTANCE
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OF

BILLS

SECTION

OF

[CHAP. 35,

EXCHANGE.

210.

KINDS OF ACCEPTANCES.'
An acceptance is either general or qualified. A
[227. j
general acceptance assents without qualification to the order
A qualified acceptance in express terms varies
of the drawer.
the effect of the bill as drawn.

SECTION

211.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A GENERAL ACCEPTANCE.

-

An acceptance to pay at a particular place is a
general acceptance unless it expressly states that the bill is to
be paid there only and not elsewhere.
[228.

]

SECTION

212.

QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE.
An acceptance is qualified, which is:
[229.]
Conditional, that is to say, which makes payment by
1.
the acceptor dependent on the fulfillment of a condition therein
stated;
Partial, that is to say, an acceptance to pay part only
2.
of the amount for which the bill is drawn;
Local, that is to say, an acceptance to pay part only
3.
at a particular place;
4.
Qualified as to time;
5.

The acceptance of some one or more of the drawees,

but not of all.

SECTION

213.

RIGHTS OF PARTIES AS TO QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE.
[230,

J

The holder may refuse to take

a

ance, and if he does not obtain an unqualified
'
^

qualified acceptacceptance,

English Bills of Exchange Act, Sec. 19.
See English Bills of Exchange Act, Sec. 19 (2 c).
See

he

SEC.

213.]

may treat the

ACCEPTANCE

bill

OF

BILLS

OF

EXCHANGE.

S3I

dishonored by non-acceptance.
Where
a qualified acceptance is taken, the drawer and indorsers are
discharged from liability on the bill, unless they have expressly
or impliedly authorized the holder to take a qualified acceptance, or subsequently assent thereto.
When the drawer or
receives
notice
of
a
indorser
qualified acceptance, he must
a
reasonable
time
within
express his dissent to the holder, or
he will be deemed to have assented thereto.
as

CHAPTER XXXVI.
Presentment of Bills of Exchange for Acceptance.

SECTION
WHEN PRESENTMENT

214.

FOR ACCEPTANCE MUST BE MADE

[240. J Presentment for acceptance must be made:
Where the bill is payable after sight, or in any other
1.
case where presentment for acceptance is necessary in order
to fix the maturity of the instrument; or
2.
Where the bill expressly stipulates that it shall be
presented for acceptance; or
Where the bill is drawn payable elsewhere than at the
3.
residence

or place of business of the drawee.

In no other case is presentment for acceptance
in order to render any party to the bill liable.

SECTION

necessary

215.

WHEN FAILURE TO PRESENT RELEASES DRAWER AND
INDORSER.
[241. J Except as herein otherwise provided, the holder
of a bill which is required by the next preceding section to be
presented for acceptance must either present it for acceptance
or negotiate it within a reasonable time.
If he fails to do so,
the drawer and also indorsers are discharged.

SECTION
PRESENTMENT;

216.

HOW MADE.

Presentment for acceptance must be made by or
on behalf of the holder at a reasonable hour, on a business
[242.

]

SEC.

217.

J

PRESENTMENT

day, and before the

EXCHANGE,

OF

bill is overdue,

person authorized to accept
half; and
1.
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drawee

or some

or refuse acceptance on his be-

Where a bill is addressed

to

two or more drawees

who are not partners, presentment must be made to them all,
unless one has authority to accept or refuse acceptance for all,
in which case presentment may be made to him only;
2.
Where the drawee is dead, presentment may be made
to his personal representative;

Where the drawee has been adjudged

bankrupt or
an insolvent, or has made an assignment for the benefit of
creditors, presentment may be made to him or to his trustee
3.

a

or assignee.

SECTION
ON

217.

WHAT DAYS PRESENTMENT

MAY BE MADE.

[243. J A bill may be presented for acceptance on any
day on which negotiable instruments may be presented for
payment under the provisions of sections seventy-two and
When Saturday is not otherwise a
eighty-five of this act.
holiday, presentment for acceptance may be made before
twelve o'clock noon on that day.

SECTION

218.

PRESENTMENT WHERE TIME IS INSUFFICIENT.
Where the holder of a bill drawn payable else[244. ]
where than at the place of business or the residence of the
drawee has not time, with the exercise of reasonable diligence,,
to present the

bill for acceptance before presenting it for pay-

it falls due, the delay caused by presenting the bill for acceptance before presenting it for payment
is excused and does not discharge the drawers and indorsers.
ment on the day that

SECTION

219.

WHERE PRESENTMENT
[245.

J

IS EXCUSED.

Presentment for acceptance is excused and a bill

PRESENTMENT
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EXCHANGE.

[CHAP.

36,

may be treated as dishonored by non-acceptance in either of
the following cases:
1.
Where the drawee is dead, or has absconded, or is a

fictitious person, or a person not having capacity to contract
by

bill;
Where,

after the exercise of reasonable diligence,
presentment cannot be made;
Where, although presentment has been irregular, ac3.
ceptance has been refused on some other ground.
2.

SECTION

220.

WHEN DISONORED BY NON-ACCEPTANCE.
A bill is dishonored by non-acceptance:
When it is duly presented for acceptance, and such

[246.
1.

J

an acceptance

as is

prescribed by this act is refused

or cannot

be obtained; or
2.

When presentment for acceptance is excused and the

bill is not accepted.

SECTION

221.

DUTY OF HOLDER WHERE BILL NOT ACCEPTED.
[247. J Where a bill
and is not accepted within
presenting it must treat the
ance or he loses the right of

is duly presented for acceptance
the prescribed time, the person

bill

dishonored by non-acceptrecourse against the drawer and
as

indorsers.

SECTION

222.

RIGHTS OF HOLDER WHERE BILL NOT ACCEPTED.
[248. J When a bill is dishonored by non-acceptance, an
immediate right of recourse against the drawers and indorsers
accrues to the holder and no presentment for payment is necessary.

CHAPTER XXXVII.
Protest of Bills of Exchange.

SECTION

223.

IN WHAT CASES PROTEST NECESSARY.
[260. j Where a foreign bill appearing on its face to be
such is dishonored by non-acceptance, it must be duly protested for non-acceptance, and where such a bill which has
not previously been dishonored by non-acceptance is dishonored by non-payment, it must be duly protested for nonif it is not so protested, the drawers and indorsers
payment,
are discharged.
Where a bill does not appear on its face to
be a foreign bill, protest thereof in case of hishonor is unnecessary.

SECTION

224

PROTEST; HOW MADE.

if

3.

it,

[261. J The protest must be annexed to the bill, or must
contain a copy thereof, and must be under the hand and seal
and must specify:
•f the notary making
1.
The time and place of presentment;
2.
The fact that presentment was made and the manner
thereof;
The cause or reason for protesting the bill;
any, or
The demand made and the answer given,
4.
the fact that the drawee or acceptor could not be found.

SECTION

225.

PROTEST; BY WHOM MADE.
I.

A

j

[262.

Protest may be made by:
notary public; or

PROTEST
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[CHAP.

37,

By any respectable resident of the place where the
bill is dishonored, in the presence of two or more credible
2.

witnesses.

SECTION

226.

PROTEST; WHEN TO BE MADE.
When a bill is protested, such protest must be
[263. J
made on the day of its dishonor, unless delay is excused as
herein provided.
When a bill has been duly noted, the protest

may

be

subsequently extended

as

of

the

date

of

the

noting.

SECTION

227.

PROTEST; WHERE MADE.
[264. J A bill must be protested at the place where it is
dishonored, except that when a bill drawn payable at the
place of business or residence of some person other than the
drawee, has been dishonored by non-acceptance, it must be
protested for non-payment at the place where it is expressed
to be payable, and no further presentment for payment to, or
demand on, the drawee is necessary.

SECTION

228.

PROTEST BOTH FOR NON-ACCEPTANCE AND NONPAYMENT.
A bill which has been protested for non-acceptance may be subsequently protested for non-payment.
[265. J

SECTION

229.

PROTEST BEFORE MATURITY WHERE ACCEPTOR
INSOLVENT.
Where the acceptor has been adjudged

bankrupt or an insolvent or has made an assignment for the benefit
[266.

]

a

SEC.

230.

J

PROTEST

OF
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of creditors, before the bill matures, the holder may cause the
bill to be protested for better security against the drawer and
indorsers.

SECTION

230.

WHEN PROTEST DISPENSED WITH.'
Protest is dispensed with by any circumstances
which would dispense with notice of dishonor.
Delay in notor
ing
protesting is excused when delay is caused by circumstances beyond the control of the holder and not imputable to
his default, misconduct or negligence.
When the cause of
ceases
to
delay
operate, the bill must be noted or protested
with reasonable diligence.

[267.]

SECTION

231.

PROTEST WHERE BILL IS LOST,

ETC

a

it,

[268. J Where a bill is lost or destroyed or is wrongly
detained from the person entitled to hold
protest may be
made on
copy or written particulars thereof.

This

English Bills of Exchange Act, sec.
etc.,
Bush, (Ky.), 82; Daniel on

is

2

quoted directly from
Act, sec. 51, subd. 8.

4

'

is

This
taken from the
subd. 9; Morgan v. Bank,
Neg. Inst., sec. 730.

51,

the

English Bills of Exchange

CHAPTER XXXVIII.
Acceptance of Bills of Exchange for Honor.

SECTION

232.

WHEN BILLS MAY BE ACCEPTED FOR HONOR.
[280. ] Where a bill of exchange has been protested for
dishonor by non-acceptance or protested for better security
and is not overdue, any person not being a party already
liable thereon, may, with the consent of the holder, intervene and accept the bill supra protest for the honor of any
party liable thereon or for the honor of the person whose acThe acceptance for honor may be
count the bill is drawn.
for part only of the sum for which the bill is drawn; and
where there has been an acceptance for honor for one party,
there may be a further acceptance by a different person for
the honor of another party.

SECTION

233.

ACCEPTANCE FOR HONOR; HOW MADE.
[281. j An acceptance for honor supra protest must be
be in writing and indicate that it is an acceptance for honor,
and must be signed by the acceptor for honor.

SECTION

284

WHEN DEEMED TO BE AN ACCEPTANCE FOR HONOR OF
THE DRAWER.
When an acceptance for honor does not ex[282. J
pressly state for whose honor it is made, it is deemed to be
an acceptance

for the honor of the drawer.

SEC.

ACCEPTANCE

235.]

OF

BILLS

SECTION

LIABILITY

OF

EXCHANGE.
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235.

OF ACCEPTOR FOR HONOR.

The acceptor for honor is Hable to the holder
and all parties to the bill subsequent to the party for whose
[283.

J

honor he has accepted.

SECTION

236.

AGREEMENT OF ACCEPTOR FOR HONOR.
The acceptor for honor by such acceptance en[284. J
gages that he will on due presentment pay the bHl according
to the terms of his acceptance, provided it shall not have been
and provided also that it shall have been
duly presented for payment and protested for non-payment
and notice of dishonor given to him.
paid by the drawee,

SECTION

237.

MATURITY OF BILL PAYABLE AFTER SIGHT; ACCEPTED
FOR HONOR.

Where a bill payable after sight is accepted for
[285.]
honor, its maturity is calculated from the date of the noting
for non-acceptance and not from the date of the acceptance
for honor.

SECTION

238.

PROTEST OF BILL ACCEPTED FOR HONOR, ET CETERA.
Where a dishonored bill has been accepted for
[286.]
honor snpra protest or contains a reference in case of need,
it must be protested for non-payment before it is presented for
payment to the acceptor for honor or referee in case of
need.
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[CHAP. 38,

239.

FOR PAYMENT TO ACCEPTOR FOR HONOR;
HOW MADE.

Presentment for payment
[287. J
honor must be made as follows:

to

the

acceptor for

If it

is to be presented in the place where the protest
for non-payment was made, it must be presented not later
1.

than the day following its maturity.
If it is to be presented in some other place than the
2.
place where it was protested, then it must be forwarded within
'
the time specified in section one hundred and four.

SECTION

240.

WHEN DELAY IN MAKING PRESENTMENT
[288.

J

IS EXCUSED.

The provisions of section eighty-one apply where

delay in making presentment to the acceptor for
honor or referee in case of need.^

there

is

SECTION

241.

DISHONOR OF BILL BY ACCEPTOR FOR HONOR.
When the bill is dishonored by the acceptor for
honor it must be protested for non-payment by him.

[289.]

'So in original.

There is no section 104, probably means sec.

175^

So in original.

Probably means sec. 141.

CHAPTER XXXIX.
Payment of Bills of Exchange for Honor.

SECTION

242.

WHO MAY MAKE PAYMENT FOR HONOR.

Where a bill has been protested for non-payment
[300. J
any person may intervene and pay it supra protest for the
honor of any person liable thereon or for the honor of the
person for whose account it was drawn.

SECTION

243.

PAYMENT FOR HONOR; HOW MADE.
[301.]

The payment for honor supra protest, in order

to operate as such and not as a mere voluntary payment, must
be attested by a notarial act of honor, which may be appended
to the protest or form an extension to it.

SECTION
DECLARATION

244.

BEFORE PAYMENT FOR HONOR.

The notarial act of honor must be founded on a
[302.]
declaration made by the payer for honor or by his agent in
that behalf declaring his intention to pay the bill for honor
and for whose honor he pays.

SECTION

245.

PREFERENCE OF PARTIES OFFERING TO PAY FOR HONOR.
Where two or more persons oiler to pay a bill for
the honor of different parties, the person whose payment will
[303.

J

PAYMENT
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[CHAP. 39,

discharge most parties to the bill is to be given the preference.

SECTION
EFFECT

ON

246.

SUBSEQUENT PARTIES WHERE BILL IS PAID
FOR HONOR.

Where a bill has been paid for honor, all parties
subsequent to the party for whose honor it is paid are discharged, but the payer for honor is subrogated for, and succeeds to, both the rights and duties of the holder as regards
the party for whose honor he pays and all parties liable to the
latter.
[304. J

SECTION

247.

WHERE HOLDER REFUSES TO RECEIVE PAYMENT SUPRA
PROTEST.
[305. J Where the holder of a bill refuses to receive payment supra protest, he loses his right of recourse against any
party who would have been discharged by such payment.

SECTION

248.

RIGHTS OF PAYER FOR HONOR.
The payer for honor on paying to the holder the
[306.]
amount of the bill and the notarial expenses incidental to its
dishonor, is entitled to receive both the bill itself and the
protest.

CHAPTER XL.
Bills in

a

Set.

SECTION

249.

BILLS IN SETS CONSTITUTE ONE BILL.
Where a bill is drawn in a set, each part of the
O.J
numbered
being
and containing a reference to the other
the
whole
of
the parts constitute one bill.
parts,
[3

1

set

SECTION

250.

RIGHTS OF HOLDERS WHERE DIFFERENT PARTS ARE
NEGOTIATED.
Where two or more parts of a set are negotiated
[311.]
to different holders in due course, the holder whose title first
accrues is as between such holders the true owner of the bill.
But nothing in this section affects the rights of a person who
in due course accepts or pays the part first presented to him.

SECTION

251.

LIABILITY

OF HOLDER WHO INDORSES TWO OR MORE
PARTS OF A SET TO DIFFERENT PERSONS.

Where the holder of a set indorses two or more
[312. J
parts to different persons he is liable on every such part, and
every indorser subsequent to him is liable on the part he has
himself indorsed, as if such parts were separate bills.

BILLS
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IN A SET.

SECTION

[CHAP. 40,

252.

ACCEPTANCE OF BILLS DRAWN IN SETS.
[313.

J

The acceptance may be written on any part and

If the drawee accepts
written on one part only.
more than one part, and such accepted parts are negotiated
to different holders in due course, he is liable on every such
part as if it were a separate bill.

it must

be

SECTION

253.

PAYMENT BY ACCEPTOR OF BILLS DRAWN IN SETS.
[314. J When the acceptor of a bill drawn in a set pays
it without requiring the part bearing his acceptance to be delivered up to him, and that part at maturity is outstanding in
the hands of a holder in due course, he is liable to the holder
thereon.

SECTION

254.

EFFECT OF DISCHARGING ONE OF A SET.
[315. J Except as herein otherwise provided, where any
one part of a bill drawn in a set is discharged by payment or
otherwise the whole bill is discharged.

CHAPTER XLI.
Promissory Notes and Checks.
SECTION

255.

PROMISSORY NOTE DEFINED.
A negotiable promissory note within the mean[320. J
ing of this act is an unconditional promise in writing made by
one person to another signed by the maker engaging to pay
on demand or at a fixed

or determinable future time, a sum
certain in money to order or to bearer.
Where a note is
drawn to the maker's own order, it is not complete until indorsed by him.

SECTION

256.

CHtCK UHFINED.
A check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank
[321.]
payable on demand.
Except as herein otherwise provided,
the provisions of this act applicable to a bill of exchange payable on demand apply to a check.

SECTION

257.

WITHIN WHAT TIME A CHECK MUST BE PRESENTED.
A check must be presented for payment within
[322. J
a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused
by the delay.'
'See Culver

V.

Marks,

122

Ind., 554;

22

N. E. Rep., 1086.
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SECTION

[CHAP. 4I,

258.

CERTIFICATION OF CHECK; EFFECT OF.
Where a check is certified by the bank on which
it is drawn the certificate is equivalent to an acceptance.
[323.

]

SECTION

259.

EFFECT WHERE THE HOLDER OF CHECK PROCURES IT
TO BE CERTIFIED.
Where the holder of a check procures it to be
[324. J
accepted or certified the drawer and all indorsers are discharged from liability thereon, i

SECTION

260.

WHEN CHECK OPERATES AS AN ASSIGNMENT.
A check of itself does not operate as an assign[325. J
ment of any part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with
the bank, and the bank is not liable to the holder, unless and
until it accepts or certifies the check.

'Minot

V.

Russ,

156

Mass., 458.

CHAPTER XLII.
Notes Given for a Patent Rights and for a Speculative
Consideration.

SECTION

261.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT GIVEN FOR PATENT RIGHTS.
[330.]

A promissory note or other negotiable instru-

ment, the consideration

of which consists wholly or partly of
the right to make, use or sell any invention claimed or represented by the vendor at the time of sale to be patented, must
contain the words "given for a patent right" prominently and
legibly written or printed on the face of such note or instrument above the signature thereto; and such note or instrument in the hands of any purchaser or holder is subject to the
same defenses as in the hands of the original holder; but this
section does not apply to a negotiable instrument given solely
for the purchase price or the use of a patented article.

SECTION

262.

NEOTIABLE INSTRUMENT FOR A SPEOULATIVE
ERATION.

CONSID-

[331. j If the consideration of a promissory note or
other negotiable instrument consists in whole or in part of the
purchase-price of any farm product, at a price greater by at
least four times than the fair market value of the same product at the time, in the locality, or of the membership and
rights in an association, company or combination to produce
or sell any farm product at a fictitious rate, or of a contract or
bond to purchase or sell any farm product at a price greater
by four times than the market value of the same product at

NOTES
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[CHAP.

42,

time in the locality, the words, "given for a speculative
consideration," or other words clearly showing the nature of
the consideration, must be prominently and legibly written or
printed on the face of such note or instrument above the signature thereof; and such note or instrument, in the hands of
any purchaser or holder, is subject to the same defenses as in
the hands of the original owner or holder.
the

SECTION

263.

HOW NEGOTIABLE BONDS ARE MADE NON-NEGOTIABLE.
[332.

J

The owner or holder of any corporate or muni-

cipal bond or obligation (except such as are designated to circulate as money, payable to bearer), heretofore or hereafter
issued in and payable in this State, but not registered in pursuance of any State law, may make such bond or obligation,
or the interest coupon accompanying the same, non-negotiable, by subscribing his name to a statement indorsed thereon,
that such bond, obligation or coupon is his property; and
thereon the principal sum therein mentioned is payable only
to such owner or holder, or his legal representatives or assigns,
unless such bond, obligation or coupon be transferred by indorsement in blank, or payable to bearer, or to order, with
the addition of the assignor's place of residence.

CHAPTER XLIII.
Laws Repealed; When to Take Effect.
SECTION

264.

LAW REPEALED.
[340.

J

The laws or parts thereof specified in the sched-

ule hereto annexed

are hereby repealed.

SECTION

265.

WHEN TO TAKE EFFECT.
[341.

J

This chapter shall take effect on the first day of

October, eighteen hundred and ninety-seven.

ENGLISH BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACT,
(45

AND 46

Vict., Ch.

61,

Aug.

18,

1882.

1882.)

An Act to Codify the Law Relating to Bills of Exchange,
Cheques,

and Promissory

Notes.

CHAPTER XLIV.
Preliminary.

SECTION

266.

SHORT TITLE.

[i.J

This act may be cited

as

the

Bills of Exchange

Act, 1882.

SECTION

267.

INTERPRETATION OF TERMS.
In this act, unless the context otherwise requires: —
"Acceptance" means an acceptance completed by deliv-

[2.]

ery or notification.

" Action" includes counter-claim and set-off.
" Banker" includes a body of persons, whether incorpor-

ated or not, who carry on the business of banking.
"Bankrupt" includes any person whose estate is vested
in a trustee or assignee, under the law for the time being in
force relating to bankruptcy.

"Bearer"

means

the

person

in

possession

of a bill or

note which is payable to bearer.

"Bill"

means

bill of exchange,

and

"note"

means

promissory note.

" Delivery"

means transfer of possession,
structive, from one person to another.

actual or con-

267.

J

" Holder"

PRELIMINARY.

55

means the payee or endorsee of a

who is in possession

"Indorsement"

bill or note

or the bearer thereof.
means an indorsement completed

of

1

it,

SEC.

print.

a

it

a

'
'

by
delivery.
"
Issue
means the first delivery of
bill or note, comas
holder.
pleted in form, to a person who takes
"Person" includes a body of persons, whether incorporated or not.
"Value" means valuable consideration.
"Written" includes printed, and "writing" includes

CHAPTER XLV.
Bills of Exchange — Form and Interpretation.
SECTION

268.

BILL OF EXCHANGE DEFINED.
[3.

I.

J

A bill

is an unconditional

of exchange

order

it
is

it,

in writing, addressed by one person to another, signed by the
addressed
requiring the person to whom
person giving
a

a

a

fixed or determinable future time,
to pay on demand or at
sum certain in money to or to the order of
specified person,
or to bearer.

An instrument which does not comply with these
conditions, or which orders any act to be done in addition to
not
bill of exchange.
the payment of money,
An order to pay out of
not unparticular fund
conditional within the meaning of this section; but an unqualified order to pay, coupled with {a) an indication of
particto re-imburse himself or
ular fund out of which the drawee
particular account to be debited with the amount, or (d)
statement of the transaction which gives rise to the bill,
unconditional.
bill
not invalid by reason —
4.
not dated;
(a) That

is a

That

(c)

that any value has been given therefor;
That
does not specify the place where
drawn or the place where
payable.

not

specify

the

value

SECTION

given,

or

is

it

it

does

is

{d)

it

it it

is

is

A

a

is

a

3

a

is

a

is

2.

269.

of

it

I.

An inland bill

purports to

be —

a

bill which

is,

[4.J

is

INLAND AND FOREIGN BILLS.
or on the face

(a) both drawn and payable within the

SEC.

FORM AND INTERPRETATION.

270.]

British Islands, or

553

drawn within the British Islands upon
some person resident therein. Any other bill is a foreign bill.
For the purposes of this act ' ' British Islands " mean any
part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland,
the Islands of Man, Guernsey, Jersey, Alderey, and Sark,
and the islands adjacent to any of them being part of the
dominions of Her Majesty.
2.
Unless the contrary appear on the face of the bill
the holder may treat it as an inland bill.
((5)

SECTION

270.

EFFECT WHERE DIFFERENT PARTIES TO BILL ARE THE
SAME PERSON.

I.
[5- J
order of, the

A bill may be drawn payable to, or to the
drawer; or it may be drawn payable to, or to

the order of, the drawee.

Where in

2.

a

bill drawer and drawee are the same

or where the drawee is a fictitious person or a person
not having capacity to contract, the holder may treat the
instrument, at his option, either as a bill of exchange or as a
promissory note.
person,

SECTION

271.

ADDRESS TO DRAWEE.
I.
The drawee must be named or otherwise indi[6.]
cated in a bill with reasonable certainty.
2.
A bill may be addressed to two or more drawees
whether they are partners or not, but an order addressed to
two drawees in the alternative, or two or more drawees in
succession, is not a bill of exchange.

SECTION

272.

CERTAINTY REQUIRED AS TO PAYEE.
[7.

J

I.

Where

a

bill is not payable to bearer,

the
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payee

must

be named or

otherwise indicated

[CHAP. 45,

therein with

reasonable certainty.
2.

A bill may

be made

payable to two or more payees
payable in the alternative to one

jointly, or it may be made
A bill may also be
of two, or one or some of several payees.
made payable to the holder of an office for the time being.
Where the payee is a fictitious or non-existing per3.
son, the bill may be treated as payable to bearer.

SECTION

273.

WHAT BILLS ARE NEGOTIABLE.
I.
When a bill contains words prohibiting trans[8.]
fer, or indicating an intention that it should not be transferable, it is valid as between the parties thereto, but is not
negotiable.
2.

A negotiable bill may be payable either to order or

to bearer.
3.

A bill is payable to bearer which is expressed to

be

so payable, or on which the only or last indorsement is an indorsement in blank.
4.

A bill is payable to order which is expressed

to be

so payable, or which is expressed to be payable to a particular
person, and does not contain words prohibiting transfer or in-

dicating an intention that it should not be transferable.
Where a bill, either originally or by indorsement, is
5.
expressed to be payable to the order of a specified person, and
not to him or his order, it is nevertheless payable to him or
his order at his option.

SECTION

274.

SUMS PAYABLE.

I. The sum payable by a bill is a sum certain
[9.]
within the meaning of this act, although it is required to be
paid —
(a) With interest.
By stated installments.
{i>)

SEC.

275.

J

(c)

{d)
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By Stated

installments, with a provision that
upon default in payment of any installment the
whole shall become due.
According to an indicated rate of exchange, or

according to a rate of exchange to be ascertained as directed by the bill.
2.
Where the sum payable is expressed in words and
also in figures, and there is a discrepancy between the two,
the sum denoted by the words is the amount payable.
Where a bill is expressed to be payable with inter3.
est, unless the instrument otherwise provides, interest runs
from the date of the bill, and if the bill is undated from the
issue thereof.

SECTION
BILL PAYABLE

[lo.J
(«)

275.

ON DEMAND.

I. A bill is payable on demand —
Which is expressed to be payable on demand, or
at sight,

or on presentation;

or

In which no time for payment is expressed.
Where a bill is accepted or indorsed when it is

{b)
2.

it shall, as regards the acceptor who so accepts, or
be deemed
bill payable on
any indorser who so indorses
a

it,

overdue,
demand.

SECTION

276.

BILL PAYABLE AT A FUTURE TIME.

[II.]

a

is

A

determinable future time
payable at
the meaning of this act which
expressed to be
is

within

bill

payable —

At

is

is

a

a

fixed period after date or sight.
fixed period after the occurrence of a
2.
On or at
certain to happen, though the time of
specified event which
happening may be uncertain.
An instrument expressed to be payable on a contingency
not a bill, and the happening of the event does not cure the
1.

defect.

FORM AND INTERPRETATION.
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SECTION

[CHAP.

45,

277.

OMISSION OF DATE IN BILL PAYABLE AFTER DATE.

[i2.j

Where a bill expressed

to be payable at a fixed

period after date is issued undated, or where the acceptance
of a bill payable at a fixed period after sight is undated, any
holder may insert therein the true date of issue or acceptance,
and the bill shall be payable accordingly.
Provided that ( i ) where the holder in good faith and by
mistake inserts a wrong date, and (2) in every case where a
wrong date is inserted, if the bill subsequently comes into the
hands of a holder in due course, the bill shall not be avoided
thereby, but shall operate and be payable as if the date so inserted had been the true date.

SECTION

27.S.

ANTE-DATING AND POST-DATING.
[13.

j

I.

Where

a

bill or an acceptance

or any in-

dorsement on a bill is dated, the date shall, unless the contrary be proved, be deemed to be the true date of the drawing, acceptance or indorsement, as the case may be.
2.
A bill is not invalid by reason only that it is antedated or post-dated, or that it bears date on a Sunday.

SECTION

279.

COMPUTATION OF TIME OF PAYMENT.
Where a bill is not payable on demand, the day
[14.]
on which it falls due is determined as follows:
I.
Three days, called days of grace, are, in every case
where the bill itself does not otherwise provide, added to the
time of payment as fixed by the bill, and the bill is due and
payable on the last day of grace:
Provided that —

SEC.
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280.]

When the last

day of grace falls on Sunday,
Christmas Day, Good Friday, or a day appointed by Royal proclamation as a public
fast or thanksgiving day, the bill
except in
is,

(«)
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the case hereinafter provided for, due and payable on the preceding business day;

When the last day of grace

is

a

bank holiday
(other than Christmas day or Good Friday)
under the Bank Holidays Act, 1871,' and acts
amending or extending
or when the last
of
day
grace
Sunday and the second day
of grace
bank holiday, the bill
due and
payable on the succeeding business day.
is

is

bill

a

is

Where

2.

a

it,

{b)

a

if if

a

a

is

is

is

a

is

payable at a fixed period after date,
after sight, or after the happening of
specified event, the
time of payment
determined by excluding the day from
which the time
to begin to run and by including the day of
payment.
Where
bill
payable at
3.
fixed period after sight,
the time begins to run from the date of the acceptance
the
bill be accepted, and from the date of noting or protest
the
bill be noted or protested for non-acceptance or for nondelivery.
The term "month" in
bill mean calendar month.
4.
a

SECTION

280.

CASE OF NEED.

is

is

a

J

a

The drawer of
bill and any indorser may insert
[15.
therein the name of
person to whom *-he "^older may resort
in case of need, that
to say, in case the bill
dishonored
is

is

by non-acceptance or non-payment.
Such person
called
the referee in case of need.
It
in the option of the holder
to resort to the referee in case of need or not as he may

think fit.
'34 and

35

Vict,

Ch.

17.
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SECTION

[CHAP. 45,

281.

OPTIONAL STIPULATIONS BY DRAWER OR INDORSER.
bill, and any indorser, may insert therein an express stipulation: —
1.
Negativing or limiting his own liability to the holder;
2.
Waiving as regards himself some or all of the hold[1 6.

J

The drawer of

a

er's d'lties.

SECTION
DEFINITION
[17.]

I.

282.

AND REQUISITES

The acceptance

of a

OF ACCEPTANCE.

bill is the signification

by the drawee of his assent to the order of the drawer.

An acceptance is invalid unless it complies with the
following conditions, namely:
(«) It must be written on the bill and be signed by the
2.

{b)

The mere

signature of the drawee
without additional words is sufficient.
It must not express that the drawee will perform
his promise by any other means than the payment of money.
drawee.

SECTION

283.

TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE.
—

is

it,

A bill may be accepted:
[18.]
1.
Before it has been signed by the drawer, or while
otherwise incomplete;
2.
When it is overdue, or after it has been dishonored by a previous refusal to accept, or by non-payment;
When a bill payable after sight is dishonored by
3.
the
non-acceptance, and the drawee subsequently accepts
entitled
holder, in the absence of any different agreement,
to have the bill accepted as of the date of first presentment
to the drawee for acceptance.
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SECTION

[CHAP. 45,

284.

GENERAL AND QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCES.
[19.]
qualified.

I.

An acceptance is either {a) general or (l>\

A general acceptance assents without qualification
A qualified acceptance in express
to the order of the drawer.
terms varies the effect of the bill as drawn.
In particular an acceptance is qualified which is: —
2.

(«)

(d)
(c)

Conditional, that is to say, which makes payment
by the acceptor dependent on the fulfillment
of a condition therein stated;
Partial, that is to say, an acceptance to pay part
only of the amount for which the bill is drawn;

Local, that is to say, an acceptance to pay only
at a particular specified place;
An acceptance to pay at a particular place is a
general acceptance, utjless it expressly states

(d)
(e)

that the bill is to be paid there only and not
elsewhere;
Qualified as to time;
The acceptance of some one or more of the
drawees,

but not of all.

SECTION

285.

INCHOATE INSTRUMENTS.
I. Where a simple signature on a blank stamped
[20.]
paper is delivered by the signer in order that it may be converted into a bill, it operates as a prima facie authority to
fill it up as a complete bill for any amount the stamp will
cover, using the signature for that of the drawer, or the
acceptor, or an indorser; and, in like manner, when a bill is
wanting in any material particular, the person in possession
of it has a prima facie authority to fill up the omission in
any way he thinks fit.
2.
In order that any such instrument when completed
may be enforceable against any person who became a party
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45,

thereto prior to its completion, it must be filled up within a
reasonable time, and strictly in accordance with the authority
given.

Reasonable time for this purpose is a question of fact.
Provided that if any such instrument after completion is
negotiated to a holder in due course, it shall be valid and
effectual for all purposes in his hands, and he may enforce it
as if it had been filled up within a reasonable time and strictly
in accordance with the authority given.

SKCTION

280.

DELIVERY.
Every contract on

bill, whether it be the
drawer's, the acceptor's, or an indorser's is incomplete and revocable, until delivery of the instrument in order to give effect
thereto.
Provided that where an acceptance is written on a bill,
and the drawee gives notice to or according to the directions
of the person entitled to the bill that he has accepted it, the
acceptance then becomes complete and irrevocable.
2.
As between immediate parties, and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due course, the delivery: —
In order to be effectual must be made either by
{a)
or under the authority of the party drawing,
[2

I.J

I.

a

or indorsing, as the case may be;
shown to have been conditional or for a

accepting,

May be
special purpose only, and not for the purpose
of transferring the property in the bill.
But if the bill be in the hands of a holder in due course
a valid delivery of the bill by all parties prior to him so as to
make them liable to him is conclusively presumed.
{b)

Where

bill is no

longer in the possession of a
party who has signed it as drawer, acceptor, or indorser, a
valid and unconditional delivery by him is presumed until the
contrary is proved.
3.

a

CHAPTER XLVI.
Capacity and Authority of Parties.

SECTION

287.

CAPACITY OF PARTIES.
I.
Capacity to incur liability as a party to a bill
[22.]
is co-extensive with capacity to contract.
Provided that nothing in this section shall enable a corporation to make itselt liable as drawer, acceptor, or indorser
of a bill unless it is competent to it so to do under the law
for the time being in force relating to corporations.
2.
Where a bill is drawn or indorsed by an infant,
minor, or corporation having no capacity or power to incur
liability on a bill, the drawing or indorsement entitles the
holder to receive payment of the bill, and to enforce it against
any other party thereto.

SECTION

288.

SIGNATURE ESSENTIAL TO LIABILITY.
[23.] No person is liable as drawer, indorser, or acceptor of a bill who has not signed it as such:
Provided that —

signs a bill in a trade or assumed
name, he is hable thereon as if he had signed it in his own name;
The signature of the name of a firm is equivalent to
2.

Where

1.

a person

the signature by the person so signing of the names of all persons liable as partners in that firm.

SECTION

289.

FORGED OR UNAUTHORIZED
[24.

]

SIGNATURE.

Subject to the provisions of this Act, where a sig-
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bill is forged or placed thereon without the au-

thority of the person whose signature it purports to be, the
forged or unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative, and no
right to retain the bill, or to give a discharge therefor, or to
enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired through or under that signature, unless the party
against whom it is sought to retain or enforce payment of the
bill is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority.
Provided that nothing in this section shall effect the ratification of an unauthorized signature not amounting to a forgery.

SECTION

290.

PROCURATION SIGNATURES.
A signature by procuration operates as notice that
[2 5. J
the agent has but a limited authority to sign, and the principal is only bound by such signature if the agent in so signing
was acting within the actual limits of his authority.

SECTION
PERSONS

291.

SIGNING AS AGENT OR IN REPRESENTATIVE
CAPACITY.
I.

Where a person signs a bill as drawer, indorser, or acceptor, and adds words to his signature indicating
that he signs for or on behalf of a principal, or in a representative character, he is not personally liable thereon; but the
mere addition to his signature of words describing him as
an agent, or as filling a representative character, does not
exempt him from personal liability.
2.
In determining whether a signature on a bill is that
of the principal or that of the agent by whose hand it is written, the construction most favorable to the validity of the instrument shall be adopted.

[26.]

CH

AFTER XLVII.

The Consideration for

SECTION

a

Bill.

292.

VALUE AND HOLDER FOR VALUE.
I. Valuable consideration for a bill may be
[27. J
constituted by: —
Any consideration sufificient to support a simple
(a)
contract;
An antecedent debt or liability,
Such a debt or
(d)
liability is deemed valuable
consideration
whether the bill is payable on demand or at a
future time.
2.
Where value has at any time been given for a bill
the holder is deemed to be a holder for value as regards the
acceptor and all parties to the bill who became parties prior
to such time.
Where the holder of a bill has a lien on it arising
3.
either from contract or by implication of law, he is deemed to
be a holder for value to the extent of the sum for which he
has a lien.

SECTION

293.

ACCOMMODATION BILL OR PARTY.
An accommodation party to a bill is a person who has signed a bill as drawer, acceptor, or indorser,
[28.]

I.

without receiving value thereof, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person.
An accommodation party is liable on the bill to a
2.
holder for value; and it is immaterial whether, when such
holder took the bill, he knew such party to be an accommodation party or not.
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294.

A
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HOLDER IN DUE COURSE.
A holder in due course is a holder who has
under the
taken a bill, complete and regular on the face of
following conditions, namely:
was
before
That he became the holder of
(«)
had been
overdue, and without notice that
such was the fact;
previously dishonored,
it

it,

I.

if

it

it

[29.]

took the bill in good faith and for value,
and that at the time the bill was negotiated to
him he had no notice of any defect in the title
of the person who negotiated it.
person who negotiates
2.
In particular the title of
bill
defective within the meaning of this Act when he obtained the bill, or the acceptance thereof, by fraud, duress, or
force and fear, or other unlawful means, or for an illegal conin breach of faith, or unsideration, or when he negotiates
he

a

That

it

is

a

{b)

a

fraud.
A. holder (whether for value or not), who derives his
not
bill through a holder in due course, and who
title to
has all
himself
party to any fraud or illegality affecting
the rights of that holder in due course as regards the acceptor
and all parties to the bill prior to that holder.
a

it,

a

is

3.

der such circumstances as amount to

SECTION

295.

PRESUMPTION OF VALUE AND GOOD FAITH.
a

a

J

is

bill

I.

Every party whose signature appears on
party thereto for
prima facie deemed to have become

[30.

value.

Every holder of

bill \s prima facie deemed to be
in an action on
admitholder in due course; but
bill
ted or proved that the acceptance, issue, or subsequent negoaffected with fraud, duress, or force and
tiation of the bill,
fear, or illegality, the burden of proof
shifted, unless and
until the holder proves that, subsequent to the alleged fraud
or illegality, value has in good faith been given for the bill.
is

is

it

a

if

a

a

is

2.

CHAPTER XLVIII.
Negotiation of Bills.

SECTION

296.

NEGOTIATION OF BILL.
[31.

]

I.

A bill is negotiated when it is transferred

it,

from one person to another in such a manner as to constitute
the transferee the holder of the bill.
2.
A bill payable to bearer is negotiated by delivery.
A bill payable to order is negotiated by the indorse3.
ment of the holder completed by delivery.
Where the holder of a bill payable to his order trans4.
fers it for value without indorsing
the transfer gives the
transferee such title as the transferror had in the bill, and the
transferee in addition acquires the right to have the indorsement of the transferror.

Where any person

a

is

a

5.

under obligation to indorse
bill in representative capacity, he may indorse the bill in
such terms as to negative personal liability.

SECTION

-297.

REQUISITES OF A VALID INDORSEMENT.
as

is

An indorsement in order to operate

a

negotiaconditions,
namely, —
tion must comply with the following
I. It must be written on the bill itself and be signed by
the indorser.
The simple signature of the indorser on the bill,
sufficient.
without additional words,

[32.J

recognized,

is

of a

a

a

"copy"
An indorsement written on an allonge, or on
bill issued or negotiated in country where "copies" are
deemed to be written on the bill itself.
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BILLS.

entire bill.
A
partial indorsement, that is to say, an indorsement which purports to transfer to the indorsee a part only of the amount
payable, or which purports to transfer the bill to two or more
indorsees severally, does not operate as a negotiation of the
bill.
Where a bill is payable to the order of two or more
3.
payees or indorsees who are not partners all must indorse, unless the one indorsing has authority to indorse for the others.
Where, in a bill payable to order, the payee or in4.
dorsee is wrongly designated, or his name is misspelt, he may
indorse the bill as therein described adding, if he thinks fit,
his proper signature.
Where there are two or more indorsements on a
5.
bill, each indorsement is deemed to have been made in the
order in which it appears on the bill, until the contrary is
2.

must

be

an indorsement

of the

proved.

An indorsement may be made in blank or special.
It may also contain terms making it restrictive.
6.

SECTION

298.

CONDITIONAL INDORSEMENT.
Where a bill purports to be indorsed condition[33-]
ally, the condition may be disregarded by the payer, and payment to the indorsee is valid whether the condition has been
fulfilled or not.

SECTION
INDORSEMENT

IN BLANK

AND

2h9.

SPECIAL

INDORSEMENT.

I.
An indorsement in blank specifies no indorsee, and a bill so indorsed becomes payable to bearer.
2.
A special indorsement specifies the person to whom,
or to whose order, the bill is to be payable.
The provisions of this Act relating to a payee apply
3.
with the necessary modifications to an indorsee under a special
indorsement.
[34,]
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bill has been indorsed in blank, any holder
may convert the blank indorsement into a special indorsement
4.

When

OF

a

by writing above the in'dorser's signature a direction to pay the
bill to or to the order of himself or some other person.

SECTION

300.

RESTRICTIVE INDORSEMENT.
I. An indorsement is restrictive which prohibits
[35.]
the further negotiation of the bill, or which expresses that it
is a mere authority to deal with the bill as thereby directed,
and not a transfer of the ownership thereof, as, for example,
if a bill be indorsed "Pay D. only," or "Pay D. for the account of X.," or "Pay D. or order for collection."
2.
A restrictive indorsement gives the indorsee the right
to receive payment of the bill and to sue any party thereto
that his indorser could have sued, but gives him no power to
transfer his rights as indorsee unless it expressly authorize him
to do so.

restrictive indorsement authorizes further
transfer, all subsequent indorsees take the bill with the same
rights and subject to the same liabilities as the first indorsee
under the restrictive indorsement.
3.

Where

a

SECTION

.301.

NEGOTIATION OF OVERDUE OR DISHONORED BILL.
is negotiable in its origin it conit has been (a) restrictively indorsed or (d) discharged by payment or otherwise.
2.
Where an overdue bill is negotiated, it can only be

I. Where a bill
[36. J
tinues to be negotiable until

negotiated subject to any defect of title affectipg it at its maturity, and thenceforward no person who takes it can acquire
or give a better title than that which the person from whom
he

took it had.
3.

A bill payable on demand is deemed to

be overdue

within the meaning and for the purposes of this section, when
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it appears on the face of it to have been in circulation for an
What is an unreasonable length
unreasonable length of time.
of time for this purpose is a question of fact.
Except where an indorsement bears
4.

date

after the

maturity of the bill, every negotiation is prima facie deemed

to have been effected before the

bill was overdue.

Where a bill which is not overdue has been dishonored any person who takes it with notice of the dishonor takes
it subject to any defect of title attaching thereto at the time
of dishonor, but nothing in this sub-section shall affect the
rights of a holder in due course.
5.

SECTION

302.

NEGOTIATION OF BILL TO PARTY ALREADY LIABLE
THEREON.
Where a bill is negotiated back to the drawer, or
to a prior indorser, or to the acceptor, such party may, subject to the provisions of this Act, re-issue and further negotiate
the bill, but he is not entitled to enforce payment of the bill
against any intervening party to whom he was previously
liable.
[37 -J

SECTION

303.

RIGHTS OF THE HOLDER.
[38. J
as follows:

The rights and powers of the holder of a bill are

He may

bill in his own name:
2.
Where he is a holder in due course, he holds the
bill free from any defect of title of prior parties, as well as
from mere personal defences available to prior parties among
themselves, and may enforce payment against all parties liable
1.

on the

sue on the

bill:

Where his title is defective {a) if he negotiates the
bill to a holder in due course, that holder obtains a good and
complete title to the bill, and {b) if he obtains payment of the
bill the person who pays him in due course gets a valid discharge for the bill.
3.

CHAPTER XLIX.
General Duties of the Holder.

SECTION

304.

WHEN PRESENTMENT FOR ACCEPTANCE IS NECESSARY.
1.

Where

acceptance

a

bill is payable after sight, presentment for

is necessary

in order to fix the maturity of the in-

strument.

bill expressly stipulates that it shall be presented for acceptance, or where a bill is drawn payable else2.

Where

a

where than at the residence or place of business of the drawee,
it must be presented for acceptance before it can be presented

for payment.
3.

In no other case is presentment for acceptance neces-

sary in order to render liable any party to the bill.
4.

Where the holder of

a

bill, drawn payable elsewhere

than at the place of business or residence of the drawee, has
not time, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, to present
the bill for acceptance before presenting it for payment on the
by presenting the bill
it for payment is excused,

day that it falls due, the delay caused

for acceptance before presenting
and does not discharge the drawer and indorsers.

SECTION

305.

TIME FOR PRESENTING BILL PAYABLE AFTER SIGHT.
I. Subject to the provisions of this Act, when a
[40.]
bill payable after sight is negotiated, the holder must either
present it for acceptance or negotiate it within a reasonable
time.
2.

If

he do not do so, the drawer and all indorsers prior

to that holder are discharged.
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reasonable time within the
meaning of this section, regard shall be had to the nature of
the bill, the usage of trade with respect to similar bills, and
3.

In determining what is

a

the facts of the particular case.

SECTION

306.

RULES AS TO PRESENTMENT FOR ACCEPTANCE AND EXCUSES FOR NON-PRESENTMENT.
I.
A bill is duly presented for acceptance which
[41. J
is presented in accordance with the following rules:
The presentment must be made by or on behalf
(a)
of the holder to the drawee,

(d)

or to some person

authorized to accept or refuse acceptance on
his behalf, at a reasonable hour on a business
day and before the bill is overdue;
Where a bill is addressed to two or more drawees,
who are not partners, presentment must be
made to them all, unless

one has authority to

accept for all, then presentment may be made
to him only;

Where the drawee is dead, presentment may be
made to his personal representative;
(d) Where the drawee is bankrupt, presentment may
be made to him or his trustee;
Where authorized by agreement or usage, a pre{e)
sentment through the post-office is sufficient.
2.
Presentment in accordance with these rules is excused, and a bill may be treated as dishonored by non-accept(c)

ance:
(a)

(d)
(c)

Where the drawee is dead or bankrupt, or is a
fictitious person or a person not having capacity to contract by bill;
Where, alter the exercise of reasonable diligence,
such presentment cannot be effected;
Where, although the presentment has been irregular, acceptance has been refused on some
other ground.
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1

The fact that the holder has reason to believe that
the bill, on presentment, will be dishonored does not excuse
3.

presentment.

SECTION

307.

NON-ACCEPTANCE.
I. When -a bill is duly presented for acceptance
[42.]
and is not accepted within the customary time, the person
presenting; it must treat it as dishonored by non-acceptance.
If he do not, the holder shall lose his right of recourse against
the drawer and indorsers.

SECTION

308.

DISHONOR BY NON-ACCEPTANCE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.
[43. J
(a)

(d)

I. A bill is dishonored by non-acceptance:
When it is duly presented for acceptance,

and

such an acceptance as is prescribed by this act
is refused or cannot be obtained; or
When presentment for acceptanceis excused and
the

bill is not accepted.

Subject to the provisions of this Act, when a bill is
dishonored by non-acceptance, an immediate right of recourse
against the drawer and indorsers accrues to the holder, and no
2.

presentment for payment is necessary.

SECTION

309.

DUTIES AS TO QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCES.
I. The holder of a bill may refuse to take a
[44.]
qualified acceptance, and if he does not obtain an unqualified
acceptance may treat the bill as dishonored by non-acceptance.

qualified acceptance is taken, and the
drawer or an indorser has not expressly or impliedly authornot
ized the holder to take a qualified acceptance, or does
2.

Where

a

GENERAL
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subsequently assent thereto, such drawer or indorser is discharged from his HabiHty on the bill.
The provisions of this sub-section do not apply to a parWhere a
tial acceptance, whereof due notice has been given.
foreign bill has been accepted as to part, it must be protested
as to the balance.
3.

When the drawer or indorser of

a

bill receives notice

of a qualified acceptance, and does not within a reasonable
time express his dissent to the holder, he shall be deemed to
have assented thereto.

SECTION

310.

RULES AS TO PRESENTMENT

FOR PAYMENT.

Subject to the provisions of this Act, a bill must
[45. J
If it be not so presented the
be duly presented for payment.
drawer and endorsers shall be discharged.
A bill is duly presented for payment which is presented
in accordance with the following rules:
1.
Where the bill is not payable on demand, presentment must be made on the day it falls due.
2.
Where the bill is payable on demand, then, subject
to the provisions of this Act, presentment must be made within
a reasonable time after its issue in order to render the drawer
liable, and within a reasonable time after its indorsement, in
order to render the indorser liable.
In determining what is a reasonable time, regard shall be
had to the nature of the bill, the usage of trade with regard
to similar bills, and the facts of the particular case.
Presentment must be made by the holder or by some
3.
person authorized to receive payment on his behalf at a reasonable hour on a business day, at the proper place as hereinafter defined, either to the person designated by the bill as
payer, or to some person authorized to pay or refuse payment
on his behalf if with the exercise of reasonable diligence such
person can there be found.
4.

proper place: —
Where a place of payment is specified in the bill
and the bill is there presented;

A bill is presented
(a)

at the
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Where no place of payment is specified, but the
address

of the drawee

the bill, and the
{c)

OF

or acceptor is given in

bill is there presented;

Where no place of payment is specified and no
address given, and the bill is presented at the
or acceptor's place of business if
known, and if not, at his ordinary residence if
known;
In any other case if presented to the drawee or
acceptor wherever he can be found, or if presented at his last known place of business or
drawee's

{d)

residence.

Where

bill is presented

proper place, and
after the exercise of reasonable diligence no person authorized
to pay or refuse payment can be found there, no further presentment to the drawee or acceptor is required.
6.
Where a bill is drawn upon, or accepted by, two or
more persons who are not partners, and no place of payment
is specified, presentment must be made to them all.
Where the drawee or acceptor of a bill is dead, and
7.
no place of payment is specified, presentment must be made
to a personal representative, if such there be, and with the
exercise of reasonable diligence he can be found.
8.
Where authorized by agreement or usage a presentment through the post-office is sufficient.
5.

a

SECTION

at the

311.

EXCUSES FOR DELAY OR NON-PRESENTMENT
PAYMENT.

FOR

I. Delay in making presentment for payment is
[46.]
excused when the delay is caused by circumstances beyond
the control of the holder, and not imputable to his default,
misconduct, or negligence.
When the cause of delay ceases to
operate presentment must be made with reasonable diligence.
2.
Presentment for payment is dispensed with, —
{a)

Where, after the exercise of reasonable diligence,
presentments as required by this Act, cannot
be effected.
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omission, shall not be prejudiced by

course subsequent to the
the omission.

Wtiere a bill is dishonored by non-acceptance, and
due notice of dishonor is given, it shall not be necessary to
dishonor by non-payment unless
give notice of a subsequent
the bill shall in the meantime have been accepted.
2.

SECTION

314.

RULES AS TO NOTICE OF DISHONOR.
Notice of dishonor in order to be valid and effecbe given in accordance with the following rules: —
1.
The notice must be given by or on behalf of the
holder, or by or on behalf of an indorser who, at the time of
himself liable on the bill.
giving
2.
Notice of dishonor may be given by an agent either
in his own name, or in the name of any party entitled to give
notice whether that party be his principal or not.
Where the notice
given by or on behalf of the
holder,
enures for the benefit of all subsequent holders and
right of recourse

against

the

is

it

all prior indorsers who have
given.
party to whom

a

it

3.

is

is

it,

[49. J
tual must

is

given by or on behalf of an indorser
Where notice
enures for
entitled to give notice as hereinbefore provided,
the benefit of the holder and all indorsers subsequent to the
given.
party to whom notice
The notice may be given in writing or by personal
communication, and may be given in any terms which suffi5.

is

it

4.

a

a

6.

ciently identify the bill, and intimate that the bill has been
dishonored by non-acceptance or non-payment.
dishonored bill to the drawer or an
The return of
sufficient notice of disindorser is, in point of form, deemed
honor.

is

is

A

A

7.

written notice need not be signed, and an insufficient written notice may be supplemented and validated by
mis-description of the bill shall not
verbal communication.
given
vitiate the notice unless the party to whom the notice
in fact misled thereby.

5

GENERAL

76

DUTIES

OF

THE

HOLDER.

49,

[CHAP.

Where notice of dishonor is required to be given to
any person, it may be given either to the party himself, or to
his agent in that behalf.
Where the drawer or indorser is dead, and the party
9.
the notice must be given to
personal
giving notice knows
such there be, and with the exercise of reasrepresentative,
onable diligence he can be found.
10.
bankrupt, notice
Where the drawer or indorser
may be given either to the party himself or to the trustee.
11.
Where there are two or more drawers or indorsers
who are not partners notice must be given to each of them,
unless one of them has authority to receive such notice for the
is

if

a

it,

8.

others.
honored,

and

must

be given

be given

within

bill

disreasonable time there-

as soon as the

is

The notice may

a

12.

In the absence of special circumstances notice

is

after.
not

deemed to have been given within a reasonable time, unless

—

Where the person giving and the person to receive
notice reside in the same place, the notice
given or sent off in time to reach the latter on
the day after the dishonor of the bill;
Where the person giving and the person to receive
(d)
notice reside in different places, the notice
sent oft on the day after the dishonor of the
bill,
there be
convenient hour on
post at
that day, and
there be no such post on that
day then by the next post thereafter.
bill when dishonored
in the hands of an
Where
13.
agent, he ma)- either himself give notice to the parties liable
on the bill, or he may give notice to his principal.
he give
notice to his principal, he must do so within the same time as
he were the holder, and the principal upon receipt of such
notice has himself the same time for giving notice as
the
agent had been an independent holder.
Where
bill receives due notice of disparty to
14.
honor, he has after the receipt of such notice the same period
of time for giving notice to antecedent parties that the holder
has after the dishonor.
a

a

a

if

if

If

a

is

if

a

if

is

is

(a)
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notice of dishonor is duly addressed and
posted, the sender is deemed to have given due notice of dishonor, notwithstanding any miscarriage by the post-office.
15.

a

SECTION

315.

EXCUSES FOR NON-NOTICE AND DELAY.
I.
Delay in giving notice of dishonor is excused
[50. J
where the delay is caused by circumstances beyond the control of the party giving notice, and not imputable to his default, misconduct, or negligence. When the cause of delay ceases
to operate the notice must be given with reasonable diligence.
2.
Notice of dishonor is dispensed with —
When, after the exercise of reasonable diligence,
{a)
notice as required by this act cannot be given
to or does not reach the drawer or indorser
sought to be charged;
{d)

(c)

By waiver, express or implied.

Notice of dishonor may be waived before the time of giving
notice has arrived, or after the omission to give
due notice;
As regards the drawer in the following cases,
namely, ( i ) where drawer and drawee are the
same person, (2) where the drawee is a fictitious person or a person not having capacity to
contract, (3) where the drawer is the person
to whom the bill is presented for payment, (4)
where the drawee or acceptor is as between
himself and the drawer under no obligation to
accept or pay the bill, (5) where the drawer

(d)

has countermanded payment;
As regards the indorser in the following cases,

namely, (i) where the drawee is a fictitious
person or a person not having capacity to contract and the indorser was aware of the fact at
the time he indorsed the bill, (2) where the
indorser is the person to whom the bill is presented for payment, (3) where the bill was accepted or made for his accommodation.
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316.

NOTING OR PROTEST OF BILL.
I.
Where an inland bill has been dishonored it
[51. J
may, if the holder think fit, be noted for non-acceptance or
non-payment, as the case may be; but it shall not be necessary to note or protest any such bill in order to preserve the
recourse against the drawer or indorser.
2.
Where a foreign bill, appearing on the face of it to
be such, has been dishonored by non-acceptance it must be
duly protested for non-acceptance, and where such a bill,
which has not been previously dishonored by non-acceptance,
is dishonored by non-payment it must be duly protested for
If it be not so protested the drawer and innon-payment.
dorsers are discharged.
Where a bill does not appear on the
face of it to be a foreign bill, protest thereof in case of dishonor is unnecessary.
A bill which has been protested for non-acceptance
3.
may be subsequently protested for non-payment.
Subject to the provisions of this Act, when a bill is
4.
noted or protested, it must be noted on the day of its dishonor.
When a bill has been duly noted, the protest may be
subsequently extended as of the date of the noting.
Where the acceptor of a bill becomes bankrupt or
5.
insolvent or suspends payment before it matures, the holder
may cause the bill to be protested for better security against
the drawer and indorsers.
6.
A bill must be protested at the place where it is dishonored:
Provided that —
When a bill is presented through the post-office,
{a)
and returned by post dishonored, it may be
protested at the place to which it is returned
and on the day of its return if received during
business hours, and if not received during business hours, then not later than the next business day;
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When a bill drawn payable at the place of business or residence

of some

person other than
drawee,
has been dishonored by nonacceptance, it must be protested for non-payment at the place where it is expressed to be
payable, and no further presentment for payment to, or demand on, the drawee is necesthe

sary.

A protest must contain

copy of the bill, and must
be signed by the notary making
and must specify —
protested;
(a) The person at whose request the bill
The place and date of protest, the cause or reason
{d)
for protesting the bill, the demand made, and
the answer given,
any, or the fact that the
drawee or acceptor could not be found.
Where bill
lost or destroyed, or
wrongly detained from the person entitled to hold
protest may be
made on a copy or written particulars thereof.
Protest
dispensed with by any circumstance which
would dispense with notice of dishonor.
Delay in noting or
excused when the delay
caused by circumprotesting
stances beyond the control of the holder, and not imputable
to his default, misconduct, or negligence.
When the cause
of delay ceases to operate the bill must be noted or protested
with reasonable diligence.
a

is

is

9.

is

it,

is

is

a

8.

if

is

it,

7.

SECTION

317.

DUTIES OF HOLDER AS REGARDS DRAWEE OR ACCEPTOR.
When

ment for payment

bill

is

generally presentnot necessary in order to render the aca

I.

is

[52.]

accepted

ceptor liable.

it

is

is

When by the terms of

a

qualified acceptance presentment for payment
required, the acceptor, in the absence of
not discharged by the
an express stipulation to that effect,
omission to present the bill for payment on the day that
2.

matures.
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not necessary to protest

it,

In order to render the acceptor of

3.

a

[CHAP.

49,

bill liable it is

or that notice of dishonor should

him.
bill presents
for payment,
Where the holder of
4.
he shall exhibit the bill to the person from whom he demands
payment, and when a bill
paid the holder shall forthwith
deliver
up to the party paying it.
it

is

it

a

be given to

CHAPTER L.
Liabilities of Parties.

SECTION

318.

FUNDS IN HANDS OF DRAWEE.
I. A bill, of itself, does not operate as an assign[53.]
ment of funds in the hands of the drawee available for the
payment thereof, and the drawee of a bill who does not accept as required by this Act is not liable on the instrument.
This sub-section shall not extend to Scotland.
2.
In Scotland, where the drawee of a bill has in his
hands funds available for the payment thereof, the bill operates as an assignment of the sum for which it is drawn in favor
of the holder, from the time when the bill is presented to the
drawee.

SECTION

LIABILITY

319.

OF ACCEPTOR.

The acceptor of a bill, by accepting it:
[54.]
1.
Engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of
his acceptance;
2.
Is precluded from denying to a holder in due course:
(a) The existence of the drawer, the genuineness of
his signature, and his capacity and authority to
(6)

(c)

draw the bill;
In the case of a bill payable to drawer's order, the
then capacity of the drawer to indorse, but not
the genuineness or validity of his indorsement;
In the case of a bill payable to the order of a third

then,
person, the existence of the payee and his
capacity to indorse, but not the genuineness or

validity of his indorsement.
36
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PARTIES.

OF

SECTION

LIABILITY
[55.]

50,

320.

OF DRAWER OR INDORSER.

The drawer of

a

bill by drawing it:

Engages that on due presentment it shall be accepted and paid according to its tenor, and
that if it be dishonored he will compensate the
holder or any indorser who is compelled to pay
provided that the requisite proceedings on
dishonor be duly taken;
Is precluded from denying to a holder in due
it,

(a)

I.

[CHAP.

(d)

course the existence

capacity to indorse.
bill by indorsing it:
The indorser of
shall be acEngages that on due presentment
(a)
cepted and paid according to its tenor, and
that
be dishonored he will compensate the
holder or
compelsubsequent indorser who
led to pay
provided that the requisite proceedings on dishonor be duly taken;
Is precluded from denying to a holder in due
(d)
it,

a

is

if
it

it

a

2.

of the payee and his then

regularity in all
respects of the drawer's signature and all previous indorsements;
Is precluded from denying to his immediate or
subsequent indorsee that the bill was at the
time of his indorsement a valid and subsisting
bill, and that he had then
good title thereto.
genuineness

and

a

(f)

the

a

course

SECTION

321.

STRANGER SIGNING BILL LIABLE AS INDORSER.
a

a

J

Where
bill otherwise than as
person signs
[56.
drawer or acceptor, he thereby incurs the liabilities of an indorser to a holder in due course.
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322.

MEASURE OF DAMAGES AGAINST PARTIES TO DISHONORED BILL.

SECTION
TRANSFERRER

is

a

it,

Where a bill is dishonored, the measure of dam[57.]
ages, which shall be deemed to be liquidated damages, shall
be as follows:
1.
The holder may recover from any party liable on
the bill, and the drawer who has been compelled to pay the
bill may recover from the acceptor, and an indorser who has
been compelled to pay the bill may recover from the acceptor
or from the drawer, or from a prior indorser:
The amount of the bill;
{a)
Interest thereon from the time of presentment for
{b)
payment if the bill is payable on demand, and
from the maturity of the bill in any other case;
The expenses of noting, or, when protest is neces{c)
sary, and the protest has been extended, the
expenses of protest.
2.
In the case of a bill which has been dishonored
abroad, in lieu of the above damages, the holder may recover
from the drawer or an indorser, and the drawer or an indorser
who has been compelled to pay the bill may recover from any
party liable to him, the amount of the re-exchange with interest thereon until the time of payment.
Where by this Act interest may be recovered as dam3.
be withheld
ages, such interest may, if justice require
bill
expressed to be payable
wholly or in part, and where
with interest at a given rate, interest as damages may or may
not be given at the same rate as interest proper.

323.

BY DELIVERY AND TRANSFERREE.
is

it,

J

it

I.

a

bill payable to bearer
Where the holder of
he
called a
by delivery without indorsing
negotiates
" transferrer by delivery."
[58.
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A transferrer by delivery is not liable on the instru-

ment.
3.

A transferrer by delivery who negotiates

a

bill thereby

it

is

it,

warrants to his immediate transferree being a holder for value
that the bill is what it purports to be, that he has a right to
and that at the time of transfer he
not aware of
transfer
valueless.
any fact which renders

CHAPTER LI.
Discharge of Bill.

SECTION

824.

PAYMENT IN DUE COURSE.
I. A bill is discharged by payment in due course
[59. J
by or on behalf of the drawee or acceptor.
" Payment in due course " means payment made at or after the maturity of the bill to the holder thereof in good faith
and without notice that his title to the bill is defective.
2.
Subject to the provisions hereinafter contained,
when a bill is paid by the drawer or an indorser it is not discharged; but
Where a bill payable to, or to the order of, a
(a)
third party is paid by drawer, the drawer may
enforce payment thereof against the acceptor,
but may not re-issue the bill:
Where a bill is paid by an indorser, or where a
{i>)
bill payable to drawer's order is paid by the
drawer, the party paying it is remitted to his
former rights as regards the acceptor or antecedent parties, and he may, if he thinks fit,
strike out his own and subsequent indorsements, and again negotiate the bill.
Where an accommodation bill is paid in due course
3.
by the party accommodated the

bill is discharged.

SECTION

325.

BANKER PAYING DEMAND DRAFT WHEREON INDORSEMENT IS FORGED.
[60. J Where a bill payable to order on demand is
drawn on a banker, and the banker on whom it is drawn pays

DISCHARGE
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5 1,

the bill in good faith and in the ordinary course of business, it
is not incumbent on the banker to show that the indorsement

indorsement was made by or
under the authority of the person whose indorsement it purports to be, and the banker is deemed to have paid the bill in
due course, although such indorsement has been forged or
made without authority.
of the

payee or any subsequent

SECTION

326.

ACCEPTOR THE HOLDER AT MATURITY.
When the acceptor of a bill is or becomes the
[61. j
holder of it at or after its maturity, in his own right, the bill
is discharged.

SECTION

327.

EXPRESS WAIVER.

I.

When the holder of a bill at or after its
maturity absolutely and unconditionally renounces his rights
against the acceptor the bill is discharged.
The renunciation must be in writing, unless the bill is delivered up to the acceptor.
2.
The liabilities of any party to a bill may in like manner be renounced by the holder before, at, or after its maturity; but nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a
holder in due course without notice of the renunciation.
[62. J

SECTION

328.

CANCELLATION.
I. Where a bill is intentionally cancelled by the
[63.]
holder or his agent, and the cancellation is apparent thereon,
the

bill is discharged.
2.
In like manner any party liable on

a

bill may

be dis-

charged by the intentional cancellation of his signature by the
holder or his agent.
In such case any indorser who would

SEC.
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have had a right of recourse against the party whose signature
is cancelled, is also discharged.

A cancellation made unintentionally,

or under a misof
the holder, is inoperative;
authority
but where a bill or any signature thereon appears to have been
cancelled the burden of proof lies on the party who alleges
that the cancellation was made unintentionally, or under a
mistake, or without authority.
3.

take, or without

the

SECTION

329.

ALTERATION OF BILL.
I.
Where a bill or acceptance is materially
[64. J
altered without the assent of all parties liable on the bill, the
bill is avoided except as against a party who has himself
made, authorized, or assented to the alteration, and subsequent indorsers.
Provided that,
Where a bill has been materially altered, but the alteration is not apparent, and the bill is in the hand of a holder in
due course, such holder may avail himself of the bill as if it
had not been altered, and may enforce payment of it according to its original tenor.
2.
In particular the following alterations are material,
namely, any alteration of the date, the sum payable, the time
of payment, the place of payment, and, where a bill has been
accepted generally, the addition of a place of payment without the acceptor's assent.

CHAPTER LII.
Acceptance and Payment for Honor.

SECTION

330.

ACCEPTANCE FOR HONOR SUPRA PROTEST.
Where a bill of exchange has been protested
for dishonor by non-acceptance, or protested for better security, and is not overdue, any person, not being a party already
liable thereon, may, with the consent of the holder, intervene
and accept the bill supra protest for the honor of any party
liable thereon, or for the honor of the person for whose account the bill is drawn.
2.
A bill may be accepted for honor for part only of the
sum for which it is drawn.
An acceptance for honor supra protest in order to be
3.
valid must —
(a) Be written on the bill, and indicate that it is an
acceptance for honor:
Be signed by the acceptor for honor.
((5)
Where an acceptance for honor does not expressly
4.
state for whose honor it is made, it is deemed to be an acceptance for the honor of the drawer.
Where a bill payable after sight is accepted for
5.
honor, its maturity is calculated from the date of the noting
for non-acceptance, and not from the date of the acceptance
for honor.

[65.]

I.

SECTION

LIABILITY
[66.]

I.

331.

OF ACCEPTOR FOR HONOR.

The acceptor for honor of

bill by accepting
will, on due presentment, pay the bill ac-

it engages that he
cording to the tenor of his acceptance,

a

if it is not paid by the

SEC.

332.
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provided it has been duly presented for payment, and
protested for non-payment, and that he receives notice of
drawee,

these facts.

The acceptor for honor is hable to the holder and to
all parties to the bill subsequent to the party for whose honor
2.

he has accepted.

SECTION

332.

PRESENTMENT TO ACCEPTOR FOR HONOR.
I. Where a dishonored bill has been accepted
[67.]
for honor supra protest, or contains a reference in case of
need, it must be protested for non-payment before it is presented for payment to the acceptor for honor, or referee in
case of need.

Where the address of the acceptor for honor is in the
same place where the bill is protested for non-payment, the
bill must be presented to him not later than the day following
its maturity; and where the address of the acceptor for honor
is in some place other than the place where it was protested
for non-payment, the bill must be forwarded not later than
the day following its maturity for presentment to him.
Delay in presentment or non-presentment is excused
3.
by any circumstance which would excuse delay in presentment
for payment or non-presentment for payment.
When a bill of exchange is dishonored by the accep4.
tor for honor it must be protested for non-payment by him.
2.

SECTION

333.

PAYMENT FOR HONOR SUPRA PROTEST.

I. Where a bill has been protested for non-payment,
[68.]
any person may intervene and pay it supra protest for the
honor of any party liable thereon, or for the honor of the person for whose account the bill is drawn.
2.
Where two or more persons offer to pay a bill for the
honor of different parties, the person whose payment will discharge most parties to the bill shall have the preference.

ACCEPTANCE
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52,

Payment for honor supra protest, in order to operate
as such and not as a mere voluntary payment, must be attested by a notarial act of honor which may be appended to the
protest or form an extension of it.
The notarial act of honor must be founded on a dec4.
laration made by the payer for honor, or his agent in that behalf, declaring his intention to pay the bill for honor, and for
whose honor he pays.
Where a bill has been paid for honor, all parties sub5.
sequent to the party for whose honor it is paid are discharged,
but the payer for honor is subrogated for, and succeeds to
borh the rights and duties of, the holder as regards the party
for whose honor he pays, and all parties liable to that party.
6.
The payer for honor, on paying to the holder the
amount of the bill and the notarial expenses incidental to its
dishonor, is entitled to receive both the bill itself and the protest.
If the holder do not on demand deliver them' up, he
shall be liable to the payer for honor in damages.
Where the holder of a bill refuses to receive payment
7.
supra protest he shall lose his right of recourse against any
party who would have been discharged by such payment.
3.

LIII.

CHAPTER

Lost Instruments.

SECTION

334.

HOLDER'S RIGHT TO DUPLICATE OF LOST BILL.
>[69.

]

Where

a

bill has been lost before it is overdue,

the person who was the holder of it may apply to the drawer
to give him another bill of the same tenor, giving security to
the drawer

if required to idemnify

him against

all persons
to have been lost shall be

whatever in case the bill alleged
found again.
If the drawer on request as aforesaid refuses to give such
duplicate bill, he may be compelled to do so.

SECTION

385.

ACTION ON LOST BILL.

In any action or proceeding upon a bill, the court
[70.]
or a judge may order that the loss of the instrument shall not
be set up, provided an indemnity be given to the satisfaction
of the court or judge against the claims of any other person
upon the instrument in question.

CHAPTER LIV.
Bill

in a Set.

SECTION

336.

RULES AS TO SETS.
Where a bill is drawn in a set, each part of
the set being numbered, and containing a reference
to the
other parts, the whole of the parts constitute one bill.
2.
Where the holder of a set indorses two or more parts
to different persons, he is liable on every such part, and every
indorser subsequent to him is liable on the part he has himself
indorsed as if the said parts were separate bills.
Where two or more parts of a set are negotiated to
3.
different holders in due course, the holder whose title first accrues is as between such holders deemed the true owner of the
bill; but nothing in this sub-section shall affect the rights of a
person who in due course accepts or pays the part first pre-

[7 1. J

I.

sented to him.
4.

The acceptance may

be

written on any part, and it

must be written on one part only.

If

than one part, and such accepted part gets into the hands of different holder in due course,
he is liable on every such part as if it were a separate bill.
When the acceptor of a bill drawn in a set pays it
5.
without requiring the part bearing his acceptance to be delivered up to him, and that part at maturity is outstanding in the
hands of a holder in due course, he is liable to the holder
the drawee accepts more

thereof.

Subject to the preceding rules, where any one part
of a bill drawn in a set is discharged by payment or otherwise,
the whole bill is discharged.
6.

CHAPTER LV.
Conflict of Laws.

SECTION

337.

RULES WHERE LAWS CONFLICT.
bill drawn in one country is negotiated,
accepted, or payable in another, the rights, duties, and liabili[72.]

Where

a

ties of the parties thereto are determined as follows:

The validity of

bill as regards requisities in form isdetermined by the law of the place of issue, and the validity
as regards requisities in form of the supervening contracts,
such as acceptance, or indorsement, or acceptance supra protest, is determined by the law of the place where such contract was made.
Provided that —
Where a bill is issued out of the United Kingdom
(«)
it is not invalid by reason only that it is not
stamped in accordance with the law of the
place of issue;
Where a bill, issued out of the United Kingdom,,
(3)
conforms, as regards requisities in form, to the
law of the United Kingdom, it may, for the
purpose of enforcing payment thereof, be
treated as valid as between all persons who negotiate, hold, or become parties to it in the
1 .

a

United Kingdom.
2.
Subject to the provisions of this Act, the interpretation of the drawing, indorsement, acceptance, or acceptance
supra protest of a bill, is determined by the law of the placewhere such contract is made.
Provided that where an inland

bill is indorsed in

a

eign country the indorsement shall as regards the payer be
terpreted according to the law of the United Kingdom.

for-

in-

CONFLICT
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55,

The duties of the holder with respect to presentment

for acceptance or payment and the necessity for or sufficiency
of a protest or notice of dishonor, or otherwise, are determined by the law of the place where the act is done or the bill
is dishonored.
Where a bill is drawn out of but payable in the Uni4.
ted Kingdom and the sum payable is not expressed in the
currency of the United Kingdom, the amount shall, in the
absence of some express stipulation, be calculated according
to the rate of exchange for sight drafts at the place of payment on the day the bill is payable.
Where a bill is drawn in one country and is payable
5.
in another, the due date thereof is determined according to
the law of the place where it is payable.

CHAPTER LVI.
Cheques

on a Banker.

SECTION

338.

CHEQUE DEFINED.
[73. J A cheque is a bill of exchange drawn on a banker
payable on demand.
Except as otherwise provided in this part, the provisions
of this Act applicable to a bill of exchange payable on demand apply to a cheque.

SECTION

839.

PRESENTMENT OF CHEQUE FOR PAYMENT.
Subject to the provisions of this Act: —
1.
Where a cheque is not presented for payment within
a reasonable time of its issue, and the drawer or the person
on whose account it is drawn had the right at the time of
such presentment as between him and the banker to have the
cheque paid and suffers actual damage through the delay, he
is discharged to the extent of such damage, that is to say, to
the extent to which such drawer or person is a creditor of
such banker to a larger amount than he would have been had
[74.

J

such cheque been paid.

In determining what is

reasonable time regard
shall be had to the nature of the instrument, the usage of
trade and of bankers, and the facts of the particular case.
The holder of such cheque as to which such drawer
3.
or person is discharged shall be a creditor, in lieu of such
drawer or person, of such banker to the extent of such dis2.

charge,

a

and entitled to recover the amount from him.
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340.

REVOCATION OF BANKER'S AUTHORITY.
[75. J The duty and authority of a banker to pay a
cheque drawn on him by his customer are determined by: —
1.
Countermand of payment;
2.
Notice of customer's death.

CHAPTER LVII.
Crossed Cheques.

SECTION

341.

GENERAL AND SPECIAL CROSSINGS DEFINED.
I.

Where a cheque bears across its face an addition
the words " and company" or any abbreviation
thereof between two parallel transverse lines, either, with or
without the words "not negotiable;" or {&) two parallel
transverse lines simply, either with or without the words "not
negotiable," that addition constitutes a crossing, and the
cheque is crossed generally.

[76.]

of — {a)

(2).

Where

a cheque

bears across its face an addition

of the name of a banker, either with or without the words

"not negotiable, " that addition constitutes

a crossing,

and

the cheque is crossed specially and to that banker.

SECTION

342.

CROSSING BY DRAWER OR AFTER ISSUE.

I. A cheque
[77. J
cially by the drawer.
2.

Where

a cheque

may be

crossed

is uncrossed,

generally or spe-

the holder may cross

it generally or specially.

Where a cheque is crossed generally the holder may
cross it specially.
Where a cheque is crossed generally or specially, the
4.
holder may add the words " not negotiable."
Where a cheque is crossed specially, the banker to
5.
whom it is crossed may again cross it specially to another
banker for collection.
6.
Where an uncrossed cheque, or cheque crossed gen3.

CROSSED CHEQUES.

5^8

[CHAP. 57,

erally, is sent to a banker for collection, he may cross it specially to himself.

SECTION

343.

CROSSING A MATERIAL PART OF CHEQUE.
[78.

J

A crossing authorized by this Act is

a

material

part of the cheque; it shall not be lawful for any person to
obliterate or, except as authorized by this Act, to add to or
alter the crossing.

SECTION

344.

DUTIES OF BANKER AS TO CROSSED CHEQUES.
I.

Where a cheque is crossed specially to more
than one banker except when crossed to an agent for collection being a banker, the banker on whom it is drawn shall
refuse payment thereof.
2.
Where the banker on whom a cheque is drawn which
is so crossed nevertheless
pays the same, or pays a cheque
crossed generally otherwise than to a banker, or if crossed
specially otherwise than to the banker to whom it is crossed,
or his agent for collection being a banker, he is liable to the
true owner of the cheque for any loss he may sustain owing
[79.

J

to the cheque having been so paid.
Provided that where a cheque is presented

for payment
which does not at the time of presentment appear to be
crossed, or to have had a crossing which has been obliterated,
or to have been added to or altered otherwise than as authorized by this Act, the banker paying the cheque in good faith
and without negligence shall not be responsible or incur any
liability, nor shall the payment be questioned by reason of
the cheque having been crossed, or of the crossing having
been obliterated or having been added to or altered otherwise
than as authorized by this Act, and of payment having been
made otherwise than to a banker or to the banker to whom
the cheque is or was crossed, or to his agent for collection being a banker, as the case may be.

SEC.

CROSSED CHEQUES.

345 -J

SECTION

599

345.

PROTECTION TO BANKER WHERE CHEQUE IS CROSSED.
if

if

if

a

it
is

if

it,

[80. J Where the banker, on whom a crossed cheque is
drawn, in good faith and without negligence pays
crossed
crossed specially, to the banker to
generally, to a banker, and
crossed, or his agent for collection being
banker,
whom
the cheque has come
the banker paying the cheque, and,
into the hands of the payee, the drawer, shall respectively be
entitled to the same rights and be placed in the same position
as
payment of the cheque had been made to the true owner
thereof.

SECTION

346.

EFFECT OF CROSSING

[8i.j

ON

HOLDER.

person takes a crossed cheque which
the words "not negotiable," he shall not have and
bears on
better title to the cheque than
shall not be capable of giving
had.
that which the person from whom he took
a

it

a

it

Where

SECTION

347.

PROTECTION TO COLLECTING BANKER.

J

Where a banker in good faith and without negli[82.
gence receives payment for a customer of a cheque crossed
generally or specially to himself, and the customer has no
title or a defective title thereto, the banker shall not incur
any liability to the true owner of the cheque by reason only
of having received such payment.

CHAPTER

LVIII

Promissory Notes.

SECTION

348.

PROMISSORY NOTE DEFINED.
I.
A promissory note is an unconditional promise
[83.]
in writing made by one person to another signed by the maker,
engaging to pay, on demand or at a fixed or determinable
future time, a sum certain in mone}-, to, or to the order of, a
specified person or to bearer.
2.
An instrument in the form of a note payable to maker's order is not a note within the meaning of this section

un-

less and until it is indorsed by the maker.

A note is not invalid by reason only that it contains

3.

also

a

pledge

of collateral

security with

authority to sell or

A note which

is,

dispose thereof.

a

is

is

or on the face of

it

purports to be,
both made and payable within the British Islands
an inland
note.
Any other note
foreign note.
4.

SECTION

349.

DELIVERY NECESSARY.
is

A

inchoate and incomplete unpromissory note
til delivery thereof to the payee or bearer.

[84.]

SECTION

350.

JOINT AND SEVERAL NOTES.
I.

J

A

promissory note may be made by two or
more makers, and they may be liable thereon jointly, or
jointly and severally according to its tenor.
[85.

SEC.

PROMISSORY

351.]
2.

by two

Where

60I

"I

runs
promise to pay" and is signed
persons it is deemed to be their joint and

a note

or more

NOTES.

several note.

SECTION

351.

NOTE PAYABLE ON DEMAND.
I. Where a note payable on demand has been
[86. J
indorsed, it must be presented for payment within a reasonable time of the indorsement.
If it be not so presented the
indorser is discharged.
2.

In determining what is

a reasonable time, regard
shall be had to the nature of the instrument, the usage of
trade and the facts of the particular case.
Where a note payable on demand is negotiated, it is
3.
not deemed to be overdue, for the purpose of affecting the
holder with effects of title of which he had no notice, by reason
that it appears that a reasonable time for presenting it for
payment has elapsed since its issue.

SECTION

352.

PRESENTMENT OF NOTE FOR PAYMENT.
I. Where a promissory note is in the body of it
[87. J
made payable at a particular place, it must be presented for
payment at that place in order to render the maker liable.
In any other case, presentment for payment is not necessary
in order to render the maker liable.
2.
Presentment for payment is necessary in order to
render the indorser of a note liable.
Where a note is in the body of it made payable at a
3.
particular place, presentment at that place is necessary in
order to render an indorser liable; but when a place of payment is indicated by way of memorandum only, presentment
at that place is sufficient to render the indorser liable, but a
presentment to the maker elsewhere, if sufficient in other respects, shall also suffice.

6o2
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SECTION

LIABILITY

[CHAP.

58

353.

OF MAKER.

—
[88.] The maker of a promissory note by making it
1.
Engages that he will pay it according to its tenor.
2.
Is precluded from denying to a holder in due course
the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse.

SECTION
APPLICATION

354.

OF PART II TO NOTES.

I.

Subject to the provisions in this Part, and
except as by this section provided, the provisions of this Act
relating to bills of exchange apply, with the necessary modifications, to promissory notes.
[89.]

2.

In applying those provisions the maker of

a note

shall be deemed to correspond with the acceptor of a bill, and
the first indorser of a note shall be deemed to correspond with
the drawer of an accepted bill payable to drawer's order.
The following provisions as to bills do not apply to
3.
notes; namely, provisions relating to —
Presentment for acceptance;
(a)
Acceptance;
{i>)
Acceptance supra protest;
(c)
{d)
4.

Bills in

a set.

Where a foreign note

is unnecessary.

is

dishonored, protest thereof

CHAPTER LIX.
Supplementary.

SECTION
GOOD
[90. J

355.

FAITH.

A thing is deemed to be done in good faith, within

meaning of this Act, where it is in fact done honestly,
whether it is done neghgently or not.

the

SECTION

356.

SIGNATURE.
Where, by this Act, any instrument or writing
is required to be signed by any person, it is not necessary that
he should sign it with his own hand, but it is sufficient if his
signature is written thereon by some other person by or under
[9 1. J

I.

his authority.

In the case of a corporation, where by this Act any
instrument or writing is required to be signed, it is sufficient
if the instrument or writing be sealed with the corporate seal.
But nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring the bill or note of a corporation to be under seal.
2.

SECTION

357.

COMPUTATION OF TIME.
Where, by this Act, the time limited for doing any
act or thing is less than three days, in reckoning time, non[92.

J

business days are excluded.

"Non-business days" for the purposes of this Act mean —
(a) Sunday, Good Friday, Christmas Day;

SUPPLEMENTARY.
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{b)

A bank holiday under the Bank Hohdays
1

(c)

[CHAP.

87

1,

59,

Act,

or acts amending it;

A day appointed by Royal proclamation

as a

pub-

lic fast or thanksgiving day.

Any other day is

a business

day.

SECTION

358.

WHEN NOTING EQUIVALENT
[93.

J

For

TO PROTEST.

the purpose of this Act, where a

bill or note

is required to be protested within a specified time or before
some further proceeding is taken, it is sufficient that the bill
has been noted for protest before the expiration of the specified time or the taking of the proceeding; and the formal protest may be extended at any time thereafter as of the date of
the noting.

SECTION

359.

PROTEST WHEN NOTARY NOT ACCESSIBLE.
[94. J Where a dishonored bill or note is authorized or
required to be protested, and the services of a notary cannot
be obtained at the place where the bill is dishonored, any
householder or substantial resident of the place may, in the
presence of two witnesses, give a certificate, signed by them,
attesting the dishonor of the bill, and the certificate shall in
all respects operate as if it were a formal protest of the bill.
The form given in Schedule i to this Act may be used
with necessary modifications, and if used shall be sufficient.

SECTION

360.

DIVIDEND WARRANTS MAY BE CROSSED.
[95.

J

The provisions of this Act

as

to crossed checks

shall apply to a warrant for payment of dividend.

SEC.

361.

J

SUPPLEMENTARY.

SECTION

605

361.

REPEAL.
The enactments mentioned in the second schedule
[96.]
of this Act are hereby repealed as from the commencement of
this Act to the extent in that schedule mentioned.
Provided that such repeal shall not affect anything done
or suffered, or any right, title, or interest acquired or accrued
before the commencement of this Act, or any legal proceeding
or remedy in respect of any such thing, right, title, or interest.

SECTION

362.

SAVINGS.

I. The rules in bankruptcy relating to bills of
[97. J
exchange, promissory notes, and checks, shall continue to apply thereto notwithstanding anything in this Act contained.
2.
The rules of common law including the law merchant, save in so far as they are inconsistent with the express
provisions of this Act, shall continue to apply to bills of exchange, promissory notes and checks.
Nothing in this Act or in any repeal effected thereby
3.
shall affect:

The provisions of the Stamp Act, 1870,' or acts

(d)

or any law or enactment for the
amending
time being in force relating to the revenue;
The provisions of the Companies Act, 1862,' or
it,

(a)

(c)

(d)

'33 and 34 Vict, c. 97.
^25 and 26 Vict., c. 89.

it,

or any act relating to joint
stock banks or companies;
The provisions of any act relating to or confirming
the privileges of the Bank of England or the
Bank of Ireland respectively;
The validity of any usage relating to dividend
warrants, or the indorsements thereof.
acts amending

SUPPLEMENTARY.
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SECTION

[CHAP.

59,

363.

SAVING OF SUMMARY DILIGENCE

IN SCOTLAND.

Nothing in this Act or in any repeal effected
thereby shall extend or restrict, or in any way alter or effect
the law and practice in Scotland in regard to summary dili[98.

J

gence.

SECTION

364.

CONSTRUCTION WITH OTHER ACTS. ETC.
Where any act or document refers to any enactment repealed by this Act, the act or document shall be construed, and shall operate, as if it referred to the corresponding provisions of this Act.
[99. J

SECTION

365.

PAROL EVIDENCE IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN SCOTLAND.
In any judicial proceeding in Scotland, any fact
[100. J
relating to a bill of exchange, bank check, or promissory note,
which is relevant to any question of liability thereon, may be
proved by parol evidence:
Provided that this enactment shall
not in any way affect the existing law and practice whereby
the party who is, according to the tenor of any bill of exchange, bank check, or promissory note, debtor to the holder
in the amount thereof, may be required, as a condition of obtaining a sist of diligence, or suspension of a charge, or
threatened charge, to make such consignation, or to find such
caution as the court or judge before whom the cause is depending may require.
This section shall not apply to any case where the bill of
exchange, bank check, or promissory note has undergone the
sesennial prescription.

SUPPLEMENTARY.

Fi rst
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Schedule}

Form of protest which may be used when the services of
notary cannot be obtained.
Know all men that I, A. B. (householder), of
in the county of . ;
United Kingdom, at the
, in the
request of C. D., there being no notary public available, did
1 88 . . at
demand
on the
day of
payment (or acceptance) of the bill of exchange hereunder
written, from E. F. , to which demand he made answer (state
Wherefore, I now in the presence of G. H.
answer, if any.)
and J. K. do protest the said bill of exchange.
A. B.
(Signed)

a

J-

K.

l
f

Witnesses.

N. B. — The bill itself should be annexed, or a copy of
the bill and all that is written thereon should be underwritten.

'The other schedules are purely
therefore omitted. — Ed.

local in interest, and are
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INDEX.
ABSOLUTE ACCEPTANCE,
defined, i86 n.

ACCEPTANCE,
defined, i8o, 182 n, 246, 558.
form of, 182 n.
may be by parol, 182 n.
must be written when, 185 n.
may be of bill not yet drawn, 182 n.
may be by telegram or telephone, 183 n.
may be implied from detention, 183 n.
promise to pay, amounts to, 184.
when need not be, 184.
general methods of, 185.
can only be made by the drawee, 196.
discounting by drawee is not, 180.
may become and indorser, 181.
drawee may sue upon contract, 181.
may be for honor or supra protest, 199.
may be by stranger when in blank, 199 n.
may be by a member of a firm, 199 n.
joint parties must all accept, 199 n.
may be by an agent, 199 n.
effect of, 116 n, 202 n, 205, 380 n.
prima facie evidence of effects of drawer in hands of acceptor,
174, 177-

classification of acceptances, 186 n.
kinds of, 186 n, 530.
absolute, 186 n, 188.
conditional, 186 n, 188.
implied, 186 n.
local, 187 n.
partial, 187 n, 189 n, 190 n,

virtual, 187 n.

195

n.

presentment for, when necessary, 379, 532.
how made, 379, 528.
when excused, 380 n.
may be delayed, 380 n.
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ACCEPTANCE,
may be express, constructive,

oral, or written,

207-221.
irrevocable, 206 n.
in what name, 182 n, 196-199.
while bill is incomplete, 182 n, 184 n.
of bill not yet drawn, 182 n, 184 n.
of bill overdue, 184 n.
must be according to tenor of bill, 180, 188-195,
nee dnot be dated, 184 n.

183 n, 185

11,

188.

qualified acceptance, 186, 188, 530, 559.
rights of parties imder, 530.
conditional acceptance, loi n, 186 n, 188, 530.
defined, 186.
absolute acceptance, 186.
who may accept, 118 n, 178, 196, 199, 538.
by drawer, 118 n, 178 n.
necessity for delivery by acceptor, 200, 202.
forms and varieties of, as verbal, written, and implied from
conduct, 182 n, i83n, 184 n, 187 n, 538.
payee may refuse partial acceptance, 195 n.
evidence of, 182 n.
may be cancelled, 204.
may not be cancelled after delivery, 205, 206.
when necessary, 207, 379.
written acceptance, 207.
verbal or parol acceptance, 207, 211.
by telegram, 183 n.
implied from conduct, 183, 529.
detention of bill, 183-184 n, 529.
destruction of bill, 183-184 n, 529.
on separate paper, 212, 528.
of unaddressed bill, 117.
promise to accept, 182, 208, 209, 217, 218, 528.
parol promise to accept, 182, 207, 209, 211.
accommodation
acceptor, see "Accommodation."
may be of a bill yet to be drawn, 209, 211, 213, 216, 220, 221.
may be revoked before delivery, 213.
what bills must be accepted, 185.
rights of holder when refused, 380 n, 534.
time allowed, 529.
in case of need, 557.
time of acceptance, 558.

liability of acceptor, 180, 228-232, 231, 232.
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ACCEPTANCE,
facts which acceptor is estopped to deny, or warranties, 228232, 232 n, 233, 237.
see

"Estoppel."

refusal of, rights of holder, 380 n.
damages against acceptor, 219.
for honor or supra protest, 222, 538, 542.
liability of acceptor supra protest, 224, 227 n.
for whom made, 227 n,
to whom liable, 227 n.
steps necessary to consummate liability of, 224, 225,
226,

539.

liability of, 539.
presentment

to drawee at maturity,

224, 225,

226.

protest on nonpayment

by drawee, 225, 226.

of check, 405 n.

ACCEPTANCE FOR HONOR,
see "Acceptance."
see generally, 222.

ACCEPTOR,
drawee may become an indorser,
who may accept, 186.
of bill, defined, 109 n, 181.
relation to bill, 116.

181.

liability of, 178, 503.
see "Acceptance."
facts which he is estopped to deny, or warranties,

228-232,

232 n.
see "Estoppel."

capacity of, warranty by, or estoppel of indorser, 310 n, 228232, and note,
accommodation acceptor, see "Accommodation."
supra protest, liabiHty of, 222-227, 227 n.
liability of, 222-227,
steps necessary to consummate
227 n.

presentment to drawee at maturity, 222-227, 227 n.
protest on nonpayment by drawee, 222-227, 227 n.

ACCOMMODATION,
accommodation party defined, 299 n, 563.
liability of, 267, 299 n, 563.
persons accommodated, 382 n.
diversion, 300 n.
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ACCOMMODATION,
overdue accommodation
indorsement, 299 n.

paper, 300 n, 442

11.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION,
see "Defenses.''

ACTION,
who may sue, 250.
when action must be brought, 392 n.

ADMINISTRATORS,
see

"Executors and Administrators,"

131

n.

ADMISSIONS,
see

"Warranties."

AGENTS,
see "Principal and Agent," also 132 n.
liability of, 508.

capacity to make negotiable contracts,
authority of, 132 n.
joint agents, 132 n.
signature of, 132 n, 162 n.
married woman may be, 125.
how appointed, 126 n.
form of signature, 162 n.
signature of cashier, 162 n.
may accept bills of exchange, 199 n.

132.

ALLONGE,
defined, 261, 277 n.

ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENT,
effect

of, 525.

as a defense,

384-402,

473.

possible through negligence of maker, 403-407.
by a stranger, 401 n.
material, 400 n, 401 n, 402 n, 525.
immaterial, 402 n, 525.

through negligence, 403-407, 407 n.
writing contract over indorsement in blank, 265, 266, 295 n,
297 n, 308, 331 n.

warranty by,

or estoppel of, indorser,

American Bills of Exchange act.

287 n, 310 n, 312 n.

in general, 479-550-

AMERICAN BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACT,
in general, 479-550-
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AMOUNT,
Ambiguity,
see 496, 491.

see

"Bill of Exchange;" "Promissory Note."

ANNE, STATUTE OF,
see 26,

Tj.

3

AND

4,

ANTECEDENT DEBT,
see

"Consideration."

ASSIGNMENT,
defined, 248.
the common law rule, 248.
common law rule abrogated, 249.
rights which assignee receives, 248-249.
rights of assignee, 250.
is subject to equities, 250, 252.

assignability distinguished from negotiability, 248.

may be by parol, 250.
may be in writing, 250.
whether writing an indorsement or assignment, 340.
of non-negotiable instruments, 86 n, 250.
action by assignee, 86 n, 338, 339, 250, 251.
notice of assignment, 250-251, 252.
notice, by whom given, 252.
consideration, 263.
subject to equities between prior parties, 86 n, 250, 252, 262.
distinguished from an indorsement, 248.
requirements in case of, 251.

ATTORNEY'S FEES,

effect of a provision to pay, gin.
statutory provisions, 92 n.
liability, of indorser for, 293 n.

BANKRUPTCY,
a defense,

431 n.

of holder, transfer by operation of law, 274 n.
indorsement by bankrupt, 274.

BANK BILLS,
see

"Negotiable Contracts."

see 149, 457 n.

BANK NOTES,

defined, 457, 458.
see

"Negotiable

Contracts."

stolen, rights of bona fide holder, 149.
purpose of, 458.
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BILL OF EXCHANGE,

"Negotiable Contracts."
purpose of, 41 n, 42 n.
defined, 46, and note, 245, 526.
kinds of, 51.
see

foreign bill, 23, 25 n, 51 n, 552.
inland bill, 23, 25 n, 51 n, 552.
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BILL OF EXCHANGE,
origin of bills, 21.

parties defined and enumerated, 51 n.
form, 50 n.
must be written, 47 n, 484.
may be written with pen or pencil, 47 n.
must not be under seal, 50 n.
essentials in general, 47-50.
indicia of negotiability, 174-177, 554.
origin of negotiability, 23-27, 41 n.
date, 163, 163 n, 556.
place of date, 165 n.
necessity for and meaning

of "value received,"

130, 168 n,

176.

days of grace, 97 n, 104 n, 105 n.
order contained in bill, 54-59, 54 n.
certainty as to terms, 54.
uncertainty as to event, 57 n.
uncertainty as to time, 57 n, 176.
payment out of particular fund, 57 n, 88 n, 100, 102 n,
17s,

-^77-

in money or
some other thing, 84 n, 91 n.
payable on demand or at sight, etc., 102 n, 442 n.
no time of payment expressed, 105 n, 164 n.
time of payment, blank, 164 n.
payable in installments, 94 n, 443.
must be for payment of monev only, 58 n, 53, 54, 83-89,-

giving holder option between payment

84 n.
payment in property other than money, 83-89.
option given holder, 84 n.
performance of other acts in addition to payment
money, 86 n, 91 n.
definition of money, 85 n.
amount blank, 164 n.
amount must be certain, 54, 90-94.
interest, 92, 92 n.
exchange, 93 n.
payable in foreign money, 84 n, 85 n, 86 n, 87 n.
specification of parties, 155-162.
n, 114, 115, 155-162, 160 n.
signature of drawer,
certainty as to parties, 54, 109-134.
designation of drawee, 196, 197, 199.

iii

designation

of payee, 109-134,

118 n.

of:
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BILL OF EXCHANGE,

and promissory notes compared, yjj.
and checks distinguished, 448-455.

in sets, 543.

acceptances of two or more, 543.
where different parts are negotiated,
payment of, 544.
discharge of one, effect of, 544.

543.

what bills are negotiable, 554.
payable at a future time, 555.
payable on demand, 555.
omission of date, 556.

ante-dating, 556.
post dating, 556.
payable to order of drawer, 196-199.
payable to fictitious person, 112, 113, 118 n.
delivery, 54, I35-IS4in escrow, 146, 152, 153.
discount of bill by drawee before acceptance, 178-187.
relation of dnnvee to bill before acceptance, 28, 178-187,
190 n.

acceptance, see "Acceptance.''
accommodation parties, see ''Accommodation."
non-negotiable bill, 84 n, 117 n, 250.
liability of drawer, 161 n, 181, 185, 186.
warranties or facts which the drawee is estopped to deny,
_

203-205.

liability of acceptor, 180, 228-247, 232 n.
see "Acceptance."
facts which acceptor is estopped to deny, 228-247,

"Estoppel;" "Warranties."
liability of indorser, see "Indorsement."

232 n.

see

sets of, 51 n.

BILLS OF LADING,
see

"Negotiable Contracts."

defined, 459.
purposes of, 459.
negotiable by statute, 459.

BIOGRAPHY AND ORIGINAL,
see 21-32.

BLANK,
indorsement in blank, 258 n, 259 n, 295, 304 n, 305 n.
indorsement written on blank note, 164 n, 419 n.
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"BOHEMIAN OATS," NOTES,
see 416 n.
see "Defenses.''

BONA FIDE HOLDER,
defined 434, 441 n.

"Purchaser for Value without Notice."
rights of, 144, 147, 148, 149, 152 n, 153 n, 434-447see

BURDEN OF PROOF,
as to whether

one is

a

purchaser

for value without notice,

167 n, 427 n.

BONDS,
defined, 453 n.
coupons, 454 n.

CAPACITY,

of parties to contract,

121 n, 124

n, 126 n, 127 n, 129 n, 132 n,

133 n, 561.
see "Defenses."

of drawee, estoppel to deny, 232 n.
of prior parties, warranty by, or estoppel of indorser, 282 n,
295 n.

CASHIER,
see

"Agent," and 162 n.

CERTAINTY,
as to order in

bill or promise in note, 54, 62.

as to amount to be paid, 90-94, 484.
as to parties, 54, 109-134, 553-

CERTIFIED CHECKS,
see

"Negotiable Contracts."

effect of, 452 n, 544.

CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT,
see

"Negotiable Contracts."

CERTIFICATE OF STOCK,
see

"Negotiable Contracts."

defined, 461.

negotiability of, 461.

CERTIFICATE OF PROTEST,
form of 369.

CHECKS,
origin, or history of, 28.

defined, 448, 45° n, 545not entitled to grace, 104.

i
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CHECKS,
memorandum checks, 451 n.
defined, 451 n.
nature of, 451 n.
form of, 450 n.
drafts on bank in another state, 450 n.
effect of delay in presentment, 450 n.
checks and bills distinguished, 449.
presentment and demand of, 450 n, 545.
payment upon unauthorized indorsement, 453 n,
liability of banker for failure to honor, 453 n.
and bills of exchange distinguished, 448-455.
when should be presented, 452.
where parties reside in same place, 542.
where parties reside in different places, 542.
genuineness of terms contained in bill, 228 n,

231

n,

233-240.

facts

wliich the indorser is estopped to deny, 282 n, 310-313.
that the bill or note will be accepted and paid, 282 n,
310 n.

genuineness of instrument, 282 n, 310 n.
that the instrument is a vaild and subsisting obligation,
310 n.

that the obligation of all prior parties are valid, 294 n,
310 n.

capacity of prior parties, 282 n, 310 n.
that he, as indorser, has title, and the right to transfer,
282 n, 310 n.

indorser without recourse, 298 n, 310 n, 314-322, 319
322 n.

COLLECTION,
see

"Attorney's Fees."

COMMON LAW CONTRACTS.
Negotiable and common law contracts, distinguished,

38.

CONDITIONS,
commercial contracts must not contain, 74, -jj n.
will be sustained if sure to happen, 79 n.
reason for the rule, 79 n.
may be imposed by indorsement, 81 n.
inconsistent, will be disregarded, 81 n.
if changes time of payment simply, will be sustained,
must appear upon contract, 82 n.

81 n.

n,
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CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE,
defined, 186 n.

in general, 186 n.
see "Acceptance."

CONDITIONAL INDORSEMENT,
defined, 297 n.
in general, 297 n.
see

"Indorsement."

CONFLICT OF LAWS,
instrviment executed in one state and payable in another controlled by what law, 463-470, and notes,
usury laws, 274 n, (463-492 n).
intention of parties, 463-470, and notes,
intent to evade law, 463-470.

CONSIDERATION,

need not be stated, 167.
presumed, 167, and note.
what will support, 169 n.
natural affection not sufficient, 169 n.
may be inquired into, 169 n.
defined, sufficiency, 167, 169 n, 563.
money consideration, 170 n.
other than money, 170 n.
pre-existing debt, 172 n, 563.
necessity for and rneaning of "value received," 168 n.
bill or note imports a consideration, 167 n.
want or failure of, as a defense, 168 n.
for assignment of non-negotiable instrument, 263.
of indorser's contract, 294.
illegality of, 399, 420-429.
statutory prohibition, 372 n, 320 n, 321 n, 399, 420-429.
violation of the Sunday laws, 165 n.
other statutes, 420-427.
common-law prohibition, 399, and notes,
contravention of public policy, 399, and notes,

in general, 420-429.

restraint of trade, 429.
effect of illegality, 420-429.
illegality as being total or partial, 420-429.
accommodation paper, see "Accommodation."
suretyship contract, 471.
of guaranty, 475.
presumption of, 494.
want of, effect of, 495contract
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CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERY,
see

"Delivery.''

CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE,
see

"Notice."

CONTRIBUTION,
as between indorsers,

233 n.

as between accommodation

indorsers, 299 n.

CORPORATIONS,
power to execute commercial contracts, 127 n.
not allowed to execute accommodation contracts, 128 n.
power to indorse commercial contracts, 128 n.
the form of their contracts, 129 n.
power of their agents, 129.
indorsement by, 274 n, 492.

CORPORATIONS— PUBLIC^

power to make commercial paper, 129.

COUPON,

defined, 453 n.
see

"Negotiable Contracts."

COUPON BONDS,
defined, 453 n.
see

"Negotiable Contracts."

COVERTURE,
see

"Married Women."

CUSTOM OF MERCHANTS,
defined and explained, 21-32.

DAMAGES,
see

liability of "Acceptor;"

"Maker;" "Drawer;" "Indorser."

DATE,
see

"Non-Essentials,"

163.

of bill or note, 163.
ante and post-dating, 165 n, 556, 488.
effect of dating on Sunday,
165 n.
where placed, 165 n.
mistake in, 166 n.
presumption as to, 488.
when may be inserted, 489.
blanks, when filled, 489.

DAYS OF GRACE,
defined, 104 n.
allowed on notes and bills, 97 n.
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DAYS OF GRACE,
upon suretyship or guaranty, 472,476.
not allowed on checks, 104 n.
what instruments entitled to, 104 n.

where grace is allowed, when is payment due, 104 n.
may be dispensed with, 105 n.
what days are hoHdays, 105 n.
when grace is allowed, when payment demanded, 104 n.

DEATH,

of holder, presentment may be delayed, 382.
of holder, transfer by operation of law, 2^2, n, 332 n.
of joint payee or indorsee, rights of survivor, 332 n.

DEFENSES,

general classes of, 398 n.
cut off by transfer do not again attach, 260 n, 261 n.
as against immediate party, and as against purchaser for
value without notice, 261 n, 418 n, 419 n.
as real or personal, 398 n.
real defenses, 384-462, 398.
personal defenses, 398, 408,-419 and notes,
coverture, 399 n, 430.
instruments executed by married woman, 133 n, 430 n.
indorsement by married woman, 273 n, 436 n.
infancy, 400 n, 430-433 and note.
instruments executed by, 131 n, 132 n, 378 n, 430.
notes for necessaries, 430 n.
notes for torts, 430 n.
indorsements by, 273 n, 321 n.
persons under guardianship, 431.
persons non compos mentis, 399-402 n.
instruments executed by, 132 n.
indorsements by, 321 n.
drunken persons, 431 n, 432 n.
instruments executed by, 431 n, 432 n.
instruments avoided by statute, 427 n.

bankruptcy, 431.

usury, 429 n, 430.
alterations, 232, 399, 384-402.
forgery, 228-232.
fraud, 399 n, 232 n, 4o8-4i9> 4^6 n, 417 n.
personal defense, 416 n.
rights of bona fide holder, 417 n.

provisions, 417 n.
"Bohemian Oats" notes, 416 n.

statutory

note obtained by, 418 n.
42
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DEFENSES,
want or failure of consideration, 399 n.
illegality of consideration, 399 n, 420-429.
personal defense, 420.
when it exists, 427 n.
illustrations of, 428 n, 429 n.
statutory prohibition, 321 n, 317.
violation of the Sunday laws, 165 n.
other statutes, 425.

common-law prohibition, 399 n, 427 n.
contravention of public polic) , 427 n, 430 n.

in general, 428 n.
restraint of trade, 428 n.
effect of illegality, 420-429.
illegality as being total or partial, 420-429.
want of delivery, 399 n.
discharge of instrument and of the parties thereto, 399, 473.
payment, 399 n.
accord and satisfaction, 399 n.
discharge by agreement, 399 n, 473.
discharge of drawer or indorser by prejudicial acts or
neglect of holder, 282-294.
discharge by diversion, 300, 301, 473.
statute of limitations, 38-48.

DEFINITIONS,

acceptance, 182 n.
acceptor, 51 n.
accommodation parties, 299 n.
bank notes, 457.
bill of exchange, 46.
foreign bill, 51 n.
inland bill, 51 n.
in general, 481. ,
bill of lading, 459.
certificate of stock, 461.
check, 450.
coupon, 454.
coupon bonds, 453.
custom of merchants or law merchant,
20-32.
drawer, 51 n.
drawee, 51 n.
due bill, 462.
guarantor, 475.
indorsement.

2j8, j.qo, 255-263.
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DEFINITIONS,
indorser of bill, 255-263.

of note, 255-263. ,
letter of credit, 456.
maker, 53 n.
material alteration, 399 and notes,
memorandum check, 451 n.
money, 83, 84 and notes,
payee of bill, 51 n.
payee of note, 53 n.
promissory note, 52.
receiver's certificate, 461.
suretyship, 471.
United States treasury notes, 457.
warehouse receipt, 460.

DELIVERY,
defined, 150 n, 560.
kinds of, 150 n.
to an agent, 150 n.
of bill or note, 54, 135 n.

the necessity of, 143, 144.
does execution include delivery,
does indorsement prove, 142.
note not good until, 145.

J41,

490.

conditional, 146.

fraudulent, effect of, 146, 151 n.
obtained without, 149.
constructive, 150 n.
when made, 151 n.
when note to be signed by others, before, 151 n.
cannot be made after death of maker, 151 n.
to a fictitious person, effect of, 152 n.
may be compelled, 152 n.
maker must part with possession, 152 n.
maker not liable unless, 153 n.
on Sunday, 154 n.
parol evidence admissible, 154 n.
in blank, 164 n.
without date, 164 n, ,

without stating the amount, 164 n.
through negligence, 152 n.
after death of maker,
actual or constructive,

151 n.

150 n.

,
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DELIVERY,
escrow, 146, 150 n, 152 n.
must not be to payee, 153 n.
may be placed in hands of payee, when, 153 n.
,
by acceptor, 200-206.
by indorser, 278-282.
sufficiency of, 150 n.
transfer by, 32.
see

"Transfer."

conditional,

151

n.

presumption as to time of, 152 n, 490.
may be rebutted, 152 n.

DEMAND,
when

to be made, instrument

302 n, 282-294,

upon whom.

payable

on demand, 74 n,

487.

effect of failure to demand,
instrument payable on, when over-due, 442 n, 487.

DISCHARGE OF INSTRUMENT],
as a defense,

notes,
293 and

how, 523.
payment, 473.
by operation of law, 356-358.
by agreement, 399.
discharge of drawer or indorser by prejudicial act or neglect
of holder, 282-294 and notes, 374-376.
see

"Suretyship."

when persons secondarily

liable, 523.

DISCOUNT,
of bill by drawee before acceptance, 178-187.
of paper without date, 165 n.

DISHONOR,
when dishonored, 512, 571.
see "Notice of Dishonor."
by non-payment, 574. ,
by non-acceptance, 571.

DIVERSION,

of accommodation paper, 300 n.
of suretyship contract, 473.

DRAWEE,

duty of, 231.
of bill, defined, 109 n.
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DRAWEE,
may discount the bill, i8i.
may become an indorsee, i8l.
may become an indorser, i8i.
may accept supra protest, iSi.
may sue prior parties, iSi. ,
designation of, 198, 199.
in case of need, 527.
relation to bill before acceptance, 27, 196, 228.
not liable until acceptance, 178-187.
warranties or admissions of, 228, 232 n.
must know handwriting of drawer, 231 n, 233.
need not know handwriting in body, 231 n.
presumed to know handwriting of drawer, 231 n, 233, 237.
presentment, when dead, 533.

DRAWER,
not liable until acceptance, 178, 198.
of bill, defined, 109 n.
signature of, 117.
rights and liabilities before acceptance, 27, 181, 196, 503.
after acceptance, 374.
liability of, 180, 182 and notes,

liability of and indorser compared, 375.

of check, 449-453 and notes,
discharge from liability by acts or neglect of holdei-, 282-294,
374-

existence of, estoppel of acceptor to deny, 233-240 and notes,
signature of, estoppel of acceptor to deny, 233-240.
authority to draw, estoppel of acceptor to deny, 385.
capacity of, estoppel of acceptor to deny, 233-240.
accommodation drawer, see "Accommodation."
capacity of, warranty by, or estoppel of, indorser, 282-294
and notes.

DRUNKARDS,
power to make negotiable contracts, 133 n.

DRUNKENNESS,
as a defense, 431 n, 432 n.

instruments

executed by drunken persons, 431 n.

DUE BILLS,
see

"Quasi-Negotiable Contracts."

defined, 69 n, 462.

distinguished from promissory notes, 72 n, 73 n.
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EXCHANGE,
payment of an amount certain with, 93 n.

EXCHEQUER BLLS,
see

"Negotiable Contracts."

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS,

power to execute and deliver negotiable contracts,
power to transfer negotiable instrument, 274 n, 281.
transfer to, on death of holder, 274 n.
presentment to 381 n.

131.

EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT,
see

"Assignment."'

EQUITY,
see

"Purchaser for Value without Notice.''

equitable assignment, 249.
relief against inadvertent failure to indorse, 249, 250, 447 n.

EQUITIES,
what is meant by, 253.
what equities may be interposed, 254.
title of bona fide holder for value not subject to, 137, 261 n.
see "Defenses."
assignee of non-negotiable instrument takes subject to, 86,
249, 250, 251, 252, 254.
see "Defenses."
effect of failure to indorse, 249, 250, 255 n, 328 n, 447 n.
transfer of over due pater, subject to, 330 n, 333n.

ESCROW,
delivery in escrow, 152 n,

153 n.

ESSENTIALS,
enumerated, 54.
see "Bills of Exchange;'' "Promissory Notes.''
in writing, not sealed, 47 n, 50 n.
an order in a bill, 31 n, 54-59, 55 n.
a promise in a note, 59.
to pay money, 54, 83, 84 n, 86 n, 87 n, 88 n, 89 n.
order or promise must be absolute, 54, 74,
n, 79 n, 80 n,
81 n, 82 n.

JJ

amount must be certain, 54, 90, 90 n, 91 n, 92 n, 93 n, 94 n.
time must be certain, 54, 95 n.
parties must be definite, 54, 109.
must be signed, 54, 155.
must be delivered, 54, 135 n.
not payable out of a particular fund, 177, 193 n.
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ESTOPPEL,
of maker to deny delivery, if negligent, 149.
facts which acceptor is estopped to deny, 228-232, 232 n,
genuineness of drawer's signature, 228-232, 232 n, 236,
237-

existence of drawer, 232 n.
capacity of drawer, 232 n.
authority to make draft, 232 n.
competency of payee to indorse, 232 n, 233-240.
facts which acceptor does not admit, 233-240.
of payee's or subsequent indorsements,
genuineness
233-240, 240 n.
payment upon.
checks as negotiable instruments, 448-455, and notes,
presentment, protest, and notice of dishonor, effect of delay,
450 n, 451 n, 545.
rights of holder against bank, 449-452, and notes,
certification and acceptance of checks, 452 n, 546.
effect upon drawer's liability, 452 n, 544.
failure of bank to honor check, 453 n.
payment by, 449, 450.
when operates as an assignment, 451, 546.

FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION,
see

"Consideration."

FEES,
notarial fees, see "Collection."

FEME COVERT,
see

"Married Women;" "Defenses."

see

"Bill of Exchange."

FOREIGN BILL,
FORGERY,

defined, 246.
by wrong payee of same name, 119 n, 240-247.
as a defense, 233-240.
estoppel of, warranties by, indorser, 312 n, 318.
of bill in respect to terms, acceptor not estopped, 233-240.
of indorsements, estoppel of acceptor, 240-247.
of drawer's signature, estoppel of acceptor, 228-232, 231 n.

FORM,
of bill of exchange, 50 n.
of promissory note, 52 n,

53.

indicia of negotiability, I74-I75see "Bill of Exchange;" "Check;" "Promissory Note."
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FRAUD,
259 n, 289, 399 n, 408-419, 416 n.

as a defense,

rights of bona fide holder, 417 n.

statutory provisions, 417 n.
"Bohemian oats" notes, 416 n.
where deUvery obtained by, 418 n.
obtained in blank, 419 n.

GOLD AND SILVER CERTIFICATES,
see

"Negotiable Contracts."

defined, 459.
Goldsmith's notes, 27.

GOVERNMENT BONDS,
"Negotiable Contracts."

see

GRACE,
see

"Days of Grace."

GUARANTY,

,

whether writing an indorsement or guaranty, 209-219.
defined, 475.
in general, 475-478.
form of contract, 475.
consideration for, 475.
negotiability of contract, 476.
not entitled to grace, 476.
classification of, 476.
necessity for presentment, demand and notice, 476.
liability of guarantor, 477.
how discharged, 477.
rights of guarantor, 477.

GUARDIANS,
power to make negotiable instruments,
power to transfer instrument,

HISTORY,

133 n.

-

of bills of exchange, 21-32.

HOLIDAYS,
what days are, 105 n.
note or bill falls due on,

105 n.

Holt's (Lord) objection to the negotiability of promissory
notes, 25 and note.

HOLDER FOR VALUE,
what constitutes, 502.
duties of, 569.

INDEX.

685

HOLDER IN DUE COURSE,
what constitutes, 502.

HONOR,

acceptance for honor, 222, 224, 227 n, 538, 542.

HUSBAND AND WIFE,
see

"Married Women."

ILLEGALITY,

see "Denfenses."

illustration, 428 n.
when it exists, 427 n, 428 n.
burden of proof, 427.
usury, 429.

,

ILLEGAL AGREEMENTS,
illegality as a defense, 420-429.
see "Consideration.''
effect of renewal of, 428 n.
what contracts are, 428.
illustrations of, 428 n, 429 n.

IMPLIED ACCEPTANCE,
see

"Acceptance."

IMMATERIAL ALTERATIONS,
effect of, 402.
see "Defenses."

,

INCOMPLETE CONTRACT,
liability of person executing, 419 n, 559.

INDICIA,

I

"Non-Essentials."
of negotiability, 174-177, 554.
see "Bill of Exchange;" "Promissory Note."
bills and notes need not contain, 174.
see

INDORSEE,
duty of, 377.
see

"Indorsement;" "Purchaser for Value without Notice."

not subject to equities, 260 n.

may have better title than his indorser, 260 n.

INDORSER,

,

order in which liable, 507.
when deemed, 506.
in an action by what must show, 370-383admission of,
see

"Warranties."
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INDORSER,
consideration of indorser's contract, 294 n.
duty of, 377.
liability of drawer and indorser compared, 375.
of bill or note, defined, 109 n, 255 n.
may limit his liability, 258 n.
accommodation indorser, see "Accommodation."
amount of liability, 293 n, 294 n.
liability for attorney's fees, 293 n.
not liable to each other in contribution, 293 n.
where less than full amount paid, 294 n.
capacity of, warranty bv, or estoppel of, subsequent indorser,
310-313, 310 n.
liability of, 164 n, 180, 250 n, 274, 282-294, 283, 293.

discharged how, 265.

see "Indorsement."
liability for annual interest, 284, 288.
liable only upon condition, 285, 287.
discharge of, by act or neglect of holder, 282-294, 310.

INDORSER WITHOUT RECOURSE,
contract of, 322 n.
warranties of, 322 n, 315-322.

INDORSER,

*

SPECIAL,

liability of, 304-309.
defined, 296.

INDORSEMENT,
mode of, 256.
when necessary, 257 n.
negotiable by.
defined, 249, 255 n, 263 n, 295 n, 496.
upon blank instrument, 164 n.
by whom made, 265-275.
when made, 332 n.
formal requisites, 250, 255, 261, 276, 565.
must be written, 250, 276 n.
must be on the instrument indorsed, 250, 260.
must be by payee or subsequent holder, 264.

kinds of, 295 n, 497.

to whom, 257 n.
indorsement or assignment, 249.
indorsement or guaranty, 265-275.
of entire instrument, 257 n, 332 n, 496.
in blank, 250 n, 295 n, 304-309, 497.
right to fill up, 331 n.
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INDORSEMENT,
may be changed to a special, 308.
written contract over indorsement
296 n.
a

in blank, 250 n, 295 n,.

guaranty m.ay be, 256.

applies to negotiable

contracts only, 256.

upon non-negotiable contract is an assignment, 256 n.
effect of transfer without, 258 n.
when contract may be transferred without, 258 n.
presumed to be bona fide, 260 n.
burden of proof, 260 n.
may be with pen or pencil, 277 n.
effect of after maturity, 312 n.
negotiability cannot be restrained by, 295-303.
general effect, 301.
effect of, 301 n. ,
indorsement written on blank bill or note, 164 n, 265, 415418.

absolute, 298 n.
qualified, 498.
in full, 296 n.
instrument originally payable to bearer, 261-263, 295303, 296 n, 304-309, 304 n.
of instrument overdue, 301 n, 302 n, 326-335.
without recourse, 298, 314-322, 322 n.
warranties, 322 n.
contract of, 322 n. ,
conditional indorsement, 295 n, 297 n, 498.
defined, 299 n.
restrictive indorsement, 295 n, 297 n, 497.
defined, 297 n.
effect of, 498.
nature of indorsement, 255-263 and notes, 301 n.
as a contract, 140, 256 n, 258 n, 282-294, 301 n, 350.
as a transfer, 180, 301.
requisites of indorsement, 255-263, 261, 276.
no particular form required, 276, 276 n.
following tenor of instrument, 250 n.
who may indorse, 273 n.
necessity for delivery, 278-282, 282 n.
explained by parol evidence, 258 n, 259 n.
anomalous or irregular indorsements, 264-275, 259 n, 275 n.
by person whose name does not otherwise appear, 264'275-

'
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INDORSEMENT,

(anomalous or irregular indorsements),
defined, 275 n. ,
indorsement before transfer by payee, 264-275.
his liability, 275 n, 506.
title of indorsee, 249 n, 250 n, 260.
who may take by, 250 n.
by an infant, 273 n.
by non compos mentis, 273 n.
by administrator, 274 n.
by husband at common law, 274 n.
by a bankrupt, 274 n. ,
by a partner, 274 n.
by a corporation, 301.
not subject to equities between original parties, see "Defenses."
I
forgery of indorsement, 246-247, 312.
accommodation indorser, see ''Accommodation," and 299 n,
495-

1

liability of, 299 n.
by agent, 301

n.

by joint payees, 273.
right of holders to strike out, 304-309, 331 n, 500.
when it may be made, 332 n.
governed by the lex loci, 333 n, 334 n, 356, 463-470, 469 n.
470 n.
of non-negotiable instrument, 329 n.
liability of indorser, 179, 250 n, 282-294.
warranties or facts which indorser is estopped to deny, 282,
310-313, 310 n.
that the bill or note will be accepted and paid, 282, 310 n,
genuineness of instrument, 310 n.
that the instrument is a valid and subsisting obligation,
310 n.

that the obligations of all prior parties are valid, 310 n.
capacity of prior parties, 281, 310 n.
that he, as indorser, has title and the right to transfer,
282, 310 n.

indorser without recourse, 298, 299, 282, 310 n, 314-322.
warranties or facts which transferrer without indorsement is
estopped to deny, 323-335.
presumption as to time of, 260 n.
presumption as to place of, 261 n.
must not be partial, 332 n.
liability of a special indorser, 304-309.
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INDORSEMENT,
delivery necessary, 302.

after payment, effect of, 330 n.
mistake in, 33in.
genuineness of, estoppel of acceptor, 240-247, 240 n.
discharge of indorser, 282-294, 375.
competency of payee to indorse, estoppel of acceptor, 240-247.
necessity for, to transfer instrument, 257 n.
effect of failure to indorse by mistake or otherwise, 250,
251,

251

mistake

INFANCY,

n.

in, 331 n.
,

capacity of, 121.
as a defense, 121 n, 430-433, 433 "■
instruments executed by infants, 121 n, 430 n, 433 n.
joint note of infant and adult, 121 n.
indorsement and transfer by infant, 273 n, 320 n.
infant liable for necessaries, 121 n.
infants liable for torts, 122 n.
infant as payee, 122 n.
infant as indorser, 122 n, 273 n.
liability upon his indorsement, 123 n, 273 n.
infant's ratification, 122 n, 273 n.
note of infant and adult, 124 n.
note of infant partner, 124 n.
indorsement by, 492.

INLAND BILL,
see

"Bill of Exchange."

INSANE PERSONS,
power to make negotiable

contracts, 133 n.

INNOCENT PARTIES,
rights of, 145, 147.

INSANITY,
see

"Lunacy.''

INTEREST,
does not render amount uncertain, 92, 92 n.
where no time of payment is stated, 102 n
incident to the principal, 282-294.
liability to pay, by indorser, 282-294.
defenses to payment of, 282-294.
alteration of rate, material, 401 n.
annual, when due.
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INTERPRETATION OF TERMS,
see 481,

550.

INTOXICATION,
see

"Drunkenness."

KNOWLEDGE,
see

"Notice."

LARCENY,
see

"Stolen

Instrument.''

LAW MERCHANT,

,

defined and explained, 29 n.

LETTERS OF CREDIT,
see

"Negotiable Contracts."

defined, 456.
general, 456.

LIMITATIONS,
see

"Statutes of," 288.

LIABILITY OF ACCEPTOR,
see

"Acceptor."

see 381.

LIABILITY OF DRAWER AND INDORSER,
see

"Drawer"; "Indorser."

see 582.

LIABILITY OF ACCEPTOR FOR HONOR,
see

"Acceptor supra protest."

see 388.

LIABILITY OF MAKER,
see

"Maker."

see

302.

special, 456.
form, 457.

LORD FIOLT'S OBJECTION TO PROMISSIORY NOTES,
see 25

and note.

LOCAL ACCEPTANCE,
defined, 187 n.

LOST INSTRUMENT,
action on, 591.
rights of bona fide holder, 26, 33, 48, 144, 146, 149, 416, 581.
protest of, 339.

LUNATICS,
power to make negotiable

contracts, 133 n.
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LUNACY,
as a defense, 398 n.

,

instruments executed by persons non compos mentis, 124 n.
indorsement and transfer by persons non compos mentis,
319 n.

lunatics, capacity to contract, 124 n.
effect of insanity upon capacity to contract,

MAKER,

124 n.

of note, defined, no.
signature of, 117 n, 155-162, 160 n.
liability of, 161 n, 505.
capacity of warranty by, or estoppel of indorser, 282 n, 310 n.
accommodation maker, see "Accommodation."

MATERIAL ALTERATION,
see "Defenses."'
see 384-402.

defined, 399 n.
effect of, 400 n.
by a stranger, 401 n.
illustrations of, 401 n, 402 n, 525.
what constitutes, 525.

MARRIED WOMEN,
marriage of holder, rights of husband, 125 n, 274 n.
transfer to married woman, rights of husband, 257 n.

coverture as a defense, 398 n, 430 n.
instruments executed by, 124 n.
indorsement and transfer by, 274 n, 431 n.
capacity of, 124 n.
at common law, 124 n.
under the statute, 124 n, 126 n.
liability of husband for ante-nuptial contract of,
liability of — general rule, 125 n.

liabiHty of

as a partner,

126.

as an agent, 125.
as a surety,

MATURITY,
time of, 513.
see

"Time;" "Overdue Paper."

how computed, 513.

MEASURE OF DAMAGES,
see 583.

125 n.
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MEDIUM OF PAYMENT,

in general, 54, 83-90 and notes.

MEMORANDUM CHECKS,
in general, 451 n, 452 n.

MERCHANTS,
see

"Custom of Merchants."

METHODS OF TRANSFER,
by
by
by
by
by

act of parties,

assignment,
indorsement,
delivery,,

operation of law, 248, 332 n.

MISTAKE,

in indorsement, 331 n.
in place for demand of payment, 363.
as to contract entered into, 410, 415.

MONEY,

defined, 85 n.
instrument must be payable in but may be money of any
country, 87 n, 486.
instrument must be payable in, 54, 83, 84 n.
must not be payable in "bills payable,'' 87 n.
general rule, 84 n.
may be payable in merchandise when, 84 n.
statutory rule, 84 n.
must not be payable in "goods," 84 n.
the reason for the rule, 85 n.
equivalent expressions for "money," 86 n.

"bank bills," 87 n.
"money," 87 n.
"currency," of this place, 87 n.
"good current money," 87 n.
"current funds of the State of Ohio," 87.
"current money," 87 n.
must not be payable out of a particular fund, 88 n.
may be charged to a particular fund, 88 n.
must not be payable in "money" and an "act," 89 n.
the amount of money must be certain, 90.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
power to execute commercial

NATURE,
of negotiable

contracts,

contracts, 32, 41 n.

130 n.
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NEGLIGENCE,
delivery by, 147, 148.
of maker, 403-407,
407 n.
of indorser, 410.
,

of acceptor, 245.
,
of purchaser for value without notice, 434-447,
446 n.

NEGOTIABILITY,

origin of, 23. ,
upon what instruments,

first allowed, 23, 41 n.
purpose of, 41 n.
indicia of, 174-177.
see "Bill of Exchange;" "Promissory Note."
of suretyship and guaranty, 471, 472.

distinguished from assignability, 86 n, 256 n.
see "Assignment;" "Indorsement;" "Transfer."
the statute of Anne, 26, 27,
n.

jj

the custom of merchants, or law merchant, defined and explained, 29 n.
see "Bill of Exchange;" "Checks;" "Defenses ;" "In-

dorsement;" "Purchaser for Value without Notice;"
"Transfer."
additional terms do not affect, 486.
what constitutes, 497.

NEGOTIABLE CONTRACTS,
negotiable contracts
guished, 38.
enumerated, 46.
defined, 46-53.

and

common

law

contracts,

disting-

,
,

"Essentials;" "Bills of Exchange;" "Promissory Note."
how made non-negotiable, 548.

see

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS,
see

"Bill of Exchange;" "Check;'' "Promissory Note."

NON-ESSENTIALS,
generally, 163.
|
need not be dated, 163 and note.
parol evidence admitted, 165 n.
effect of dating on Sunday, 165 n.
ante and post dating, 165 n.
mistake in, 166 n.
need not specify consideration, 167.
extrinsic evidence admitted, 168 n.
need not stipulate place of payment, 173.
presumed place, when not named, 173.
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NON-ESSENTIALS,
need not contain indicia of negotiability,

174-177.

NON CO.MPOS MENTIS,
see

see

"Drunkenness;"'

"Lunacy."

"Indorsement," 273 n.

NON-NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS,
distinguished from negotiable instruments, 84 n, 117 n, 248.
assignment of, 249, 250, 251.
see

"Assignment,"

assignment distinguished from negotiation,
presumption of consideration, 167 n.
indorsement of, 329 n.

24S.

NOTE,

see

"Promissory Note.''

see

Goldsmith,

NOTICE,

27.

kinds of, 445.
effect of non-notice, 474.
rules as to, 575.
construction, 445.
actual, 445.
excuses for, 577.
of assignment of non-negotiable instrument, 251, 252.
to agent, 446 n.
effect of, 446 n.
before full amount is paid, 503.
what constitutes, 583.
of equities, 446 n.
see "Purchaser for Value without Notice."
to partners, 271.
to joint parties, 271, 272.

NOTICE OF DISHONOR,

form of, 516, 575.
necessity for, 282-294, 383 n, 472, 476.
defined, 366, 519.
:
how, when, and where it must be given,
515. 519-

360, 361, 367 n,

sufficiency of notice, 360, 516, 519.
indentification of instrument, 346.
statement of presentment, etc., 360.
to whom given, 515.
where party is dead, 517.
by whom notice should be given, 365, 367 n, 515. 517.
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NOTICE OF DISHONOR,
may be given by agent, 515, 516.
to whose benefit notice accrues, 375.
method of giving notice, 360, 521.
time of giving notice, 312 n, 366 n, 367 n, 518.
efifect of failure to give notice of dishonor, 272, 282, 294, 521,
522.

excuses for failure to give notice, 261 n, 369 n, 577.
waiver of notice, 261 n, 369 n, 520, 521.
of check, 453.
to partners, 517.
to persons jointly Hable, 517.
to bankrupt, 518.
where given, 518.
when parties reside in same place, 518.
when parties reside in different places, 518.
where sent, 519.
who effected by waiver of, 520.
when need not be given to drawer, 521.
when need not be given to indorser, 521.

NOTARIAL FEES,
see

"Collection."

NUDUM PACTUM,
see

"Consideration."

OPERATION OF LAW,
transfer by, 248, 332 n.

ORDER,
in bill, 54-59. 55 "•
see "Bill of Exchange."
see illustrations of, 55 n, 58 n.
a request may amount to, 57 n.
no particular form of words necessary, 57 n.
an acknowledgment of a debt not sufScient, 58 n.
"pleas" may amount to an order, 58 n.
contained

ORIGINAL PARTIES,
defined, 109 n.

ORIGIN,

of negotiability, 23.
of checks, 28.

OVERDUE PAPER,

may be transferred, 184 n, 301 n, 312 n, 330 n.
rights of transferee, 301 n, 330 n.
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OVERDUE PAPER,
when instrument payable on demand becomes, 442.
when instrument payable in installments becomes, 443.
purchaser before maturity, 441 n, 442 n.
note payable at sight, when overdue, 442.
note payable in installments when overdue, 443 n.

PAROL ACCEPTANCE,
see "Acceptance.''

PAROL EVIDENCE,
inadmissible

,

to vary terms of indorsement,

PARTIAL ACCEPTANCE,

258 n, 259 n.

,

define, 187 n, 189 n, 195.
effect on liability of prior parties,

PARTNERSHIP,

195

infant's liability as a partner, 124 n.
power to make negotiable contracts,
partners, form of signature, 126 n.
indorsement by, 274 n.

n.

126

n, 127 n.

PARTIES,
see

"Essentials," 54, 109-130.

to bill of exchange, 51 n, 109-130.
how designated, 109 n, no n.
to promissory note, 54, 109-133.
must be certain, 109 n, 117 n.
exception as to certainty of, 117 n.
who may accept bill, 118, 178.
see i-icceptance."
,
antecedent discharged by partial acceptance,
195 n.
accommodation parties, see "Accommodation."
certainty as to, 54, 109-133, 117 n.
specification of, 118 n, 119 n.
capacity of parties, 121 n.
see

"Acceptor;"

"Drawee;"

"Drawer;"

"Drunkenness;"

"Holder;" "Infancy;" "Indorsee;" "Guardians;" "Trustees;"
"Indorser;"
"Lunacy;"
"Maker;" "Married Women |"

"Payee."
1
where parties left blank, 118 n.
may be described, 119 n.
how designated, 109, no.

PAYEE,
of bill, defined, no n.
of note, defined, no n.
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PAYEE,
designation of, 110 n.
rules concerning, 118 n. ,
payable to fictitious person,
competency
240.

to indorse,

112, 118.

estoppel of acceptor to deny,- 233-

I

may refuse partial

PAYMENT,

iii,

or conditional acceptance,

195

medium of, 54, 83, 84 n.
must not depend upon a contingency, 74, j-j n.
must not be out of a particular fund, "j"/ n.
may indicate a particular fund, jy n.
will be good if condition is sure to happen, 79 n.

at convenience of maker, 80 n.
may be merchandise, when, 84 n.
statutory provisions, 84 n.
place of, 173, 402 n.
time of payment, days of grace, 104 n.
payment for honor, 541, 589.
by whom, 541.
\
how made, 541.
effect upon subsequent parties, 542.
rights of payer, 542.
in due course, 585.
part payment, 428 n.
presentment for, 509.
where not payable on demand, 509.
what constitute, 509.
time of payment, 95, 572, 573.
the exact time need not be stated, 102 n.
when note is lost, 103 n.
when payable in installments, 103 n.
when payable on demand, 103 n.
before maturity, effect of, 330 n.
when demanded, when last day is a holiday, 105.
where no time is stated, 105 n.
presentment for, 381 n, 572.
when necessary, 281 n.
how made, 381 n.
when excused, 382 n, 573.
where there are several drawees, 382 n.
in case of partners, 382 n.
where drawee or maker is dead, 382 n.
may be delayed when, 383 n.

n.
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PAYMENT,
effect of, 383.

PERSONS PRIMARILY LIABLE,
in general, 482.
discount of bill by drawee before acceptance, 178, 187.
according to tenor of instrument, 180.
when a discharge and defense, 178, 187.
presentment for, when necessary, 381 n.
manner of presentment for, 381 n.
indorsement after, 330 n.

PERSONAL DEFENSES,
defined, 398.
see "Defenses."'

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES,
see

"Executors and xAdministrators."

see also page 131 n.

PLACE,
as to indorsement,
see

see "Indorsement" and 333 n.
all 334 n, 356, 463-470 and note.

PLACE OF PAYMENT,
need not be stated,
see

123.

"Non-Essentials."

excuses for delay, 573.
rules as to, 572.

PRESENTMENT,
why made, 350.
effect of, 383 n.
necessity for, 282, 294, 350, 370, 381 n, 383 n, 379, 380 n, 472,
476, 532.
purposes of, 350, 351.
when payable at bank, 510.
instrument must be exhibited,
where debtor is dead, 511.

510.

to partners, 511.
to point parties, 511.
when not necessary, 511.
for acceptance, 379 n.
how made, 380 n.
when executed, 380 n.
manner of, 354, 379 n, 380, 532.
time of, 389, 380 n, 282, 294, 533.
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PRESENTMENT,
days of grace, 104 n,
355 n, '472, 476.
place of, 379 n, 38011,
510.
by whom and to whom, 351, 379,
383.
eflfect of failure to present, 377,
532.
excuses for failure to present, 380 n, 572,
533.
excuses for delay in, 380 n, 512.
of check, 450 n.
for payment, how made, 381 n.
for payment, 381 n.
how made, 381 n.
when delayed, 383 n.
when excused, 383 n.

PRESENTMENT AND DEMAND,
see

"Presentment."

see 370-383.

PRESUMPTION,
as to whether

party is

a

purchaser for value without notice,

372 n.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT,
notice to agent, 446 n.
see "Agent," and also 132 n.

PROMISE,

contained in note, 59, 73, and notes,

"Promissory Note."
what words are equivalent to "promise," 65, 69 n, to
an I. O. U. not a good promise, 72 n.
must be absolute and unconditional, 74.
see

PROMISSORY NOTE,
when first used, 24.

"Negotiable Contracts."
Lord Holt's objection to, 25, and note,
see

defined, 545, 600.

purpose of, 41 n.
and money compared, 39.
and goods compared, 38.
the statute of Anne, 26.
non-negotiable note, 63.
origin of negotiability of, 23, 38, 42 n.
form of, 52 n.
must be written, 52 n.
must not be sealed, 52 n.
essentials of note, in general, 54, 59, 69 n, 63.

"jt,

n.
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PROMISSORY NOTE,
what words will import a promise to pay, 71 n.
indicia of negotiability, 174, 177.
and bills of exchange compared, 377.
obtained in blank and wrongfully filled up, 419 n,
given for patent right, 547.
given for speculative puiposes, 547.
when unconditional, 485.
days of grace, 104, 134 n, 355 n, 472, 476.
delivery, 54, 135 n, 135, 154, and note.
in escrow, 146.
date, 163-166, and note,
where placed, 165 n.
effect of on Sunday, 165 n.
mistake in, 166 n.
under seal, 50.
the promise contained in note, 54, 59-73.
certainty as to terms, 54, 68, 79.
uncertainty as to event, 79.
uncertainty as to time, 102 n, 107 n.
payment out of particular fund, 57 n, 88 n, 102 n, 177.
giving holder option of payment in money or some other
thing, 84 n, 91 n.
payable on demand or at sight, etc., 102 n, 442 n.
no time of payment expressed, 105 n, 164.
time of payment blank, 164.
payable in installments, 94 n, 443.
must be for payment of money only, 54.
payment in property other than money, 83-89.
option given holder, 83 n, 89 n.
performance of other acts in addition to payment of
money, 84 n, 89 n.
definition of money, 85 n .
amount blank, 164.
amount must be certain, 54, 90-94.
interest, 90-94.
exchange, 93 n, 94 n.
payable in foreign money, 87 n, 88 n.
specification of parties, 109-134.
signature of maker, 117 n, 155-162.
certainty as to parties, 117 n, 109, 134.
designation of payee, 109-134.
payable to fictitious person, 109-115.
necessity for and meaning of "value received," 167-172, and
notes.

INDEX.
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PROMISSORY NOTE,
accommodation parties, see "Accommodation."
liability of maker, see "Indorsement."

PROMISE TO GIVE,

prorr.ise to "give," not

a

PROTEST,

good note, 73 n.

defined, 366 n, 535.
requisites of certificate of, 367 n,
336-369.
necessity for, effect of failure to protest, 361,
366 n, 535, 536acceptance supra protest, 179-181.
in order to hold acceptor supra protest,
222-227.
by whom made, 367 n, 534.
where made, 536.
dispensed with, 369 n, 520, 522, 537.
for better security, 369 n.
purposes of, 361.
when to be made, 366.
form of certificate, 368 n.
form of notice of protest, 369 n.
waiver of, 520.
who affected, 520.
for non-acceptance, 536.
for non-payment, 536.
before maturity, 536.
where bill is lost, 537.

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS,

power to execute commercial

PUBLIC POLICY,

agreements in contravention

contracts.

129 n.

of, 398 n, 427 n.

PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE,

defined 441 note,
who is a purchaser for value without notice, 146-148, 441 n,.
444 n, 434, 437-447, 563purchaser in due course, 502.
value, 167-172 n, 441 n.
notice, 441 n, 445 n.

kinds of 445 n.
title obtained without indorsement, of bill or note payable toorder, 446.
overdue payer, 330 n, 331 n, 441 n, 564.
in due course, 44 n.
without notice, 445 n.
for value, 444 n.
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PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE,
before maturity, 441 n.
presumption and burden of proof, and order of proof, 427 n,
564-

of coupon bonds, 453 n.
defenses as against, 398 n.
defenses as real or personal, 398 n.
real defenses, 384-402, 398 n.
personal defenses, 398 n.
coverture, 398 n, 430 n.
infancy, 398 n, 441 n, 430, 433, and notes,
persons non compos mentis, 398 n.
drunken persons, 431 n, 432 n.
non-delivery of instrument, 416-419, and notes,
statutes avoiding instrument, 416-418, and notes,
usury, 398 n, 429 n.
alterations, 238, 384, 403-407.
forgery, 237-240.
fraud, 384, 408-419, and notes, 427 n, 434.
want of failure of consideration, 140-148.
illegality of consideration, 420-428, and notes,
statutory prohibition, 398 n, 416 n.

violation of Sunday laws, 140-144.
common-law prohibition, 398 n, 428 n.
contravention of public policy, 398 n, 428 n.
in general, 428 n.
restraint of trade, 429 n.
effect of illegality, 419, 420 n.
illegality as being total or partial,
notes,

discharge

of the instrument

420 and

and of the parties thereto,

296, 301, 336 n.

payment, 330 n, 398 n.
discharge by agreement, 398 n.
discharge of drawer or indorser by prejudicial acts
or neglect of holder, 282, 294, 374-383.
statute of limitations, 57-73.
stolen instruments, 26, 39, 144, 146, 149, 389, 448.
lost instruments, 39, 144, 389.
purchaser before maturity, 441 n.
purchaser in due course of business, 444 n, 564.

PURPOSE,

of negotiability, 32-43, 41 n, 188 n.

INDEX.

QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE,
in general, 178-187.
see "Acceptance."

QUASI-NEGOTIABLE
enumerated,

CONTRACTS,

46, 53, 456-462.

REAL DEFENSES,
see

"Defenses."

see 398 n.

defined, 398.

RECEIVER'S CERTIFICATE,
defined, 461.

"Negotiable Contracts."
negotiability of, 461.
see

RESTRAINT OF TRADE,

agreemnt in, 49 n, 327-330.

RESTRICTIVE INDORSEMENT,
defined, 297 n.
in general, 297 n.
see

"Indorsement."

RIGHTS OF HOLDER,
to sue, 502.
when not purchaser in due course, 502.
in due course, 503.

RULES AS TO SETS,
see 592.

SATISFACTION,
see

"Discharge of Instrument."

SET-OFF,
see "Defenses.'

SEAL,
see

"Essentials."

must not contain.

SIGNATURE,
see

"Essentials," 54, 109-134, 561, 603.

sufficiency, 160 n, 603.
by whom made, 161 n.
form of, 161 n.
may be written, 161 n.
may be printed, 161 n.
in trade name, 491.
bv two or more, 161 n.
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SIGNATURE,
by agent, 161 n, 162 n, 562, 491.
by cashier, 162 n.
of drawer, estoppel of acceptor to deny, 228-232, 232 n.
forged or unauthorized, 561, 493.

procuration, 562.

STATUTES,
the statute of Anne,
of limitations, 288.

14, 26,

JJ.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS,
a defense,

59-73.

begins to run as to interest, 282-294, 288.
begins to run as to the entire contract, 329 n.
indorsement, 329 n.

STOLEN INSTRUMENT,

transfer of, 26, 39, Xi^.
rights of bona Me holder, 26, 39, 144, 146, 149, 389.

SUBSEQUENT
defined,

PARTIES,

108 n.

SUNDAY,
note or bill falls due on, 105 n.
violation of the Sunday laws, 165 n.
delivery on, 153.

SUPRA PROTEST,

for Honor."
acceptance supra protest, 222.
see "Acceptance

SURETY,
defined, 471.
in general, 471-474.
form of contract, 471.
consideration necessary, 471.
negotiability of contract, 472.
not entitled to grace, 472.
necessity for presentment, demand and notice, 472.
liability of surety, 472.
how discharged, 472, 473.
of drawer and indorser, 185-187.
rights of surety, 474.

SURVIVORSHIP,

of joint payee or indorsee, 327-330.

TENOR,
of bill, 180, 178-187.
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TIME,
reasonable, 482.

"Essentials," 54.
of payment must be certain, 95.
of delivery presumed, 150 n, 153 n.
computation of, 107 n, 481, 556.
when measured from an act, 107 n.
when measured from an event certain to pass, 106 n.

see

of payment, days of grace, 104 n, 443 n, 444 n.
depending upon an event, 106 n.
lost notes when due, 103 n.
need not always be stated, 102 n.
where no time stated, 105 n.
when payable on or before a certain time, 106 n.

of acceptance, 558.

TITLE,

of indorsee or holder, see "Indorsement;" "Transfer."
warranty of, by indorser ,251 n, 293 n, 310-313, and notes.

TRADE, RESTRAINT OF,

unlawful agreements, 327-330.

TRANSFER,

without indorsement, effect of, 446 n, 501.
in general, 248-254, 583.
defined, 583.
by delivery simply, 328.
methods of transfer, 248.
(i) by act of parties, 248.
assignment, 248.
rights of assignee, 350, 384-402.
indorsement, see "Indorsement."
delivery, 248, 278, 282 and notes, 328 n.
n.
(2) by operation of law, 248, 332
n.
death of holder, 322, 332
bankruptcy of hloder, 332 n, 264-273.
marriage of femesol, 264-273.
husband and wife, 255-263, 332 n.
death of joint payee or endorsee, 332 n.
overdue paper, 178-187, 295-303.
rights of transferefe, 295-303, 323-335.
indorsement, 258, 350, 319,
of negotiable instrument without
and notes,

of non-negotiable instrument, see "Assignment."
warranties, 327.
of lost instrument,

26, 39, 144, 389-

INDEX.

7o6

TRANSFER,
of stolen instrument, 26, 39,
title of holder, 255, 263.

144.

TRUSTEES,
power to make negotiable instruments,

133 n.

UNITED STATES TREASURY NOTES,
see

"Negotiable Contracts."

defined, 457 n.

UNLAWFUL AGREEMENTS,

in general, 420-429, and notes,
see

"Consideration."

UNCERTAINTY,
see

"Bill of Exchange;" "Promissory Note."

USURY,
as a defense,

VALUE,

398 n, 429 n, 463-470.

what constitutes, 167-172, 441 n, 444 n.
see

"Purchaser for Value without Notice."

VALUE RECEIVED,
necessity for and meaning of expression,

167-172, and notes.

VERBAL ACCEPTANCE,
see "Acceptance."

WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS,
defined, 460.
see

"Negotiable Contracts.''

as negotiable

instrument,

WARRANTIES,

460.

by acceptor, 228-232, 232 n, 233, 237, 238.
genuineness of drawer's signature, 228-232, 232 n, 233,
2^7. 238.

existence of drawer, 232.
capacity of drawer, 232, 240.
authority to make draft, 232.
payee's competency to indorse, 232.
facts which acceptor does not admit,
238.
genuineness of payee's and subsequent

indorsements,

240-244.

genuineness of terms contained in bill, 230-244.
by indorser, 310-313, 310 n.
that the bill or note will be accepted and paid,
310 n.
genuineness of instrument, 232 n, 310 n.

INDEX.
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WARRANTEES,

(by indorser),
that the instrument is a vaUd and subsisting obhgation,
310 n.

i

that the abUgations of all prior parties arc valid, 298 n,
299 n, 310 n.
capacity of prior parties, 299 n, 310.
that he, as indorser, has title, and the right to transfer,
I
299 n, 310 n.
transferrer
without indorsement,
Dy

323-335,

506.

316, 319, 327 n,

it,

genuineness of instrument, 323-335 n, 327 n, 506.
capacity of prior parties, 323-335 n, 327 n.
that he has title, and right to transfer, 323-335 n.
that the instrument is what it purports to be, 323 and
notes.
I
that the instrument is not forged, 323 n.
by indorser without recourse, 314, 322.
that he is a lawful holder, 314, 322.
that he has the title, 314, 322.
that the contract is a genuine one, 314, 322.
that he has a right to transfer
314. 322.
n.
by drawee by acceptance, 232
the signature of drawer, 232 n.
that he has funds, 232 n.
that drawer has capacity, 232 n.
that the payee has capacity to indorse, 232 n.
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